Making history from Japan's margins: Ōta Masahide and Okinawa by Humphry, Julia
THESES SIS/LIBRARY  TELEPHONE: +61 2 6125 4631 
R.G. MENZIES LIBRARY BUILDING NO:2 FACSIMILE:  +61 2 6125 4063 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY  EMAIL: library.theses@anu.edu.au 
CANBERRA ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA 
USE OF THESES 
This copy is supplied for purposes 
of private study and research only. 
Passages from the thesis may not be  
copied or closely paraphrased without the  
written consent of the author. 
MAKING HISTORY 
FROM JAPAN'S MARGINS 
-:r~ Ota Masahide and Okinawa=-
By Julia Humphry 
(Julia Yonetani) 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the 
Australian National University 
Canberra 
August 2002 
Unless otherwise indicated, this is my own original work. 
' ' ../ ~·
August 2002 
ll 
"Human life occurs only once, and the reason we 
cannot determine which of our decisions are good 
and which is bad is that in a given situation we 
can make only one decision; we are not granted a 
second, third, or fourth life in which to compare 
various decisions. 
History is similar to individual lives in this 
respect." 
Milan Kundera, 19841 
1 Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being (London: Faber and Faber, 1999 [1984]), p. 219. 
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-~ Abstract~"" 
On 28 September 1995, Okinawan Governor Ota Masahide announced that he 
had decided to refuse to act as proxy in the signing of leases for land utilized by the US 
military within Okinawa prefecture. In his subsequent testimony to the Japanese 
Supreme Court, he argued that the disproportionate burden of US bases in Okinawa 
amounted to a form of institutionalised discrimination. More than any previous 
governor, Ota drew connections between the base issue-or what he has repeatedly 
termed the "Okinawan problem"-and questions of democracy, autonomy, and cultural 
diversity. 
Before running for governor in 1990, Ota was an academic and a central figure 
in Okinawan public debate. Spanning almost fifty years, he has written over 60 books 
on contemporary issues concerning Okinawa. This thesis explores the multiple 
connections between "politics" and "history" vilithin the life and work of Ota Masahide 
as an intellectual and as governor of Okinawa. I trace the way in which Ota has 
negotiated and contested Japanese national paradigms of homogeneity and US military 
power within historical discourse and as activist and politician. 
In postwar Okinawa, claims to Okinawan culture and history have been 
inherently politicised, just as contests over Okinawa's position in relation to Japan and 
against the US military presence are also cultural and historical contests. Within the 
intersection between politics and history, the question of how to conceive of history 
from "the margins" has also been a question of how to perceive and combat the cultural, 
economic, and political structures by which Okinawa is marginalised within Japan and 
under US-Japan relations. 
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-;;-;;:: Introduction =-
Okinawa and the Reaffirmation of US-Japan Security Relations 
On 17 April 1996, US president Bill Clinton met with Japanese Prime Minister 
Hashimoto Ryiitar6 in what then US secretary of defence William Perry described as 
''the most significant summit since the end of the Cold War." 1 Both heads of state 
reaffirmed the US-Japan Security Treaty and the "global partnership" between the two 
countries. A day later, on April 18, Clinton told the Japanese Diet that while the Soviet 
Union had collapsed and Russia was far less of a military threat, this did not mean that 
US forces should be withdrawn from Japan. Increased globalisation and technological 
and information revolutions had created a world where, the President enthused, "ideas 
flash across our planet in the stroke of a computer key, bringing with them 
extraordinary opportunities to create wealth, to protect the environment, to prevent and 
contain disease, to foster greater understanding among people of diverse cultures." Yet, 
Clinton added, "greater openness and faster change also mean that problems that start 
beyond our borders can quickly penetrate our borders." The opportunities for expanding 
capital and markets in short coincided with new threats which required a strengthened 
"global partnership" between the US and Japan. 2 The subsequent joint declaration 
issued by the two leaders reconfirmed the importance of the US-Japan Security Treaty, 
and called for increased bilateral military cooperation and the formulation of guidelines 
for joint operations in a "time of crisis." 
1 Cited in The Japan Times (1 8 April 1996), p I. 
' "Clinton emphasizes dual leadership in address before Diet," The Japan Times (19 April 1996). 
1 
Yet events on the small archipelago of Okinawa posed a direct challenge to this 
global agenda. US military bases make up almost 20% of the main island of Okinawa. 
The islands host over 70% of all the US bases in Japan. In opposition to this large US 
military presence, Okinawan Governor Ota Masahide announced his decision to refuse 
to act as proxy in the signing of leases for land utilized by the US military on the islands 
at the end of September 1995. The rape of an Okinawan girl by three US military 
servicemen less than a month previously had prompted an upsurge of anti-US base 
sentiment, culminating in an Okinawan People's Rally for Peace attended by some 
85,000 people on 21 October, 1995. Ota became the first prefectural governor in 
Japan's history to be the subject of a lawsuit by the Japanese Prime Minister. He made 
his case both in the Supreme Court of Japan and within the corridors of the Pentagon on 
highly publicized visits to Washington. No other confrontation bet\veen local and 
national government in post\var Japan placed the government in so compromised a 
position over a fimdamental element of foreign policy.3 The "Okinawa issue" exploded 
into a major diplomatic issue between the US and Japan. 
Less than a year later, in September 1996, a prefecture-wide plebiscite supported 
by the Ota administration called for a reduction in the US military presence on the 
islands. It was the first plebiscite ever held on the issue of US military bases in Japan, 
and the first ever prefecture-wide plebiscite to be conducted. Ota opposed the 
maintenance and possible expansion of the US military presence on Okinawa as laid 
down in the Pentagon's "Nye Report" of February 1995.4 In his testimony to the High 
Court and appeal to the Supreme Court in March and August of 1996 respectively, Ota 
argued that the highly disproportionate burden of US bases in Okinawa amounted to a 
'Nakachi Hiroshi, "Kenpo, Okinawa, Nihonjin," Gunshuku mondai shiryo, February 1996, pp. 38-43. 
4 Officially entitled "U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region" or EASR, the report was 
released by the US Department of Defense in February 1995. See for example "Pentagon affirms Asia 
commitment," The Japan Tlmes (28 February 1995), p I. 
2 
form of institutionalised discrimination. He also argued for an appreciation of 
Okinawans' distinct history, cultural heritage, and desire for peace. More than any 
previous governor, Ota drew connections between the base issue--<>r what he has 
repeatedly termed the "Okinawan problem"-and struggles over democracy, identity, 
autonomy, and cultural diversity. 
The conflict which arose over the US military base issue was inherently 
historical in a dual sense. Its origins Jay in the role imposed on Okinawa during the 
Cold War, and in over fifty years of protracted US military presence on the islands. The 
disproportionate VS military presence in Okinawa highlighted the inequalities of 
Japan's postwar system, and its legacies in the post-cold war. Arising from competing 
visions for the future, this political conflict was also deeply related to struggles over 
economic autonomy, cultural diversity, identity, and the past. As Matthew Allen notes: 
" 'Okinawan values' have been invoked in providing a historically legitimated, 
regional, and, at times, ethnic basis of separateness from the cultural colonizaing 
influence of Japan and the military colonization of the United States."5 
On close examination, the "Okinawa problem" reveals itself as intimately 
connected to contests over identity, historical memory, and cultural representation. 6 Ota 
sought equality and the recognition of cultural and historical difference. His historical 
analysis and appeal to a unique Okinawan culture and identity provided a 
countemarrative of mobilization against dominant notions of national security, the role 
imposed on Okinawa within US-Japan relations, and hegemonic national narratives of 
homogeneity. 
5 Matthew Allen, identity and Resistance in Okinawa (Maryland, US: Ro\\man and Littlefield, 2002), p" 
237-8, 
6 See also my "On the Battlefield of Mabuni: Struggles over Peace and the Past in Contemporary 
Okinawa," East Asian History No" 20, pp. 145-168, etc"; and David Tobaru Obenniller, "The Okinawan 
Struggle over Identity, Historical Memory, and Cultural Representation," The Japan Foundation 
Newsletter, Vol. 27 No" 3-4, pp, 12-16, 
3 
'This thesis looks at the profound and multiple connections between "politics" 
and "history" within the life and work of Ota Masahide. Before running for governor in 
1990, Ota was a professor of history and journalism, and a central figure in public 
intellectual debate on Okinawa. Spanning almost fifty years, he has written over 60 
books and hundreds of newspaper and magazine articles on contemporary issues 
concerning Okinawa and Okinawan history, politics, and sense of identity.1 The 
intermixing of"history" with "politics" has also been played out in Ota's life tbrough 
the intercDnnection between his role as "intellectual figure," "activist," and "politician." 
\Vhat is in a life? Put another way, how does the "academic" reconcile his or her place 
as writer, thinker, and teacher with the desire to play some kind of an active role in the 
context of pressing social, political, cultural, and environmental issues within 
contemporary society? Living within the highly politicised context of postwar Okinawa, 
the pervasive question of the relation between "theory" and "practice" has been a focal 
concern for Ota within his intellectual work as well as in his political career. 
Researching and writing this thesis in the turbulent times of today, this question drew 
me to Ota as an intellectual and political figure and has been the core coneern of this 
''thesis"-as both a piece of v.riting and a real-life process. 
History, Nation, and Periphery 
Ernest Renan remarked in 1882 that national memories and a sense of history, of 
"sharing, in the past, a glorious heritage and regrets, and of having, in the future, [a 
shared] progranune to put into effect," are "essential conditions for being a people."8 
7 In this body of work, Ota has explored the Battle of Okinawa, the US occupation of Okinawa, Okinawa 
popular consciousness, Okinawan identity, central government polices towards Okinawa, the Okinawan 
People Right's Movement and both pre- and postwar struggles to gain political representation in Japan, 
Okinawan reversion to Japan, Okinav."a's economy, education, the Emperor system, and Emperor 
Hirohito's stance towards Okinawa following Japan's surrender. 
8 ErnestRenan, "What is a nation?'' in Homi K. Bhaba,Nation and Narration (London and New York. 
4 
Yet, as Prasenjit Duara observes, complicit v,ith the formation of the idea of nation 
though it is, history may also provide materials through which those on the margins of a 
nation seek to organize a "eountemarrative of mobilization." Ensuing eon tests over 
history reveal the multiple sources of identity creation, and the process of construction 
and repression through which historical narratives--which often posture as eternal, 
essential or evolutionary history-are imposed and contested. 9 
To speak of Okinawa as the "margins" of Japan is in no way to marginalize it. 
As periphery or margin, Okinawa does not exist in binary opposition to the imaginary 
"centre" of Japan. As Fujitani, White and Yoneyama point out in the context of 
competing memories of war, marginalized memories do not occupy a separate or 
alternative space of remembrance to dominant or hegemonic ones: "To the contrary, 
their marginality or silence is linked necessarily to the centrality, volume, visibility, and 
audibility of more dominant stories."10 Political and historical struggles Vvithin Okinawa 
attest to the contested nature of nation-building, as well as discontinuities within 
national collective memory. 11 Contests over competing memories or claims to history 
highlight the violent process of erasure which has formed a part of centralized 
"civilizing" projects of national consolidation and assimilation in modernity. 12 
Assertions of Japanese homogeneity may be invoked in attempts to reifY this erasure or 
Routledge, 1990), p. 19. 
'Prasenjit Duara, "Historicizing :-!ationalldentity, or Vlbo Imagines What and When," in GeoffEJey and 
Gregory Suny ( eds.) Becoming National: A Reader (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), p. 168. 
10 ~Introduction" in T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White and Lisa Yoneyama (eds.) Perilous Memories: The 
Asia-Pacific War(s) (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001), p. 4. 
11 Kang Sang-jung and Yoshimi Sbunya, "Sazameku aratana koteki kukan: Okinawa no toi," Sekai (May 
2000), 161. Reprinted in Guri5baruka no enkinhi!: atarashii ki'Jkyi'ikiikan o motomete (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 200 l ), Chapter Six. 
12 For a discussion on the meaning of a "history centered on the margins," see Wesley Sasaki-Uemura, 
·'Tanigawa Gan's Politics of the Margins in Kyushu and Nagano," positions, 7:1 (Spring 1999), pp. 129· 
63. 
5 
delegitimize alternative political, social, and historical claims in the present. 13 A dearth 
of English works on Okinawa, only redressed very recently in a surge of interest in the 
islands, attests to the far-reaching legacy of what Oguma Eiji has phrased "the myth of 
the homogenous Japanese nation."14 It also hints to the process whereby the history of 
US colonization in the Pacific has been largely overshadowed by the binary oppositions 
of the cold warY 
Official nationalist discourse in Japan has never found an obvious place for 
Okinawa. 16 In early modern Japan, the Ryukyu Kingdom was partially integrated within 
the Tokugawa system under the control of Satsuma, while also maintaining tributary 
relations with China. Both Ainu territory and the Ryuky<~ Kingdom were segregated 
from the bakufu administration, while at the same time forcefully incorporated into its 
trading system. The Shimazu lords of Satsuma were granted the right to incorporate the 
kok:udaka (productivity as calculated by amount of rice) of Ryukyu into their holdings, 
and profited from Ryukyu's tributary trade with China. This system of relations was 
largely derived from a Chinese-inspired concept of civilization in which place was 
perceived according to the hierarchy of centre (ka) and periphery (1). 17 
13 On the influence of notions of Japanese homogeneity in English literature on Japan see also David 
Tobaru Obermiller, "The Okinawan Struggle over Identity, Historical Memory, and Cultural 
Representation." 
14 Oguma Eiji, Taniitsu minzoku shinwa no kigen (Tokyo; Shiny<!sha, 1995). 
15 As Fujitani, \Vhite and Yoneyama observe: "The void left by the collapse of the cold war order has in 
fact opened up possibilities for more diverse, localized, and contradictory narratives and memories about 
the past to emerge and compete h1 the various public spheres" (1~ Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White and Lisa 
Yoneyama (eds.) Perilous Memories, op cit., p. 5). At the same time, the 1990s have seen a surge in 
historical revisionism aod neonationalism on both sides of the Pacific, augmented by the instabilities of 
an increasingly globalized financial system and the events of 1 l September 2001 (See Chapter Five). 
16 For a discussion of these discourses and their exclusionary practices see Carol Gluck, "The Past in the 
Present" in Andrew Gordon ( ed.) Postwar Japan as History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993), esp. pp. 88·9. 
17 Kikuchi !sao, "Kyokai to minzoku" inArano Yasunori et al. (eds.), Ajia no naka no Nihonshi: chishtki 
to minzoku (Tokyo; Tokyo University Press, 1992). See also Tessa Morris-Suzoki, "The Frontiers of 
Japanese Identity," in Stein Tonnesson and Haos Antlov (eds.) Asian Forms of the Nation (Richmond, 
surrey: Curzon Press, 1996); and Arana Yasunori, Kinsei no Nihon to higashi Ajia (Tokyo: Tokyo 
6 
Yet such a hierarchical organization of relations became untenable in an 
international system which increasingly revolved around modern (Western) notions of 
borders, sovereignty, national defence, and imperial might. The Meiji government, 
established in 1868 on the eve of the most intense period of eolony-grabbing in history, 
pursued "on a domestic front the policies of civilization (bunmeika) and rich-nation-
strong-army, and on the international front the projects of revision of the equal treaties 
and demarcation (possession) of territory, seeking a direction to realize the 'appearance 
of independence' while similarly advocating the 'building of national prestige' in those 
regions on the periphery."18 Difference in modern Japan became interpreted as temporal 
rather than spatial, in concert with evolutionary ideals embodied in Western-inspired 
notions of civilization (bunmei). 19 The incorporation of the concept of geographically 
limited territorial sovereignty, based on the delineation (within the geographical 
imaginary and the realpolitik of international diplomacy) of clearly defined boundaries, 
was integral to this "policy of civilization."20 The modern sovereign state was based on 
the ideological and geographical separation of Japan from its "others," and the denial of 
"everything that carmot be assimilated."21 
The policy of the "abolition of Ryukyu Kingdom" (Ryiikyu shobun) was part of 
this project of state-building and territorial consolidation. 22 In March 1879, Meiji 
University Press, 1988). 
" Nishlzato Kiko, "Ryilkyu shobun to Karafoto, Chishima kokan joyaku," in Arano eta/ ( eds) Ajia no 
naka no Nihonshi, p. 167. 
•• As analyzed by Tessa Morris-Sozuki, "A Descent into the Past: The Frontier in the Construction of 
Japanese Identity," in Donald Denoon et al. (eds.) Multicultural Japan (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
20 On a comparison between premodern and modern concepts of frontier/boundary in the context of Japan, 
see Bruce L. Batten, "Frontiers and Boundaries of Premodern Japan," in Journal of Historical Geography 
Vol. 24 No.2 (Aprill999), pp. 166-82. 
21 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Polity Press: Cambridge, UK, 1991), pp. 3-4. 
22 This is not to suggest that this project was not highly contested within central forces in Japan. As Kevin 
Doak points out: "The dilemma of how to build a truly modern nation, a politicized Japanese identity for 
the new state, was a constant thorn in the side of the revolutionaries who had brought the young Emperor 
Meiji to the apex of the Meiji state but who could not hring all the people to identify with a modern, 
7 
official Matsuda Michiyuki arrived in Shuri with an entourage of some 30 or so 
officials, 160 police, and 400 infantry to implement the final stage of this policy. Shi:i 
Tai, the King of Ryukyu, was banished from Shuri Castle, and the Ryukyu Kingdom 
forcefully incorporated into Japan as Okinawa prefecture. The Meiji government 
justified this annexation to China on the grounds that Ryukyuans were of a "race" 
(jinshu) common to the rest ofimperial Japan?3 
The abolition of the Ryukyu Kingdom marked the consolidation of the Japanese 
national "geo-body."24 Yet it also coincided with the subsequent blurring of boundaries 
between colony and nation, as Japan expanded its territories to Taiwan and beyond. 
This lead to a geographical discourse which through an increasingly ambiguous 
perception of the kokutai (literally "national body") "did not lend itself to logical 
articulation."25 The embracing of Western paradigms Vvithin Japan's nationa!Jimperial 
project was accompanied by a sense of loss and accompanying desire for that which 
could not be aniculated within the adopted dichotomies of colonizer/colonized, 
Occident/Orient, and civilized/barbarian. The celebration of romantic nostalgia, anti-
rational logic, and over-determined aniculations of the kokutai served to represent in 
Japanese intellectual and popular discourse that which was "unrepresentable" within the 
modernist rationalist lexicon?6 In its extreme form, Imperial Japan's self-proclaimed 
imperial Japanese one. The policy of Ryiikyii shobun was also contested within the highest echelons of the 
Japanese oligarchy (see Julia Yonetani, "Ambiguous Traees and the Politics of Sameness: Placing 
Okinawa in Meiji Japan," Japanese Studies, Vol. 20 No. I, (May 2000), pp. 15-31). 
11 It is important to note that the policy of Ryiikyii shobun was also contested within the highest echelons 
of the Japanese oligarchy. The Ministry ofthe Left was against both Deputy Finance Minister Inoue 
Kaoru's plan announced in 1872 to prohibit any further tributary relations, and his suggestion that 
Ryukyu was located within naichi (Japan's inner territuries). See Julia Yonctani, "Ambiguous Traces and 
the Politics of Sameness: Placing Okinawa in Meiji Japan," Japanese Studies, Vol. 20 No. l, (May 2000), 
pp. 15-3!. 
24 A term used by Thongchai Winichakul in Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Eody of a Nation 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994). 
25 Mizuuchi Toshio, "Chiri shiso to kokumin kokka keisei," Shiso, No. 845 (November 1994), p. 87. 
26 As !ida observes: "Negatively correlated »ith the rise of enlightenment reason and modern rationalism, 
the aesthetic is the domain where the unspeakable sturies of the excluded are given voice as a protest 
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mission came to be coneeived as the liberation of Asia from Western domination and 
the "overcoming of modernity" through total war. 
State bureaucrats in the Meiji period incorporated Western-conceived notions of 
civilization and progress, while maintaining an ambivalence towards its Eurocentric 
assumptions. Anthropologist Torii Ryfizo (1870-1953) depicted Okinawans as Japanese, 
yet also saw them as more primitive than the peoples of what he described as 'the inner 
territories of Japan' (naichl). As Steven Harrell observes in relation to China, this is 
common to a "civilizing ideology" which seeks to integrate peripheral peoples into 
modern eentralized projects of national consolidation. Those on the periphery are 
depicted as both primitive and civilizable-that is, from the same origins yet not as far 
advanced as the people of the civilizing centre. The imperial and national "civilizing 
centre" draws its rationale from the belief that the process of domination helps the 
"periphery" attain the more developed and superior qualities of the centre. While an 
entire nation's population is subject to assimilation, the "civilizing project" on the 
periphery is more extreme for two reasons. Firstly, the cultural distance between centre 
and periphery is greater. Secondly, the "civilizing" or assimilationist project often ends 
up emphasizing the very difference between centre and peripheral peoples that it is 
ostensibly trying to reduce. As Harrell observes: "It is when directed at peripheral 
peoples that the civilizing project takes on its full and paradoxical character."27 
The question of who was and who was not to be regarded as 
"Japanese"/"imperial subjects" within Japan's national/imperial project was highly 
contested, politically and historically contingent, and often ambiguous. Torii saw 
against the transformative forces in the modern configuration of thought and social order and against their 
violent inscriptions in the realm of 'the body"' (Yumiko !ida, Rethinking Identity in Modem Japan: 
Nationalism as aesthetics (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 3). 
27 Stevan Harrel, "Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them," in Stevan Harrell (ed.) 
Cultural Encounters on China:, Ethnic Frontiers (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 
1995), pp. 3-36. 
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Okinawans as Japanese, and yet not quite Japanese. Okinawans were depicted as "the 
closest genealogical group or ethnos (minzoku) to the people of the inner territories of 
Japan"-by their very categorization separate from Japan-as-naichi. Torii concluded 
that both Japanese from the civilizing centre (naichi-jin) and Ok:inawans originated 
from the same ancestors-the "descendants of the Emperor" (tensonha) or "Japanese 
proper" (lwyil no Nihon:Jin). Through the creation of this third all-embracing category, 
the term "Japanese" could be depicted as either Japanese proper, the people of the inner 
territories of Japan, or both-as simultaneously inclusive and exclusive as well as 
ancient origin and present reality. According to this logic, although a product of the 
same fixed origins, Ok:inawans must be "civilized" (that is 'Japanized') in order to 
become more like Japanese of the inner territories through a process of"assimilation."28 
As Jennifer Robertson points out: "Assimilation ultimately defined a process whereby, 
as a strategy of colonial domination and control, the Japanese nation assumed a protean 
character capable of absorbing, reappropriating, and reinscribing cultural difference 
according to the dominant ideology and image of Japaneseness."29 
The ambiguity of Okinawa's discursive location in articulations of the Japanese 
kokutai was also reflected in its geopolitical and social position within Japan's 
expanding empire. Okinawa's systematic incorporation into Meiji Japan was 
" For Torii's work on Okinawa, see TGrii Ryow, "Okinawa shotii ni kyojii seshi senjiirnin ni t>mite" and 
"Yaeyama no kiseki ni tsuite," first published in Taiyo and Tokyo Anthropological Society Journal 
respectively (1905), and reprinted in Torii Ryilzi5 no Zenshii, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1975); and 
also "Okinawa-jin no bifu no iro ni tsuite," first printed in Tokyo Anthropological Society Journal (1904) 
and reprinted in Torii RyiJzo no Zemhii, Vol. 4. I analyze the integration of Okinawa into Japan and 
Japanese anthropological discourse in Julia Yonetani, "Ambiguous Traees and the Politics of Sameness: 
Placing Okinawa in Meiji Japan." See also Tomiyama !chiro, "'Ryilk!l·jin' to iu shutai -lha Fuy!i ni 
okeru ooryoku no yokan," Shiso, No. 878 (1997), translated into English by John Winsom and Walter 
Hatch as "The Critical Limits of the National Community: The Ryukyuan Subject," Social Science Japan 
Journal, 1:2(1998),pp.l65-79. 
29 Jennifer Robertson, Takarazuka: Sexual Politics and Popular Culture in Modern Japan (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998), p. 93. 
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accompanied by discrimination and exclusion. 30 The policy of "Preserving Old 
Customs," held in place until 1899 at least in part to placate the Ryukyuan elite, 
maintained a burdensome system of taxation on Okinawan peasants, particularly in the 
outlying islands of Y aeyama and Kumejima. The first prefectural elections and the first 
elections to the national diet were held in 1909 and 1912 respectively, roughly twenty 
years after mainland Japan. All prewar governors of Okinawa were from outside the 
prefecture, and few of the officials within Okinawa's powerful and elitist Bureau of 
Education were from Okinawa, testimony to the exclusion of Okinawans from central 
political proccsses.31 
Throughout the prewar period Okinawa held an ambiguous place as both/neither 
the "inner territory" ( naichi) and/nor the "outer territories" (gaichi) of Japan's 
expanding empire, its fluid and contested position discemable only "-ithin the complex 
power relations of imperial Japan. 32 1bis ambiguity was manifest, for example, in the 
'House of Peoples' incident of 1903, where an exhibit within the Osaka Industrial 
Exhibit featured two Okinawan women, together with Koreans, Ainu, and Taiwanese 
aborigines as objects of curiosity to mainland Japanese onlookers.33 Okinawans held 
both a tenuous ethnic position and political, economic, and social status within the 
Japanese empire. In the 1900s, the Japanese Diet debated a proposal to integrate 
Okinawa with Taiwan under joint colonial rule. The proposal was defeated after fierce 
opposition from within Okinawa. 
In the pages of local newspapers, Okinawan intellectuals and elite figures 
greeted both the "House of Peoples" exhibit and the proposal to integrate Okinawa 
30 See for example Alan Christy, ''The Making of Modern Subjects in Okinawa" in Tani E. Barlow (ed.) 
Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia {Durham and London; Duke of University P(ess, !999), 
pp. 141-69; Oguma Eiji, 'Nihonjin 'no kyokoi (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1998); Ota Masahide, Okinawa no 
Minshii ishiki (Tokyo: Genbundo Shinsha, 1967). 
31 Alan Christy, "The Making of Modern Subjects in Okinawa," p. 165. 
32 Ibid., p. 163. 
" Ibid., p. 141. 
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under Taiwan's colonial government 'hith fierce indignation. Nany members of the 
Ryukyuan elite fiercely opposed the Kingdom's annexation to the Japanese state in 
early Meiji. Yet particularly after Japan's display of force in the Sino-Japanese war in 
1895 and the subsequent implementation of conscription in Okinawa, a large number of 
Okinawans internalised the process of assimilation imposed upon them, and the 
assumption of inferiority towards things "Okinawan." The impetus to "become 
Japanese" \<,'as propelled by a desire for equality and from fear of subjugation.34 
As Steven Harrell observes on the position of the marginalized voice within 
modern "civilizing" projects: 
The reactions of peripheral peoples to civilizing projects are not .. .limited to the 
development of ethnic identity. Insofar as civilizing projects are wholly or partly 
successful, they include the participation of the peripheral peoples. And in fact, as 
long as peripheral peoples agree, at least on the surface, to the terms of definition 
and scaling imposed by the civilizers, the civilizees will be granted a voice to 
speak to themselves and the world about the success of the project. In this sense, 
the answer to whether the subaltern can speak is that the subaltern can speak on 
the sufferance of the civilizer. Voice is granted on the provision that it \viii speak 
in favor of the project, or at least in the project's terms.35 
The complexities of Okinawa's complicity within Meiji Japan's "civilizing 
project" are embodied within the figure oflha Fuyil (1876-1947), the so-called founder 
of Ok:inawan studies. Iha was born as the eldest son of a wealthy family who had made 
their fortune through trade with China in the midst of the transition period marking the 
Ryukyu Kingdom's annexation to the Meiji state. His extensive historical, linguistic, 
and anthropological work,s and his life itself, may be conceived as comprising of an 
endeavour to resolve the ruptures between these two periods-and to define his and 
Okinawa's place in Japan according to the transformed set of power relations and 
34 lbid., 153. 
"Steven Harrell, "Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them," in Steven Harrell (ed.) 
Cultural Encounters on Chinas Ethnic Frontiers, p. 34. 
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conceptualisation of civilization which emerged in the Meiji era. A graduate in 
linguistics from Tokyo Imperial University, Iha was Torii Ryuzo's assistant and 
informant during his anthropological fieldwork in Okinawa in 1904. After returning to 
Okinawa as a celebrated university graduate, he employed Torii's analysis in the 
formulation of his "theory of a common ancestry between Ryukyu and Japan" (Nichi-
Ryil doso-ron). As he described his aims in 1909: 
From the time of my youth .. .I have endeavored to construct a mental bridge 
between the two ethnic groups (ryi5minzoku no aida) [of Ryuk:yu and Japan] by 
conceiving from an academic standpoint the way in which Okinawans comprise 
part of the Yamato race (Yamato minzoku). 1 came to hold the conviction that this 
was a form of patriotism, and an expression of devotion to my country. 36 
As integral to a discourse of assimilation, lha's project was doubly complicit in 
the construction of a modem Japanese subject-working within Western-inspired 
conceptualisations of civilization and progress, and re-envisioning an essentialized 
Japanese historical narrative. 
Yet Iha's self-defined project of reconciliation between Okinawa and Japan was 
inherently ambivalent-as a double recreation not only of Okinawans within the 
Japanese race but of an autonomous Okinawan history and conceptualization of self. As 
Steven Harrell further observes: "The paradox of civilizing projects is that they can, in 
some circumstances, turn back on themselves. With their avowed (and often sincere) 
intention to raise the cultural or civilizational level of the peripheral peoples, civilizers 
also make an implicit promise to grant equality, to share power, to give up ultimate 
control over how and when the subalterns speak."37 1ha's conceptualisation of common 
ancestry was integrsJly related to a political agenda advocating equality: "it is time for 
"Iha Fuyii, Iha Fuyii zenshii, Vol. 10 (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1974-6), p. 335. 
37 Steven Harrell, "Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them." p. 35. 
13 
Okinawans to claim their rights as pure Japanese citizens."38 At the same time, Iha also 
combined Torii's analysis with direct references to "Okinawa" as a category both 
distinct from and comparable to the ethnic group of "Y amato." In doing so, he inverted 
the articulation of Okinawans as Japanese, such that not only were "Japanese" signifiers 
discovered within Ryukyu, but "Ryukyuan" signs could also be discerned within 
Japan. 39 Iha relativised differences between ''Yamato" and "Ryukyu" through the 
evocations of a "common ancestry." In this way, he endeavoured to claim Okinawans' 
rights to equality while at the same time rediscover a unique Ryukyuan!Okinawan 
identity in the concept of individuality or Okinawan kosei. 
It was thus a politics of sameness--within which there existed differing 
interpretations of assimilation and commonality-that became the primary site of 
contention in expressions of Okinawan identity in the prewar period. This became a 
factor affecting the direction that political struggles over and within Okinawa have 
taken since. The contradictions embedded in Japan's prewar assimilationist policy-
which stressed the necessity for Okinawans to become Japanese while already being 
Japanese-have never been fully resolved. Similarly, contested notions of ambiguous 
commonality-as embodied within a "politics of sameness"-remain integral to the 
"politics of memory" whereby contesting perceptions of Okinawa's position historically 
and within contemporary relations have been played out in Okinawa and Japan in the 
postwar period. 
In 1945, Okinawa became the site of the only ground war between US and 
Japanese forces fought within Japan. The bloody battle killed almost a third of the 
population. With the military landing on the main island of Okinawa on I April 1945, 
the US Navy declared the suspension of all Japan's powers over Okinawa, and vested 
the rigl1t of government and jurisdiction of the local population in United States Pacific 
38 Iha Fuy!i,Jha Fuyil zenshU, Vot. 10, p. 9. 
39 As analyzed by Tomiyama Ichiro, "Ryilkyil·jin to iu shutai: lha Fuyil ni okeru bOryoku no yokan." 
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Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas Commander-in-Chief; Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.40 ln 
other words, the military occupation of Okinawa was ordered and established 
simultaneously with the planning and execution of combat strategy. Ota cites this fact as 
instituting the "primary difference between Okinawa's occupation and [that of! the 
Japanese mainland," and sees it as a precursor to prolonged direct occupation of the 
islands following the war.41 In 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty carne into effect. 
A.rticle Three of the treaty accorded the US administration legislation and jurisdiction 
rights over the territory and inhabitants of Okinawa (including Nansei Islands south of 
29 degrees north latitude).42 In an effort to legitimise military colonisation and reassure 
Japan that this arrangement was not permanent, the US guaranteed Japan "residual 
sovereignty" over the islands.43 
Under this agreement, in the words of Ogurna Eiji: "Okinawa was territorially a 
part of 'Japan', and Okinawans were also 'Japanese' citizens, but the constitution was 
not applicable, the right to political representation was denied, there were limits on 
travel and family register transferral, and the islands were ruled by a military 
commander with a monopoly over the three [judicial, administrative and legislative] 
powers. An existence both 'Japanese' and not; this was Okinawa according to Japan. 
Moreover, according to the US, Okinawans were not 'American', nor were they 
guaranteed legal or civil rights."44 Administrative rights over Okinawa were returned to 
Japan in 1972, yet the implications and legacies of Okinawa's geographical and 
"'Kiyoshi Nakachi, Ryukyu-US-Japan Relations 1945-1972 (Philippines: Abiva House Publishing, 
1989), p. 28 (Nimitz Declaration, USCAR Civil Affairs Activities in Ryukyu Islands, Vol. I, 1945, pp. 
112-13). See also Ota Masahide, Essays on Okinawa Problems (Tokyo: Yui Shuppan, 2000). 
41 Ota Masahide, Essays on Okinawa Problems, ibid., p 197. 
42 As well as "1\'ampo shoto" south of Sofu kan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Islands and the Iota 
(Volcano) Islands) and Paraee Vela and Marcus Island. Kiyoshi Nakachi, Ryukyu-US-Japan Relations 
1945-1972, p. 53. (ciled from World Peace Foundation, ed., Documents on American Foreign Policy, Vol. 
Xlll, 1951, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953) p. 471). 
41 Kiyoshi Nakachi, Ryukyu-US-Japan Relations 1945-1972, p. 55. 
" Oguma Eiji, Nihonjin no kyokai, p. 480. 
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ideological separation from the rest of Japan remained an issue in political contests and 
within popular memory. Almost 29 years after the reversion of Okinawa to Japan and 
49 years to the day after the San Francisco Treaty came into effect, the editorial of one 
of Okinawa's two major newspapers, the Okinawa Times (Okinawa Taimusu), 
reflected: "In relation to this day, there is no such thing as a common 'national memory' 
(kokumin no kioku). Mainland Japan and Okinawa eompletely differ in their 
remembrance of the historical date which determined the eourse postwar Japan would 
Since the war, multiple and contradictory meanings of "Okinawa" and "Japan" 
have been fought over and negotiated within, and against, US military power. Okinawa 
has simultaneously stood at the geographical and ideological margins of Japan, while it 
has remained at the centre of the US-Japan strategic relationship as the "keystone of the 
Pacific" in US military strategy. The political, economic, and cultural power structures 
within postwar US-Japan-Okinawan relations were built upon, and compounded with, 
vestiges of hierarchical relations from the prewar period. 
After reversion, direct military rule was replaced by indirect forms of 
dependency and the homogenisation of society and culture within Japan. Yet Okinawa's 
central position within the US and Japan's reified bilateral security structure remained. 
Under the circumstances, claims to Okinawan identity, place, and past have inevitably 
been highly politicised and contested. One of the consequences of that history, as Laura 
Hein points out, "is that all expressions of culture are 'always already' politicised and 
all claims of Okinawa distinctiveness beeome part of this larger debate over 
contemporary political identity." 46 Within this politics of identity, the reverse also 
appears highly pertinent; that is, not only are claims to an Okinawan culture and history 
45 Okinawa Taimusu, editorial, 28 April2001. 
46 Laura Hein, "Introduction: The Territory ofldentity and Remembrance in Okinavva," Critical Asian 
Studies, 33:1 (2001), 31-6. 
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"always already" politieised, but contests over Okinawa's position in relation to Japan 
and against US military control have necessarily been cultural and historical contests 
too. 
Ota Masahide, Okinawa, and the Making of History 
The conflation of culture, history, and the political in struggles over Okinawa's 
position in Japan's postwar relations take concentrated form in the person of Ota 
Masahide. Ota was born in 1925 on the tiny island of Kumejima, situated approximately 
90 kilometres west of and, in the pre-war period, a twelve-hour boat ride away from 
Naha, the biggest city on Okinawa's main island. He was the youngest child of four in a 
farming family. Ota Masahide grew up with his two elder brothers, Masaji and ShOen, 
his elder sister, Sae, and his mother, Kame. His eldest brother, Masaji, entered the 
Japanese Navy and died in unknown circumstances during battle in 1944. His second 
eldest brother, Shoen, died during the war in an ill-equipped hospital in Naha in 1941. 
Kumejima boasted much more fertile conditions than many other islands ·within the 
Okinawan archipelago, and Ota's family grew rice, potatoes, and vegetables. Yet his 
family only owned a small plot of land, and soon after Ota Masahide was born his 
father, Ota Sh5k6, emigrated to South America in search of work. His mother, Kame, 
now left to support three children on her own, made extra money by cooking staff meals 
at the school. Sh6k6 remained in Brazil until after the end of World War Two. When he 
returned to Yokohama port on his way back to Okinawa, Masahide was studying at 
university in Tokyo. Masahide reunited with his father in Yokohama at this time before 
his father returned to Kumejima. He only knew his father for these three days. In 1955, 
Ota Shoko passed away while Masahide, his only remaining son, was in the US 
completing a Masters degree. Masahide's mother passed away at the age of 104 years 
on 30 October 2001. 
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After graduating from Otake Elementary School in Kumejima, and without the 
financial resources to fund his own further studies, Ota became a janitor v,ithin the 
school. A year later, after receiving a recommendation from the school principle, he left 
Kumejima with the intention of entering technical high school in Tokyo. Yet while 
staying in Shuri on Okinawa's main island "IVith his cousin and her husband, Y amasato 
SeishO, who was a mathematics teacher at the Okinawa Normal School for Teachers, he 
was encouraged to take the Teacher's School entrance examination. He passed the 
examination, and in accordance with the wishes of his mother, who preferred her son 
stayed closer to Kumejima, entered Okinawa Normal School in 1941. By 1943, the 
battle for the Pacific had intensified, and the students of Okinawa Normal School 
became fully mobilized to assist >vith the war effort. On 31 March 1945, the day the US 
military forces occupied Kerama Islands and the day before the US landed on the shores 
of Yomitan village in central Okinawa, Ota was recruited along with 385 other students 
into the Okinawa Normal School Student "Imperial Blood and Iron Corps," fonned 
under the orders of Japan's 32nd Army Command. 226 out of Okinawa Normal 
School's total of 386 students died in the battle for Okinawa.47 In Ota's year, only 37 
students survived of a total of 152. 48 Injured and near-starving, Ota spent several 
months hiding in the cliffs and surrounding caves of Mabuni, in Okinawa's south, 
dodging snipers and the US military onslaught while scavenging leftover supplies from 
dead and injured Japanese soldiers, the US military, and local Okinawan civilians. Ota's 
war experience formed the foundation of his analyses on the Battle of Okinawa and 
Japanese militarism. 
47 Ota Masahide, !rei no to.· Okinawa-sen senhotsusha o inoru (Naha: Naha Shuppanaha, 1985), p. 173. 
" 'Okinawa Mandai purojekuto 'ooraru hisutorii (OMPOH) (transcript of a series of interviews ofOta 
Masahide conducted by Ito Takeshi, Sarlo Akihiro, and Maita Keio, and recorded by Tanba Kyosaka), p. 
27. 
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After being released from Yaka prison camp in October 1945, Ota moved to 
Ishikawa City, where he was recruited by the military as a labourer to assist in 
reeonstruction of the war-torn island. Soon afterwards, he found work within the 
education division of Ryukyu Gunto Government, established under US military 
direction. He assisted in the duplication of new elementary school textbooks under the 
division's head, Nakasone Seizen. He entered the education division's centre for further 
learning, and then in the Okinawa Foreign Language School, which actually only taught 
one language-English. Ota studied and worked part time, as a houseboy for the family 
of a US military officer, and a bartender. After graduation, he began to teach at a 
subsidiary English school in the northern village of Nago. In 1950, he received a 
scholarship to attend Waseda University, where he majored in English literature. Soon 
after graduating, Ota received funding to further his studies through a US scholarship 
scheme, and he undertook a Masters of Arts at Syracuse University, New York State, in 
journalism. On completing his studies, he was appointed to an administrative position 
under the dean of the newly established University of the Ryukyus. Two years later, he 
began lecturing at the university, where he continued to work for over thirty years 
(1958-1989) as a lecturer, assistant professor, and later professor and head of the 
Department of Law and Letters.49 During this time, Ota also held a research position at 
Tokyo University Newspaper Research Institute (Tokyo daigaku shin bun kenkyujo) for 
several years (1963-4 and 1968-70), undertook research in Hawaii University's East 
West Centre for a one-year period (1978-79), and was invited as a Fullbright scholar to 
the University of Arizona State for one year (1978-79). He served as governor of 
Okinawa for two tenns from 1990-98. In the national elections of July 2001, he was 
elected to the Upper House of the Japanese Diet as a representative of the opposition 
49 Ota was head of the department from 1983-85. 
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Social Democratic Party of Japan. He continues to hold this position at time of 
• • .:;o 
wntmg.-
As an academic Ota has been a central figure in debates on social, historical, and 
political issues concerning Okinawa: as a politician he has frequently appealed to 
Okinawan culture and history, and conceived of his political position in the context of 
Okinawa's historical position within Japan. 51 Following his defeat in the 1998 
gubernatorial elections, Ota refected on the relation between his historical 
consciousness and political career in the following way: 
My approach to the base issue is different from say someone who had become 
governor straight from the ranks of government For years I have studied the 
abolishment of dominions and disposal of Ryukyu (Ryukyu shobun), subsequent 
economic conditions in Okinawa, the reasons why Jahana Noboru began the 
Okinawan People's Rights Movement, anti-establishment forces in Okinawa, and 
Okinawans' changing view of the United States .. .It is as an extension of this that 
I come to approach the base issue. It is not something I just began to think about 
on becoming governor, but something I became involved in from the perception 
that. .. the very mode of being of the people of Okinawa from the time of the 
abolishment of the Ryukyu domain (haihanjiken), is under question. That is the 
difference. 
Both Ota's intellectual work and his political career have been part of 
negotiating and contesting Okinawa's historical and political location. Contests over the 
historical position of Okinawa in rei ation to mainland Japan have been and are also 
contests over Okinawa's position in Japan and within US-Japan relations. For Ota, the 
evocation of the past has been integral to conceptualisation of the present and future 
possibilities. History is consecutively an explanation of the present, and a lesson to be 
50 Biographical sources on Ota include: the Asabi Tapes; Ota IY!asahide, Okinawa no ketsudan (Tokyo: 
Asahi Shinbunsha 2000); 'Okinawa Mondai purojekuto 'ooraru hisutorii (OMPOH) (see bibliography for 
explanation of sources), 
51 Asahi Tapes (28 April 1999). 
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heeded in envisioning the future. Embedded within the articulation of a sense of 
Okinawan identity, it is also inherent to contests over the nation and its makeup. 52 
Yet Ota has not employed a "eounternarrative of mobilization" to the extent that 
he has sought to envision an alternative claim to sovereignty through Okinawan 
independence. This countemarrative has rather been embedded within a "politics of 
sameness," as involving a strategy of simultaneous incorporation and differentiation 
\\ithin tropes of being "Japanese." Ambivalence and double consciousness are not 
simply born out of political opportunitism but are the result of strategies developed 
under the conditions of hierarchical and centralized relations of domination. 53 As 
Rajagopala Radhakrishnan observes: 
I would argue that there is a distinction between ambivalence as a g1ven 
conditioning and the agential politicization of ambivalence. We caunot forget that 
double consciousness and ambivalence are mutually constitutive, and peoples and 
cultures that have been coerced into more than one history through domination, 
slavery, and colonialism have the ethicopolitical need and authority to make their 
presence felt in all of these histories. Ambivalence gives these cultures a double 
directionality: a here of the present home, and a there of the elsewhere in terms of 
"As Deniz Kandiyoti observes, nationalist discourse presents itself as both a "modern project" and as a 
reaffirmation of authentic cultural values culled from the depths of a presumed communal past: "It 
therefore opens up a highly fluid and ambivalent field of meanings whieb can be reactivated, reinterpreted 
and often reinvented at critical junctures of the histories of nation-states. There meanings are not given, 
but fought over and contested by political actors whose definitions of who and what constitutes the nation 
have a crucial bearing on notions of national unity and alternative claims to sovereignty as well as on the 
sorts of gender relations that should inform the nationalist project" (Deniz Kandiyoti, "Identity and its 
Discontents: Women and the Nation," cited in Rey Chow, Ethics after idealism: Theory-.Culture-
Ethnicity-Reading, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 70). 
" Such a strategy of ambivalence and double consciousness has also been integral to articulations of 
Puerto Rican identity. As observed by Frances Negron-Muntaner and Ramon Grosfoguel: "On the island 
as well as in the United States ... the ambignity of Puerto Ricans' relationship to the United States creates a 
slippery semantic context where sometimes 'Puerto Rican' is claimed as a sign of difference, for example, 
cultural identity and language, while at other times, the same sign is equated with being part of the 
'United States' (citizenship, welfare, entitlements). The double strategy was spectacularly performed 
during the intense debates around language policy in Puerto Rico during the early 1990s" ("Introduction" 
in Puerto Rican Jam: Rethinking Colonialism and Nationalism (Minneapolis and London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 16). 
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which metropolitan contemporaneity can be interrogated and transformed. 54 
Ota's analysis has worked within Japan's "civilizing project" as defmed and 
reconceived within the hegemonic relations and economic development ideology of the 
postwar period. At the same time it has resisted and contested these relations. 
Evocations of Okinawan history and a sense of self have been integral to the formation 
of the "elsewhere" of Ota' s double consciousness, and a position from which to 
interrogate and seek to transform the Tokyo "metropolis." 
Japanese notions of national identity are themselves not fixed. As Prasenjit 
Duara has pointed out, on close examination, "in place of the harmonized, mono logic 
voice of the Nation, we find a polyphony of voices, contradictory and ambiguous, 
opposing, affirming, and negating their views of the nation."55 For all their discursive 
homogenizing power, discourses on nationalism and national identity throughout East 
Asia have not been able to displace social resistance, or contentions, whether on the 
basis of gender, ethnicity, or alternative political and ideal visions of the nation. "Rather 
than a homogenous discourse-whether emanating from the state, the nation, or ethnic 
groups-identity is actually the site of hegemony, contestation, and various kinds of 
resistance."56 
The implementation of the San Francisco system in Japan in 1951-2 in particular 
was accompanied by the solidification of opposing political camps within Japanese 
society and politics over fundamental conceptualisations of foreign policy, Japanese 
war aggression, and the significance of Japan's constitution. While the moderate 
54 Rajagopalan Radhakrshinan, Diasporic Meditations: Between Home and Location (Minneapolis: 
lJniversity of Minnesota Press, 1996), xxiv, as cited in Frances Negron-Muntaner and Ramon Grosfoguel 
(eds.) Puerto Rican Jam, pp. 17-8. 
55 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press), 
1996, p. 10. 
""Introduction" in Kai-wing Chow, Kevin M. Doak, and Poshck Fu (eds.) Constructing Nationhood in 
Modem East Asia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), pp. 9-12. 
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conservative camp, dominated by the figure of Yoshida Shigeru, advocated a 
maintenance of the status quo as embodied in the peace settlement and the US-Japan 
Security Treaty, the left-wing opposed Japanese rearmament and the post-treaty 
stationing of US military forces in Japan, and called for a multilateral peace treaty and 
permanent neutrality in the cold war. 57 Ideals of the postwar as encapsulated in the 
slogan "demilitarisation and democratisation" were incorporated into the anti-security 
treaty movement, popular tropes of war remembrance, and intellectual thought. 
Personified in the renowned political scientist Maruyama Masao, they also became 
integral to the endeavour to ground a sense of individual subjectivity or shutaisei within 
Japanese society, deemed essential to the functioning of democracy. 58 As Rumi 
Sakamoto observes: "Arguing that the tragedy of Japanese fascism was caused by the 
lack of free, autonomous subjects with 'internalised ethlcs,' Maruyama counterpoised 
an idealized model of Western modernity to ultra-nationalism. Central to tills model 
were modern subjectivity (a free and autonomous consciousness that allows an 
individual to independently judge the external world and actively intervene in it) and 
the 'neutral state' that guarantees the inner freedom of the subject."59 
57 See for example John Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience 
1878-1954 (Cambridge (Massachusetts): Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1988)., 
in particular Chapter Ten ("The Separate Peace, Rearmament, and 'Subordioate Independence"'), pp. 
369-414. 
58 Masao C\1iyoshi provides a useful explanation of the term shutaisei: "Shutaisei, according to 
Kenkyusha's New Japanese-English Dictionary, is 'subjectivity; subjecthood; independence; identity.' All 
four words are pertinent, but none of them exactly corresponds to the Japanese tenn. The absence of an 
English equivalent underscores that shutaisei is a native invention. Initially coioed by the Kyoto 
philosophes, it is a ¥lOrd widely used after 1945 to fill a perceived gap in the Japanese language. The 
Japanese thought they saw the concept they named shutaisei everywhere in Western intellectual 
discourse: individualism, democracy, liberali;.m, libertarianism, subject, subjectivism, and libertinism 
flourished V>ithout bound. A compound of shu (subject, subjective, sovereign, main), tai (body, substance, 
situation), and sei (quality, feature), the word means inclusively the agent of action, the subject of 
speculation or speech act, the identity of existence, and the rule of individualism" (Off Center: Power and 
Culture Relations Between Japan and the United States (Cambridge, US: Harvard University Press .• )991), 
pp. 97-8). 
" Rumi Sakamoto, "Dream of a Modem Subject: Maruyama Masao, Fukuzawa Yukichi, and 'Asia' as the 
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In opposition to the US military presence in Okinawa, Ota has framed his claims 
within these counter-hegemonic narratives of nation and accompanying progressive 
political movements. Yet in endeavouring to attain Okinawan subjectivity and 
autonomy, he has also maintained an ambivalence towards constructions of a Japanese 
national subject. This sense of ambivalence increased as the terms of reversion emerged 
and Japan's postwar progressive opposition movement itself fragmented. He saw that 
the ideological and geographical separation of Okinawa within Japan's postwar system 
was fuelled by and exacerbated a profound fissure between Okinawa and mainland 
Japan. This fissure was exemplified by the inability for Japanese government and 
mainland Japanese to conceive of the Okinawa issue as their ovv'Il. One of Ota's aims 
was to strive to fill this gap in perception. At the same time, though, he also sought to 
claim an autonomous Okinawan self and political and cultural autonomy for Okinawa. 
While inherent differences also obviously exist, Ota's project of dual incorporation and 
differentiation has clear parallels with Iha Fuyfi's60 
On the one hand, Ota' s political and historical articulations of Okinawan identity 
disrupt the reification of state authority, security policy, the glorification of war, and 
hegemonic national historical narratives. They also challenge hierarchical centre-
periphery relations of power which are maintained through systems of economic 
dependence, centralized administration, and the homogenisation of culture. On the other 
hand, his analysis has worked within modern evolutionary conceptualisations of 
progress, and essentialist articulations of the nation-state (albeit within the ambivalent 
binary of Okinawa and mainland Japan). At certain junctures he has reified nationalist 
tropes which emphasize the loss incurred by the Japanese people in the war at the 
behest of the state without questioning individual accountability. At other junctures, he 
Limit ofldeology Critique." Japanese Studies, Vol. 21, No.2, 2001, p. 137. 
60 On ambivalence and pluralism within Okinawan identities see also Matthew Allen, Identity and 
Resistance in Okinawa, especially pp. 1·23. 
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has directed profound criticisms towards Japan's relation to its decolonised "others." 
Within an ambiguous binary between Okinawa and mainland Japan, however, this has 
also resulted at times in an obscuring of Okinawa's own complex role within Japan's 
prewar empire. During his period as governor, Ota appointed the first female vice-
governor of Okinawa, was the first Okinawan leader to promote affirmative action, and 
supported a Women's Affairs Section within the prefectural administration. Yet he also 
has evoked notions of a collective Okinawan identity which, criticizes Linda Angst; 
often represent Okinawan subjectivity in a way that denies Okinawan female agency 
and privileges issues of political identity and autonomy.61 
Ota's claims to Okinawan subjectivity have been constrained by the very 
discourses and relations of power in which they are peripheralized. 62 Concurrently, 
however, they have also intervened in significant ways to resist and challenge the 
conditions by which these relations and conceptions of national homogeneity are 
constructed and reproduced.63 In concentrating on the complex interaction between this 
dual process of containment and intervention, I attempt to move beyond the theoretical 
and political impasse of a bifurcated debate between "an ontological preoccupation with 
a fixed nationality, culture, or ethnicity and a sceptical postrnodern pragmatism that 
distrusts any form of identitarian orientation, whether strategic or pluralistic."64 In 
simply refuting all social and cultural identities as essentialist, we cannot fully confront 
the extent to which essentialised structures regulate social, cultural, and political 
61 As detailed in "The Sacrifice of a Schoolgirl: The 1995 Rape Case, Discourses of Power, and Women's 
Lives in Okinawa," Critical Asian Studies, 33:2 (2001); 245-68; and Linda Irene Angst, In a Dark Time: 
Community, Memory, and the Making of Ethnic Selves in Okinawan Women s Narratives, Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Graduate School Faculty, Yale University, 2001. 
62 As has been analyzed in the context of subaltern studies by Gayatari Spivak ("Can the Subaltern 
Speak?", reprinted in Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin ( eds.) The Post-Colonial Studies 
Reader (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 24-8). 
63 
'!be importance of examining the capaeity of the subject to resist imperialism and intervene in the 
conditions which appear to corutruct subjectivity is pointed out by Stephen Siemon, "The Scramble for 
Post-Colonialism," reprinted in The Post-Colonial Studies Reader, ibid., pp. 45-52. 
64 Leo T. S. Ching, Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation, p. 194. 
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practices. Nor can we see the important ways in which centre-peripheral relations of 
power have been contested through counter-identity claims.65 
Ota's resistance is doubly complicit-v.ithin the discursive practices which it 
disrupts, and in the apparatus of the nation-state which it seeks to transform and 
transgress. This implication takes a very literal form during his term as Okinawan 
governor, and in the cycle of conflict, compromise, and negotiations with the central 
government which marked this period. Moreover, it is also paralleled in Okinawa's ov.n 
incorporation into the Japanese nation-state and the role imposed on it in the US-Japan 
postwar system. It is precisely through a strategy of resistance and compliance, 
incorporation and differentiation, that Ota has sought to challenge the set of conditions 
whereby Okinawa itself has been implicated within imperial and hegemonic relations 
and connected structures of organized violence. Complicity is at the foundation of the 
endeavor to conceive and empower a collective Okinawan subject, just as Okinawa's 
historical and political incorporation within hegemonic structures forms a core 
philosophical and political dilemma in the very attempt to conceive of an Okinawan 
autonomous subjectivity. 
In examining the interlocking of historical and political struggles within 
postwar Okinawa, it is also important to contextualize identity politics itself. Contests 
over identity, historical representation, and culture are tied to the political conditions 
within which they have been fought-in this case in the context of struggles over US 
military occupation/colonization, and Okinawa's subsequent incorporation into reified 
US-Japan security relations and Japanese centralized political and economic structures. 
In this way, as David Gary Shaw observes in conceiving of history and agency; "much 
of the entire linguistic apparatus cannot be separated from everything else, all the other 
65 As also discussed by Ching, ibid .• pp. 194-5. 
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components of the 'action situation'.''66 Individuals play an active role in reproducing 
and contesting discursive practices, as well as the political, cultural, and economic 
power structures connected to these practices. 
Moreover, while the past is connected to both discursive contests and >vider 
political struggles, it is not wholly reducible to either. Past historical moments as well as 
previous conceptualizations of historical relations are evoked within contemporary 
debates in a complex interweaving of multiple "networks oftime."67 Political and social 
contests are moreover tied to the historical conditions from which they have emerged. 
To once again take heed of Duara's observations: "A more complex view of history 
suggests that if the past is shaped by the present, the present is also shaped by the past 
as inheritance, and the most fertile questions lie in understanding how this dialectic is 
articulated within the contest over the significance of national history."68 It is in the 
context of this dialectic that interweaving contests within postwar Okinawa are played 
out. It is also precisely in the context of these complex processes that I seek to examine 
the multiple ways in which Ota has sought to "make history"-through conceptualising 
the past, acting in the present, and envisioning possible futures. 
As Ota notes, his experience during the Battle of Okinawa has formed the basis 
of his writing and intellectual thought. The first chapter traces transformations in Ota's 
reflections and analyses on war across a period spanning over fifty years. The following 
chapters examine the evolution of Ota's thoughts up to Okinawan reversion in 1972; his 
writings on Okinawan history and identity following Okinawan reversion to Japan; and 
his negotiations over the Okinawa base issue during his time as governor. The last 
66 David Gary Shaw, "Happy in Our Chains? Agency and Language in the Postmodem Age," History and 
Theory, Theme Issue No. 40, (December 2001), p. 7. 
67 For a subtle examination of these interlocking "networks of time" in the context of intellectual debate 
in contemporary China, see Geremie Banne, "Time's Arrows: Imaginative Pasts and Nostalgic Futures" 
in Bam11! and Gloria Davies (eds.) Voicing Concerns: Contemporary Chinese Critical Inquiry (Boston: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), pp. 227-58. 
68 Prasenjit Duara, "Historicizing National Identity, or Who Imagines What and When," pp. 161-2. 
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chapter focuses on contests over identity under Inamine Keiichi, Ota' s successor, and 
the politicised process by which history is made and shaped in contemporary Okinawa . 
•••• • •••• 
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-~CHAPTER ONE~~ 
Recollecting War and Constructing Peace 
The Battle of Okinawa 
"The reason why I have become deeply involved with 'Okinawa is 
not only because it is the place where I was born and grew up. For 
me, 'Okinawa' signifies more than merely my 'place of birth.' While 
perhaps a slight exaggeration, it may be said that 'Okinawa' is the 
'point of origin' of my existence from which, ·with 1945 as the 
dividing line, I was reborn,. or rather, have sought to reincarnate 
myself. 
That 'Okinawa' can be the point of my origin lies first and foremost 
in the fact that is was there that I experienced the 'Battle of Okinawa.' 
I believe that my experience during the Battle of Okinawa has 
formed, in various ways, the nucleus of my life ever since. This is 
because, whether specifically consciously or not, experiencing the 
Battle of Okinawa has unmistakably determined the way in which I 
have lived after the war." 
Ota Masahide, 1971 1 
Rebirth and Remembrance in Postwar Okinawa 
Ota has written in several places of the way in which, interned within 
Okinawa's Yaka Prison of War camp at the end of the war, he became overwhelmed 
with a fierce desire to live the remainder of his life in a "totally different" way to his 
experience up to that point.2 He recounts how, using the broken end of a small bamboo 
1 Ota Masahide, "Okinawa to watashi", Okinawa keiken, 2 (Autumn, 1971 ), p. 2. 
2 Ibid., p. 3; "Watashi no tenki: Okinawa sen ni rnita ningen no akugyo," Asahi Shinbun, (21 July 1981 }, p. 
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stick and condensing his ration of coffee into a thick brown solution as ink, he 
repeatedly v.Tote the words "rebirth" (shinsei) and "the creation of life" (sei no sozo) 
onto scrap pieces of paper and the lids of empty cans found in the camp. He later 
interprets this impulsive action as the "outpouring" of his will to be "reborn"-to not 
entrust his body and mind to meaningless notions of "national will" and "national 
interest," but to seek a new autonomous (shutaiteki) way of life according to the true 
human desires of self (jiko ). The precious lesson learnt from the tragedy of war was that 
a mode of living which denies subjectivity and humanity signifies the spiritual "death" 
of the individual.3 
Contests over war remembrance-as dialogues with the past and as visions of 
the future-have haunted postwar Japan. In Okinawa, where close to one-third of the 
local population were killed in the only ground war between US and Japanese forces 
fought in Japan's so called "inner territories," the legacies of war remain engraved in 
historical memory and upon the geopolitical landscape. In the name of "rebirth," Ota 
has spent over half a century recollecting the war. As Ota himself reflected in his final 
lecture as a professor at the University of Ryukyus in 1990, "my experiences during the 
Battle of Okinawa have formed the base of my method of research, mode of thought 
and way of seeing."4 Moreover, as Ota further observed, this point formed a vital 
difference between his research and prewar works on "Okinawan Studies" produced by 
such figures as Iha Fuyu and Higashionna Kanjun. Repentance over the war 
necessitated a revision of history in the attempt to evoke meaning in the present and the 
future. 
Ota' s endeavour harboured its own contradictions--contradictions which are 
present in the picture of his war-weary figure etching out characters in the brown ink of 
9; and Okinawa no Ketsudan, (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 2000), p. 38. 
3 Ota Masahide, "Okinawa to watashi," pp. 3-4. 
4 Ota Masahide, Okinawa: Helwa no ishiji (Jwanami Shoten, 1996), p. 19. 
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US military-rationed ground coffee in Okinawa's internment camp. For this vivid image 
also seems to highlight pervasive issues concerning discontinuity and war remembrance 
relevant to all of postwar Japan. The Battle of Okinawa brought untoward personal and 
cultural destruction to the islands. Ota sought to impart meaning to the tragedy and 
trauma of this ruin through utopian ideals of redemption and reconstruction. Yet they 
were ideals themselves steeped in repentanee over the war, guilt over his own survival, 
and a sense of nostalgia and overwhelming loss towards an irretrievable past. 
Repentance over the war fed Ota's desire to obtain individual autonomy and 
subjectivity. In the spirit of Maruyama Masao's critique of wartime ultranationalism 
and conception of Japan's postwar democratisation project, Ota saw that Japan's 
authoritarian Empire system was founded on the denial of subjectivity. "Rebirth" in the 
postwar era necessitated the attainment of autonomy. Yet this conceived "new 
beginning" was simultaneously inherently ahistorical, and founded on the historical 
"lesson" of the war. The experience of war was both cut off from a perceived redeemed 
present, and the point which must be continually returned to in order to impart meaning 
to this rupture. This metaphorical break obscured continuities between the prewar and 
postwar era/ and the implications of decoloni2·.ation.6 The postwar struggle to obtain 
subjectivity in the present left open the complex issues of how to conceive of historical 
agency and individual responsibility in retrospect. An assumed disjunction between the 
Japanese state and the people, and the tendency to lay war blame primarily on the 
5 As Carol Gluck observes: "The myth of a new beginning, itself a radically ahistorical notion, not only 
prevented seeing the twentieth century whole, but it also elided the prewar and wartime and perpetuated 
the notion of a long postwar." ("The Past in the Present," p. 94). 
6 As L. E. Ching observes; "precisely because the total defeat of Japanese militarism occurred at the 
hands of the Allied forces and not under the pressure of the empire's disintegration ... (t)he exigent 
concern was not that of Japan's relationship to its decolonized others, but to itself' (Becoming Japanese, 
pp. 43-4). 
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former, ironically compromised the pursuit of personal and political autonomy and 
eschewed exhaustive claims to war responsibility 7 
Yet Ota' s analysis did not rest solely on a perceived separation between the state 
and the people. Nor have his accounts of war purely served to reproduce a sentimental 
victim consciousness in fitting with popular tropes of postwar nationalism. 8 His early 
testimonies of the war experience painted a complex and disturbing picture of personal 
devotion, horror, delusion, and repentance in the face of bloody battle and unmitigated 
defeat. In the years leading up to reversion in 1972, Ota began conducting more 
historical analyses of the war. These analyses were integrally related to political 
contests over Okinawa's position within Japan. In contrast to the situation in mainland 
Japan, the end of the war in Okinawa did not bring occupation reforms and democracy, 
but twenty-seven years of US military rule. War experience for Ota entailed a rejection 
of assimilation policies and the ideology of Japanese nationalism from the time of the 
disposition of Ryukyu Kingdom in 1879. ln other words, particularly in the years 
directly leading up to and following Okinawan reversion to Japan in 1972, it called for a 
complete reappraisal of Okinawa's cultural, historical, and political position in relation 
to the modem Japanese nation-state. 
7 Rikki Kersten's insightful observations on autonomy~ democracy, and war responsibility in relation to 
Maruyama Masao and other early postwar Japanese intellectuals are highly relevant to Ota in this respect 
(Rikki KJrsten, Democracy in Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masaa and the Search for Autonomy, (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 14). 
8 For an analysis of the popularization of victim C<>nsciousness in postwar Japan, see James 1. Orr The 
Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2001). As Orr observes, a crucial number of war testimonies and analyses of war in 
mainland Japan sought to raise tbe question of individual respoasibility: "There have always been voices 
of conscience, just as there have always been ineidences of inadvertent and willful neglect of Japan's 
aggressive past. Rather than dwell on this amnesia, one needs also to trace the selective and manipulated 
remembrance of those aggressions." (p. 173). Lisa Yoneyama examines the complexities of testimonial 
practices in Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space. and the Dialectics of Memory, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1999), especially Chapter 3. 
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Narratives of war, as intimately connected to the production of a collective sense 
of identity, are inherently politicaL9 As Peter Novick attests, collective memory "is not 
just historical knowledge shared by a group ... (but) is understood to express some 
eternal or essential trnth about a group."10 It is both reproduced by the state to reinforce 
its O\\>TI legitimacy, and mobilized by oppositional groups in the name of competing 
definitions of the nation, and as a counter narrative of mobilization for minority groups. 
The promulgation of peace, as a "lesson of history" learnt through the horrors of war, 
has been an essential creed of Ota's position and of social movements in postwar 
Okinawa. On the eve of reversion, war remembrance became intertwined in complex 
ways with contests over the terms of reversion and collective identity in Okinawa From 
this time, a competing set of divisions can be discerned within Ota's work: between the 
Japanese military and civilians, and between the state (kokka) and the citizens (kokumin) 
of Japan, but also between mainland Japan (hondo, Yamato) and Okinawa. Ota 
condemned not only the Japanese government but mainland Japanese for their 
consensual and even complicit role in determining Okinawa's plight during and after 
the war. Okinawans, not mainland Japanese, were seen as the victims, and the Japanese 
military, together with an institutionalised system of discrimination and imposed 
assimilation, the perpetrators. 
It is important to note in this sense how war remembrance evolved over time, in 
the context of wider struggles. The beliefs and aspirations of the present influence 
depictions of the past as they are manifested respectively in different historical 
contexts.ll Each time the war experience and the Battle of Okinawa was retraced in the 
9 On the connection between memory and sociability see :-Jarita Ryilichi, Rekishi-gaku no sutairu: 
rekishi-gaku to sono shiihen (Tokyo: hvanami shoten, 2001), pp. 202-4. 
10 Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston and New York: Mariner Books, 1999), cited from 
Linda Angst, In a Dark Time; Community, Memory, and the Making of Ethnic Selves in Okinawan 
Women~ Narratives, p. 23. 
ll Maurice Halbwachs was at the forefront of analyses on collective memory in relations between the past 
and the present. See Maurice Halbwachs. On Collective Memory (Chicago and London: University of 
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endeavour to define its significance in the present and for the future, it \vas accorded 
new significance-as an integral part of contest~ over public memory, collective 
identity, and historical consciousness. This is not to suggest that the past is "'holly 
defmerl by the present. As Lewis A. Coser observes, collective and individual historical 
memory has both cumulative and presentist aspects. 12 This chapter traces Ota's 
reflections and analyses on war across a period spanning over fifty years, framing them 
in the context of the issues of autonomy, war responsibility, democracy, gender 
relations, and the historical and political position of Okinawa, in the effort to provide a 
glimpse of the multiple ways in which questions of war remembrance and forgetfulness 
have become entwined with political, historical, and cultural battles in Okinawa's long 
and tumultuous postwar period. 
Recollecting War: "That Which was Paid For in Blood" 
The first material Ota published on his war experience was a book which came 
out in 1953 entitled Okinawa kerrfitai, or The Okinawa Youth Corps. It is a compilation 
of various testimonies about the war from survivors of the "Imperial Blood and Iron 
Corps" (Tekketsu Kinnotm) of Okinawa's Normal School for Teachers (Shihan GakkO). 
Published eight years after the end of the war, The Okinawa Youth Corps was one of the 
first books written and compiled by an Okinawan on the Battle of Okinawa. It was 
preceded only by two major Okinawan records. One is Tetsu no bOfo (The Typhoon of 
Steel), a collection of various war testimonies compiled from interviews by journalists 
from the local newspaper, Okinawa Times. The other is Okinawa no higeki (The 
Tragedy of Okinawa), testimonies from the female student equivalent of the Imperial 
Blood and Iron Corps, the so called Himeyuri Corps (Himeyuri tm), compiled by 
Chicago Press, 1992). 
"Lewis Coser, "Introduction: Maurice Halbv.'llCbS 1877-1945" in Maurice Halbwachs (trans. and ed. by 
Lewis A. Coser), On Collective Memory, 1-34. 
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Nakasone Seizen, a former teacher at the girl's school and survivor of the war. 13 
Nakasone became a leading official in the civilian education division of the Okinawa 
Gunto Government in the early years of US occupation. Nakasone was also Ota's 
mentor. Directly after the war, Ota assisted Nakasone in the process of rev.Titing 
textbooks, as well as in identifying the bones of war dead from the Himeyuri Corps and 
sending them back to surviving family memhers.14 
Ota edited The Okinawa Youth Corps together with Hokarna Shuzen, who was 
also a survivor of the student corps and who would later became a well knOVI'Il scholar 
on Okinawan linguistics and history. During his third year at Waseda University Ota 
travelled from Tokyo back to Okinawa to collect testimonies from other fellow 
colleagues who had survived the war. In June 1953, on the eighth anniversary of the last 
organized resistance of the Japanese 32nd Army in the Battle of Okinawa, Ota 
contributed an article to a newspaper commemorating the publication of The Okinawa 
Youth Corps. In describing the process of compiling the book he WTote: "Approximately 
ten months ago, I carne back to Okinawa to collect memoirs [on the battle]. Reading the 
VITitten testimonies that were assembled, the tragic scenes of the time crowded my head 
as if had they happened only yesterday. Overcome by tears and grief, I had to stop 
writing, and this became a reason for the book's delay." Ota described being 
overwhelmed by "anger and a feeling of oppression" on numerous occasions when 
trying to take up his pen. Once the process was over, however, he felt that "a shadow 
which had weighed at my heart for eight dark years was suddenly lifted, and I became 
I I 'th . ,.ts comp ete y overcome WJ emotion. · 
" Nakasone Seizen, Okinawa no higeki: Himeyuri no too meguru hitobito no shuki (Tokyo: KachO 
ShobO, 1951). Shima Tsuyoshi (Oshiro Masayoshi) provides a comprehensive summary of all material 
published on the Battle of Okinawa up to 1983 in his Okinawa o kangaeru (Naha: Okinawa Bunko, 1983} 
pp, 107-129. 
l4 The Asahi Tapes (29 January 1999). 
15 
'Okinawa kenjitai' hakkan ni tsuite," Ryfi/g;ii Shinpi5 (bereafter RS) (23 June 1953}, p. 4. 
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The Okinawa Youth Corps was published in the midst of rising Cold War 
tensions. Early in 1953, the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands 
(USCAR) utilized its executive powers over Okinawa to hand down a series of orders 
aimed at legalizing land hitherto expropriated under occupation, and expropriate further 
land for the expansion of US military facilities over the islands. 16 Within Okinawa there 
was a restrictive political environment, stringent censorship, and a growing opposition 
movement towards USCAR's policies. In his introduction to the Okinawa Youth Corps, 
Ota denied that the publication held "ideological or political intentions," as had "been 
inferred by some."17 He attested that the book was "merely a faithful expression of what 
we felt, saw, and experienced at the time" of war. In a following article introducing the 
book in a local newspaper, however, Ota did elucidate that he had become determined 
to convey at least a "fragmentary part" of the "sacrifice" which Okinawa had borne 
during the war to a wide section of Japanese because "the various problems which 
Okinawa faces in the present are directly related to the great misfortunes of that time."18 
In the book's introduction, in an implicit appeal to Okinawa's postwar plight Ota called 
on the people of Japan to recognize Okinawa's sacrifice in the war, as the "epitome" 
(shukuzu) of what a final ground war in mainland Japan would have been like had it 
occurred. 
In other words, for Ota the act of recording the war on paper was both an 
emotionally draining and redemptive personal experience, and undertaken in the context 
of direct military occupation. Ota' s testimony formed part of a larger struggle against 
the system of relations whereby US military coloni7.ation of Okinawa was sustained and 
16 See Etsujiro Miyagi "The Land Problem: (1952-1958)" in Ota Masahide (ed.),A Comprehensive Study 
on US Military Government on Ol<inawa: An Interim Report (sic) (Nishihara, Okinawa: l:niversity ofthe 
Ryukyus, 1987), pp. 36-100. 
17 Ota Masahide "Introduction" in Ota Masahide and Holauna Shuzen (eds.), Ol<inawa kenjitai (Tokyo: 
Nil10n shuppan, 1953), pp. 2-3. 
18 
"'Okinawa kenjitai' hakkan ni tsuite," RS (23 June 1953), p. 4. 
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legitimised through the separation of Okinawa from Japan under the logic of residual 
sovereignty. ln conjunction with the rise of the reversion movement, war remembrance 
in Okinawa came to be defined against the US occupation, and incorporated into 
mainland Japanese tropes of war and victimhood. Claims to sameness and equality were 
integral to the struggle for "emancipation" against "foreign rule." As a consequence, 
issues relating to Japanese imperialism in the Asia-Pacific, the contradictions embedded 
within the prewar project of"Japanization" or the "becoming of Imperial subjects", and 
Okinawa's complex and ambiguous positioning under Japan's empire were largely 
deferred. 19 ln short, consolidated in reaction against US military rule and mobilized in 
the political movement calling for equal rights for Okinawans as Japanese nationals, 
memories of Japanese prewar colonialism was often repressed in Okinawan postwar 
identity formation. 
Ota's written testimony of his war experiences makes up the first section of the 
book, and continues for over one hundred pages. The title of Ota's piece is "That Which 
was Paid for in Blood" (chi de aganatta mono). Ota emphasized that his account was a 
relaying of war experience "as it happened." 20 ln order to convey this experience, 
however, Ota had to reconstruct his feelings and thoughts from a time when he was 
much younger, and the \\>Titing style itself inevitably includes the understanding of 
hindsight. 21 The account was wTitten in first person, and the descriptions are vivid, 
drawing the reader into gruesome scenes of war, death, and destruction, as the Japanese 
forces become cornered and finally disband at the cliffs of Mabuni, on the southernmost 
tip of Okinawa's main island. It begins on 22 March 1945, just over a week before the 
19 Tomiyama Ichiro critically analyzes this process in Senjo no kioku (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, 
1995). 
20 Ota Masahide "Introduction" in Cta Masahide and Hokama Shuzen (eds.), Okinawa ke'!fitai, p. 2. 
Emphasis in original. 
21 As Lisa Yoneyama has observed on Hiroshima: "\'ihether they choose to write or speak, the survivors 
must confront the fact that their witnessing of Hiroshima's obliteration can never be reconstructed or 
conveyed in its original form" (Hiroshima Traces, p. 92). 
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US land on the main island of Okina\1/a. What follows is a brief summary of the 
account's narrative. 
Ota listened together with his fellow colleagues to the year master, Mr. Sato 
Hayami, lecturing the students on how great their fortune was and what an honour it 
would be to give themselves over for service to the country while still in the purity of 
youth. Ota too believed in purity. He felt the air over the peaceful town of Shuri turning 
heavy, as in the wake of a summer storm, and imaged the form of Okinawa's Diego 
flower in his head. Without even realizing it, he and his colleagues had already begun to 
"accept the fateful notion that our lives were to end before reaching the age of 
twenty."22 The follo\\'ing day, on March 23, Shuri was attacked in an intense air-raid 
from carrier-born aircraft, and two days later, on March 25, US troops landed at nearby 
Kerama Islands. Ota realized that it was only a matter of time before they would reach 
Okinawa's main island. On March 31, the enemy began firing long range shells towards 
a small island just outside the harbour of ~ah~ only a stone's throw away from Shuri 
castle and the headquarters of the Japanese command. Ota was called along with the 
teachers, staff, and students of the Okinawa Normal School to assemble in front of a 
cave near Shuri, and under orders from Japan's 32nd Army the entire school was 
conscripted. They were formed into the Imperial Blood and Iron Corps. The younger 
students took to the provisional uniforms relatively merrily, teasing one an.other on their 
appearance. In retrospect, Ota marvels at the extent to which he and his colleagues 
faced the oncoming onslaught with such lack of awareness and so little ado. 
The US landed on the coast of Chatan in the central part of Okinawa island the 
next day. The sea had turned into a black mass of every different type of military vessel 
imaginable. The roar of carrier-born aircraft across the island skies of Okinawa was a 
22 Ota Masahide, ·~chi de aganatta mono'\ in Okinawa kenjitai, p. 3. 
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"spectacle beyond description."23 Ota was conscripted into the Chisotai Infantry within 
the Blood and Iron Corps. This infantry was charged with conveying information 
released by the army headquarters at Shuri to local civilians who were hiding in caves 
in the surrounding area. The students moved from cave to cave in groups of two to three 
at night, trying to avoid roads and particularly intersections, which were constantly 
bombarded with artillery shells. While this job was dangerous, Ota considered himself 
lucky to be able to escape from the cramped conditions and stench of the crowded 
caves. As the bombardment intensified, members of the newly recruited corps were 
increasingly hit. Those whom the remaining student corps members managed to bury 
were "the lucky ones of the ill-fated." 24 Shuri gradually became surrounded by the 
oncoming enemy, and the students were ordered by the military command to "advance" 
by foot to the south. Ota was shocked and disbelieving: "What do they mean advance?! 
Isn't that just a mere euphemism for withdrawal?"25 
On the way to Mabuni, Ota suffered from chronic dysentery. He no longer cared 
about the war, or about victory, but was overwhelmed only by the desire to be relieved 
of his pain and exhaustion. In the face of attack, aside from constant fear and complete 
exhaustion, the number of students and soldiers around him still alive grew less and less 
by the day. He saw numerous corpses of dead animals and local people on the trip. He 
felt the chances he had been given of survival grov.'ing fainter, and his mind and his 
body advancing towards death. At the beginning of June, Ota's infantry was ordered to 
conduct "underground operations." They were to reach behind enemy lines, from where 
they were to promote the fighting spirit of civilians, and throw the enemy in confusion 
from behind. Ota was pleased: finally they could act out their destined "noble duties." 
But Ota and his colleagues never managed to infiltrate the ranks of the enemy. There 
23 Ibid., p. 6. 
24 Ibid., p. 2!. 
25 Ibid., p. 25. 
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were no civilians left in the designated area where they were supposed to conduct their 
activities. He returned to the infantry headquarters at Mabuni in the face of heavy 
artillery, where he was ordered on another mission to a nearby cave. Wandering through 
the war-tom district of southern Okinawa, Ota began to question the meaning of war: 
"What were we doing? Up to now I had not doubted this at all. I just naively believed in 
the war. The doubt formed an invisible shadow in my chest, plaguing at me 
incessant! y. "26 
Yet Ota vacillated. In a cave where he and his colleague fled to after coming 
literally within feet of CS soldiers, local civilians looked on in horror and prayed as a 
soldier lay bleeding to death before them. Ota was overcome with emotion, and felt 
ashamed at his earlier lack of faith. The soldier died and the enemy grew closer. Ota and 
his colleague fled once again to the coast. On 19 June, the surviving members of 
Chis6tai were given orders to disband. They left in groups of three to penetrate enemy 
lines, heading towards Kunigami, in the northernmost part of Okinawa Island. Ota's 
recollections after this time are disorientated. He \Vas injured in the foot by shrapnel 
soon after he left the cave, and lost contact with his colleagues. He wandered around the 
cliffs of Mabuni, shorn of all vegetation by flame throwers, and finally fled into the 
water to escape from the incessant bombing. He woke up washed up on the rocks of 
Mabuni, dazed, hungry, and injured. He was left alone, without food, and in shock on 
the rocky cliffs for an unknown period of time. Ota dreamt of his mother and his home 
island of Kurue. The battle was surely lost. At night he scavenged for food found near 
corpses, or left by the US soldiers who scouted the hillsides during the day. Ota found 
out that Japan had unconditionally surrendered from a Japanese officer named Shirai 
who could read English and had managed to pick up some magazines left by the CS 
military. Ota and Shirai both surrendered after a former member of the local defence 
26 Ibid., p. 59. 
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corps cooperating with the US military cleanup operation came to 1he cave where they 
and others were hiding and urged them to hand themselves over. The local showed them 
the largely incomprehensible imperial rescript announcing surrender which the Emperor 
had read to the nation over a month before. 27 While the Japanese in the cave were 
initially disbelieving, they were finally convinced by the flowery language and difficult 
characters of the rescript. 
By focusing on Okinawa's undeniably tragic plight, Ota's account is in one 
sense conducive to the kind of "psychology of victimhood" that James J. Orr observes 
has featured extensively in Japanese popular postwar antiwar literature. 28 As Orr 
observes, the mythicising of war victimhood ;vi1h the peace movement in the 1950s and 
increasingly in the 1960s "manifested a tendency to privilege the facts of Japanese 
victimhood over considerations of what occasioned that victimhood. "29 Life before the 
onslaught was ideally pictured, with schoolboys living out their youth on a peaceful 
island boasting beautiful vegetation and a tradition of culture, exemplified by the 
ancient castle of Shuri, and its surrounding temples, trees, and glistening lake. The 
students are depicted as passive agents of the Japanese state's oppressive totalitarian 
ideology. Thrown into the midst of bloody battle, they became impotent victims, unable 
to mount an attack on the overwhelmingly superior forces of enemy, and falling to an 
onslaught of artillery shells, flame throwers, and direct fire. 
Yet even here, tensions in Ota's account produce a competing narrative \vithin 
the text to the Battle of Okinawa as "Japanese" experience. Appeal to Okinawa's 
postwar plight is echoed within the text by vivid descriptions of the sacrifices and losses 
27 In Okinawa kenjitai, this incident is described as occurring on 15 September 1945. In a book published 
in !972, however, Ota's corrects this date to 21 September 1945 (Okinawa no kolroro: Okinawa-sen to 
watashi (Tokyo: lwanami sboten, 1972), p. 213). According to Ota's testimony in Okinawa no lrokoro, 
Ota arrived in Yaka Internment Camp by truck on 23 September 1945. 
28 James J. Orr, The Victim as Hero, p. 106. 
29 Ibid., p. 3, 
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which local Okinawan civilians were forced to pay. Ota repeatedly notes the way in 
which the plight of local civilians was the most wretched throughout the bloody 
fighting. The able-bodied had already been mobilized into local brigades, leaving only 
young girls and the aged to fend for themselves. Many dug their own shelters, only to 
be driven out by the Japanese military, who in turn deprived them of the scarce 
provisions they had gathered. Ota recounted how locals were abused for obstructing the 
battle, and told by the Japanese military that if caught in the hands of the enemy they 
would be killed. In some cases, they became subject to the brutal force of their O\Vn 
army, accused of being spies, and for making the smallest of complaints were slandered 
as 'traitors' (hikokumin) or even killed. Even being treated in such a way, Ota pitifully 
noted, the locals "still believed with conviction in the victory of their homeland 
(sokoku), and withstood all sorts of hardships, aimlessly roaming the battlefield with 
nothing but the clothes on their back. "30 
Moreover, in many ways Ota's testimony was too gruesome to be sentimental. 
His depiction of bloody combat, disillusionment, multiple deaths and ultimate defeat 
provided a profound critique of war, the Japanese military, the Japanese state and the 
ideology of the Emperor system. Ota described how, in the makeshift army hospital at 
Haebaru, the putrid smell of blood and body odour which permeated the oppressive air 
of the caves was too much to bear. In the cave at Shuri, when the first student, Kuba, 
was hit by shrapnel, the bottom half of his right leg was severed almost completely, left 
dangling by a few tendons. Ota and the other students watched on in shock as the leg 
lay twitching to-and-fro, as if it had a life of its own. On the march southwards, when 
Ota lost his firenrm in a blast: "human hands, feet, a leg-less torso, and organs with the 
insides spilling out.. .such things were lying about on the cragged ground. They were 
probably catapulted once into the air together with mud, and then fell dovvn again. I 
30 Ota Masahide, "Chi de aganatta mono", in Okinawa kerljilai, p. 34. 
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found myself unable to imagine that this was, an instant before, the figure of a living 
human ·with a mind and body the same as our own. I searched amongst the blood and 
lumps of flesh for my rifle, but couldn't find it anywhere." On the cliffs near the cave 
that became the Japanese command's makeshift headquarters at Mabuni, an injured Ota 
tried to drag his feet across the ground but "the remains of dead bodies, burnt the colour 
of roasted potatoes, were piled up one on top of the other, and it was difficult to find a 
place to put my feet." After he was injured, Ota tried to undo the boots of a dead soldier 
to wear on his impaired and bleeding leg, but the bloated corpse kept swaying together 
with the boot as he tried to jerk it off. When finally he managed to pull the boot from 
the soldier's feet, layers of skin pealed off with it. 
In the face of such horror, Ota began to doubt Japan's nationalist ideology and 
the war. In the early throes of battle the locals were grateful for Ota and his colleague's 
messages from the Japanese military command: "they did not know how to doubt. Even 
seeing before their eyes the discrepancy of forces, they had full faith in the infallibility 
of the imperial nation."31 Yet as the war continued, the civilians became more and more 
derisive towards Ota as he mouthed words of caution and encouragement from army 
command. Ota also began to lose faith. He avoided repeating the command's 
proclamations of oncoming victory: "I no longer had confidence in my own 
words ... and now I would just be scoffed at."32 Injured and starving, Ota began to have 
traitorous thoughts, and to doubt the ideology which he had up to that point 
unquestioningly believed dictated his duty in life. This doubt lead to misgivings. Ota 
ruminated: "might it not be that we have all taken the >~Tong path? Have not all of us 
been blinded by some strange delusion?"33 The passage where Ota learns of Japan's 
surrender is particularly compelling. Ota recounts how he was totally incapable of 
31 Ibid., p. 16. 
32 Ibid., p. 47. 
33 Ibid., p. 90. 
43 
connecting those who had died believing they were helping protect the nation (kokutai) 
with defeat. Ota implored: "Vv'hat about all the people that have died up till now, that 
won't come back? Do you mean to say their death was totally pointless?"34 Ota wanted 
to claim that their death was not in vain. But he does not. He finds significance in his 
own survival, in the ability to tell the story of those who died. Yet to the end of Ota's 
testimony, when he is taken by truck to Yaka internment camp, the many deaths of the 
Battle of Okinawa remain meaningless. The young students, civilians, and even 
Japanese soldiers who one by one fall to their death are certainly portrayed as victims. 
Yet it is difficult for those who die a "dogs death" (inuji), completely in vain, to become 
heroes. 
There is an ambiguity in Ota' s account which can finally be left only to 
interpretation. This ambiguity is manifested in the title of Ota's testimony itself: "That 
Which is Paid for in Blood." What exactly "that"-in Japanese literally "the thing" 
(mono )--whieh is gained by spilt blood is is not clear. Moreover, the phrase "paid for" 
is also equivocal. In Japanese, the term used (aganau) can mean both to buy something, 
or to atone for one's sins through some form of payment. Was Ota implying that no 
matter how much we wish to place significance on the blood of the war dead, that there 
was in fact no "thing" which could gained from the multiple meaningless deaths of war? 
Or did he seek to emphasize that the blood spilt in the Battle of Okinawa was the 
sacrifice that Okinawa was forced to pay for the sake of mainland Japan? Or did he seek 
to claim, as he would later infer, that he was indebted to the spilt blood of his colleagues 
for his O\Vll life, and therefore it was his obligation as survivor of the battle to speak of 
the horrors of war in the name of peace?35 
"Ibid., pp. 110-l L 
35 ln 1977, Ota republished the testimony of his war experiences in a single book form, as Tekketsu 
kinnotai, {Naha: Hirugisha, 1977). In the introduction to this book, Ota stated: "This year constitutes the 
thirty-third year of mourning for the Battle of Okinawa's v-1ar dead. I have keenly felt that this opportunity 
should be used to once more earnestly reflect on the significance ofthe Battle of Okinawa and my ov.n 
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Such ambiguities within the text were integrally related to the way in which Ota 
sought to negotiate Okinawa's experience within the postcolonial "coloniality" of US 
occupation. Against the framework of the US military presence, Ota incorporated his 
account of the Battle of Okinawa into tropes of Japanese war experience-tropes which 
effectively excluded debate on Japan's colonial legacy. At the same time, this 
incorporation was accompanied by a deep-felt sense of betrayal-by Japan's defeat in 
the war, by the sacrifice Okinawa was forced to pay, by the fallacy of imperial ideology, 
and by Okinawa's postwar conditions. Placed under the constraints of direct US 
military occupation, these issues were left largely implicit. It was only as war 
remembrance in Okinawa became increasingly politicised in the struggle against the US 
military occupation and calls for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan that these questions 
began to rise to the surface. 
The 1952 movie of the Himeyuri Corps, the female equivalent of the Blood and 
Iron Corps, entitled "Himeyuri no Ti?' or "The Himeyuri Monument," became a hit 
throughout Japan. In its wake, "The Okinawa Youth Corps" was also made into a movie 
a year later directed by Iwama Tsuruo, distributed by Shochiku, and starring the 
relatively well-known actors lshihama Akira and Ogi Minoru. It was agreed that money 
received from the book and the movie rights of"The Okinawa Youth Corps" would be 
used to construct a monument in commemoration of those comrades who died in the 
war. "The Statue of Peace" stands next to the original stone "Okinawa Youth Corps 
Monument" which was built by alumni associations in 1946, below the cliffs of 
Mabuni. The three bronze figures in the statue were designed to symbolize friendship, 
love, and eternal peace. Ota brought it with him to Okinawa from Tokyo in 1954 after 
his graduation from Waseda. At this time, USCAR were in the midst of a "counter-
experiences on the battlefield. That is, 1 have no choice but to do so. For, when I survived the war, I 
perceived all too well that my very life was that 'paid for' (aganawareta mono) by the blood of my 
colleagues." 
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communist" crackdovm campmgn in response to widespread resistance to its land 
expropriation policies in Okinawa. Ota later recounted that he was subject to 
surveillance by the US military for possible subversive ideological activities for his 
connection to the peace monument, and at one stage feared that his US scholarship 
might even be jeopardized. 36 
Yet the Okinawa Youth Corps never came to serve, as the Himeyuri Corps have, 
a dominant image of the Battle of Okinawa in Japan. The movie of Himeyuri no to was 
remade in 1982 and again in 1995. The Himeyuri Peace Museum opened next to the 
Himeyuri Monument near Mabuni in 1989, and has become a popular tourist site. There 
is no equivalent museum for the Okinawa Normal School for Boys, and the movie of 
"The Okinawa Youth Corps" was never remade and remains relatively unknown. The 
question as to why the male student corps have not enjoyed the fame of the Himeyuri 
(literally "lily maiden") particularly in mainland Japan is a compelling one. In the 
prewar era, images of Okinawa served to reinforce hierarchies and contain difference.37 
In the postwar, as Lisa Yoneyama insightfully traces, tropes of female atomic bomb 
survivors in Hiroshima came to reinforce ambiguous conceptions of Japanese 
victimhood at once benevolent with and antithetical to US hegemony and militarism?8 
In the case of the Himeyuri, tropes from prewar Okinawa are replicated with postwar 
36 Okinawa no kelsudtm, pp. 61·3. 
31 Alan Christy suggests that the fear of effeminacy served a motivating factor in the desire to "become 
Japanese" in Okinawa. Of prewar Okinawa, he observes: "Representing the colonized (territory or 
people) as feminine is yet another standard trope of colonist representation, and its employment in prewar 
Okinawa reveals yet one more colonialist power differential in the relation between Okinawa and Japan. 
This trope WdS frequently expressed in the fixation of Japanese observers on the problem of Okinawan 
prostitution." 
" On the one hand the so-called Hiroshima maidens-young female atomic bomb survivors who received 
orthopedic surgery on their deformed limbs and other medical treatment in the United States in the 
1950s-served to reinforce alliance and friendship between Japan and the benevolent United States. On 
the other hand, tropes of motherhood which prevailed in peace and antinuclear discourses came to signifY 
that which was antithetical to US militarism and imperialism, consolidating a national narrative whereby 
Japan ·was remembered one-dimensionally as a victim of US and Western imperialism and colonialism. 
Lisa Yoneyarna, Hiroshima Traces, p. 202. 
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relations, as the maiden comes to symbolize Okinawa's dual subjugation to the US and 
Japan. The Himeyuri has played at least a dual role in competing Japanese discourses--
as female body submitting to masculinized military state and 'body' of the emperor/9 
and virgin sacrificed for the sake of postwar peace. On the one hand nationalist 
ideology which sought to largely esteem and legitimise Japan's war effort glorified 
Okinawan participation--as symbolized by the depoliticised and passive virginal 
female student core-as an act of patriotic sacrifice. On the other, pacifist tropes uphold 
the Himeyuri story as representative of Okinawan (Japanese) suffering. The 
incorporation of Himeyuri war dead into national discourses which seek to legitimise 
Japanese militarism has been fiereely criticized and resisted by Himeyuri survivors40 
The eulogizing of the Himeyuri Corps \\':ithin popular Japanese and Okinawan 
tropes may be seen to form an integral part of the way in which women's bodies are 
disciplined and contained within the public sphere and by the state as figures of national 
self sacrifice. 41 Containing and privileging the Himeyuri experience over that of the 
male student core (who died in much greater numbers) forms part of the process 
whereby both female and Okinawan active subjectivity has been denied. The militaristic 
image conjured by the term "Imperial Iron and Blood Corps" itself stood at odds with 
the inscription of Okinawa as sublnissive, effeminate, and lacking in agency. Their 
activity in combat also made it more difficult to depict them solely as victims. Ota did 
39 As Linda Angst observes: "Their virginal condition signifies purity and innocence, which is easily 
transformed into a kind of sacred purity with their deaths, not unlike the purity associated with the 
imperial body and personage of the Emperor" (In a Dark Time: Community, },femory, and the Making of 
Ethnic Selves in Okinawan Women~ NarraJives, p. 138). 
40 Members of the Himeyuri Colleagues Association (Himeyuri Dosokai) criticized a monument in 
Kanazawa City glorifYing the war which had inscribed the Himeyuri Corps without permission (see for 
example Okinawa Taimusu (hereafter OT) (22 August 2000). 
41 The way in which women's bodies are disciplines as figures of self-sacrifice to the state in 
contemporary Chinese nationalist discourse is analyzed by Prasenjit Duara in "The Regime of 
authenticity: T"nnelessnes, Gender, and national history in Modem China," in Kai-wing Chow, Kevin M. 
Doak, Poshek Fu (eds.) Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2001), pp. 359-87. 
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not completely pass over fuis point. At fue end of "That Which is Paid for in Blood," 
the young Ota reflected as he headed towards Okinawa's POW intermnent carop in 
Y aka: "I had up to this time clearly followed fue path of a soldier. V.'hat was fue use in 
trying to hide it now?" 
The Politicisation of Memory: Remembrance and Reversion 
Throughout fue 1950s and early 1960s, Okinawa's burgeoning reversion 
movement was founded upon and repeatedly sought to reinforce a sense of national 
commonality between Okinawa and Japan-conceived as the "ancestral nation." Both 
in mainland Japan and Okinawa, Okinawa's war experience, as symbolized in the fate 
of the Hirneyuri, became popularised within narratives of victirnhood and sacrifice. 42 In 
the context of Okinawa's burgeoning reversion movement, the sacrifice paid in the war 
duplicated with appeals against Okinawa's postwar plight and occupation. From fue 
1950s, reversion movement leader Yara ChObyo (who would become Okinawa's first 
elected Chief Executive in 1968) appealed to fue "heroic sacrifice" which Okinawa had 
made during the battle of Okinawa in caropaigning against fue US military's land 
expropriation policies and for financial and political support froro Japanese 
mainlanders. Y ara incorporated both pacifist and conservative ideologies into his 
speech, often making it unclear as to whether he was upholding this "sacrifice" in the 
f . . . fb •t. 43 name o peace, patnot1sm, or a mixture o OUI. 
The Japanese govenunent war compensation policies as they applied to fue 
Okinawan experience also had a complex impact on war remembrance. Due to 
42 Shima Tsuyoshi notes that of 120 books published in the 1960s on the Battle of Okinawa. 49 ofthese 
were accounts compiled by journalists or novelists. A number oflhe best-known novels on the Battle of 
Okinawa from this era were compiled by mainland Japanese, such as Sono Ayano's Ikenie no Shima (The 
Sacrifice of an Island), first published as a serial in ShUkan Gendai, 3 April-31 July 1969. 
43 Nakano Yoshio (ed.) Sengo shiryi'J: Okinawa (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1969) p. 192. 
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Okinawa's separation under the Peace Treaty agreement, legislation on benefits for 
veterans and bereaved families in Japan did not initially apply to Okinawa. After 
extensive petitioning, however, this legislation beeame applicable in 1953. Following 
further v.'idespread calls for consideration of the "special circumstances" of Okinawa, 
not only veterans and their bereaved families, but student corps and civilians who had 
"cooperated in combat" (sent6 sanka !ry6ryokusha) during the Battle of Okinawa were 
also able to apply for compensation benefits after 1956 and 1958 respectively.44 As a 
consequence, both as a political strategy in opposition to the US military, and a 
financial strategy to obtain compensation, war remembrance tended to focus on the 
extent to which Okinawans had "cooperated" with the Japanese military, and the losses 
pertained as a result. 
Yet just as Y ara himself was a complex figure, Okinawa's reversion movement 
had more than one face. As historians such as Kano Masanao have pointed out, many 
advocates of Okinawa's reversion had goals far removed from nationalistic desires.45 
With the escalation of the Vietnam War, criticism of what was seen as Japan's 
complicity with US military strategy and aggression in Asia increased within both 
mainland Japan and Okinawa. In Okinawa, the immediacy of the US military campaign 
against Vietnam in the form of the bases compounded with increasing dissatisfaction 
with the terms of reversion. Resulting mass political mobilization motivated people to 
begin to speak of their traumatic experiences during the war. This also coincided, after a 
44 See Shima Tsuyoshi, Okinawa-sen o kangaeru; and Miyagi Harumi, Haha no nokoshita mono (Tokyo: 
Kobunsha, 2001). James J. Orr observes on war compensation in Japan in the 1960s: "The 'consensus 
politics' of the Ikeda and Sato administrations allowed for many ambiguities, and in granting state 
compensation for private losses, the government bordered on valorizing these victim experiences as 
service to the state. This was an era in which the victim became the hero for Japan not only 
metaphorically but in monetary tenns as well" (The Victim as Hero, p. 1 0). 
''Kana Masanao, Kasei-ko suru rekishigaku: jimeisei no kaitai on nakade, (Tokyo: Koko shobO, 1998), 
pp. 168-72. David tobaru Obermiller also observes that '~he conventional interpretation that the 
Okinawan reversion movement reflects the 'natural' expression of Japanese identity/nationalism 
oversimplifies and distorts what were in fact complex and conflicting motivations" ("The Okinawan 
Struggle over Identity, Historical Memory, and Cultural Representation," p.l5). 
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twenty year ''blank," with the first extensive official compilation of testimonies on the 
war.46 Reappraisal of the relationship between Okinawan civilians, the military, and the 
Japanese state during the Battle of Okinawa was accompanied by a fundamental 
questioning of the significance of the war, of Okinawa's historical relations to Japan, 
and of reversion itself. 
Following The Okinawa Youth Corps, for over ten years Ota published very 
little on the battle.41 On 23 June 1965, the twentieth anniversary of the last organized 
Japanese combat, however, he contributed a piece to a local Okinawan newspaper 
highly critical of recent attempts to valorise the war. Ota wrote with concern: "It seems 
as though the tides of time have also cast the many calamities that people experienced 
to the shores of oblivion." He was particularly critical of the Okinawan elite (shidosha) 
who had themselves promoted militaristic indoctrination during the war and were now 
endeavouring to glorifY the ravages it had caused. He observed an increasing 
"triumphant proliferation" of the "fraudulent logic" which sought to claim that 
Okinawa's sacrifice was made in the name of a worthy cause. Ota called for the need to 
fully question exactly who had been sacrificed, and for what purpose and in whose 
name these sacrifices had been made. In answer to these questions, Ota increasingly 
explicitly laid out what he saw to be the political implications of war remembrance in 
46 Okinawa Board of Education (ed.) Okinawa kens hi Volume Nine, Okinawasen kiroku Part One, 1971. 
Shima Tsuyoshi describes this publication as a milestone in the history of the recording of war 
testimonies in Okinawa ( Okinawasen o kangaeru, p. 126). Shima observes that between Tetsu no bi5fu 
(1950, op cit.) and the text compilation of war experiences, Okinawasen kiroku (1970), there existed a 
twenty year "blank" in attempt~ to comprehensively compile testimonies from the war in Okinawa. He 
appeals: "Why was fbere this long silence? In order to ansv;er thi> question, we must look at the 
conditions under which narratives on the war were produced. In ofber words, it is an issue involving our 
stance towards records on the war." ( Okinawasen o kangaeru, p. 113). 
47 Two exceptions are Ota's "Heiwa irei Kannon kenrit>u ni omou" (Two-part Series), OT(21 and 26 
December 1958), which focuses on the making of the Okinawan "Goddess of Mercy" peace monument; 
and "Unmei o kuruwaseta hi: aani pairu o shinonde" OT, 24-7 Aprill960, which was written in 
commemoration of the American war journalist Ernie Pyle, who was killed when accompanying US 
troops in lejima on 18 Aprill945, and includes translations of some of Pyle's dispatches in the early 
throws of the battle. 
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the present. In the turbulent years leading up to reversion, for the first time Ota openly 
debated the significance of the Battle of Okinawa in the immediate context of US and 
Japanese policies over the islands. He also embarked on more historical analyses of the 
Battle of Okinawa. 
In his well known and controversial work Minikui Nihonjin (The Ugly 
Japanese), first published in 1969, Ota was unequivocal in his lambasting of the 
Japanese military and imperial court's total disregard for the fate of Okinawa or its 
civilians during the war. Here Ota did not hesitate to state that the "thing which was 
gained" by Okinawa's sacrifice in the war was the postwar prosperity of mainland 
Japan-at the expense of the peace and well being of Okinawa-and condemn the 
Japanese government and mainland Japanese for condoning these conditions. For the 
first time Ota systematically laid down a comprehensive historical analysis of the Battle 
of Okinawa. According to his analysis, prior to battle the Imperial Headquarters' knew 
of America's oncoming onslaught, but were only concerned about the fate of Okinawa 
to the extent that it affected the "decisive battle" (kess en) to be fought on Naichi or the 
inner territories of Japan. In other words, the Imperial Headquarters did not consider 
Okinawa or Taiwan as a part of Japan proper. Neither was the survival of the local 
population a priority for Japan's military officials. Fleeing to the northern area of 
Okinawa and if need be fighting a war of attrition from the hills would have saved the 
majority of Okinawan civilians from being directly caught in the crossfire between the 
two armies. Yet this strategy was not chosen. Ota concluded that the reason for this lay 
not only in a perceived "samurai tradition" in Japan (where flight from the enemy was 
considered cowardly) but in the fact that the Battle of Okinawa was first and foremost 
considered by the Japanese military to be a delaying tactic in order to more fully prepare 
for war in the home territories. In other words, Okinawa was sacrificed as a "suteishi" 
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(literally "sacrificial stone," a sacrificial piece in the game of go) for the sake of 
mainland Japan. 48 
By 1970, Ota drew a direct correlation between the Battle of Okinawa and 
present conditions. He likened the persistent US military presence in Okinawa to a 
continued state of war. While the rest of Japan experienced the "end" of the war on 15 
August 1945, Okinawans had been forced to carry on an enduring struggle in the form 
of US occupation. Ota cynically equated the Japanese government's public stance on 
reversion with the hnperial Headquarters' propaganda during the war. In the Battle of 
Okinawa, Ota had been charged with reading out imperial rescripts which spoke of the 
"great advances" of the Japanese military to war-weary and increasingly disbelieving 
Okinawan civilians who were clearly facing the consequences of full onslaught and 
unmitigated defeat. Now, the Japanese government was giving false reassurances that 
Okinawa would with reversion enjoy conditions "on par" with the rest of the country, 
while it set about strengthening the military presence on Okinawa. Ota pointed out that 
the bases in Okinawa were not only stockpiled with chemical and nuclear weapons,49 
but were directly linked to US military operations in Vietnam. Okinawans were 
continually reminded of war even if they tried to forget of the Battle of Okinawa. 
As the ratification stage of US-Japan negotiations on the return of Okinawa 
neared, pro-reversion groups increasingly voiced their dissatisfaction with the terms of 
agreement. On 15 October 1971, a protest against the ratification of the reversion 
agreement was held in Naha.5° Four days later, Ota contributed an article to the Asahi 
'
8 On the politics of war memory in Ota's home island ofKume, see Matthew Allen, Identity and 
Resistance in Okinawa, especially Chapter One. 
49 See Chapter Two of this thesis. In July 1969, a canister of nerve gas stored on Okinawa developed a 
leak, and the story hit American press headlines, conftrming the suspicion that unconventional weapons 
had long been stored on bases in Okinawa. See also Saran takes, Nicholas Evan, Keystone: The American 
Occupation of Okinawa and US-Japanese Relations (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 
2000}, p. 186-8. 
50 These protests also incorporated a burgeoning anti-reversion movement which was ironically advocated 
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outlining what he saw to be the reasons why the residents of Okinawa were fiercely 
defying the terms of the reversion agreement, and taking to the streets in protest. 5 1 From 
this period, Ota came to depict Okinawans' struggle for reversion as embodied in what 
he termed the "Okinawan spirit" (Okinawa no kokoro ). The "Okinawa spirit," also 
translatable as the "Okinawan heart," was a term which Ota came to use frequently from 
this period to distinguish fundamentally Okinawan traits or a sense of Okinawan-ness. 
Ota employed it to contrast what he saw as a distinct Okinawan-ness to either mainland 
Japan (Hondo or Yamato) or Japan (Nihon). The term has since become closely 
associated v.rith the anti-base movement in Okinawa. Ota saw the Okinawa spirit to be 
embodied in three ideals of reversion: the preservation of peace and opposition to war; 
the establishment of autonomy; and the restoration of humanity. He saw all three of 
these tenets as deriving from Okinawa's modem history, particularly the war experience 
He concluded that Okinawans' desire for peace came from regret for the loss of 
life of almost one in every three Okinawans during the Battle of Okinawa, and a~ a 
reaction against the Japanese government's policies towards the islands. Ota noted that 
historieally the Japanese government had only been concerned with Okinawa as a 
military buffer zone in order to defend the rest of Japan. He pointed out that during the 
Meiji Period, the Japanese state stationed military forces in Okinawa in spite of the 
fierce objections of the Ryukyuan court. The Battle of Okinawa was seen as the tragic 
consequence ofthe military role forced upon Okinawa. Ota also contrasted the reversion 
movement with prewar assimilation policies. From the abolition of the Ryukyu 
Kingdom in the Meiji period, the modem history of Okinawa was the history of 
by many who had previously been avid supporters of return to Japan. David Tobaru Obenrriller observes 
of this phenomenon: "Even though much anti-reversion sentiment arose from dissatisfaction over the 
reversion negotiations (especially the continuation of the status quo of the VS bases), l believe the anti-
Japanese sentiment reflects a nascent expression of an Okinawan ethnic nationalism at a popular level" 
("The Okinawan Struggle over Identity, Historical Memory, and Cultural Representation," p. 15). 
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"Taiken ni nezasu 'hansen': Nichibei gill\ii kanri ni kikikan", Asahi Shinbun (19 October 1971) 
Evening Edition. 
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"Japanization" (.Nihonka). Becoming Japanese was equated with "the production of 
imperial subjects" (kominka). The national government expunged all things 
"Okinawan" and introduced an education system centred on the ideology of the 
emperor. Ota saw the Battle of Okinawa as the tragic result of this indoctrination and 
Okinawans' desire to gain identity as Japanese. In repentance, Okinawans sought 
reversion in order to obtain human rights or a "human identity," rafuer than simply a 
"Japanese" one. Reversion was in this sense a struggle for the pursuit of autonomy, as 
well as rights as national citizens. Ota stressed that war had taught Okinawans fue 
importance of individual will or subjectivity (shutaisei). In advocating reversion, they 
would to be able to determine their own path, free from US occupation. 52 
Ota also stressed that the US and Japanese endeavours to maintain and even 
reinforce Okinawa's strategic military importance after reversion-now through the 
joint management of both governments-directly contravened these three tenets of the 
'Okinawan spirit. ' 53 He saw the pursuit of reversion to be antifuetical to fue US military 
presence and fue further militarisation of Okinawa furough the stationing of Japan's Self 
Defence Forces (SDF). In various writings during this time, Ota criticized Japanese 
government attempts to station Japan's SDF on the island as part of the supposed 
"defence of Okinawa." He drew on fue lessons of the Battle of Okinawa in exposing to 
question Japanese government-defined notions of "defence," "security," and fue 
"national interest." In particular, he saw fue relationship between Okinawan civilians 
and fue Japanese military during fue war as epitomizing the self-interested motives of 
fue state and the military. 
52 Ibid. See also Okinawa no lw!wro (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1972). 
53 Ota wrote: "In other words, the set of conditions which we abhor and fear the most, the "joint control" 
of Okinawa through the US-Japan military order, is becoming a reality" ("Taiken ni nezasu 'hansen': 
Nichibei gunji kanri ni kikikan", ibid.). 
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The most chilling reminders of the discrepancies between military strategy and 
civilian protection lay in the incidents of civilian atrocities perpetuated by the Japanese 
military during the course of the war. Ota first examined some of these cases in The 
Ugly Japanese. Numerous cases of civilian atrocities perpetuated by the Japanese 
military have been recorded. Up to twenty civilians were tortured and massacred by the 
Japanese military under commander orders in Ota's home island of Kume. The US 
marines landed in force on Kume Island on 26 June 1945. Asato, a local and employee 
ofKume Island's Post Office, was captured by the US military and sent to the Japanese 
army base with a message demanding surrender. He was executed on the spot by the 
Japanese army commander, and his wife and children later drowned themselves in the 
river. Nine people who were initially caught by the US military and released were 
subsequently shot to death by members of the Japanese army and their bodies burnt. 
Another villager, Nakandakari, travelled back to Kume from Okinawa Island and 
sought to notify locals that the war was already over, but was killed by the Japanese 
military together with his wife on 18 August. Two days later, a Korean family of seven 
were killed by the Japanese military intelligence. 54 
While in these cases civilians were clearly directly killed by the hands of the 
supposed "friendly" army (yUgun ), incidents of what was referred to as "compulsory 
group suicide" (ky6sei sareta shudan jiketsu) are more complex. On the island of 
Tokashiki for example, where almost four hundred civilians committed "group suicide," 
it remained a point of contention as to whether the Japanese military actually gave out a 
military command ordering the civilians to commit suicide. Civilian survivors attested 
that after the Americans landed on Tokashiki, the locals were told to gather in the 
Japanese army camp, where they were ordered to commit mass suicide by the military 
commander. They were handed grenades by the Japanese army, and those who did not 
54 For an account of these incidents in English see also Matthew Allen, Identity and Resistance in 
Okinawa. 
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immediately die from the blast subsequently began murder one another with sticks, 
razor blades, pots, and farm tools, hitting each other over the head and cutting one 
another's throats. The Japanese general who commanded over Tokashiki, however, 
while acknowledging the suicides occurred, avidly denied that he ordered them to take 
place. In an interview in 1968 the commander asserted: "I think the civilians felt at the 
time it better to die and not be burden for the army." Aware of this complexity, Ota 
included the discrepant positions between civilians and the military in his analysis in 
The Ugly Japanese. In conclusion he placed the multiple incidents of "compulsory 
group suicides," whether "self-determined" or coerced by the military, in the context of 
an ill-prepared, reckless war, where the locals faced military onslaught, starvation, and 
an army unconcerned -..vith their fate. He also suggested that, as in many elements in the 
Battle of Okinawa, at question was the "national character" (kokuminse1) of Japanese 
themselves-and an underlying prejudice towards Okinawans. 55 
On the one hand the multiple incidents of civilian atrocities in the Battle of 
Okinawa provided all too horrific evidence for Ota to question the intrinsic nature of the 
Japanese military, and the Japanese government's claims to national security in the 
present. Remembrance of Japanese military atrocities against civilian coincided with 
and became highly politicised within opposition to the placement of Japanese Defence 
Forces within Okinawa. Yet these incidents of atrocities also raised questions about 
Okinawa's position within Japan. For was it merely that the military did not protect the 
civilians, or was it also that they did not consider the Okinawans worth protecting-as 
not "Japanese" enough?56 Ota only implicitly raised this problematic, yet it produced 
55 Questions of historical agency and the incorporation of imperial ideology within Okinawa integral to 
the complexities surrounding incidents of"group suicide" came to the fore in relation to textbook issues 
in the 1980s as examined in the following section. 
56 This issue has been examined by Tomiyama Ichiro (see for example, Tomiyama Ichiro, Se'iio no kioku 
(Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, 1995)). In Eaglish, see for example Ichiro Tomiyama, "Spy': 
Mobilization and Identity in Wartime Okinawa," Senri Ethnological Studies, 51 (2000), pp. 121-32. 
Tomiyama positions the mobilization ofOkinawans during the war as the extreme manifestation of the 
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inherent tensions in his analysis on war. On the one hand Ota adopted many of the 
tenets of Japanese postwar pacifism, particularly in his separation of the state (kokka) 
from the people (kokumin), and his questioning of the legitimacy of the former as 
protector of the latter. On the other hand, Okinawans were placed in opposition to the 
"national character" of the "Japanese" which formed the base of discrimination which 
Okinawans experiences within Japan. Okinawans were sacrificed not only through the 
US military onslaught, but in the direct hands of the Japanese military. Moreover, 
discrimination continued in the form of US military occupation and Ignorance, 
indifference, or even complicity in securing Okinawa's plight. Knowledge of this 
discrimination, and a sense of ambivalence towards mainland Japan, rose to the surface 
as in became only too evident that reversion would fail to realize the ideals of peace and 
autonomy. 
In 1971, on the eve of the ratification of the reversion treaty, Ota deeply 
regretted the fact that Okinawans were not only the "victims" (higaisha) of US-Japan 
postwar policy, but also "aggressors" (kagaisha) in Asia, as (unwilling) host to large US 
military bases both during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. 57 The underlying violence 
embedded within the US military presence, and the immediacy of the Vietnam War as 
embodied in this presence, complexly overlapped with traumatic memories of the Battle 
of Okinawa. Yet as in the prewar period, the process of "becoming Japanese" through 
reversion only reinforced Okinawa's compromised position. Okinawa's dual role--as 
both victim and aggressor-formed the core of Ota's philosophieal dilemma. The 
ideology of assimilation and "Japaniz.ation" expounded since the Meiji Era. 
57
" 'lrei no Hi' ni kokoro iradatsu: Mabuni no jigokue, ima mo", RS (23 June 1971), p. 17. Nicholas Evan 
Sarantakes suggests that Okinawa's military strategic importance during the Vietnam War may not have 
been as great as locals believed, and that the US Air Force made almost no use of airfields in Okinawa 
during the Vietnam War due to strong local opposition, though he does not provide extensive historical 
material to maintain this claim (Sarantakes, Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and US-
Japan Relations, op cit, pp. 142-43). Other evidence attests tbat at least from 1968 Okinawa was a major 
departure point forB-52 bombing campaigns over Vietnam (see Chapter Two). 
57 
incidents of "mass suicide" themselves highlighted in horrific detail the inmixing of 
consent and coercion symbolic of Okinawa's incorporation v,'ithin the modern Japanese 
nation-state. Hierarchical relations of dependence were duplicated in the postwar period 
through Okinawa's dual subjugation to the US and Japan. Moreover, in spite of 
reversion, again Okinawa was unable to defy the role imposed upon it as the "keystone" 
of (imperial) hegemonic military power in the region-to be the "determinant of its own 
history." In response, Ota sought to resist Okinawan incorporation into reified structures 
of violence by reclaiming an Okinawan identity-an identity which in turn became 
inextricably interlinked with a perceived sense of Okinawans' peaceful traditions and 
desire for peace founded on remembrance of the tragedy and sacrifice of war. 58 
War remembrance thus became increasingly politicised and intertwined within 
contests over reversion in the years up to 1972. Neither did its significance abate with 
Okinawa's return to Japan. On the contrary, on the eve of ratification of the US-Japan 
agreement on Okinawa, Ota expressed an ever fiercer conviction of the burning 
necessity to derive meaning from his war experience: 
In the so-called "Okinawa Diet" proceedings which begin from this coming !6 
October [1971], the US and Japanese governments 'hill no doubt ratify the 
"Agreement on Okinawan Reversion", formulated mthout the participation of the 
Okinawan people. In doing so, they will fully fortify the "state mil" (kokka is hi). 
If this is the case, it is certain that Okinawa mil face its most serious turning point 
in the postwar period. Under these conditions, there is an urgent necessity to 
reconsider our experiences in the Battle of Okinawa and reconfirm our 
determination to maintain our ''original resolution" [on rebirth and the need to 
seek autonomy] as we look to the future. Today, as Japanese, bolstered by the 
achievements of high economic growth, endeavor to unrepentantly reappraise the 
"Pacific War," I cannot but begin the arduous process of relaying in depth my 
"In this way, as Matthew Allen has pointed ou~ a clear distinction should he made between tropes on 
war victims and peace in Okinawa and in relation to for example Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Matthew 
Allen, Identity and Resistance in Okinawa, p. 48). 
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ovm war experience. 59 
Contesting Official History and Textbook Wars: The Battle of 
Okinawa on Trial 
In the eighteen odd years from Okinawan reversion to his early retirement from 
the University of the Ryukyus to stand in the Okinawan gubernatorial elections of 1990, 
Ota produced the majority of his considerable set of works to date on the Battle of 
Okinawa. He continued to extend his analysis of the war from accounts of his ovm war 
experience to more comprehensive historical analyses of the battle. Utilizing an 
extensive range of history materials, 60 he examined the battle from various perspectives: 
the ground preparation strategy of the military on both sides (or, in the case of the 
Japanese side, the lack of effective strategic preparation); military operations and 
tactics; the course of combat; and the plight of Okinawan civilians during the war. On 
the plight of civilians, he examined atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese military on 
local civilians suspected of "spying," cases of civilian "compulsory group suicide," and 
discriminatory policies of the Japanese military, such as an ordinance forbidding the use 
ofOkinawan language.61 
59 Ota Masahide, "Okinawa to watashi," pp. 3-4. 
60 Including hlstorical materials from US military records, disclosed documents from the War Records 
Office of Japan's Defense Research Institute, American wartime press clippings, and the war testimonies 
of Okinawan civilians. 
61 Works by Ota Masahide on the Battle of Okinawa from this period include: This Was the Batlle of 
Okinawa (Kaha: Naha Shuppankai, 1981); Okinawasen: sensa to heiwa (Tokyo: Shakai Shinsho, 1981); 
Soshi Okinawasen (Tokyo: lwanami Shoten, 1982); Nahajujii daikiishii (Tokyo: Kume Shoten, 1984); 
and Okinawa-sen to wa nanika (Tokyo: Kumeshoten, 1985). Ota has also compiled several collections of 
photographs from the battle, such as: Ota Masahide, Kore ga Okinawasen da: shashin kiroku (Naha: 
Ryukyu Shinposha, 1977); and Ota Masahide (ed.) Shashinshii: Okinawasen (Naha: Naha Shuppansha, 
!990). Ota recounts that he travelled extensively to Washington to gather information from US archives 
on both the war and the US occupation of Okinawa during this time. Former University ofRyukyus 
professor Miyagi Etsujiro also accompanied Ota on many of these trips and assisted in the editing and 
proofreading of0ta's English texts (author's interview "ith Ota Masahide, 4 May 2001, and with Miyagi 
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Ota's post-reversion analyses on war were integrally eonneeted to his endeavour 
to reclaim a sense of Okinawan identity in the face of strong homogenizing forces and 
the fragmentation of the community which accompanied the massive influx of capital 
into Okinawa in the early 1970s. These conditions will be more closely examined in 
Chapter Three. Here it suffices to note that war remembrance became intimately related 
to the endeavour to reclaim a sense of "identity loss" which accompanied reversion. Ota 
contrasted the peaceful traditions of Okinawa from the time of the Ryukyu Kingdom 
\Vith the "samurai" military spirit of mainland Japan.62 Tropes on Okinawa's peaceful 
tradition and "ideology of peace" (heiwa shiso), Okinawa's plight during the war, and 
historical lessons on discrepancies between military strategy and civilian protection 
were integrally linked to contests against the continuing large US military presence, 
state-sanctioned historical narratives, and Okinawa's position v.ithin Japan.63 
Particularly after reversion, within the Okinawa peace movement the Ryukyu 
Kingdom was idealized as a period of prosperity and peace, in contrast to the 
longstanding oppression which proceeded its downfall. As Linda Angst points out, 
while this teleological reading of history and focus on Japanese oppression held the 
danger of understating the agency of historical actors, it provided a powerful 
contribution to the formation of a collective ethnic identity, political resistance, and a 
new vision of civil society.64 For Ota, it also enabled a politics of possibility fbr Japan 
Etsujiri'i, 24 February 2001). 
62 See for example Ota 1vfasahide, "Taiken ni nezasu 'hansen': Nichibei gunji kanri ni kikikan"; and 
"Okinawa no heiwa shiso ni !suite." Heiwa kenkyii, No.4, June (1975); 65"72. 
63 The tensions noted in Ota's work from the pre,reversion era are also present here. On the one hand, Ota 
presents Okinawa's plight during the war as exemplary of the tragedy which would have become Japan, 
as a relatively small island nation, if it bad had to fight a ground war on its soiL At the same time, he is 
highly critical of the way in which the Japanese government has been repeatedly willing to "sacrifice" 
Okinawa in order to protect the perceived safety and profit of "Japan proper" (.Wyi1 ryl5do ), both during 
the war and in the postwar period. Ota Masahide, Okinawa: Sensa to Heiwa (Tokyo; Asahi Bunko, 1996) 
(reprint: first published by Shakai Shinsho in 1982), p, 50. 
" In a Dark Time: Community, Memory, and the Making of Ethnic Selves in Okinawan Women s 
Narratives, p. 50. 
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as a whole, and beyond. Considering the importance of viewing peace from within 
Okinawa, Ota concluded: 
I must always [think about the meaning of peace] from within my everyday life, 
forced to live side by side with military bases. It is significant to question the idea 
of peace from Okinawa not merely because we, the residents of Okinawa, 
suffered such a tragic fate in the previous war. More than anything ... it is because 
it is only by revitalizing and fully upholding the Okinawa's traditional notions of 
peace that the safety of Japan can be ensured, and we can contribute to a peaceful 
coexistence between all peoples. 65 
Yet, contrary to Ota's pacifist idealist aims, Okinawan history was largely 
excluded from Japan's education curriculum. In the afterward to Okinawa: War and 
Peace, dated March 1982, Ota criticized the pervasive lack of references to Okinawa 
within Education Ministry-approved textbooks. Up to 1960 Okinawa was literally non-
existent in textbooks used in Japan.66 Yet even in post-reversion textbooks, conditions 
did not change a great deal. Only fragmentary references were made to the Battle of 
Okinawa, generally in relation to the Himeyuri Corps, preventing the students from 
having any wmprehensive understanding of the war. Moreover, Ota noted that some 
texts referred to Okinawan reversion in 1972 without even mentioning that Okinawa 
was separated from Japan and placed under direct US military rule in the first instance. 
He reproached the Ministry of Education's textbook approval system and conservative 
nationalist trends in Japan. He called for the implementation of a system more befitting 
65 Okinawa: Sensi5 to Heiwa, pp. 212-3. 
66 11lls is verified by Nakasone Seizen, who recounts that in the early postwar period, when Japanese 
textbooks were imported to Okinawa, maps of Japan did not include Okinawa. The publishers claimed 
thai if Okinawa, which was under US military rule, was included in fbe maps, it would not pass the 
Japanese Education Ministry's approval system. Somewhat ironically, Nakasone had to request thai the 
publishers print a special version of the text for use only in Okinawa that included the islands of Okinawa 
v.ithin a map of Japan. Nakasone concludes: '"Okinawa' no doubt remained a 'gap' forever open in fbe 
minds of the generation [of Japanese] who were educated with that textbook." (Interview wifb Nakasone 
Seizen in Arasaki Moriteru (ed.), Okinawa gendaishi e no shOgen, (Part Two) (Naha: Okinawa 
Taimususha, \982) p. 193). 
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to the democratic principles of Japan's constitution, and the complete revision of 
curriculum content. 
Ota's appeal formed part of a growing literature in the early 1980s on Japan's 
war responsibility. As liberal and leftwing historians began to write highly controversial 
issues such as the Nanking massacre into school textbooks, the Ministry of Education in 
turn utilized the textbook screening process to "modify" such histories. In the summer 
of 1982 it became apparent that the Ministry was demanding the revision of references 
to Okinawan civilian massacres perpetrated by the Japanese military from a draft 
history textbook as a condition of approving its use in high schools. 67 As a reason for 
rejecting the sentence in question, the ministry asserted that The Battle of Okinawa War 
Records (Okinawasen kiroku, Volume Nine of the Okinawa Board of Education (eds.) 
Okinawan Prefectural History (Okinawa kenshi)), which was cited as reference, were 
not reliable "primary historical material." This compilation of testimonies from the war 
was the only existing official record of its kind, and its pages detail numerous incidents 
of atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese military against civilians, including the 
extortion of food, forced expulsion from refuge caves, and murder. 68 Through 
privileging official documented histories of the war compiled largely from military 
sources, the Ministry sought to delegitimise the personal, subversive, and marginalised 
oral histories of Okinawan civilians. Outraged at the ministry's stance, the Okinawan 
prefectural assembly passed a unanimous resolution in protest addressed to both the 
Cabinet and the Education Ministry on 4 September 1982. A prefecture-wide 
demonstration calling for the "democratisation of education" and involving 84 different 
Okinawan citizen groups was held ten days later. In a flood of contributions to local 
67 This first became publicly known on 26 June, 1982. For a detailed summary of the incident and its 
implications, see Shima Tsuyoshi, Okinawasen o kangaeru, pp. 65-82. 
68 Shima Tsuyosbi points out that neither the Japanese government nor the Government of the Ryukyus 
during the US occupation of Okinawa had ever conducted an official survey on civilian atrocities (ibid., p. 
65). 
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Okinawan newspapers, several hitherto unknown incidents of civilian massacres were 
also disclosed in emotional eye-witness testimonies. 69 In response, the Ministry of 
Education was foreed to retract its appraisal of The Battle of Okinawa War Records, but 
it did not change its position on the textbook in question. The ministry only approved 
the text after the reference to civilian atrocities was removed, defeating the first attempt 
to include the existence of these incidents during the Battle of Okinawa within a 
Japanese school textbook. 
At the same time as this issue erupted, a much more publicized (that is, more 
publicized outside of Okinawa)70 battle was being fought between Japan and other East 
Asian countries over Japan's textbook screening process. The controversy began after it 
was widely reported that the Ministry of Education had attempted to water dovm 
Japan's aggression on the Asian continent in textbooks, in particular by suggesting that 
publishers replace the term "invasion" (shinryaku) with "advance" (shinshitsu).71 Under 
diplomatic pressure from China and Korea, then Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa 
Kiichi announced in August that the Japanese goverament would "revise" the textbook 
descriptions. In November, the Ministry of Education also officially armounced that it 
would include a new provision in its screening process that textbooks take note of the 
importance of "international friendship and cooperation" in discussions of Japan's 
historical relations in Asia.72 
" Ibid., p. 66. 
10 Shima Tsuyoshi notes that one of Okinawa's main newspapers, the Okinawa Taimusu. for example, 
published a series of sixty-one articles on the textbook issue during the summer of 1982 (ibid., p. 66). 
11 Nozaki Yoshiko and Inoguchi Hiromitsu note that in July of 1982 the Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
and the People's Republic of China officially protested to the Japanese government, and by September 
more than 2,000 reports on Japanese textbook screening had appeared in the press of nineteen Asian 
countries (Nozalci Yoshiko and Inoguchi Hiromitsu "Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga 
Saburo's Textbook Lawsuits" in Mark Selden and Laura Hein (eds.) Censoring History: Citizenship and 
Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United Stares (Armonk, New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), 
p. 113). They also point out that while it Wd.S reported in the press as a new phenomenon, the Ministry of 
Education had been making such requests from the 1960s (ibid., p. 125). 
72 Ibid., p. 114. 
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In February 1983, Ota contributed an article in English to the Japan Times in 
which he contrasted the Japanese government's reaction to the demands of East Asian 
countries with their lack of response to the Okinawa issue. He observed: "The Japanese 
government has tended to be weak under pressure from abroad but tough concerning 
demands from ·within." Yet he also concluded that the concessions made to China and 
Korea while appreciable were still a mere palliative. He suggested that what was 
required was in fact a thorough historical review of the formation of modern Japan and 
"the crimes Japanese have committed against our neighbours," as well as the 
implementation of "permanent preventative measures" so the mistakes of war were not 
repeated again. Ota observed that the Japanese government had still not displayed a 
willingness to combat these issues-a fact most clearly sho'.'Vn in the Okinawa case. The 
deletion of passages on the killing of civilians by Japanese troops was indicative of the 
fact that the Japanese government, in seeking to expand Japan's military capability, "is 
unwilling to inform the people of what war really means." 73 Ota surmised: "The 
[textbook] issue has not been settled. It has merely been patched up for the moment."74 
His prediction would be proven correct--a mere year later, in 1984, the Ministry 
of Education's revisions of another textbook became the subject of a lawsuit. The 
plaintiff was historian Ienaga Sabur6, a long-time opponent of the Ministry of 
Education's screening process. After the Japanese government had reassured 
neighbouring countries in 1982 that it would correct depictions of Japan's relations ;vith 
Asia in school textbooks, Ienaga requested permission to make such corrections to his 
13 The full sentence reads; "While the Japanese Government has never tried to conduct a full-scale survey 
on the losses among Okinawan, the Education Ministry dispnted the number of Okinawan casualties, as 
claimed by Okinawans. and forced the total deletion of passages from textbooks on the killing of 
Okinawans by Japanese troops. This must be because the government, seeking to expand the military 
capability of Japan, is unwilling to infonn the people of what war really means .. ("Remember Battle of 
Okinawa and Textbook Issue; Government has Tradition ofMisrepresenting-or Even Omitting-Facts 
on Ryukyus .. (sic.), Japan Times (6 February 1983), p. 4. Ota includes in his analysis a review of how 
Okinawa was represented in pre-war textbooks as well as in the postwar period. 
74 Ibid .. 
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New Japanese History (Shin Nihonshi), whieh had already been approved by the 
ministry after substantial revisions. The ministry refused, and in 1983 after lenaga 
submitted a revised manuscript of his earlier text, he was again forced to make 
substantial revisions on some seventy points. Ienaga challenged the Ministry for "abuse 
of power" on eight specific points that it had demanded be revised for approval. Four 
were related to Japanese aggression in China, one the colonization of Korea, two more 
concerned protests within Japan against the imperial system, and one was over the 
Battle of Okinawa. It was Ienaga's third lawsuit against the state. Yet it was the first 
time that c.ontests over the Battle of Okinawa in textbooks were to be waged in a c.ourt 
of law. 75 Ota also became directly involved as one of the witness for the prosecution, in 
his first legal dispute with the Japanese government. 76 
The revision on the Battle of Okinawa under contention related to a sentence in 
Ienaga's original draft textbook which mentioned than "more that a few" Okinawan 
residents who died in the war were "killed as a consequence of the Japanese Army" 
(Nihongun no tame ni korosareta). No doubt sensitive to the widespread outrage its 
earlier "revision" on civilian atrocities had provoked, the Ministry of Education did not 
dispute this tact. Instead, it requested that as "mass suicides" (shiidan jiketsu, also 
translated as either "collective suicides" or "group suicides") had resulted in the largest 
number of civilian victims in the war, the text must include an account of these mass 
suicides in order that the battle be "objectively comprehended." 77 Ienaga' s counsel 
75 A part of the court proceedings were also held in Naha, Okinawa. In a dialogue with Ota, Ienaga 
asserted: "Now at last a part of court proceedings will be held in Okinawa. This is an epic event and the 
first of its kind. I am very happy that four testifiers, including lhose who experienced lhe Battle of 
Okinawa themselves and war historians, will be able to take to the stand" ("Heiwa to minshfishugi o 
kangaeru," dialogue between Ota Masahide and Ienaga Saburo (Part Three of a Three-part Series), OT 
(13 January 1988), p. 6). 
76 For a comprehensive summary and analysis oflenaga's trials, see Nozaki and lnoguchi "Japanese 
Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo's Textbook Lawsuits." 
77 For a comprehensive analysis of the revisions and their significance, see Koji Taira ""The Battle of 
Okinawa in Japanese History Textbooks" in Chalmers Johnson (ed.) Okinawa: Cold War Island (Cardiff: 
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opposed the ministry's claim that: "mass suicide" was the main cause of civilian deaih; 
ihat it must be mentioned along wiih civilian killings by ihe Japanese military in order 
to present an objective view of the Battle of Okinawa; and that the term "mass suicide" 
adequately conveyed ihe fact that force and pressure on the part of ihe Japanese Army 
bad formed a factor in these incidents. Ienaga also questioned the intentions of the 
~linistry of Education. Namely, he interpreted the Ministry's request as an attempt to 
tone down the statement that "more than a few civilians were killed a~ a consequence of 
the Japanese Army," and alternatively emphasize the noble and sacrificial spirit of 
Okinawan victims.18 
The Japanese phra~e "mass suicides," shudan jiketsu, contains inferences 
inherently Jacking in the English translation. The word used for suicide,jiketsu, literally 
means self-determination (as in ethnic self-determination). As a euphemism, it evokes a 
sense of determinate v.ill and therefore heroic honour in deaih ihat ihe usual Japanese 
term for suicide, jisatsu, does not. As Koji Taira points out, to call such cases jisatsu 
would "amount to blasphemy." 79 To use shudan (group, mass, or 'collective,' as in 
'collective security') jiketsu is iherefore to infer that ihe Okinawans sacrificed 
ihemselves en masse out of iheir own (honorable) will, and for the sake of ihe Japanese 
Imperial Nation. 80 '\\'hile on one level a question of semantics, on anoiher level 
contentions over the appropriate use of "mass suicides" as a term ihus raised 
fundamental issues concerning ihe nature and significance of ihe Battle of Okinawa. 
Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), pp. 39-49. 
78 Kyokasho Kentei Sosh6 o shlen suru Zenkoku Renraknkai (eds.). Ienaga kyokasho saiban 5: 
Okinawasen no jissi5 (Tokyo: Rongu Shuppan, 1990), prologue. 
79 Koji Taira "The Battle of Okinawa in Japanese History Textbooks," op cit., p. 42. 
80 During the war itself the expression used was gyakusai, or literally "shattered jewels," clearly a 
valorization of the act of giving one's body and life up for the sake of the Emperor and Imperial Nation. 
The term shildan jiketsu has rather ironically been traced hack to Okinawa itself. It is thought it began to 
be used, together with the phrase "collective death" or shiidan shi, around the time of the publication of 
Testu no biifu, that is 1950-5L OkinawanAniya Masaaki insists, however, that the term was not used to 
mean or infer that the deaths were in fact self -determined, although unfortunately this is the nuance that 
using the phrase on its o"n gives (Aniya Masaaki, Sabakareta Okinawasen, op cit., p. 180 (note II)). 
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Firstly, there was the question of whether the mass deaths could be seen as voluntary 
acts of free-will-a "self-determined" suicide. Secondly, there was the wider, more 
ephemeral, and yet vital issue of what inferred meaning the civilian deaths were to be 
given. Ienaga, his counsel, and his supporters, focused on the aggressions of the 
Japanese military and the atrocities they had perpetrated on Okinawans. The Ministry of 
Education sought to emphasize the sense of sacrifice and pathns in the civilian deaths-
therein implanting patriotic will onto the Okinawan civilians whether it existed or not, 
and implicitly endorsed it. 
Ota, together with the three other witness for the prosecution on the Battle of 
Okinawa issue, Aniya Masaaki, Kinjo Shigeaki, and Yamakawa Munehide, opposed 
both the Ministry's simplification of the complex set of conditions under which 
Okinawan civilians met their death into the phrase "mass suicide," and the glorification 
of these deaths. The Ienaga trial moved to the Naha Court especially to hear the four 
testimonies from I 0-11 February, 1988. Aniya and Kinjo were, together with Ota, 
university professors, and Yamakawa was a practicing teacher in Japanese History at 
Futemna High School. All were born and lived in Okinawa, and all but Y amakawa had 
directly experienced the war. 
Kinjo was born on the tiny island of Tokashiki, where 329 people had died (out 
of an estimated total population of 1300) in the "mass suicides"-what historian Aniya 
refers to as the "mass mutual killings" (shiidan teki na koroshiai)-of28 March 1945.81 
During his testimony, Kinjo brought the court to a stunned silence in his harrowing tale 
of events after the US landing on the Kerama group of islands on 27 March 1945.82 
Kinjo recounted that on the evening of the twenty-seventh, the Japanese military 
"See Aniya Masaaki's testimony in Kyokasho Kentei Sosho o shien suru Zenkoku Renrakukai (eds.). 
Ienaga kyokasho saiban 5: Okinawa-sen no jisso, pp. 136-212. See also Aniya Masaaki, Sabakareta 
Okinawasen (Tokyo: Banseisha, 1989). 
82 See the description of the court scene in Murakami Yoshio. '"Shlidan jiket.su' de wa nai. 'Oit.surnerareta 
shlidan no shi' da," Asahi Jaanaru (26 February 1998), pp. 82-6. 
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command on Tokashiki Island ordered all civilians to move to a designated area closer 
to the army's camp. After the islanders had gathered under the pelting rain, they were 
handed the few spare grenades left, and news that the military were ordering "suicide" 
spread. Some people tried to escape, but many were led back by soldiers on patroL 
Husbands began killing wives, parents their children, and brothers their sisters, with 
pots, sticks, stones, whatever was at hand. Kinjo explained to the coUrt that the event 
most deeply seared forever onto his brain was when he and his elder brother took to 
their mother. They either used a stone or a rope-he couldn't clearly recollect which. 
But there was no mistaking that he, v,ith his brother, killed his mother with his own 
hands. He recounted on the stand: "For the first time in my life, I wailed out aloud, 
overcome V>ith anguish. But it was only a sheer expression of my love ... In order that 
the people who the men loved were not murdered in the hands of those 'foreign beasts' 
(kichiku beiei), so that the women did not have to suffer the humiliation of rape. At least 
to kill them with your own hands, to have at least that consolation, it was with that 
thought that I took the lives of those who were dear to me. "B3 
In his testimony, Ota recounted how, during the course of the battle and after 
repeatedly coming fact to face with the inhumane carnage of war, he began to question 
his entire education up to that point. Ota placed his own experience in the historical 
context of education in Okinawa from the Meiji period. He testified to the court that the 
most conspicuous aspect of pre-war imperial education in Okinawa was the extent of 
so-called "Japanization." From the Meiji period, the education system had been based 
on the premise that Okinawan history and culture was inherently inferior to that of the 
rest of Japan. It promoted the complete annihilation of Okinawan culture and all things 
"backward" through rigorous indoctrination. Ota concluded that it was precisely this 
system which gave birth to Okinawans' "beast-like devotion" (dobutsu teki chfiseishin), 
" Kinjo's testimony in Kyok:asho Kentei SoshO o shien suru Zenkoku Renrakukai (eds.), Jenaga kyokasho 
saiban 5: Okinawasen no jisso, p. 99. 
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citing Oya Soichi's well known phrase, to the imperial cause during the war. Ota thus 
placed paramount importance on the power of indoctrination. Ota used the phrase 
"beast-like devotion" because he saw it as most adequately problematizing Okinawans' 
slave-like devotion to the imperial system, assimilationist policies, and the nature of 
prewar education, and because unlike tenns like "devotion" or "purity," it did not seek 
to glorify the war.84 
Ota explicitly opposed not only the Ministry of Education's corrections, but the 
screening process as a whole. He asserted that the Ministry of Education's revisions 
revealed a lack of repentance for the war, and the screening process attested to the 
state's continued extensive control over education in the postwar period. In a powerful 
speech against Japan's education system, Ota directly criticized the Ministry of 
Education's postwar screening system in the context of the inherent flaws of Japan's 
prewar education: 
What did an "education promoting the making of imperial subjects" (/Wminka 
kyoiku ), and that is precisely what prewar education was, entail? That which the 
state (lwkka) detennined was correct was laid down in textbooks, and only those 
textbooks chosen by the state were used in school. In my experience, nothing but 
these texts were used in class. Thus, everything you knew was what was fed to 
you. And, if the teacher said "use this textbook," you just swallowed it word for 
word. That was the kind of education I received. From that experience, personally 
I instinctively dislike it when the ruling political authority tries to enforce onto 
educational eon tent its O\\TI perspective as the one and only correct view ... 
In other words, I believe that educational content should maintain diversity, and 
that it should allow a freedom of choice ... In this sense, in relation to the basic 
principles of education, the writers of textbooks should be free to write their texts 
according to the principles laid out in the Basic Education Law, as founded on the 
Japanese Constitution, and the teachers given autonomy to choose texts, also 
taking account of whether or not these principles have been adhered to ... 85 
84 Ota's testimony in ibid., particularly pp. J 1-20. 
85 Ibid,, pp. 18-19. 
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lbe counsel for the Japanese goverrunent brought two people to the stand in 
support of their case during proceedings in Tokyo--novelist and Sasagawa Peace 
Foundation Trustee, Sono Ayako, and director of the Japanese Defense Agency's War 
Records Room, Ichitomi Noboru. Ichitomi went so far as to deny that civilian murders 
had even taken place, and his testimony was ultimately dismissed by the court for lack 
of objectivity. Sono is a well-knovvn Japanese novelist.86 She visited Okinawa in the 
late sixties to gather historical material on the war, and interviewed the former Japanese 
military commander on T okashiki Island, General Akamatsu Kijigen, as well as civilian 
survivors. Based on these findings, and Akamatsu's diary of events, she wrote an 
account on the mass deaths at Kerama Islands first as a journal series and later as a book 
entitled The Story Behind a Afyth (Aru shinwa no haikei). 87 Sono came to the conclusion 
that there was no evidence that the military had ordered civilians on the island of 
Tokashiki to commit suicide. She debunked earlier accounts of the Tokashiki deaths 
published in The Typhoon of Steel (Testu no bi5fo)88 as having been based on second-
hand accounts from people living in the main island of Okinawa. She surmised that 
survivors had in part not corrected these erroneous claims because of stipulations in 
Japan's war compensation legislation. She also concluded that Akamatsu's order to kill 
civilians suspected of being "spies" was based on military law and could not be 
condemned from a legal or moral point of view. In her testimony to the court, Sono 
asserted that Akamatsu had not given any direct army command ordering the civilians 
to commit suicide. She also emphasized that the military were dispatched to T okashiki 
" More recently she drew media attention for providing lodgings to former Peruvian president and 
colleagne Fujimori Alberto after he announced he would step down from the presidency and remain in 
Japan amongst charges of longstanding corruption. 
37 There is no doubting discrepancies exist in war accounts, as Shima Tsuyoshi also argues in Okinawasen 
o kangaeru, pp. 107-29. Sono Ayako also argued that residents in Tokashiki Island had asserted there was 
a military order commanding them to commit suicide so that they could claim benefits from the 
government. 
88 Naha: Okinawa Taimususha, 1950. 
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island not to protect the islanders per se, but to attack the oncoming enemy for the sake 
of Japan as a whole. g9 
As Okinawan historian Shima Tsuyoshi conceded in 1983, the Typhoon of Steel 
did include historically questionable assertions, and: "At this stage there exists no 
historical evidence which can counter Sono's explanation on account of fact."90 By the 
mid-l980s on the island of Zamami, near Tokashiki, some locals came to admit that 
there had not in fact existed a military order demanding civilians to commit suicide. 
According to local historian Miyagi Harumi, her mother, Miyagi Hatsue, directly met 
with former military commander Umesawa Yutaka in December 1980 and confessed 
that she had lied about the military order in the effort to ensure residents within the 
impoverished peripheral and war-stricken island who had lost family were eligible 
under Japanese legislation to receive compensation. Facing stress at being castigated by 
locals for divulging her long-kept and emotionally draining secret, and publicly exposed 
by Umesawa, Hatsue died of cancer in 1990.91 
Hatsue's personal trauma bespeaks of the complex and often 1ragic way in 
which individuals have sought to negotiate the contiguration of power relations in pre-
and postwar Okinawa. As a highly personal account, it divulges the way in which each 
individual was severely restricted within the disciplinary regimes of war without 
simplifYjng this process as total or encompassing the complete overvvriting of the 
subject, the element of choice, and responsibility.92 The civilian suicides and atrocities 
committed by the Japanese military in general bring to question issues of historical 
"Aniya !v1asaaki, Sabakoreta Okinawasen. Namihara Tsuneo made an important critique of Sono Ayako's 
work in the context of individual responsibility in "Sono Ayako's The Background of a Myth and Hannah 
Arendt," unpublished paper, International Sympesium on Hannah Arendt, University of the Ryukyus, 4 
December 2001. 
"'Shima Tsuyoshi, Okinawasen o kangaeru, p. 114. 
91 Miyagi Harumi, Haha no nokoshita mono (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 2001). 
91 On a sensitive account of these issues in an Okinawna context, see also Christopher T. Nelson, "Huziki 
Hayato, the Storyteller: Comedy, Practice and the Politics of Everyday Live in Okinawa," Postcolonial 
Studies, Vol. 4 No.2 (July 2001), pp. 189-209. 
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agency and victimization, and divulge how war remembrance has compounded with 
personal and political struggles in the postwar era. 
They also bring to question the construction of self and other at the foundation 
of national historical narratives and security discourse, and for these reasons remain 
inherently controversial as well as highly complex. As Tomiyama Ichiro has pointed 
out, fear of the Okinawan "spy"-s seen to be manifested in the incomprehensible 
Okinawan dialect-embodied fear of the other within. This fear reveals the ultimately 
violent and destructive ambiguity of overdetermined constructions of "us" and "them" 
which are at the core of total war discourses. For historians Miyagi Harumi and Shima 
Tsuyoshi, as well as Ota, at issue in the problem of civilian group suicides was similarly 
much more than the question of whether or not a military order existed. They 
challenged the assumption that the military represented or sought to protect civilians as 
a whole, and placed the sacrifices Okinawan civilians had made in the context of 
historical discrimination. As Shima criticizes, while Sono' s work cannot be disputed on 
fact, it ignores these important issues and merely reconstructs a patriotic narrative. 
The Ministry of Education sought to reaffirm the legitimacy of the state first by 
denying the occurrence of atrocities, and, when this \\'aS defeated, through emphasizing 
the way in which civilians "wilfully" sacrificed their lives to the nation body. On the 
other hand, by arguing that all civilian suicides were tantamount to murder, Ienaga 
wrote out the question of historical agency. The issues which arose in the Ienaga trial 
revealed the dilemma and problematic of the postwar liberal democratic movement-s 
a struggle for political autonomy through remembrance of its lack. In the context of the 
court room, lenaga' s sentence on the battle was placed against the Ministry of 
Education's "corre<:tions," and one had to be defined as more or less "correct" than the 
other. As a legal issue, the question centred around the legality of the Ministry of 
Education's corrections, rather than the screening process as a whole. The irony was 
that Ienaga's counsel could only claim the right to freedom of choice and diversity in 
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textbooks by asserting a counter historical truism. Yet by placing full blame for the 
tragedy of mass "compulsory suicides" during the Battle of Okinawa on the Japanese 
military, they ran the risk of obscuring the complexities of Okinawa's experience of war 
and modernity. 
The first judgement on lenaga' s third lawsuit against the state \.Vas passed dmvn 
in October 1989. The court questioned the validity of the Ministry of Education's claim 
that "collective suicide" had been the main cause of death during the Battle of Okinawa. 
Yet, it concluded that as "collective suicide" was also a distinct feature of the war, the 
Ministry of Education was not unlawful in demanding it be included in the text in 
question. In legal terms, Ienaga's claims on the revision over the Battle of Okinawa 
were defeated.93 Almost ten years later, on August 29, 1997, the five presiding judges in 
the Supreme Court passed down a unanimous verdict that it was not illegal for the 
Ministry of Education to issue the request for revision in relation to the Battle of 
Okinawa Ienaga's claims were upheld on only one point, relating to the biological 
warfare experiments of Unit 731.94 
Yet the proceedings on the Battle of Okinawa provided an itnportant public 
arena in which personal war experiences could be voiced. 95 They brought contested 
issues surrounding the battle to the attention of at least a portion of mainland Japanese 
press, and provided the means to further air these issues within Okinawa. They mounted 
a challenge against the Ministry of Education's screening process from within Japan of 
political implications well beyond the court room. Moreover, the debate over the Battle 
of Okinawa displayed how Japan's relations with Asia were also inherently eounected 
n Koji Taira, "The Battle of Okinmva in Japanese History Textbooks," pp. 46-7. 
94 The Supreme Court ruled 3-2 that the Ministry of Education's orders to delete all references to Unit 731 
from the text was an abuse of discretionary powers. 
9
' As Nozaki and Inokuchi point out, Ienaga's lawsuits "provided a countervailing force in the struggle 
over national narrative and identity construction in postwar Japan" ("Japanese Education, Nationalism, 
and Ienaga Saburo's Textbook Lawsuits," p. 119). 
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to questions of democracy, autonomy, diversity, and of course history \Vithin Japan 
itself. That is, the textbook issue was not only a "diplomatic issue." The lawsuit 
highlighted links between the Japanese government's stance towards the war in 
Okinawa and in the Asian region as a whole. Following his experience as a testifier in 
the Jenaga trial, Ota too began to draw important historical connections between civilian 
atrocities in Okinawa and Japanese aggression within the rest of Asia. 
Connections between the Ministry of Education's screening of references to the 
Japanese military in Okinawa and aggressions in Asia first become clear after the 
outbreak of the first textbook controversy in the early 1980s. At this time, Ota provided 
an analysis of some of the links between the "internal" (Okinawan) textbook 
controversy and the "external" (neighbouring Asian countries) one. He traced both back 
to at least the Meiji period, when Japan saw other Asians and minority groups as 
backward.96 He saw that the issue was integral to the question of how Japan viewed its 
history and its place in the world. He also stressed that the outcome of textbook 
controversies would inevitably influence "Japan's future course"-in its internal 
relations with Okinawa and relations with the Asian region as a whole.97 
Two years after the first verdict on the lenaga case, Ota made further historical 
comparisons between Okinawa and the rest of Asia. In a book entitled Genocide: When 
Humans become Inhuman (Genocide: ningen ga ningen de wa naku naru loki), he drew 
direct historical links between war in Okinawa and on the Asian continent for the first 
time. He analysed Japanese atrocities in Asia-in particular the massacres of Nanking, 
96 He related the textbook issue to an incident during the 1903 Osaka Exposition, when traditional 
Okinawans, Ainu, and Koreans were objectified as living anthropological subjects in an exhibit entitled 
'The House of Peoples." Plans to also exhibit Chinese were dropped after protests from China. and the 
Korean woman displayed was also removed after vigorous protesting by Koreans. In spite of stirring a 
wave of criticism within Okinawa, however, the two Okinawan women "exhibits" remained1 together 
with the Ainu. Ota Masahide, "Remember Battle of Okinawa and Textbook Issue: Government bas 
Tradition ofMisrepresenting-m Even Omitting-Facts on Ryukyus" (sic.), Japan Times (6 February 
1983) p. 4. 
91 Jbid .. 
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and connected the mentality of the Japanese army during invasion of China to the 
discrimination which local Okinawan civilians faced in the hands of the Japanese 
military during the Battle of Okinawa. 
Until the publication of Genocide, Ota did not extend his criticism of war to 
include reference to Japanese aggression in Asia during World War Two. In Genocide, 
he observed that the incidents of atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese Army in 
Nanking implicated Japan's military from commanders at the highest level to the lowest 
ranking foot soldiers. He surmised that subsequently Japanese troops, who had not 
fought a war on Japanese soil since the Meiji period, brought these brutal methods of 
combat directly from Asia to the battlefield in Okinawa. Okinawa civilians were 
murdered on groundless accusations, and forbidden to speak their own language, even 
though many elderly people could not speak standard Japanese. Although Okinawans 
believed after a long process of assimilation that they were "fully-fledged" Japanese, 
Ota concluded that on the battlefield they were not treated as such. 
Ota laid down in Genocide a radical critique of the relations between Okinawan 
civilians and the Japanese military during the war. He did not set out to valorise the US 
military-and was on the contrary highly critical of the indiscriminate bombing of 
Okinawa. Yet he undoubtedly focused on Japanese military as the primary perpetrators 
of aggression in the war-in Asia and on the battlefields of Okinawa. By viev.'ing both 
Okinawans and Chinese as victims of Japanese discrimination, Ota clearly placed 
Okinawa historically mthin the rest of Asia and against mainland Japan. Genocide, like 
The Ugly Japanese and other works, was critical of Japan's stance towards Okinav.<t-
both historically and in the present. At the same time, it went beyond Ota's earlier 
works in one significant aspect. By placing Okinawan history in a wider regional 
context, it both relativised Japanese history from mthin and provided a profound 
criticism of Japan's historical relations in Asia. In other words, through comparing 
Okinawa's experience to colonialism and war aggression in the rest of Asia, Ota began 
75 
a radical breakdown of what Leo T. S. Ching has described as the enclosed discursive 
space of postwar Japan. As Ching notes, within this closed space the exigent concern 
has remained not that of Japan's relationship to its decolonised "others," but only its 
own war defeat.98 The "myth of the homogenous nation" was thus inaugurated within 
this enclosed framework: "By effacing and denying the graces of those who 'once were 
Japanese,' the postwar cultural identity of the Japanese as a homogenous people was 
able to establish itself as Japan's self image."99 Against this image, Ota's comparative 
framework simultaneously disrupts hegemonic assumptions of national homogeneity 
and the effacement of Japanese colonialism from historical memory. 
Paradoxically, however, Ota's analysis also invited the further erasure of the 
complicit role Okinawans played in Japanese expansion. 100 In other words, placing 
civilian atrocities in the Battle of Okinawa alongside the atrocities of Nanking without 
considering this role reinforced a victimology which rendered all Okinawans hapless 
victims of Japanese militarism. Ota's public and prolific criticisms of the Education 
Ministry's textbook screening process, of Japan's education system as a whole, and of 
historical discrimination against Okinawa and Japanese militarism provided a counter· 
hegemonic voice against conservative Japanese nationalist forces allied to US military 
hegemony. Evocations of the "Okinawan Spirit" were integral to social and political 
endeavours which sought to envisage alternative claims to a Japanese identity formed 
on the ideals of peace and democracy, and a pluralistic society. Yet the dual 
incorporation and differentiation of Japanese tropes of war integral to this project 
coincided with a deferral of sustained debate on the internalisation of assimilatory 
practices in prewar Okinawa within the context of Japanese imperialism, and its relation 
98 Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation, p. 44-5, 
99 Ibid., p. 34. 
100 On Korean soldiers in !he Japanese military, see for example UtsumiAiko, "Korean 'Imperial 
Soldiers': Remembering Colonialism and Crimes against Allied POWs" in Fujitani, White and Yoneyama 
(eds.). Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific WarM, pp. 199-218. 
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to complex questions of agency and responsibility. This problematic became diffused 
between the lines and within the pages of Ota's analyses on genocide and war. As we 
shall see, it has also become engraved onto the granite walls of Okinawa's massive 
Cornerstone of Peace Monument, conceived and built during Ota's term as governor. 
Constructing Peace: The Cornerstone of Peace and the 
"Okinawan Spirit" 
Contending memories and conceptions of the past are not only the subject of 
history books, or even court rooms. They also take multiple and often conflicting forms 
within the landscape. In Okinawa, where Ryukyuan!Okinawan and Japanese histories 
cDnverge and compete, the grim scenes of decaying remains in dank and half-concealed 
caves contrast with the glittering monuments dedicated to the heroic and noble spirits of 
war. In the south of Okinawa Island, scene of the most protracted fighting during the 
Battle of Okinawa, it is perhaps least of all the dead who are at rest-and at the National 
Peace Memorial Park at Mabuni a cacophony of narratives speak in their name. 
Mabuni is a rugged coral ridge which rises some 300 feet above the water's edge 
on one side, boasting extensive views over hills to the west and the sea below. At the 
top of the cliff and looking out to sea stands the Reimei no To, or Break of Dawn 
Monument, built in honour of Lieut.-Gen. Ushijima Mitsuru, Commander of the 
Japanese 32nd Army during the battle, and his Chief of Staff Lieut.-Gen. Cho Isamu. 
The monument stands above the cave where the two military commanders committed 
suicide on 23 June 1945. It is said that the monument's shape was envisaged to evoke 
seppuku (harakiri, the traditional Japanese form of suicide), 101 and that its title, "Break 
101 It is a matter of historical debate as to whether Usbijima and CM did actually commit harakiri, or 
whether they died from rifle wounds. 
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of Dawn," was designated by the late Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. 102 The term 
reimei or 'dawn break' in one sense evoked the arrival of a new, enlightened "postwar" 
era. Yet it is also clearly linked to images of hi no maru (the rising-sun flag), imperial 
Japan, as the land of the rising sun, and the Emperor himself, revered according to 
nationalist rhetoric as the living embodiment of the sun-goddess Amaterasu. The 
monument was built at the behest of the Okinawa Bereaved Families Association, and 
was completed in 1962.103 
As in the case of written accounts of war, the decade of the 1960s saw an influx 
of war monuments with nationalist and patriotic overtones in Okinawa. Many of these 
monuments were sponsored during Japan's era of high economic growth by veteran 
associations in mainland Japan. 104 According to a survey report published in 1983 
compiled by the Okinawa Christian Network Opposed to the Nationalization of 
Yasukuni Shrine (Yasukuni Jinja kokueika hantai Okinawa kurisuto sha renrakukal), 42 
of the 73 monuments built during the Okinawan "memorial boom" of the sixties were 
constructed at the behest of mainland Japanese organizations, and 32 of these contained 
expressions glorifying the war. 15 of the 20 monuments constructed during this period 
by the Okinawa Bereaved Families Association, who purportedly strengthened ties with 
their powerful mainland counterpart around the same time, 105 were also said to include 
such expressions. 106 Mainly these inscriptions valorise the spirits of the war dead and 
their "noble sacrifice," and some even paraphrase lines from Lieut.-Gen. Ushijima's last 
102 Ota Masahide, Okinawa no ketsudan (fokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 2000), p. 144. 
103 Ota Masahide, !rei no ti5: Okinawasen senbotsusha o inoru (Naha: Naha Shuppansha, 1985), p. I 03. 
104 Gerald Figal suggests that: "That the :majority of overtly patriotic memorials in Okinawa appeared 
during the 1960s could be seen as an assertion of new-foU!ld Japanese national pride in the wdke of 
postwar economic recovery and as a prelude to the Japanese re-territorialisation of Okinawa that would 
come with Reversion in 1972" (Waging Peace on Okinawa," Critical Asian Studies 33.1 (March 2001), 
pp. 46-7). 
105 Ota Masahide, /rei no ti5,· Okinawasen senbotsusha o inoru, p. 24. 
,,. As cited in ibid,, pp. 22-3. 
78 
imperial military order .107 The largest concentration of monuments which include such 
patriotic dedications may be found at Memorial Hill in the peace park of Mabuni, at the 
apex of which stands the Break of Dawn monument itself.108 
Ota long expressed a strong apprehension towards the glorifYing of war and 
adulation of Japanese militarism in Okinawa's war memorials. 109 He became 
particularly vocal in his opposition after the publication of the Okinawa Chtistian 
Network's survey coincided with heated debate over "epigraph issue" (hibun mondai) 
in Okinawa. In a guidebook on Okinawa's war memorials published in 1985, Ota 
concluded that clearly the epitaphs on a large number of memorials in Okinawa 
"contradicted" the "spirit" of the residents of Okinawa. 110 Following his victory in the 
gubernatorial elections of 1990, as a reaction against nationalistic currents and in direct 
opposition to the Break of Dawn monument's militaristic symbolism, Ota vowed to 
build a monument "unlike any previous one" within the grounds of Mabuni's peace 
On 1 May 1991, an Okinawan prefectural research committee was formed to 
develop a conceptual outline for the construction of a peace monument (originally 
provisionally titled the "Heiwa no Kabe" or "Peace Wall") within Mabuni park. Over 
two years later, in October 1993, the guidelines for the making of the monument, 
entitled the "Heiwa no Ishiji" or "Cornerstone of Peace," were laid do"Wn in a 
107 As also outlined by Gerald Figal in "Waging Peace on Okinawa," Critical Asian Studies, p. 46. As 
Figal notes, these patriotic inscriptions have been the focal point of both the "epitaph controversy" (hibun 
mondm) and opposition to the "Ya.sukunification" (Yasukunika, in other words, the valorization of the war 
on par with the nationalistic Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo) of Okinawa (Ibid.). 
108 As Gerald Figal observes: "The set phrase 'glorious spirits and manifest merits of the war dead' (eirei 
kensho) conveys overwhelmingly the message of epitaphs found on the prefectural memorials line up on 
'memorial hill' above the Peace Park in Mabuni ... " (Ibid., p. 46}. 
109 See for example Ota Masahide, "Heiwa irei Kannon kenritsu ni omou" (Two-part Series), Okinawa 
Taimusu (21 and 26 December 1958). 
110 Ota Ma.sahide, !rei no Iii: Okinawasen senbotsusha o inoru, 22. 
111 As Ota recounts in Okinawa no ketsudan, pp. 144-8. 
79 
prefectural report. 112 The Heiwa no Ishiji was to embody the "unique cultural and 
regional characteristics" of Okinawa, and fulfil its functions as both a "place of prayer" 
(inori no ba) and a "symbol of peace" (heiwa no shiichii). In the report's prologue, Ota 
expressed his apprehension at the recent tendency to merely "treat war as just another 
event in hib1ory." It was as if, he reflected, "time has eroded our repentance and the 
lessons learnt from our tragic war experiences." He stressed both the "immense 
sacrifice" that Okinawa was forced to make during the war, and the need to "recognize 
and apologize for our position as aggressors against neighbouring countries." On the 
significance of the new peace monument he declared: 
Today, in spite of the end of the Cold War's divisions between East and West, the 
many regional conflicts of the world have not abated. Moreover, in direct and 
indirect connection with this situation, massive military bases still exist within our 
prefecture. It can only be said that these conditions remain far from the peaceful 
society desired. 
Facing this reality, I believe it is our duty and call to ... convey to the world the 
"Okinawa Spirit" and our everlasting desire for peace by paying our respects to 
the Battle of Okinawa war dead and adhering to the lessons of war. 
The "Cornerstone of Peace," will engrave the names of all those who died in the 
Battle of Okinawa, regardless of nationality, and become the focal base from 
which Okinawa can convey a message of peace. 
Conceptualisation and construction of the Cornerstone of Peace progressed 
hand-in-hand with plans for a new prefectural peace museum, and the establishment of 
an international peace research centre in Okinawa. Together these three projects made 
up the major components of the Ota administration's "peace promotion" policy. As a 
cultural backbone, they were also formulated in conjunction with and integral to the 
m Okinawa-ken, "'Heiwa no Ishiji' kensetsu kihon keikakusho," Okinawa Prefecture unpublished 
document, October 1993 (kindly provided by Ota Peace Research Institute, June 2001). 
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prefectural "action program," which called for the return of military-base land and the 
curtailing and ultimate withdrawal of the US military presence in Okinawa. 113 In 
subsequent years, however, following Ota's defeat in the gubernatorial elections of 
1998, plans for the Okinawa International Peace Research Institute (OKIPRI) were 
stalled indefinitely by Ota's successor, Governor Inamine Keiichi, and in the summer of 
1999, the New Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum also became the site of 
fierce controversy after it was divulged the Inamine administration sought to alter 
exhibition content prior to opening (see Chapter Five). The Cornerstone of Peace is thus 
the only one of these three major "peace projects" which was actually completed within 
Ota's term as governor of Okinawa and which thus stands as a direct legacy of his 
administration. 
The winning design chosen for the Cornerstone by a selection committee114 was 
entitled "Everlasting Waves of Peace." It is composed of concentric arcs of wave-like 
black granite walls on which are engraved the names of the war dead. The walls form a 
concentric arc towards the sea, and convening onto an open circular space at the edge of 
Mabuni cliffs. At the centre of this space stands the "Fire of Peace" (Heiwa no hi). The 
concept was in part inspired by the Vietnam Veterans Memorial at Washington Mall.m 
Yet while the Vietnam Veterans Memorial includes the names of only US military war 
dead, a unique characteristic of the Cornerstone of Peace is its gesture towards 
memorialising all war casualties, regardless of nationality or status as combatant or 
civilian. The monument was first unveiled at the official ceremony commemorating the 
fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Battle of Okinawa, on 23 June 1995. The fire's 
113 Special Edition Tokushil 1, "Heiwa gyosei no suishin to kichi mondai nado no kaiketsu sokushin," 
downloaded from the Okinawa Prefecture website (<www.pref.okinawa.jp>), November !999. 
114 A Cornerstone of Peace Design Competition was held in 1993, and the winner announced on 7 
September 1993. The competition attracted 274 entrants in total. 
115 For an analysis of this memorial see Marita Sturken, Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War; the AIDS 
Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 
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flame was ceremoniously lit by four elementary school representatives from Korea, the 
United States, Taiwan, and Okinawa.ll6 At the time of unveiling, 234,183 names had 
been engraved on the Cornerstone's granite walls, including 147,100 from Okinawa, 
72,907 Japanese from other prefectures, and 14,166 from outside Japan (the US, 
Taiwan, and North and South Korea). 117 
Official national narratives of Japanese homogeneity and militarism are 
challenged on various levels. The decision not to employ the Japanese imperial calendar 
nor play the anthem "Kimigayo" at the official opening ceremony indicates a refusal to 
sanction symbols of Japanese imperialism. The commemoration date inscribed on the 
monument is 23 June 1995, yet the names engraved on the Cornerstone's walls also 
extend to all those who died of war-related afilictions within a year of 7 September 
1945-in tacit recognition of the fact that for many the Battle of Okinawa did not end 
with the suicide of Lieut.-Gen. Ushijima, and in a further attempt to avoid a Japanese 
military-centred view of history.118 On a more literal though perhaps unintended level, 
the Cornerstone also provided a competing dialogue to the "Japan-US security 
partnership." The latter was described by the then Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryi.itaro 
and President Bill Clinton in their April 1996 joint security declaration as providing the 
"' See Gerald Figal "Historical Sense and Commemorative Sensibility at Okinawa's Cornerstone of 
Peace," Positions, 5:3, pp. 745-78. 
ll7 Ishibara Masaie and Arakaki Shoko (translated by Douglas Dreistadt), "The Cornerstone of Peace 
Memorial: Its Role and Function," Okinawa international University Journal of Culture and Society, Vol. 
1 No. I, October 1996, p. 79; and Ishihara Masaie, "Memories of War and Okinawa," in Fujitani, \\'bite 
and Yoneyama (eds.) Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s), pp. 87-107. 
u• Ota challenged 23 June 1945 as the date of the end of the war in the lenaga trial. See his testimony in 
Kyokasho Kentei Sosh5 o shien suru Zenkoku Rennumkai (eds.).lenaga f9;0kasho saiban 5: Okinawasen 
no jisso, pp. 6-7. For Aniya Ma.saaki the issue of whether or not 23 June is designated as the day of 
remembrance is no less than one of "whether the war is to be examined from the perspective of the 
'Emperor's Army', or fully examined from the viewpoint of the people" ("Okinawasen kenkyii no 
nijilnen" in Okinawa Prefectore History Teachers Association (ed.) "Rekishi no shinjitsu wa yugametewa 
naranai," Rekishi to jissen, No. 20 (Dec. 1999), p. 7). 
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"cornerstone of achieving common security objectives ... for the Asia-Pacific Region as 
we enter the 21st Century."ll9 
Various subtle, and not-so-subtle, features of the Cornerstone also incorporated 
the sense of a distinct Okinawan-ness. The monument's title, "Heiwa no Ishiji," drew 
attention to a nnique Okinawan culture and identity by the use of the Okinawan 
pronnnciation of the Chinese character for "cornerstone" (literally "fonndation"-that 
is, "ishijt' instead of the Japanese "ishizue"). The main pathway also draws a physical 
separation between the "Okinawan" names, which are listed on one half of the 
concentric arc formation, and those of the "rest of Japan," which make up the other half 
together with the names of "foreigners" (South and North Korea, US, Taiwan, and after 
the inclusion in 1996, the United Kingdom). The Okinawan list of war dead, moreover, 
not only included those casualties from the Battle of Okinawa, but all Okinawans who 
died "as a result of the fifteen years of conflict beginning with the Manchurian 
incident."120 
From its instigation, the Cornerstone became an important symbol for the anti-
base movement in Okinawa. Due to the fact that an official comprehensive survey of 
civilian casualties during the Battle of Okinawa had never been conducted, the 
verification and collection of names for the monument marked the first time a large-
scale investigation of the war dead was carried out the prefecture. 121 This involved a 
massive mobilization of people and resources within a very limited time frame (the 
process of gathering the names was only oftlcially initiated in December 1993),122 and 
II' Japan Iimes (18 April 1996). 
120 As cited in Gerald Figal's "Historical Sense and Commemorative Sensibility at Okinav.-a's 
Cornerstone of Peace," pp. 762·3. Figal provides an insightful analysis of these features in his critique on 
the disparities between commemorative history and critical hi,torical knowledge. 
121 This long the chagrin of a number of Okinawan historians, and came up in the lenaga trial. See also 
Ishihara Masaie and Arakaki Shokn, "The Cornerstone of Peace Memorial: Its Role and Function," pp. 
90-91. 
122 See also Linda Angst, In a Dark Time: Community, Memory, and the Making of Ethnic Selves in 
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in itself stimulated awareness and reflection on the war and its affect. 123 Some observed 
that it was this process, as much as the monument itself, which secured the 
Cornerstone's importance within the Okinawan peace movement. In an incisive article 
examining the connections bet\veen memories of the Battle of Okinawa and the upsurge 
of protest and anti-base sentiment in Okinawa in 1995, Muratsubaki Yoshinobu 
concludes: "the fact that the 'Cornerstone of Peace' was constructed with the support 
and participation of many local residents is vital. To the extent that the people of 
Okinawa do not forget the horrors of war, and continue to question why it occurred, the 
'Cornerstone of Peace' ... 'Nil! remain an expression of anti-base, anti-Emperor-system, 
1'4 pro-peace causes." • 
In the complex interweaving of historical events and remembrance in 1995 in 
particular, memories, both individual and collective, were not only highly politicised, 
but became integrally connected to direct political action. The massive verification 
effort, the ceremonial unveiling of the coffin-like granite walls on the fiftieth 
anniversary of the war, and the indelible impact of the endless rows of names on the 
Cornerstone of Peace itself cannot be seen as divorced from the upsurge of protest 
which occurred in Okinawa only months later. Nor were they separate in the mind of 
Ota. In his book of the same title (Okinawa: Heiwa no Ishiji), published in 1996, Ota 
described the construction of the Cornerstone of Peace as "the largest event which took 
place to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the war." He further continued: "it 
would not be an exaggeration to say that the motivation which led to the building of the 
'Cornerstone of Peace' has also become the basis for the people of Okinawa devoting 
Okinawan Women! Narrative, p. 119. 
123 Ishihara and Arakaki observe that the verification project "stimulated an awareness among citizens of 
the value of research on the war and its tragic consequences" ("The Cornerstone of Peace Memorial: Its 
Role and Function," pp. 91). 
124 Muratsubaki Yoshinobu. ~·oldnawasen no 'kioku~ to aratana {shima gururni' tosO)" impaction 95 
(1996): 33. 
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heart and soul, night and day, to solving the military base issue."125 Ota also purportedly 
visited Mabuni and the newly constructed Cornerstone of Peace before resolving not to 
act as proxy in the signing of the leases for land used by the US military in September 
1995.126 
The Cornerstone, however, was not ..vithout its critics, many of whom also came 
from within the anti-base peace movement. Most of these criticisms focused around the 
fact that engraving the names of all the war dead rendered war responsibility ambiguous 
if not inherently problematic. The inelusion of the names of Japanese combatants 
alongside those of civilians was seen as inappropriate for a war in which the Imperial 
Army not only failed to provide protection, but committed atrocities against the local 
population.127 Takazato Suzuyo, anti-base activist and core member of the Okinawan 
group Women Act Against Violence, similarly saw the all-inclusiveness of the 
monument as problematic from a gender perspective. Children who had died during 
battle and whose names were unknovm had been included within the monument as "the 
child of..." followed by the name of their father-reinforcing structures of patriarchal 
lineage. 128 The multiple rows of granite walls which were left blank at the time of the 
monument's opening (and largely remain so) spoke most powerfully of the "absences" 
of subjugated histories. Lack of complete access to original Japanese records and the 
colonial policy of "Japanizing" names made the names of Korean war dead difficult or 
impossible to trace, and some families resisted inclusion. By the time of unveiling, only 
133 Korean (51 South and 82 North) soldiers' names had been included from what are 
estimated to be between 10, 000 and 17, 000 casualties.129 None of the names of the 
125 Ota Masahide, Okinawa heiwa no ishiji (Tokyo, Iwanami, 1996), p. 25. 
126 The Asahi Tapes (30 April 1999). 
127 Muratsubaki Yoshinobu. "Okinawasen no 'kioku' to aratana 'shima gurumi' toso," p. 34. 
1
" Takazato Suzuyo, Okinawa no onnatachi: josei no jinken to kichilguntai (Tokyo: Meiseki Shoten, 
1996), p. 55. 
129 It is of course also ironic that these names must be retrospectively divided into "North" and "South)) 
Korea. 
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unknown number of so-called "comfort women" brought from Korea and used as sex 
slaves by mainland Japanese, and no doubt Okinawan, soldiers were marked down in 
stone. 130 
In response to criticism, the Cornerstone planning committee stated that the 
Cornerstone should be viewed in conjunction with exhibit plans for the new Prefectural 
Peaee Musemn at Mabuni. This musemn, like the Cornerstone, was a major component 
of the Ota administration's "peace promotion" policy, to progress hand-in-band with the 
prefectural "action program" for the return of military-base land and for the curtailing of 
the US military presence in Okinawa. While the Cornerstone was to remain a symbol 
dedicated to the war dead in the name of peace, the museum should display in detail the 
"realities of war," and include information useful for the "study and research of 
peace." 131 In the words of Oshiro Masayasu, a member of the museum planning 
committee, while the Cornerstone was "a place of prayer" and a "symbol" of peace, the 
museum \vas to be "a site of learning" wherein "the irrationality and brutality of war 
must be displayed."132 After Ota's defeat in the gubernatorial elections of 1998, the new 
Okinawan prefectural administration sought to change the exhibit content of this 
museum (see Chapter Five). 
The Cornerstone challenged a militaristic state-centric version of history, 
contested homogenizing forces within Japan, and was an important endeavour to move 
beyond nationalistic historical narratives in an appeal towards universal pacifist ideals. 
It served a vital role as a cultural backbone to Ota's anti-base pro-autonomy policies 
130 As of June 2001,378 Korean (296 South Korean and 82 North Korean) names have been engraved on 
the Cornerstone. No names of so-called "Comfort Women" have been include<!. According to Director of 
the Myongji University Institute for Okinawa, Hong Jong Pil, numbers of Korean soldier casualties from 
the Battle of Okinawa range from 17, 000 to 20, 000. Hong was requested by Ota to assist in veril)dng 
Korean names and requesting consent from families in South Korea in 1995, and has been conducting 
investigations on the Korean v;ar dead since (special lecture by Hong Jong Pi! in Naha on 22 June 2001). 
m Cited in Oshiro Masayasu, "Kenju wa dare ni mukerareta ka," in Okinawa Prefecture History Teachers 
Association, Rekishi no shin}itsu wayugamete wa naranai, pp. 34-5, 
132 Ibid. 
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during his time as governor and as a symbol of pacifist sentiment in Okinawa, and it 
stands in triumphant contrast to the blatant nationalism of many monuments in Japan, 
the US, Australia, and beyond. Yet at the same time, it also stands as a symbol of many 
of the difficulties associated with the attempt to transnationalize the act of 
commemoration in the name of universal peace. The inclusion of all Okinawan war 
dead from 1931-1946 within the Cornerstone moreover brings to question the very aims 
of the monument--as a remembrance to all those who died in the Battle of Okinawa. It 
highlights conflicts between competing narratives within the Cornerstone-as on one 
level a subtle expression of a distinct Okinawan-ness, and on another a universalised 
and trans-national symbol of peace. 
The Cornerstone thus stands as a physical embodiment of the possibilities and 
dilemmas embedded within Ota's historical and political project. Okinawan war 
remembrance contains the potential of relativising Japan, and national historical 
narratives in general, in the name of universal peace. At the same time, the dual process 
whereby Okinawa is both incorporated within and resistant to a national Japanese 
framework, therein making its relativisation possible, is also accompanied by an 
obscuring of the role of the individual and historical responsibility. This is particularly 
problematic when the construction of an Okinawan collective identity intersects with 
other relations of subjugation-as exemplified in the case of Okinawan women, Korean 
soldiers mobilized in the Imperial Japanese Army, and Okinawan and Korean "comfort 
women." Viewed from this light, the Cornerstone of Peace's embracing inclusiveness 
ironically dislocates the multiple inscriptions of hierarchical difference and 
incorporation/exclusion which were inherent to the project of "becoming Japanese" as 
imperial ideology and nationaVcolonial policy. 133 
133 For a criticism of the discourse of collective emancipation from the perspective of gender see for 
example Rey Chow on Franz Fanon in Ethics after Idealism: Theory-Culture-Ethnicity-Reading, pp. 55-
74. 
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Such dilemmas are exacerbated within the Cornerstone by the "coarsening" 
effect of commemorative history, 134 as well as what has been referred to as the 
"traditionally didactic function" of monuments. As James E. Young observes, 
monuments have a tendency both to displace the past they serve to have us contemplate, 
and through the authoritarian propensity of monumental space reduce the viewer to 
"passive spectator."135 Young notes that: 
(B)y insisting that its meaning is as fixed as its place in the landscape, the 
monument seems oblivious to the essential mutability in all cultural artifacts, the 
ways the significance in all art evolves over time. In this way, monuments have 
long sought to provide a naturalizing locus for memory, in which a state's 
triumphs and martyrs, its ideals and founding myths are cast as as naturally true as 
the landscape in which they stand. These are the monuments sustaining illusion, 
the principles of its seeming longevity and power. 
The case of Germany seems to highlight many of the problems involved in 
attempting to devise an all-inclusive memorial. As Young observes, a memorial spaee 
which honoured all of Germany's war dead would in essence be contradictory. That is: 
"Those now considered its 'heroes' had been regarded as treacherous enemies of the 
state during the war, whereas its fallen soldiers had been killed in Hitler's campaign to 
conquer Europe and murder its Jews." Kathe Kollwitz's "Mother with Dead Son", the 
centrepiece of Germany's national memorial, Neue Wache, was fiercely criticised by 
those offended by the remembrance of Jewish victims alongside the perpetrators of 
genocide-and in the Christian image of maternal sacrifice. ]be 1994 competition for a 
"Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe" under former German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl's administration were similarly greeted with scepticism by many. As Young 
134 Gerald Figal "Historical Sense and Commemorative Sensibility at Okinawa's Cornerstone of Peace," 
op cit .. As Figal notes, the Cornerstone also reveals the difficulties in "transnationalizing" the act of 
commemoration, Figal concludes that: "Rather than being transcended, national and ethnic identities are 
encoded and contested in subtle ways throughout" (p. 764). 
135 James E. Young, At Memory sEdge: After-Images oflhe Holocaust in Contemporary Art and 
Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 
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reflects: "Instead of inciting memory of murdered Jews, we suspected, Germans would 
come dutifully to unshoulder their memorial burden, so that they could move freely and 
unencumbered into the twenty-first century. A finished monument would, in effect, 
finish memory itself."136 
A similar fear exists in relation to the Cornerstone of Peace. Namely, the 
monumentalization of the Battle of Okinawa within the monument as a symbol of peace 
may ultimately serve to justify war through its commemoration. Ota has made a strident 
and persuasive case on the inherent meaningless of the war in numerous historical and 
personal accounts. As governor of Okinawa, he instigated the construction of the 
Cornerstone in order that the "lessons of history" were not forgotten. Yet void of 
historical details (such as Okinawa's semi-colonial status within the Japanese empire, 
civilian atrocities during the war, sexual slavery, and imperial aggression by both 
mainland Japanese and Okinawans in Asia), the historical lessons to be learnt from the 
Cornerstone's global "message of peace" remain ambiguous. 
Some historians have argued that these ambiguities invite individual 
interpretation and reflection, and even the cultivation of an awareness of the past, from 
all of the monument's visitors. 137 The monument's ambiguous inclusiveness also 
enabled it to become a powerful symbol at least to an extent uniting the disparate 
groups which formed the core of Okinawa's anti-base movement. 1bese ambiguities, 
however, may similarly serve to reify the commemorative and "sacred" aspect of the 
Cornerstone (as a "place of prayer"), rather than its educational or pedagogical (as a 
"lesson of history") tone. As the past becomes the object of veneration and is 
reproduced as sacred memory, it has the power to authenticate dominant modes of 
"'Ibid., p. 194. 
'"For example, Ishihara and Arakaki suggest that inclusion of all Okinawans who died between the 1931 
Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the end ofthe fifteen-year war in 1945 "functions to symbolically 
retrace the steps of Japan's aggression in Asia and the Pacific" ("The Cornerstone of Peace Memorial: Its 
Role and Function," p. 90). 
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collective historical consciousness. In this way, as we shall see in Chapter Five, as the 
Cornerstone becomes 'rewritten' within hegemonic interpretations of history, it may in 
fact be used as a tool to assist in the erasure of marginalized and displaced memories. 
Remembrance and Return: The Battle of Okinawa in History and 
Memory 
As Carol Gluck observes: "National history is never neutral, and in postwar 
Japan, as elsewhere, the past was contested terrain on which other, larger battles over 
politics, society, and culture were being fought." In Okinawa, fierce struggles have not 
only been waged over this terrain, but its very borders: that is, the formation and 
constitution of the Japanese modern nation state itself. In the postwar period, these 
contests were inherently connected to issues of war remembrance. The Battle of 
Okinawa has been central to the politics of history and popular memory, as well as 
political struggles. In the pages of numerous books and newspapers, in the courtroom, 
the classroom, and through names engraved on stone, Ota has been a central figure in 
articulating, and contesting, war and its "historical lessons" in the present and for the 
future. 
Ota's reflections on war and peace were intimately related to Okinawa's postwar 
historical and political context-to struggles against both US military occupation and a 
state-endorseu Japanese nationalism closely allied to US hegemony. In his earliest 
work, "That Which Was Paid for in Blood," his account of his war experiences and the 
psychology of war and defeat was profoundly personal. Yet it was also made as an 
appeal to mainland Japan, to gain a wider conscience of Okinawa's plight during the 
war and under occupation. In the late 1960s, his analysis and remembrance of war 
became essentially related to contests over the meaning and terms of reversion. Issues 
of discrimination deferred under US occupation and within the reversion movement 
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came to the surface. Ota began to draw links between the experience of war, the desire 
for peace, and a distinct sense of Okinawan-ness, as embodied in the "Okinawan spirit." 
He has expanded these analyses since. He has strongly opposed attempts to glorifY the 
war, the imposition of a nationalist and conformist education in postwar Japan, the 
continued US military presence in Okinav.<~, and the stationing of Japan's Defence 
Forces in the islands. He resisted and questioned the Japanese government's security 
claims in the postwar period with continual references to his own war experience and 
the historical experience of Okinawa(ns ). The textbook issue concerned not only the 
wording of the textbook itself, but both the essence of Japan's education system and the 
future of Japan's relations in Asia. ln short, as competing visions of the future, contests 
over the war and its remembrance were intimately connected to wider cultural, social, 
and political struggles. 
Ota incorporated many of the tenets of Japan's postwar peace movement: a 
pervasive anti-militarism; a commitment to the pacifist and democratic principles of the 
constitution; a linkage between struggles for peace and democracy; and opposition 
towards the Japanese "state" in the name of the Japanese "people." The Battle of 
Okinawa was seen as a compressed version of what ground war would have been like 
had the US forces advanced to mainland Japan. It epitomized the way in which the 
Imperial Headquarters and the Japanese military prioritised the survival of the Japanese 
polity even at the expense of its own civilians. In this sense, Ota saw Okinawa's plight 
during the war, and in the postwar period, as inherently relevant to all of Japan. This 
enabled Okinawa to become an important issue within the Japanese peace movement, 
and in tum a forceful challenge to state-endorsed nationalist historical perceptions. 
Yet Ota also possessed a pervasive sense of Okinawa's history, and historical 
discrimination towards Okinawa. His appeals to universal pacifist ideals came hand-in-
hand, and were complexly intertwined, with ideas of a distinct Okinawan-ness in 
contrast to mainland Japan. During the war, the Imperial Headquarters held a particular 
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disregard for the fate of Okinawa. The Japanese military command stationed on 
Okinawa too displayed a disdain for the customs, and ultimately the survival, of 
Okinawans. Okinawa was "sacrificed" in the name of protecting the Japanese "imperial 
homeland," of which it was not considered a part. For Ota, a sense of victimhood often 
verged on an Okinawan, rather than Japanese, ethnic nationalism. His articulations on 
war partly incorporated Japanese historical narratives, and radically disrupted these 
narratives. His analysis of Okinawa's complex experience as both "Japanese" and 
colonized subject forced to "become Japanese" served to break down the closed 
discursive space of postwar Japanese war remembrance, and provide a powerful 
deconstruction of the inherent ambiguities underlying the delineation of the Japanese 
subject from its colonized "other". At the same time, Okinawa's dual role as both 
colonized and colonizer provided an inherent dilemma for Ota as he sought to empower 
an active political Okinawa subject ambiguously within Japan and against Okinawa's 
dual subjugation in US-Japanese relations. 138 
War remembrance was intimately connected to the conceived struggle for peace, 
democracy, and autonomy as embodied in the reversion movement. From the ruins of 
unprecedented physical destruction, these ideals became the focus of a conceived 
"rebirth." As it became increasingly apparent that reversion would fail to guarantee the 
conditions necessary for Okinawa to become a "determinant of its own history," war 
remembrance became the primary means of redeeming a sense ofOkinawan identity in 
the face of the forces of homogenisation and consumerism. In this way, Ota sought 
through remembrance of the war experience to mitigate against a double sense of lostr-
from the destruction of war and the failures of the postwar political struggle. In post-
reversion Okinawa, the Battle of Okinawa ironically became the centre of Ota's 
attempts to reclaim a sense of Okinawan identity, as the percentage of war survivors to 
1
" On this dual role and war remembrance, see for example Yakabi Osamu, "Gama ga silki suru 
Okinawasen no kioku,'" Gendai shiso, Vol. 28.7, June (6) 2000, pp. 114-25. 
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Okinawa's population steadily decreased and Okinawa became further incorporated 
within Japan. 
As well as having a central role in contests over war memory and history, the 
tragic experiences of war also undoubtedly left an indelible imprint on Ota' s personal 
sense of sel£ 139 Ota's remembrance of war, his sense of purpose in the struggle for an 
individual sense of self and autonomous political subject, and his intellectual analyses 
on the Battle of Okinawa intersect in multiple forms. These intersections themselves 
attest to the vital interplay and tension between memory and history--and the 
enmeshing of both in political and cultural contests in the present. Under US 
occupation, in the tumultuous years pnor to reversion, following Okinawa's 
administrative reincorporation into Japan, and during his time as governor, Ota 
repeatedly and through multiple mnemonic practices "returned" to the Battle of 
Okinawa. The Battle of Okinawa formed the foundation of his work and sense of self in 
the "postwar" in at least a dual sense-as the "origin" of a perceived "rebirth," and 
through the continual retracing of war experience and its meaning. This process of 
retracing has been intrinsic to contests over the set of power relations which placed 
Okinawa between the US and Japan. It is a process that we shall revisit, as we further 
examine how Ota sought to claim an Okinawan sense of identity, and political 
autonomy, in the years prior to reversion and beyond. 
---- ~ ----
139 In an interview following his defeat in the 1998 elections, Ota stressed this importance, stating; "When 
people's life becomes stable, they become conservative, and lose their original sense of 
purpose ... Sometimes, I think too much of my own position, and do not speak out when I should. I try to 
live as my own person, but the situation becomes all too difficult. At that time, after I see the names of my 
dead colleagues [engraved in stone], the events oftifty years ago come back to me, and it strengthens my 
resolve." The Asahi Tapes (30 April1999). Also reprinted in "Ota zen Okinawa chiji: 4 nen o kataru," 
Asahi Shinbun (26 October 1999). 
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":r;:: CHAPTER TWO =-
Between Illusion and Reality 
Okinawan Reversion 
"To say it simply, I have ... the irrepressible desire to witness with my 
own eyes 'Okinawa's momentous turning point.' To put it rather 
exaggeratedly, while only too well aware of my own powerlessness, 
it is purely that I want to play my part as one individual (shutai) in 
the making of history ... 
It is not easy to be the one voicing disharmony, just as the people of 
Yamato sing in chorus of wealth and prosperity. Moreover, 
personally I would even prefer if possible to avoid the situation 
where Okinawa becomes a gag choking at the throat of the glutton 
that is Japan. Yet if this is necessary in order to fulfill 'the minimum 
set of conditions' essential for us to live as human beings, it must be 
done nonetheless. 
I am going home, to Okinawa." 
Ota Masahide, 19701 
Return to Okinawa: Return to Japan 
HJr to return to Okinawa from Tokyo means something more than to merely 
move from one place to another, then what is it?''2 In the frrst months of 1970, Ota 
vacillated about the future direction of his life and career, and whether to stay in Tokyo 
1 Ota Masahide, "Kaerinan, iza" ("A home-eorning!"), Sekai (May 1970), 216-21. 
2 Ibid., p. 216. 
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or to return to his post at the University of Ryukyus.3 He recorded these anxieties and 
his final resolve to return to Okinawa in a short and unusually personal article published 
in the May edition of the journal Sekai. He explained that his decision arose from the 
desire to experience Okinawa's historical turning point from within the islands rather 
than to continue research from the distant shores of Tokyo. The joint communique on 
Okinawan reversion announced in November 1969 had further strengthened his resolve. 
No longer able to witness the tumultuous tide of events sweeping Okinawa from afar, 
Ota determined he must play a small part in the 'making' of this history. 
Ota sought to realize in both theory and practice what he conceived to be the 
aims of reversion. In the spirit of Japanese postwar liberal enlightenment thought, Ota 
saw the creation of an individual subject able to act as an autonomous political agent to 
be vital to the functioning of democracy. Yet unlike liberal postwar intellectuals in 
mainland Japan, Ota was not preoccupied with the question of how to guarantee the 
adequate functioning of democratic processes, but with the very attainment of civil 
rights under the Japanese constitution. In his conception of this struggle, Ota adopted 
many assumptions of postwar Japanese liberal ideology, as conceived in the ideals of 
peace and democracy. Yet he adopted these assumptions with a certain ambivalence. 
For \vithout irony, Ota saw the attainment of Okinawan political autonomy and an 
autonomous identity as the core aim of the movement calling for the return of 
administrative control over Okinawa to Japan. 
Ota noted that in viewing the historical formation of modern Japan, "one is 
struck immediately by the almost abnormal strength of 'pro-centralizing forces' within 
Okinawa." From the economy to education, politics, and culture--all aspects of 
Okinawans' lives in the prewar period were overwhelmed by "the forces of 
' During this time .• Ota received a lucrative offer from a large US company, intent on expanding its share 
in the Japanese market, and wavered as to whether he should take the post or return to his associate 
professorship in Okinawa. 
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'Japanization' and 'the making oflmperial subjects' (kominka)." All the most renov.ned 
anti-establishment activists and intellectuals of this period either left Okinawa because 
of the pressure from these forces, or went mad. Ota recounted that in learning of this 
history, he was "struck by the closed and insular nature of Okinawan society and the 
maliciousness of authority." 4 In contrast, he saw that the experience of war and 
occupation had instilled a stronger political consciousness in the minds of Okinawans. 
Precisely for this reason, he differentiated reversion from prewar assimilationism, and 
upheld the former as a call for the realization of Okinawan autonomy and the 
constitutional ideals of peace and democracy. 
As Leo T. S. Ching observes; "places are artfully Jived spaces, both physical and 
discursive, material and metaphorical, geographical and ideological, real and 
imagined."5 Ota's return to Okinawa prompted him to reflect on the relation between 
"Tokyo" and "Okinawa" on a multitude of levels, and within intersecting networks of 
time. He saw the "Okinawa problem" in both inherently personal and political terms--
and as a condition born through historical discrimination. As the contents of the 
bilateral agreement for return gradually carne to light, he increasingly questioned this 
history, and challenged the tenets of assimilation. Just as the root of the Okinawa 
issue-discrimination-was universal in its scope, so too was the fundan1ental intent of 
Okinawan reversion-the guarantee of human rights and the "restoration of humanity" 
(ningen no kaifuku). 
The Okinawan reversion movement as a whole was disparate, and embraced a 
range of groups, often with hazy, diverse, and even contradictory agendas. It was at 
once both pro-autonomous and pro-assimilationist. On the left, it incorporated elements 
of pacifist nationalism, anti-US and anti-Vietnam War sentiment, movements for 
democratic self-government and civil rights, and sociali;i and communist organizations. 
'"Kaerinan, iza," p.221. Emphasis in original. 
5 Becoming Japanese, p. 197. 
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A broader spectrum of Okinawans also called for reversion out of an emotional 
attachment to mainland Japan, the vague but pervasive notion that Japan was somehow 
the "ancestral country" (sokoku) of Okinawa, widespread discontent with the policies of 
the US military administration and "foreign rule" (iminzoku shihai), and a desire to 
attain the kind of working and living conditions enjoyed in the rest of the nation. 
The reversion movement worked within postwar Japanese ideals of peace and 
democracy, and brought to question the subjugation of Okinawa within Japan's postwar 
structure. Okinawan reversion became a focal issue of political resistance in mainland 
Japan just as Japan's oppositional political movement fragmented. The years from 1968 
to 1970 witnessen the peak of political activity, and subsequent fragmentation, of both 
mainland Japanese anti-Vietnam war anti-anpo (US-Japan Security Treaty) protests and 
pro-reversion anti-base resistance in Okinawa. This fragmentation occurred in the 
context of a general reappraisal of issues and assumptions concerning nationalism, 
identity, political resistance, discrimination, subjectivity, sovereignty, democracy, and 
autonomy within Okinawa and Japan as a whole.6 
While reversion itself was realized, many of the aims called for by progressive 
groups for the reduction or significant withdrawal of US military bases from Okinawa 
were not. It failed to guarantee the dernilitarisation of Okinawa and Japan as a whole, or 
political or economic autonomy for Okinawa. On the eve of reversion, Ota 
disparagingly observed: "In the eyes of both the US and Japanese national authorities, 
Okinav.11 is only significant as a military stronghold, and may as well be an island 
uninhabited by people. National authorities in both countries have both just used 
Okinawa as a political and economic negotiating pav.n, as if the fierce longing of the 
islands' one million people to regain a sense of humanity is not worth even one 
6 Arasaki Moriteru explores some aspects of the correlation between the fragmentation of mainland 
Japanese political movements and the reversion movement in Sengo Okinawashi (Tokyo: Nihon 
Hyoronsha, 1976). 
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mention." 7 Less than two months later, administrative control over Okinawa was 
returned to Japan in a joint ceremony in Tokyo and Washingon.8 
On the eve of Okinawa's return to Japan, frustration at his own powerlessness 
only seemed to inflame Ota' s sense of political urgency. Between 1967 and 1972, Ota 
published at least sixty articles and five books, all relating in some form to the process 
and the conditions of reversion. He emerged as a central figure in debates over 
Okinawa, and played an important role as a conduit between mainland Japanese and 
Okinawan liberal-intellectual circles.9 Even after the return of administrative rights over 
Okinawa to Japan, the unfulfilled goals of reversion remained an underlying theme of 
Ota's work--as part of an enduring contest over Okinawa, the makeup of Japan, and 
US-Japan relations. Debate over reversion highlighted divisions within and issues 
pertaining to the movement. In many ways, the issues and divisions raised ·within 
debates over reversion also continued to define the framework of political debate in 
Okinawa in years to come. 
Almost a quarter of a century after Okinawan reversion, in May 1996, Ota 
published a revised edition of one of the books he wrote during the volatile pre-
reversion period, Kyozetsu suru Okinawa (Okinawa Defiant, 1971). In the preface he 
declared: "Even though this book was written over twenty years ago, its message is still 
relevant today. That is to say, it is a fact that the stance of both the US and Japanese 
7 
"Okinawa: kokka no henyo to gyosei no naka de," Ekonomisuto (1 April, 1972), p. 108. 
8 US military bases continued to occupy 12.3% of the total land mass of the islands. It was agreed that 
16.6% of the land area used by US facilities in Okinawa vmuld be returned. Land utilized by US facilities 
remained at 12.3% ofthe~tal area of Okinawa prefecture, from 14.8% directly prior to reversion (figures 
cited from Sugeyama Shigcru. Okinawa Henkan Kyotei no kenkyii (Tokyo: Sekibunsha, 1982), p. 195-9. 
9 For example as tbe coordinator of a symposium on "The Reversion of Okinawa and the Base Issue." 
held in Naha on 13 August 1968 and published in Sekai (October 1968), pp. 37-76. Ota also coedite<l a 
journal on Okinawa with mainland Japanese writer Oe Kenzaburo during this period entitled Okinawa 
Keiken. It is difficult to gauge Ota's exact influence on public debate. Yet there is no doubt that hL' 
analysis had an impact, in publicizing the Okinawa issue, on perceptions of reversion and its significance, 
and on the way in which groups in Okinawa perceived and articulated themselves, as aspects of this 
analysis were reincorporated back into movements in Okinawa. 
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governments on the Okinawan issue has hardly changed at all."10 Two months later, in 
explaining his stance against the US bases to the Japanese Supreme Court, Ota testified: 
Reversion to Japan in 1972 was supposed to constitute the return of Okinawa 
under the Peace Constitution of Japan, and the radical transformation of Okinawa, 
both in name and in reality. In advocating reversion, the people of Okinav.a called 
for at least a decline in the US military presence on the islands to a level on par 
with the rest of Japan, the repossession of human rights, and the establishment of 
self-government () ichi). 
However, even now, approximately a quarter of a century later, conditions in 
Okinawa have hardly changed. Expansive military bases remain, and accidents, 
incidents, and pollution resulting from the bases still continue. This is very far 
from the reversion to Japan which the people of Okinawa prefecture wished for.ll 
In short, in 1996 Ota saw his stance as an attempt to fulfil the failed goals of Okinawa's 
postwar struggle. The outcome of reversion determined the form in which Okinawa was 
reincorporated into Japan. Yet in many ways, the legacy and memory of what reversion 
did not achieve had as lasting an impact, both on Ota and Okina"'a' s political 
landscape. 
The Road to Reversion 
Land Expropriation and Resistance 
Life in post-war Okinawa began for Ota in October, 1945, when he received 
permission to leave the US military POW internment camp. After five years of working 
and studying in war-tom Okinawa, in 1950 he became a member of the second group of 
students from Okinawa in the postwar period to receive scholarshiJilS to attend university 
10 Kyozetsu suru Okinawa: Nihonfokki to Okinawa no kokoro (Tokyo: Kindai Bungeisha, 1996 [1971]). 
ll As reprinted in Okinawa: Heiwa no Ishiji (Tokyo: lwanami, 1996), p. 178. Ota also made a similar 
point in his earlier testimony to the High Court in March 1996 (see Okinawa-ken chifi shi5ken, (Naha: 
Niraisha, 1996), especially pp. 104-7). 
100 
in mainland Japan. Waseda University was reno'Wned as a hotbed of student unrest, and 
in the early nineteen fifties there was a burgeoning student movement opposed to the 
remilitarisation of Japan, military campaigns on the Korean Peninsula, and the 
ratification of the US-Japan security treaty. Neither the security treaty nor the Japanese 
constitution applied to Okinawa. During the occupation period, Okinawa was excluded 
from the reforms of the SCAP (the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers) 
administration in Japan. In 1950, in the face of communist victory in China, the US 
Congress approved the allocation of 58 million US dollars towards the fortification of 
military facilities within the Ryukyu Islands.12 Two years later, the Ryukyu Islands, as 
well as the Amami and Ogasawara Islands, were separated from the rest of Japan under 
the peace treaty. 
Ota avoided participating in student demonstrations. Yet he was certainly 
affected by the pacifist idealism of the times, by the sight of colleagues being injured in 
clashes with police during demonstrations, and in the death of a close friend who 
strongly advocated the 'liberation' of Okinawa and Amami from US occupation and 
had become heavily involved in the student movement.13 Ota later named 1953 as the 
year in which he himself began to strongly advocate Okinawan reversion. He cited the 
growing struggle against the expropriation of land by the US military command within 
Okinawa, and widespread opposition towards the Korean War amongst progressive 
forces within mainland Japan, as the two primary factors driving his sentiment. 14 From 
an early stage, Ota called for reversion according to the anti-militarist ideals of the 
12 Ardsaki Moriteru, Sengo Okinawashi (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1976), p. 61. 
n Ota recounts that Taneda Shlgenobu, who grew up in the Amami Islands, arrived on the same boat from 
Okinawa to Tokyo, and boarded in the same temple lodgings near Waseda. As a result of his political 
activities, however, Ianeda was expelled from the university, and ordered to return to Okinawa. He went 
underground, scavenging food and lodgings from friends, including Ota, and moving from place to place 
in an effort to avoid the authorities and expulsion from Tokyo. Soon after, however, he became ill, and 
died within a year (as recounted by Ota in Okinawa no ketsudan, pp. 54-6). The Amami Islands were 
returned to Japan on December 25, 1953. 
14 Interview with the author ( 4 May 2001 ). 
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Japanese peace movement and m opposition towards the expansion of US military 
bases. 
Prior to 1952, the US military rationalized the use and acquisition of land in 
Okinawa by the 1907 Hague Convention's Rules of Land Warfare (Section III, Article 
III)Y By 28 April1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force,12.7% of 
the land area of Okinawa had been requisitioned for use by the US forces without 
payment, affecting a total of approximately 40,000 land owners. After the peace treaty 
came into effect, the military sought to authorize these acquisitions under the powers of 
the US Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR, originally the US Military 
Government, renamed in July 1950).16 USCAR also began authorizing an expansion of 
the area of the existing military bases, and in April 1953 issued an ordinance which 
gave the US military powers to forcefully expropriate new plots of land. Landovmers 
fiercely protested, and in May 1953, the legislature of the Government of the Ryukyu 
Islands called for the abolition of the three most controversial ordinances issued by 
USCAR on land acquisition. 17 Yet the US Army Commander effectively held absolute 
power over the GRl, the only politically elected body in Okinaw-a.18 
15 Ets4jiro Miyagi, "The Land Problem (1952-1958)," pp. 78-97. 
16 In November 1952, an ordinance was issued requiring landowners to conclude a contract with the chief 
executive of the Government of1he Ryukyu Islands (GRI, made up oflocal1egislators) which allowed the 
US to lease the land for a period of20 years. 
17 Kiyoshi Nakachi Ryukyu-US..Japan Relations 1945-1972, p. 81. In late 1952, the legislature also passed 
two resolutions demanding the guarantee of1he rights of the people ofRyukyu, and requesting the 
immediate aad unconditional reversion ofRyukyu to Japan. See Nanpo DoM Bngokai (ed.) Okinawa 
mandai kihon shiryo (Tokyo: Nanp6 Doha Engokai, 1968), pp. 1048-9. 
18 The Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) was established by USCAR in a proclamation dated 
April 1952. Article 7 of the proclamation stipulated: "The Deputy Governor of1he Civil Administration 
who is the local US Army Commander, has the right, in the event of necessity, to veto, prohibit or 
suspend the operation of any laws, ordinances or regulations enacted by the Government of the Ryukyu 
Islands or any civil government or agency of any such government; to order the promulgation of any law 
or regulation he may deem advisable; and to resume in whole or in part, the exercise of full authority in 
the Ryukyu Islands." As cited in "Report oflnvestigation Concerning Problems of Human Rights of the 
Okinawan People" (sic.), compiled by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, 30 April 1955 (US 
National Archives, RG 59 CDF 1955-59 Box 3978 F5). 
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A grass-roots reversion movement centring around the Okinawa Teachers 
Association (OTA) emerged in parallel with the intensification of the land dispute. Yara 
ChObyo, the president of the OTA, was elected as chairman of the Council for the 
Return of the Ryukyu Islands to the Japanese Fatherland (Okinawa Shoto Sokoku Fukki 
Kiseikm), established in January 1953. The Council for Reversion called for the 
abolishment of Article III of the peace treaty and urged the rise of nationalist Japanese 
sentiment within Okinawa. 19 Y ara and three other representatives from the committee 
visited Japan in early 1954 to raise funds for the reconstruction of damaged school 
buildings, and further promote nation-wide support for the reversion movement in 
mainland Japan. 20 During this time, Ota met with Yars in Tokyo, and assisted on a 
small scale with the fund-raising campaign, which by March 1954 had raised over 6 
million yen.21 
In response, however, USCAR forced Yara to resign as Council for Reversion 
Chairman, and initially refused to issue permits to Y ara and other representatives to 
visit Tokyo to accept the collected contributions. Grm.ving opposition to the US military 
amongst progressive political parties and the Okinawan student movement, efforts to 
unionise the labour force, and demands for better working conditions were met with 
repressive measures. In April 1954, USCAR warned labour unions not to participate in 
events organized for May Day, a celebration it considered dominated by communist 
19 Nanpo DohO Engokai (ed.) Okinawa mondai kihon shiry/5, pp. 1151-2. see also Kiyoshi Nakachi 
Ryukyu-US-Japan Relations 1945-1972, p. 65 
10 Okinawa Fukki Undo Keisetkai (The Association for 1he promotion of the return of Okinawa to Japan) 
was established in mainland Japan by those ofOkinawan descent in 1946. It was lead by Nakayoshi 
Yoshiald, who professed to be the first person to use 1he term 'fukki' in the context of calling for tbe 
return of Okinawa to Japan. This organization was originally dominated by conservative forces. However 
the more progressive Okinawan Peoples Association ( Okinawajin Renme~) also began more actively 
advocating reversion by the end of the 1940s, and in 1949 decided to omit "peoples" ("fin," denoting that 
Okinawans were of a different ethuicity/citizenship to Japanese) from its name, to become the more 
innocuous Okinawa Association (Okinawa Renmei) (Arasaki Moriteru, Sengo Okinawashi (Tokyo: Nihon 
Hyoronsha, 1976), pp. 74-5. 
21 Interview with Ota, details on campaign from Nakachi, Ryukyu-US-Japan Relations 1945-1972, p. 67. 
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groups. A month later, David Ogden, the Deputy Govemor of USCAR, issued an anti-
communist statement, and sought to introduce legislation outlawing the activities of the 
left-wing Okinawan People's Party for communist affiliations.22 USCAR's information 
and education division head similarly accused the OTA of "promoting communism" 
and "financing communist party members." Writing in 1968, Ota himself described the 
years of 1953-4 as marking the onset of a "dark period" in Okinawan history, when: 
"not only did USCAR take an even tougher stand against local residents, but all 
expressions of opposition towards the US military administration were seen as being 
incited by communists and their collaborators.',n 
In response to USCAR's uncompromising stance, opposition against the land 
expropriation policies escalated into a protracted non-partisan "island-wide" struggle 
(shima gurumi to so) against military policy. The "Okinawa issue" also finally gained 
significant attention in mainland Japan. In January 1955, the Asahi Shinbun ran a large 
story on the Civil Liberty Union's (jiyu jinken kyokal) findings on human rights 
infringements in Okinawa. The inquiry had been undertaken at the recommendation of 
the American Civil Liberties Union, who also directly expressed their concerns about 
land acquisition and the military's repressive policies to the Department of State and 
Pentagon. 24 In April 1955, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations published a 
22 This legislation was in fact also supported by the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party, affiliated with 
Japan's ruling LDP. 
23 
"Okinawa no osoru beki shosenkyokusei" (Okinawa's Fearsome Small electoral-district System). Ushio 
No. 93 (March 1968), p. 153. He also concluded that the "land issue" of 1955-6 bad been decisive in 
securing the transformation of Okinawans' image of the US in the early postwar period from a positive to 
negative one ("Okinawa no Amerikazo" (Okinawa's View of America), Us hi a No 104 (Special Addition) 
(December 1968), p. 25). 
24 
"The problem of Communist infiltration should be dealt with by combating it in the open without resort 
to repressive measures. Particularly it should not be confused with the propaganda for reversion to Japan 
or expressions of hostility to occupation measures." Letter addressed to General William Marquat of the 
Pentagon from the American Civil Liberties Union (US National Archives, RG 59 CDF 1955 Box 3978 
F5). 
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similarly damning report documenting extensive human rights infringements in the 
. I d 2' IS an S •• 
The immediacy of the land issue served to override larger questions of 
Okinawa's status, and following USCAR's attack on the activities of the Council for 
Reversion it was not until 1960 that an equivalent, the Council for the Return of 
Okinawa Prefecture to the Fatherland (Okinawa-ken Sokok:u Fukki Kyogikai or Fukki-
lcyo), was formed. Fukki-kyo was a large umbrella organization sponsored by three key 
organizations, the OTA, the Government Employees' Labour Union, the Council of 
Okinawan Prefectural Youth Associations, as well as progressive political parties, the 
Parent and Teachers Association, and the Bereaved Family Association. It incorporated 
pacifist, pro-centralist and pro-autonomy groups. The Okina'iV-an Liberal Democratic 
Party decided not to participate, preferring a "step by step" approach towards the 
assimilation of Okinawa's social, cultural, and political institutions rather than 
immediate reversion. 26 The reversion movement thus became integrally connected to 
and dominated by a progressive agenda. A year later, in September 1961, Ota published 
his views on reversion for the first time. 
The Call for Popular Elections 
Ota' s first article on the issue of reversion vias a lengthy review of Hamanishi 
Kenjiro's A Report on Okinawa (Okinawa e no hOkok:u), an account of the US military 
occupation of Okinawa published in early 1961. 27 Hamanishi, a mainland Japanese 
15 Japan Federdtion ofBar Associations, "Report oflnvestigation Concerning Problems of Homan Rights 
of the Okinawan People" (sic.). The report separated human rigbts infringements into three areas: the 
forcible leasing of land for military purposes; racial discrimination in wages; and "other happenings," 
which included a list of various cases where US military members had not been held accountable for rape, 
murder, or hit-and-run incidents, and restrictions on freedom of speech, publication, and collective 
bargaining. 
26 Arasaki Moriteru and Nakano Yoshio, Okinawa sengoshi (Tokyo: lwanarni shoten, 1976), pp. 116-7. 
27 Hamanishi Kenjiro, Okinawa e no hOkoku: Beikoku no ryoshiki ni uttaeru (Tokyo: TananAjiasha, 
1961). 
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journalist who completed his work after a two month trip to Okinawa, was sceptical of 
the extent of Okinawa's so called "island-side struggle" against occupation. He 
concluded that: ''I did not find a strong sense of national belonging amongst the people 
of Okinawa. From what I saw, Okinawans' sense of being Ryukyuan, above being 
Japanese, is too strong."28 Hamanishi surmised that Okinawans' desire for reversion 
arose from merely a vague sense that the islands would be economically better off as a 
part of Japan than they were under US occupation. He argued that in fact reversion 
would only seriously impede Okinawa's base-centred economy and be detrimental to 
local industry, which greatly benefited from restrictions and customs taxes imposed on 
goods imported from mainland Japan. Hamanishi declared that in fact none of the 
Okinawan business elite supported calls for reversion, and predicted that once these 
benefits were transferred down to the populace at large, the reversion movement would 
lose momentum. 
Hamanishi's views were no doubt prevalent in mainstream Japanese society, and 
his observations on economy-that it was hinged on a pro-military Okinawan elite and 
highly dependent on the bases-certainly held weight. In his critique of the book, Ota 
conceded that with reversion a multitude of complex economic issues had to be 
confronted. Yet he strongly refuted Hamanishi' s suppositions on the reversion 
movement. Ota countered that in concentrating on a group of influential Okinawans 
who economically benefited from collaborating with the US military, Hamanishi could 
not "see the forest for the trees." Ota stressed that the reversion movement in Okinawa 
was based on something more fundamental than either nationalism or pragmatics-the 
desire for equal status within a democratic nation founded on pacifist principles, and for 
an elected autonomous government. Ota referred to these aims comprehensively as the 
"pursuit of rights as human beings." He also predicted that the more the standard of 
2S Ibid., p. 12. 
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living in Okinawa improved, the more calls for reversion would grow in strength. In 
other words, "to the extent that democracy is upheld in principle, no one will be able to 
deny Okinawans the fundamental rights that all people are guaranteed tbrough their 
position as humans and members of a sovereign nation."29 
For Ota, the call for reversion was necessarily the pursuit of democratic rights-
in opposition to the authoritarian powers of the US Army Commander in Okinawa 
(renamed the High Commissioner in 1960), and in the name of autonomy. In September 
1950, after the establishment of the Okinawa Gunto Government, the first gubernatorial 
elections under US occupation (and in fact in the history of Okinawa) were held?0 After 
the peace treaty came into force in 1952, however, the Chief Executive of the newly 
established GRl was appointed by US authorities. 31 None of the tbree ChiefExecutives 
of Okinawa who held office from 1952-1968 were chosen by direct popular election, 
but were appointed by and answerable to US authorities. In response to growing calls 
for public elections, and after the pro-military Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party 
(OLDP) secured a majority of seats in the legislature in the early 1960s, USCAR 
introduced a system of indirect election where the appointment of the Chief Executive 
had to be approved by the GRllegislature. This was seen as little more than a palliative 
to many, however, and in 1964, over 100 Okinawans were injured in clashes with police 
during a mass protest against the legislature's nomination of Matsuoka Seiho (an OLDP 
member who had in fact lost to Taira in the last direct elections of 1950) to the office of 
Chief Executive. 
29 
"Nibon fukki ha kanshO kadassan ka: Hamanishi shi no 'Okinawa eno hokoku' o yonde," OT(I9 
September 1961 ), p. 8. 
30 As Ota la!er pointed out, however, this system of democratic election "became no more than a 
temporary aberration" ("Okinawa no shusek:i kosen no igi," Minami to kita No. 46 (September 1968), p. 
58). 
31 Mik:io Higa, Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa (Vancouver: University of British Columbia), p. 
30. 
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In November 1964, directly after this episode, Ota published a pointed political 
satire in one of Okinawa's main local newspapers. He drew an analogy between the 
political "burlesque" which unfolded over Matsuoka's appointment and traditional 
Ryukyuan theatre. Ota sarcastically noted that in this recent "political drama" the 
audience became so "moved" by the performance that they themselves attempted to 
"take to the stage." This was a clear reference to the crowd of angry protesters who had 
stormed the parliament in protest against Matsuoka's nomination. Members of the 
OLDP condemned the protesters. But Ota was critical of pro-military politicians-the 
"star performers" of the play-who sought to limit "audience participation" \vithin the 
theatre. He reminded his readers that on the contrary, the central and most enjoyable 
feature of Ryukyuan theatre was this tradition of audience participation, its customs of 
open interaction between the stage and floor. In a subtle yet powerful call for the 
implementation of popular elections and democratic participation, Ota concluded: 
In the political theatre, the completion of the performance is not itself the goal. 
For the audience, is not the very process of the actors' enacting of the drama the 
most important thing? In this case, the playwright and the performers cannot 
succeed without taking note of the will and feelings of the audience itself .. .I must 
repeat. The greatness of traditional Ryukyuan Theater lies in the sense of 
communion between audience and performers, in the mutual sharing of the 
theatrical space. Is not the advancement of this kind of mutual interaction the best, 
the only way, that the theatre of politics, especially in its democratic form, can 
succeed?32 
By 1967 Ota was more explicit in his criticism of US CAR's policies. Ota saw 
that the true expansion of autonomous powers was only achievable with the return of 
administrative rights to Japan, just as reversion must guarantee an increase in Okinawan 
autonomy. 33 He predicted that as long as the office of Chief Executive was a 
32 
"Mahiru no yoru no yume: shuseki shimeigeki o mite" OT ( 4 November 1964). 
33 
"Okinawa no shuseki kosen wajitsugen suru ka," Ushio No. 7 (October 1967) (Special Autumn 
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"subordinate institution" (jiizoku kikan) of the US Army Conunand, no matter who was 
appointed to the position they would ultimately be forced to defer to the US. He also 
concluded that as long as the US administration saw the strengthening and maintenance 
of the US military presence on Okinawa as their most important task and prioritised 
military issues above all else, they would seek to obstruct the establishment of local 
d . 34 emocrat1c processes. 
On 24 February 1967, a major confrontation occurred between the LDP-
majority GRI legislature and the OTA over the GRI's attempts to pass two education 
bills designed to limit the political activities of teachers. Demonstrators succeeded in 
pushing aside police and storming the legislature building. The protracted political 
conflict which ensued (known as kyoiku nihi5 soshi ti5si5 or "the struggle for the 
prevention of the two Education Laws") ended in victory for the teachers, and the bills 
were eventually shelved in November of the same year. 
Only a few months following this effective show of force by Yara's supporters, 
on I February 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued an executive order which 
authorized the popular election of the Chief Executive of the Ryukyus?5 In analysing 
these turn of events, Ota noted that: "Even the US, in prioritising 'the security and the 
most effective method of preserving' the military bases, can no longer ignore the ever-
growing demand for the expansion of rights to self-govenunent by the residents of 
Okinawa."36 In other words, US CAR's compromise on the issue of popular elections 
was seen as a pragmatic response to the growth of anti-military pro-reversion forces in 
Okinawa, rather than a fundamental change in military policy. At the same time, Ota 
Supplement), p. !52. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Kiyoshi Nakachi Ryukyu-US-Japan Relations 1945-1972, p. !26. 
36 
"Okinawa no shuseki k6sen wajitsugen suru ka," p. 163. 
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saw the realization of the elections as an important victory for Okinawans, and "a 
highly significant step towards the early attainment ofOkinawan reversion."37 
Less than three months later, the first popular election of the Chief Executive 
since before the San Francisco Treaty took place. Both the US and Japanese 
governments supported the conservative pro-military base candidate, Nishime Junji. 
Over twenty years later, disclosed documents divulged that both Tokyo and Washington 
conspired to ensure that covert funds from the CIA were directed to the election 
campaign trust of the Okinawa LDP38 In spite of these efforts, however, the candidate 
supported by Okinawa's progressive parties, Yara ChObyo, defeated Nishime by a 
sound majority. The common platform of the political coalition which had supported 
Y ara during the campaign centred upon the call for: the termination of B-52 flights from 
Okinawa; the halting of all other military operations directly tied to combat in the 
Vietnam War; the protection of Okinawans' life and property and the attainment of 
peace and security in Japan, Asia, and the world; the abolition of Article III of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty; and the immediate reversion of administrative rights over 
Okinawa to Japan.39 
Okinawa and Ota Between Japan and the US 
Viewing the Military Administration, Viewing the US 
Throughout the 1960s, Ota explicitly opposed the bases and the US military 
occupation of Okinawa. Yet he also expressed a certain faith in the conscience of the 
American people.40 Ota was fluent in English, read English materials prolifically, and 
37 
"Okinawa no shuseki kOsen no igi,'~ p. 68. 
38 Ota Masahide, Okinawa.· kichi naki shima e no dohyo (Tokyo: ShOseisha Shinso, 2001), p. 220; RS (5 
June 2000), p. I. 
39 Kiyoshi Nakachi Ryukyu-US-Japan Relations 1945-1972, p. 127. 
40 In 1967, he went to the extent of stating that: "I believe that if the ordinary American citizen was more 
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during his time at Waseda became one of the founders of the university's English 
Speaking Association. On graduation in 1954, he received a US government-funded 
scholarship to undertake an MA in journalism at Syracuse University in New York. 
Ota's studies at Syracuse provided him with academic skills which proved 
indispensable in writing and research. His experiences as a student in 1950s America 
also drew his attention to problems of discrimination and minority issues. On his first 
holiday break from Syracuse University, Ota travelled to Jacksonville, Florida, to visit a 
US teacher he had befriended and assisted translating for in Okinawa, a "Miss Cheney." 
On arrival at the station, however, he was mistaken for an illegal South American 
immigrant, and held in jail by authorities overnight, until his university could be 
contacted and his details verified. Ota was also shocked at the separation between 
"coloured" and "whites" on the buses and in public toilets. At the same time as being 
drawn to blatancy of discrimination pervasive in American society, he was drawn to 
debates on racial issues. In journalism classes and amongst other foreign student 
colleagues racial discrimination became a heated and much debated topic. In the press, 
the beginnings of Martin Luther King's bus boycott campaign in Alabama, and 
parliamentary hearings on allegations of communism drew Ota' s attention to the first 
seeds of America's growing civil rights movement, and the influence of McCarthyism 
in US politics. At university, Ota was impressed with the energy which students, male 
and female, put into publishing the university's daily student paper, The Daily Orange. 
Through journalism class, and in devouring magazines such as Time, Harper's, The 
New Republic, and what came to be his preferred source of information, The Nation, 
Ota came to cherish that which had been most lacking in his prewar education-
informed about the situation in Okinawa, a much earlier solution to the Okinawa issue could be found. If 
not an early solutio~ at least various improvements to the current situation would be forthcoming. This is 
because more than anything the American people themselves abhor the kind of situation wherein a people 
are subjugated to foreign rule against their will." "Okinawa no shuseki kosen wajitsugen suru ka," p. 158. 
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political and social debate.4 ' Ota later reflected that together with his war experience the 
opportunity he was given in the US to learn about American racial issues had been 
instrumental in opening his eyes to the historical discrimination against Okinawans 
within Japan, and its direct relation to contemporary conditions.42 
In the late 1950s, after his return from the US, Ota joined the Golden Gate Club 
(GGC or kinmon kurabu), an elite Okinawan organization whose membership was only 
open to those Ok:inawans who had graduated from US universities. The GGC was set up 
by the first group of graduate returnees from the US in 1952. From 1949 to 1970, 1089 
Okinawans were funded by the Pentagon to undertake undergraduate and graduate 
studies in the US. The GGC itself emerged as an influential organization under the US 
occupation-and a symbol of the hierarchical set of relations which helped secure 
USCAR's stronghold. Though when viewed up closely the GGC made far from a 
homogenous group, and the experience studying within US university was sometimes 
the only common thread binding members. 43 Soon after joining, Ota was elected 
president of the club for a term of one year (1957-8). Ota later noted that as the Golden 
Gate Club became even closer to the USCAR administration under the leadership of 
Takaramura Nobuo in the early 1960s, he became disaffected v.ith its pro-military 
stance. During the war, Takaramura had been aide to a Japanese marshal in the 
Philippines who was later hanged for war crimes: under occupation he became a top 
executive within the US-controlled Bank of the Ryukyus and closely cooperated with 
the upper echelons of the US military administration. 
41 Interview with the author (25 February 200 I). 
42 Ota Masahide, "Kaerlnan, iza," p. 221. Ota also reflects on the importance of his experience in the US 
in Okinawa no Ketsudan, pp. 63-71. 
43 See KinjO Hiroyuki, Kinmon Kurabu: mo hitotsu no Okinawa sengoshi (Naha: Hirugisha, 1988), p. 76. 
Kiujo cDnclodes that the GGC had "three faces": as an elite organization with close ties to the USCAR 
authority; as an influential business network; and as a "plural" group incorporating many diverse 
elements. Shinzato Hideyuki criticizes the tact that Ota himself was closely involved with this group-as 
typifying the kiod of"toadyism" which Ota was so critical of (Shinzato Hideyuki, Ota Okinawa-ken chiji 
no haishin koi (Urasoe: Puresu Okinawa, 1 994)). 
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In short, Ota was part of an Okinawa elite who, through prolonged occupation, 
were far more Americanised than their mainland Japanese counterparts, and intimately 
connected to the USCAR administration. Yet USCAR reports did not praise Ota as 
"pro-US" as they did for example Takaramura. USCAR maintained a file on all of the 
GGC's members. The description of Ota interestingly concludes: "His capacity for 
leadership probably is limited to the academic field, and within that tied to mass 
communications." 44 In years to come, Ota was critical of both prewar Japanese 
militarism and the postwar US military occupation administration. In opposing 
occupation, he sought to separate USCAR and the US military presence in Okinawa 
from America as a whole, and to reject the kind of Cold War rhetoric which assumed 
that opposition to the former entailed hostility to the latter. While often scathing 
towards the motivations of the US military, on the other hand he held a strong faith in 
many of the ideals of American democracy. In short, Ota's perception of the US was as 
multifarious as the often contradictory faces of the US which had been a pervasive part 
of his experience. 
In two separate articles in 1962 and 1968, Ota warned against the tendency for 
Okinawans to hold stereotyped images ofthe US, and vice versa.45 He noted that during 
and preceding World War II, Okinawans held a false image of Americans and British 
that had been fed by nationalistic anti-American propaganda promoted by the Japanese 
government to garner support for militarism. During the Battle of Okinawa, however, 
this image was turned on its head, as the supposedly friendly Japanese "Imperial 
soldiers" plundered the food and shelter of local Okinawans, and feared and loathed 
American soldiers risked themselves to save injured and war-stricken Okinawan 
44 
"The Golden Gate Club," 803 Record Group 260, Records ofthe US Occupation Headquarters, 
USCAR, 106 ofHCRI-LN Folder 9. 
45 
"Ryiibeijinkan no rikai wa kan6 ka: komiyunikeeshon no sh6gai ni tsuite no ikk:Osatsu/' Okinawa 
Karon (February 1962), pp. 67-71; and "OkinawanoAmerikazo," Ushio, No 104 (Special Addition) 
(December 1968), pp. 14-34. See also Chapter Three, "Okinawa no Amerikanjin" in Minikui Nihonjin. 
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civilians. Of his own experience Ota recounted that: "There were many genuinely 
humane American soldiers who displayed on the battlefield the best of America's 
attributes."46 Yet Ota warned that as a result of the prolonged occupation and US 
military policies, Okinawans had begun to again harbour hostile sentiments towards 
Americans. 
Ota saw mutual distrust between Okinawans and the US administration as 
caused not only by a conflict in interests, but by a mutual breakdown in communication. 
Ota was particularly affronted by the way in which Okinawa calls for reversion, for 
better labour conditions, for the right to strike, and for democratic elections were often 
depicted by the military as merely communist-incited "anti-Americanism." He 
concluded that if Okinawan sentiment was more clearly understood, on an individual 
level at least, Americans would be more sympathetic to Okinawa's plight. In 1965 Ota, 
assisted by two colleagues, Miyagi Etsujiro and Kyoda Seitoku, and a native English 
proof-reader, initiated the publication of a weekly English edition of the local 
newspaper, Okinawa Times. The newspaper was named The Weekly Okinawa Times. 
Kyoda worked on base: Miyagi had been a student of Ota's in Nago City some twenty 
years before, and was a journalist for the Stars and Stripes newspaper. For over three 
years, Kyoda, Miyagi and Ota met in the evenings, first at Ota's home and later \vithin 
the head office of the Okinawa Times, translating the editorial and various articles from 
the Japanese Okinawa Times. 47 
46 
"Okinawa no Amerikazo;~ p. 18. 
47 Ota Masahide, Okinawa no ketsudan. Also interview with Miyagi Etsujiro ( 4 May 200 !). The 
publication was supported by Okinawa Times president, Uechl Kazufumi. Echoing Ota's views, and in 
indirect criticism of the way events were presented in Okinawa's American press, Uechl noted in his 
introductory article on the aims of the weekly edition that: "People ... are inclined to relate fact and 
opinion l<l stereotypes. When the images portrayed in the press fail to present a social group truly, 
judgements by the people at large are perverted. Moreover, unchallenged assumptions soon harden into 
prejudice. The truth about any social group reveals weaknesses and vices, but also recognizes values, 
aspirations, and common humanity.'' The Week!Y Okinawa Times No. I (December 1965), p. 1. 
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Ota repeatedly pointed out the contradictions between USCAR's policies and 
the notion that the US was the bastion of liberty and democracy in the free world. He 
noted that the "fallacies and contradictions of American democracy" were manifest in 
the military occupation of Okinawa, and in relation to the appointment of a Chief 
Executive observed: "It is said that the reason the US is reluctant to hold popular 
elections for the post of Chief Executive is because they fear that someone will be 
chosen who they do not consider favourable for their own ends. If this is the case, it 
merely attests that America, a country which prides itself on being a bulwark of 
democracy, is admitting to its own misgovernment." 48 Ota particularly noted the 
contrast between domestic American libertarian traditions and foreign policy: "While 
Americans, as well others, recognize that the US is more rooted in 'libertarian tradition' 
than other countries, they have not displayed such virtues within Okinawa. Instead, they 
end up becoming ensnared by their own ideals-criticized by Okinawans in the name of 
these very traditions.'>'~9 
Ota also repeatedly employed this method of "reversal.'' He often cited 
criticisms against the US military occupation of Okinawa made by Americans to back 
his arguments, including American Civil Liberties Union's Robert Baldwin, who 
lobbied against human rights infringements in Okinawa, and prominent university 
professors such as Robert A. Sealapino, who expressed concerns over America's 
Okinawan policy.50 In short, the military occupation of Okinawa was the manifestation 
of the imperialism, military aggression, authoritarianism and inherent violence which 
lay behind and contradicted US claims to democracy. Yet Ota credited and sought to 
uphold the ideals of democracy and traditions of libertarianism which were a part of his 
""Okinawa no shuseki kosen wajitsugen suru ka," Ushio No.7 (October 1967) (Autumn Supplement) p. 
168. 
49 
"Okinawa no Amerikazii," p. 28. 
5° For instance, Barton Biggs' "Why do Okinawans hate America?" (Harpers, 1958), cited at length in 
"Okinawa no Arnerikaz5," pp. 29-30. 
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own experience of the US, and which contrasted v.ith the pervasive Jack of democratic 
consciousness in Japan. In fact, he went as far as to conclude: "It is Americans who rule 
over Okinawa in an undemocratic fashion. Yet it is also Americans, more than 
Japanese, who have made an effort to redress these inequities."51 
Viewing Okinawa, Viewing Japan 
In August 1965, Satii Eisaku became the first Japanese Prime Mirtister to visit 
Okinawa. In an emotional and well publicized speech, SatO symbolically addressed 
Okinawans on his arrival as "my fellow countrymen and women" and declared that: 
"Until the return of Okinawa has returned to its fatherland (sokoku), Japan's 'postwar' 
will not be over."52 Yet the Okinawan Prefectural Reversion Council and all political 
parties apart from the Okinawa LDP (affiliated with the ruling Japanese LDP of which 
Sato was head) refused to attend the official welcoming reception for the prime 
minister. Instead, the Reversion Council organized a mass rally, which was attended by 
approximately 150, 000 people. Rally participants later surrounded the hotel where SatO 
had planned to stay, ironically forcing the prime minister to seek accommodation 
overrtight within the US Army Headquarters. 53 
In an article published in the wake of Satel's visit, Ota concluded: "The real 
feelings of the people who lined the streets and waved the Japanese Rising Sun flag at 
the Pritne Mirtister, was not one of welcome in any true sense of the word. That 
mainland Japanese could not grasp this fact reflects the fundamental gap in perception 
between those who live in Okinawa, and those on the mainland. For the people of 
Okinawa, the Prime Minister's words seemed merely to ring hollow and lack any true 
51 
"Okinawa no AmerikazO," p. 31. 
""Saw shushO hOoki no suteetomento" (19 August, 1965), republishe<l in Nanpo Dohil Engokai (ed.) 
Okinawa mandai kihon shiryo, p. 620. 
53 Nakachi, Ryukyu-US-Japan Relations 1945-1.972, p. 119. 
116 
substance."54 That Sato should be surprised at the scale of these protests after his initial 
seemingly warm welcome epitomized to Ota the Japanese government's Jack of 
understanding of Okinawan sentiment. He saw that only when the Japanese government 
adequately tackled the "Okinawa issue" would the "sense of unified purpose" which the 
prime minister spoke of truly exist between Okinawans and mainland Japanese. 55 
Two years later, in the preface to his first major academic work, The Popular 
Consciousness of Okinawa (Okinawa no minshii ishiki, 1967), Ota described Okinawa's 
postwar plight in the following terms: 
Okinawa is not a prefecture of Japan as it was in the prewar period. Whatever its 
status in name, in reality Okinawa is at present not Japan. The Japanese who live 
in Okinawa are not guaranteed rights under Japan's constitution, nor are they 
allowed the right to self-government. Since the defeat of Japan in 1945, Okinawa 
remains under US military nJ!e. Furthermore, the reality is we do not know how 
long this situation must continue. 56 
In the face of over twenty years of 'ioreign rule' (iminzoku shihm), a fundamental 
question came to the fore for Ota. That is: "What is Okinawa? And what exactly does it 
mean to be Okinawan?" Ota saw the relation between Okinawans and mainland 
Japanese both historically and in the present as beset by a fundamental gap in emotional 
empathy (ondosa)-that is, the inability or even unwillingness of many mainland 
Japanese to perceive of the 'Okinawa problem' as their own. For: "If another part of 
Japan, such as Aomori, or Nagasaki, was placed in the same predicament as Okinawa, 
would the Japanese government and the people of Japan simply allow it to continue? I 
think not. It is because it is Okinawa that this situation has been tolerated." 5i The 
54 
"Okinawa jfunin no mita Sa!O shushO: 'Okinawa no hito yo, gambare' to wa nanigoto!" Asahi Jaanaru, 
(September !965) }.[o. 7: p. !4 .. 
"Ibid. 
56 Okinawa no minshii ishiki (Tokyo: Kobundo, !967), p. l. 
57 Ibid., p. 2. 
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question "Who are Okinawans?" ultimately weighed on Japan as a whole, and the 
history of discrimination towards Okinawa. 
In The Popular Consciousness of Okinawa, Ota searched for answers to these 
dilemmas through a historical examination of the formation of Okinawan popular 
consciousness in the modem era. The Popular Consciousness of Okinawa marked the 
first attempt to trace the way in which Okinawans had resisted and embraced 
assimilation into Japan in the modem era Vvithin the print media. Ota drew on a wealth 
of original material gathered from his earlier research on the history of print media in 
Okinawa from the Meiji period to World War IL It was one of the first attempts to come 
to grasp Vvith the historical process by which Okinawans "became Japanese", and has 
formed the basis of much analyses on the historical formation of modem Okinawan 
identity since. 
Ota saw comprehension of the past as a "shortcut" to understanding the 
present 58 He also hoped it could become a lesson for the present, and a useful reference 
in the formation of a blueprint for the future. 59 He incorporated modem conceptions of 
progress and emancipation into his analysis. In a similar vein to Japanese postwar 
enlightenment thought, Ota sought to find an explanation for the lack of a democratic 
revolutionary spirit in Okinawa, in the attempt to secure political agency in the present 
This raised the question as to why Okinawan society as a whole had been unable to 
effectively resist homogenisation, assimilation, and the indoctrination of imperial 
ideology. 
Ota concluded that both feudalism and modernity had emerged only belatedly in 
Okinawa. Subjugated first under Satsuma and later by the Meiji policy of 'preservation 
of old customs,' Okinawans were unable to break out of the multiple layers of shackles 
which bound them within pre-modem hierarchical social relations. These relations were 
58 
"Fukuzatsu na genchi no kokoro: kak:o o shiro no ga chikamichi," Asahi Shin bun (27 October 1967). 
59 Okinawa no rninshz< ishiki, p. 6. 
118 
in turn reinforced by discriminatory attitudes and government policies following the 
formation of the Mciji state. As a result: "Okinawans were isolated from the centre, 
neglected by the progress of the times, and unable to form a collective consciousness. 
At the end of this path lay only counterproductive nihilism, self-loathing, a distrust of 
politics, cynicism, and a sense of apathy towards life in generaL"60 
Ota was particularly critical of what he saw to be the "extreme form of 
toadyism" (gokudo no jidaishugi) which historically beset Okinawans. Unable to hold a 
definitive and common set of principles or creeds, Ota declared, Okinawans "have 
sought to sustain their existence by serving the wishes and demands of larger powers." 
As a result, they have deferred to the modes of lifestyle dictated upon them by others, 
while maintaining a severe inferiority complex. "It has been repeatedly noted that 
Okinawans," Ota asserted, "have a terrible sense of inferiority towards the rest of Japan, 
and at the same time often overreact and become emotional over the slightest comment 
made about them by others, regardless of whether or not it holds some truth."61 
Ota noted that the historical structures of subjugation and subsequent 
"opportunism" were also duplicated within postwar power relations. Under US 
occupation, USCAR authorities exploited the Okinawa's tradition structure of toadyism 
through the maintenance of a small-district electoral system in the Government of the 
Ryukyus Legislature elections. A small-district system, combined with a lack of 
democratic tradition, strong village community affiliations, and the dependence of small 
localities on Okinawa's centralized and base-centred economy benefited the pro-
military Okinawan LDP. This in turn served to further reinforce pork-barrel politics, 
d d . d '1' 62 epen ence, opporturusm an serv1 1ty. 
"' Ibid., p. 340. 
61 Ibid., p. 2-3. 
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In the prewar period Okinawans had embraced patriotic ideology and 
assimilation in an efiort to gain the spoils of Japanese imperialism on an equal par with 
mainland Japanese. In return, however, they "gained nothing but limitless despair."63 
For the hundred years of its modern history and since its incorporation within the Meiji 
state, Okinawans had been uuable to obtain either spiritual or material independence 
(jiritsu ). The question as to whether Okinawans could regain their subjectivity 
(shutaisei) and attain true autonomy was for Ota the primary aim and most difficult 
challenge of the reversion movement In order for this aim to be achieved, Okinawans 
must hold an independent spirit, and not be overcome by an opportunism which only 
reinforces hierarchical relations and exploitation. Similarly, mainland Japan must atone 
for its historical discrimination of Okinawa, and its general disdain and ignorance 
towards Okinawans' plight, both historically and in the postwar present.64 The reversion 
struggle was thus placed within the framework of the postwar Japanese struggle for 
subjectivity. 
In conceiving of the postwar pursuit for pacifism and democracy, and 
Okinawa's place within it, Ota also drew on two very different cultural figures of the 
prewar and postwar era-Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961) and Yanagita Kunio (1875-
1962). Y anaihara was a Christian liberal who was forced to resign from his chair at 
Tokyo Imperial University in 1937 after critics decried him for being a pacifist, an 
enemy of the Imperial House, and an anticolonialist. In the postwar era he returned to 
Tokyo University to become its head from 1951 to 1957.65 Yanagita was a conservative 
ethnologist and founder of Japanese folklore studies (minzoku-gaku). Yanaihara 
63 Okinawa no mtnshii ishtkt, p. 339 
64 Ibid., p. 6. (citing Kinoshita Junichi). See also "Fukki undo ni genri o: 'chinjo to seigan' wa owatta ka," 
OT(17 November, 1967), p. 2. 
6
' For a discussion ofYanaibara's thought and work see Kevin Doak, "Colonialism and Ethnic 
Nationalism in !be Political Thought ofYaonihara Tadao (1863-1961)," East Asian History No. 10 (1995), 
pp. 79-98. 
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emphasized the connection between domestic and international justice: Y anagita 
rediscovered in Japan's social and geographical margins the "old customs and 
unconscious tradition" of Japanese folklore. Their projects came from opposing poles of 
Japanese intellectual thought-Yanaihara was strongly influence by European liberal 
and enlightenment traditions, while Yanagita rejected rationalist academic discipline in 
favour of the spoken narrative of Japanese native (dochaku) culture. 
Yet whether advocating an internationalist pacifism or the essence of Japan as 
discovered on its margins, both Y anaihara and Y anagita evoked ethnic cultural 
nationalism in opposition to government policies and state-centred nationalism. Ota 
read the works of both in the early 1960s, and recounted being deeply impressed by 
them. 66 Y anaihara provided a vision of international pacifism, and Y anagita a discourse 
which empowered the periphery and criticized Japan's centralized bureaucratic policy-
making process. Both provided ideals for conceiving of reversion within the framework 
of the (ethnic) nation. Ota adopted Yanaihara's idealist vision of democracy and 
pacifism, and Y anagita' s criticism of centralised state structures. Yet at the same time, 
even from this period, a distinct tension can also be discerned in Ota's work between 
perceptions of an Okinawan and Japanese (ethnic) subjectivity. These tensions 
increased as reversion itself neared. 
In an article published soon after the 1968 Chief Executive elections, Ota wrote: 
"The right for people to choose their own political leader is taken as a given in· 
contemporary politics. And yet the hardships of the long struggle it took for the people 
of Okinawa prefecture to achieve this right are not comprehended in the mainland."67 
For Ota, Yara's victory symbolized the strength that Okinawa's political movement had 
65 Ota praises Yanaihara in "Kokoro no soko o yusaburu: Ayakaritai yuki to chisei," OT (16 August 1964), 
p. 12. He also recounts how Yanagita's work on Okinawa in particular influenced him in Okinawajin to 
wa nanika (Naha: Greenlife, 1980), pp. 72-80. 
67 
"Wareware wa 'sok~ji' o eranda," Asahi Jaanaru (24 November 1968), p. 17. 
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gained through years of resisting occupation. Yet even after the election victory, Ota 
saw that the struggle for equality had not yet been fully won, and an irtherent 
"perception gap" between mainland Japan and Okinawa remained. He appealed to 
mainland Japanese to fulfil their responsibility in realizing Okinawans' right to national 
representation in the Japanese Diet. He also stressed that, contrary to those who saw 
Yara's victory as a threat to US-Japan relations, answering to the wishes of the 
Okinawan people was a necessary prerequisite for cooperation between the two 
countries. For, Ota emphasized: "As long as it is founded on the continued denial of the 
citizen rights of Okinawan Japanese, the bilateral 'cooperation' of which both the US 
and Japanese governments speak can only be a fiction."68 
The Sato-Johnson Joint Communique and the "Ugly Japanese" 
The period from OTA's victorious battle to prevent the passing of the GRI 
legislation on education in 1967 to the breakdovm of Okinawa's progressive coalition 
on the eve of the anti-B-52 strike of February 1969 marked a highly significant torning 
point in the reversion movement. This period witnessed the increase of organized mass 
resistance against US occupation. The US authorities' inability to contain pro-reversion 
forces in Okinawa, the Japanese government's desire to reach some kind of an 
agreement on the Okinawa issue before the security treaty revision was debated in 
parliament in 1970, and a growing mass protest movement against the US-Japan 
Security Treaty and the Vietnam War in mainland Japan brought the Okinawan issue to 
a head. As one US government analysis concluded: "By January 1969 a strong 
consensus had already developed within the US Government that it would be necessary 
68 lbid., p. 19. 
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to agree to reversion in order to maximize the useful life expectancy of US military 
facilities not only in Okinawa but also in Japan proper."69 
Consequently, the policy of both the US and Japanese governments took an 
about-face. It was determined that in order to maintain the military capacity of bases in 
Okinawa, Okinawa should be returned to Japan, rather than ruled under 'separation.' 70 
The US sought to maintain its military capability on the islands, while Japan was to 
assume responsibilities for the internal security of Okinawa as part of assuming a larger 
security role \vithin the bilateral partnership. Anti-military reversion groups were unable 
to produce a united front to effectively combat this strategic change in policy. The 
reversion movement and its progressive support base became weighed down by the 
bilateral forces mobilized in response to its own successes, and fragmented. This 
fragmentation was compounded by Okinawa's entrenched economic dependence on the 
bases. It coincided and complexly intersected with the fragmentation of the foundations 
ofleft-wing opposition in mainland Japan.71 
Under US occupation, Ota contested the set of power relations which embedded 
Okinawans somewhere between Washington and Tokyo by stressing that Okinawans 
were entitled to equal rights as Japanese nationals. At the same time, he held the 
Japanese government to blame for its complicit role-in securing Okinawa's postwar 
fate, and in displaying a lack of resolve towards, and even hindering, the realization of 
69 Colm, Peter, Rosemary Hayes and Joseph A. Yager, The RITersion of Okinawa: A Case Study in 
Interagency Coordination (Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, International and Social Studies 
Division, 1972) p. 55. 
10 Arasaki Moriteru, Sengo Okinawashi (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1976), p. 291. 
11 As John Dower observes: "By 1972, !he Left Jhus had lost hold of many ofits most evocative peace 
issues: US bases in Japan, !he Security Treaty, nuclear weapons, arms production, Okinawa, and China A 
year later, wilh !he armistice in Vietnam, !he las! !,>real cause that had provided a modieum of common 
purpose among the opposition was removed. The average citizen turned inward, to bask in Japan's new 
international influence as an economic power and become consumed by material pursuits, exemplified in 
such mass-media slogans as 'My Home-ism' and 'My Car-ism"' (John W. Dower, "Peace and Democracy 
in Two Systems: External Policy and Internal Conflict" in Andrew Gordon (ed.) Postwar Japan as 
History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 27). 
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Okinawan calls for civil rights, national representation, and revers10n itself. As 
reversion emerged as a foreseeable reality, and Okinawa once again became excluded 
from the bilateral negotiations set in motion to determine its own fate, this sense of 
antagonism only increased. Though published little more than a year after Okinawcm 
Popular Consciousness, Ota's The Ugly Japanese: The Oulrage of Okinawa (Minikui 
Niho11;jin: Nihon no Okinawa ishiki, 1969)72 blazed with indignation of an intensity not 
seen in his earlier work. For Ota came to see the fight for reversion as "not only a battle 
against US occupation," but a historical and contemporary struggle "against the 
Japanese government, and against Japanese themselves."73 
The first discemable signs of a shift in the US and Japan's joint stance on the 
Okinawan issue came in the form of a joint communique issued after talks by Japanese 
Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and US President Lyndon Johnson in Washington on 15 
November 1967. The Japanese Government had formally requested that the US 
Government open talks on the future of the Ryul]'U and Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands for 
the first time in July of the same year. In the following communique, it was announced 
that negotiations for the reversion of Ogasawara Islands were to begin immediately, and 
agreed that the two governments would "keep under joint and continuous review" the 
status of the Ryukyus, "guided by the aim of returning administrative rights over the 
islands to Japan."74 
Ota published a critical commentary in the Okinawa Times on the communique 
two days after its declaration, concluding: "The recent joint communique stands out 
merely for its well-considered choice of words, and contains nothing that in any 
n Ota's own English translation of the Japanese title. 
73 Minikui Nihonjin: Nihon no Okinawa ishiki (Tokyo: Saimaru, 1969), p. 6. 
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substantial way fulfils our expectations."75 At the same time, Ota discerned that the 
meeting between the two heads of state symbolized an important historical turning point 
for Okinawa and for the reversion movement. The call for reversion, Ota stressed, must 
transform itself from a movement of "official petitions and formal requests" (chinjo to 
gigan) to one which "demands what it wants and gets what it demands" (yokyu shi, 
kachitoru). He declared that: "The reversion movement is no longer a simple expression 
of nationalism. It is obvious to all that if we rely purely on the largely sentimental and 
emotional call for release from foreign rule, the reversion movement will reach an 
impasse. The principles of the reversion movement must be fundamentally taken to 
question and redefined."76 Ota predicted that the outcome of the next round of struggle 
and conflict within Okinawa would affect the future of the whole of Japan. The aims of 
the US and Japanese governments were clearly spelled out in their policy over 
Ogasawara. That is, the return of administrative rights over the islands was to come 
hand in hand with the strengthening of security relations. Ota was quick to warn that 
there was no guarantee that Okinawa would not face the same fate, and that: "the return 
of Okinawa may very well be accompanied by the condition that the US have 
unrestricted use of the bases and maintain nuclear weapons within the islands."77 
Ota therefore made an important shift towards focusing debate much more 
squarely on the fundamental meaning of reversion. For Ota, the call for reversion was 
the call for the attainment of human rights, and for protection under Japan's "peace 
constitution." Okinawa was to no longer be used as a "means" (shudan) or "instrument" 
(dogu) by the US or Japanese governments in the name of security: "to be able to live as 
an autonomous being with your own goals, and not [like Okinawa] as a 'means' under. 
75 
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the name of the Japanese government, is a bate essential right of humans."78 Ota saw 
the peace constitution as symbolizing the fundamental principles of rebirth which 
formed the base of his political action and the pursuit of autonomy. In another article on 
published during this time, Ota recounted how his teacher and mentor, Nakasone 
Seizen, had faithfully copied out by hand the text of the constitution around the summer 
of 194 7, and how he himself had also copied out the text fl·om his teacher. Ota reiterated 
that: "The words of the constitution provided us with the key to our own rebirth. There 
we found several of the principles which formed the base of our pursuit for 
humanity."79 
In questioning the meaning of reversion, Ota contested the process by which 
Okinawa was becoming incorporated within Japan's administrative system. In the joint 
communique, Johnson and Sati'i agreed that, "with a view toward minimizing the 
stresses which will arise at such a time as administrative rights are restored to Japan, 
measures should be taken to identifY further the Ryukyuan people and their institutions 
with Japan proper." They also pledged the formation of an advisory committee to 
"develop recommendations which should lead to substantial movement toward 
removing economic and social barriers between the Ryukyu Islands and Japan 
proper."80 Less than one month later, Ota published a series of articles highly critical of 
Okinawa's so called "ittaika" or unification "boom."81 
While rendered as "further identify" in the English version of the communique, 
literally translated the Japanese term "ittaikd' called for the "becoming one" of 
78 Ibid .. 
79 
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Okinawan people, society, and economy with mainland Japan. 82 As Andrew Gordon 
observes: "the recasting of the ideal of equality as that of homogeneity, rather than 
equal opportunities for individual expression, was central to a postwar discourse 
undergirding conservative hegemony and celebrating the arrival of the middle-class 
society" in high-growth Japan. 83 It was also central to the Japanese government's policy 
on reversion. Ota contested this process, emphasizing that state-centred homogenizing 
processes compromised individual autonomy, necessary for the functioning of 
democratic processes, and stifled Okinawan identity. Healthy scepticism in respect to 
the national government's promotion of ittaika was, Ota stressed, vital to ensure that 
Okinawans do not become alienated from political processes, as they had been in the 
prewar period. 
Ittaika described a process where the extraneous or nonessential parts of 
something became incorporated into the whole. Yet Ota raised a fundamental question: 
namely, who determines what the "intrinsic" part of Japan is to which Okinawa should 
be incorporated? For Ota, the guarantee of democratic principles was the fundamental 
factor which should be given priority in any policy of incorporation. Okinawa's 
incorporation must not merely be a repetition of prewar assimilationist policies: the 
essence of true incorporation was the attaimnent of an "autonomous spirit" (jiritsushin). 
Ota emphasized that at a time when the "reversion issue" was beginning to be used as a 
pretext in the name of "national defence," Okinawans must establish for themselves 
what exactly incorporation should or should not entail. He concluded: 
Consequently, ittaika should not be a "policy of overcoming the econo11fic gap" 
between Okinawa and mainland Japan (kakusa zesei), nor should it be the hitherto 
"policy of step by step incorporation" (tsumikasane h6shiki). It is not the mere 
82 A linguistic comparison between the English and Japanese texts reveals numerous ways in which the 
US and Japanese government used terms which reflected their respective agendas and official stance in 
relation to Okinawa. 
83 Andrew Gordon, "Conclusion" in Andrew Gordon ( ed.) Postwar Japan as History, p. 463. 
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assimilation and homogenisation of Okinawa's institutions. And it is more than 
the "official administrative return of Okinawa." I believe it is the binding of a true 
"solidarity" (rentai) between Okinawans and mainland Japanese, where each 
respectively are aware of their responsibilities as subjects (shutaiteki sekinin), 
founded on the desire to build a future Japan in the name of peace and culture 
according to the principles of the constitution. It is only when this is achieved, 
that the incorporation (ittaika) which we have sought for so long will become a 
reality. 84 
For Ota, reversion did not entail homogenisation, nor only the attainment of an 
incorporated Japanese "subject", but the building of a coalition between mainland Japan 
and Okinawa based on a respect for autonomy and difference. Three months after the 
SatO-Johnson joint communique, Ota moved to Tokyo to conduct two years of further 
research at the Tokyo University Newspaper Research Institute. During this period, Ota 
drew extensive ties with liberal intellectuals in Tokyo, including Oe Kenzaburo, 
Sakamoto Yoshikazu, and Nakano Yoshio. He became a central member of a study 
group on Okinawa attended by Sakamoto and others, forged a strong connection with 
Iwanarni editor Yoshino Genzaburo, and published prolifically in the journal Sekai and 
numerous Japanese newspapers. As he emerged a central voice in debates over the 
Okinawa issue in mainland Japan, he also undertook a profound revision of Okinawa's 
historical relations with Japan. One month after his arrival in Tokyo, Ota published an 
article in the Asahi Gurafu magazine which was highly critical not only of the 
government, but mainland Japan as a whole. 
Ota was highly critical of the lack of concern within Tokyo over the mountain of 
issues facing Okinawa. He saw that this ignorance was not due to Okinawa's 
geographical distance, but the fact that Tokyo was too immersed in materialism to take 
heed of the multiple problems faced on Japan's "periphery" (henkyo). Ota began to 
draw a direct connection between this material prosperity and Okinawa's own plight. 
84 
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The prosperity of Japan was seen as gained through the tragedy of Okinawa's war 
experience, and Japan's exploitation of Okinawa in the postwar period. The separation 
of Okinawa from Japan as a result of the peace treaty was seen as a disgrace.85 
The sense of indignation discemable in the Asahi Gurqfu article set the tone for 
Ota's subsequent much lengthier analysis, The Ugly Japanese, published early the next 
year. 86 "Japanese are ugly. At least in regards to Okinawa, I can say as much." So began 
Ota's controversial work, described by the Weekly Okinawa Times as "an impassioned 
impeachment of the ignorance and egoism of the Japanese in mainland Japan in regard 
to the Okinawa issue, and their prejudices and discriminations against the Japanese 
people in Okinawa." "Reading Ota's book," the Okinawa Times review continued, "one 
realizes that if there has been any consistency in the policy of the Tokyo government 
toward Okinawa, it has been one of convenience. What is more, one is struck by the fact 
that the past century has been a continuous painful struggle for Okinawans in search of 
their identity."87 
Ota was highly critical of the Japanese government's stance on the Okinawan 
issue, particularly the "realization before our very eyes" of a mentality which "seeks to 
eschew the significance of Okinawa's sacrifice in the Battle of Okinawa, and without 
even attempting to solve the remaining legacies of the war, to once again turn Okinawa 
into a stronghold of its national defence policy." Mainland Japanese did not 
comprehend Okinawans' sentiment on claims to national defence precisely because they 
were ignorant and uncomprehending of the immense sacrifices which Okinawa paid 
during the war, and of the reality of Okinawans' postwar experience "living inside a 
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nuclear base." Moreover, this ignorance and Jack of common understanding was seen to 
have "deep historical roots in the distant past."88 
From the "house of peoples" exhibit during the 1903 Industrial Exhibition in 
Osaka, where two traditional Okinawan women were displayed as objects of curiosity 
to mainland Japanese onlookers, to the (ultimately defeated) parliamentary proposal to 
integrate Okinawa with Taiwan under joint colonial rule in the early 1900s, to the anti-
dialect assimilation policies of Imperial Japan and the ultimate disregard for the fate of 
Okinawans during the Battle of Okinawa-Ota drew on extensive material as testimony 
to the historical discrimination against Okinawa by mainland Japanese. Moreover, he 
also placed this history in 1he immediate context of current Japanese government 
policies, of the extent to which mainland Japanese fiercely opposed the presence of 
nuclear weapons in mainland Japan while displaying a seeming blatant indifference 
towards 1he situation in Okinawa, and of the government's repeated denial of 
Okinawans' right to political representation in 1he national diet. Ota criticised Sat6's 
Washington visit of November 1967 as a further betrayal of the wishes of the majority 
of Okinawans. On 1he eve of Satii's visit the GRI had passed a resolution urging the 
prime minister to determine a set date for the return of administrative rights over 
Okinawa and ensure that this return would guarantee for Okinawa a position equal to all 
other prefectures of Japan according to the "spirit of the Japanese constitution."89 Wi1h 
1hese requests unfulfilled, Ota warned, "Okinawa's distrust towards 1he Japanese 
government has only deepened." 
The perception gap between mainland Japanese and Okinawans was seen as 
born of a history of prejudice and discrimination. Moreover, the most surprising thing 
for Ota was that: "While Okinawa has been conveniently separated from Japan and left 
under foreign military rule for a period of over twenty-four years, in mainland Japan the 
"Minikui Nihonjin: Nihon no Okinawa ishiki, pp. 3-4. 
89 lbid., p. 36. 
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government and the ruling party but also an untoward proportion of the general 
population do not even recognize that they are discriminating against Okina\vans. The 
Japanese government has never yet acknowledged this discrimination or apologized for 
it. They have merely repeatedly told Okinawans over and over again to 'bear' their lot 
• for the sake of peace in East Asia and in Japan. "'90 
Ota recognized that discrimination existed on a range of levels-within 
Okinawa for example against the peripheral islands of Yaeyama, as well as within 
mainland Japan itself. Yet he noted that in regards to relations between mainland Japan 
and Okinawa, this discrimination remained institutionalised (seidojo no sabetsu). 91 
Prejudice against Okinawans not only existed on an emotional level, but was 
institutionalised within legal systems through the denial of their basic rights as Japanese 
citizens. 
Ota concluded that until mainland Japanese recognized the reality of this 
discrimination, they would not be able to grasp the fact that their own prosperity had 
been founded on Okinawa's sacrifice, or be able to perceive the Okinawan issue as their 
own. Just as The Ugly Japanese was an "impassioned impeachment" of Japan's 
historical stance towards Okinawans, it was also an emotional entreaty for mainland 
Japanese to recognize that the Okinawan issue was an important issue facing Japan as a 
whole. "Fundamental 'Japanese polity' does not hold Okinawa to be a vital part of the 
nation's body; it is expendable, under duress, if thereby the interests of the home islands 
can be served advantageously." Citing George Kerr from his well known historical 
treatise, Okinawa: The History of an Island People, Ota appealed to mainland Japanese 
to prove these observations wrong.92 
90 Ibid., p. II. 
" Ibid., p. 13. Emphasis in original. 
92 Ibid., p. 44. 
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In the first five months of after publication, The Ugly Japanese went through 
eight printings. As Hokama Shuzen noted at the time: "Out of the numerous works on 
Okinawa which have appeared in the so called 'Okinawa boom' of today, none has been 
read by as many people as The Ugly Japanese."93 Many Japanese gained knowledge of 
Okinawan issues for the first time through its pages. Numerous Okinawans also greeted 
the book as, in the words of Hokama, "lifting the weight of twenty four years of silence 
from their shoulders by giving a voice to their thoughts."94 
As a review of The Ugly Japanese in the Japanese edition of Okinawa Taimusu 
pointed out: "A sense of distrust towards mainland Japan smoulders in the depths of the 
hearts of Okinawans, and while impeaching Japan has again grown popular of late, it is 
in fact a subject with a long history." 95 In the wake of the war defeat, both pro-
independence advocates within Okinawa and the Japanese Communist Party called for 
the liberation of Ryukyu from protracted Japanese imperialist rule. As late as 1949, 
Okinawan Popular Party leader Senaga Kamejiro stressed the need to cooperate with the 
US forces in order to realize the emancipation of the "Ryukyuan race" (Ryiikyu no 
minzoku).96 As pro-reversion forces grew and opposition to the US occupation increased 
in the early 1950s, however, progressive as well as nationalist conservative groups in 
Okinawa began to stress, under different agendas, the commonalities rather than 
differences between Okinawa and mainland Japan. By the mid 1950s, even one-time 
independence advocate Senaga, now under persecution by USCAR authorities for 
communist collaboration, had begun to differentiate between Japan's historical 
93 Hokama Shuzen," 'Minikui :'>lihonjin'," Sekai (July 1969), pp. 234-4. 
94 Ibid., pp. 234-5. One person ofOkinawan descent residing in Osaka is said to have sent out tens of 
copies to his acquaintances declaring that: "this is precisely what I was trying to say." See Okamoto 
Keitoku," 'Sabetsu' no mondai o !Oshlte kangaeru Okinawa: fukudokuhon 'ningen' o meguru mondai," 
Kyoiku Hyoron (June 1971), p. 32, also Arasaki Moriteru in Sengo Okinawashi, p. 353. 
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discrimination of Okinawa, perceived as an already resolved issue, and the unequal 
system of relations of the postwar period.97 
By the 1960s, however, increasing disaffection towards the Japanese 
government's stalling on the Okinawa question brought deep-rooted issues of 
discrimination once again to the surface. This disaffection only intensified after Sato's 
visit to Washington in November 1967. By giving wide audience to an emerging 
sentiment within pro-reversion ideology, Ota also became a representative voice of it.98 
He was able to use a wealth of primary historical material to relate highly politicised 
contemporary issues to a history of discrimination and inequality. His indictment of 
Japan's historical relations with Okinawa was proffered not as a call for independence 
but from a pro-reversionist stance, and as a counter to the Japanese government's 
emerging agenda on reversion. In short, The Ugly Japanese was Ota's own attempt to 
contest the US and Japanese government's strategic shift in policy on Okinawa, and 
redefine the reversion movement as more than the mere nationalist desire for the return 
of administrative rights to Japan. 
Yet Ota's analysis and censurmg of discrimination was not universally 
acclaimed, even by anti-base left-wing Okinawan intellectuals. Such criticism attested 
to discrepancies in how reversion was conceived, both as a political movement and in 
relation to Okinawan identity. These discrepancies were indicative of a fundamental 
crisis in representation of the Okinawan/Japanese "subject", and indicative of 
fundamental fissures within the left. Historian and activist Arasaki Moriteru criticized 
Ota's analysis for being founded on an emotional sense ofvictimhood. Arasaki saw that 
97 Arasaki Moriteru, Sengo Okinawashi, op cit., p. 337. For an analysis of the change in stance within 
progressive parties in both Okinawa and mainland Japan, see Oguma Eji ibid., pp. 496-9. 
98 Arasaki Moriteru observes that the indictment of Japanese historical discrimination from within the 
reversion movement grew in strength from around the time when the Reversion Council submitted a 
"Petition Addressed to Prime Minister Sato" (Sato sari daijin e no chokusojo) directly prior to Sato's 
Washington visit in 1967, and peaked with the publication of Ota's Minikui Nihonjin. 
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it was only through delving into the numerous contradictions embedded within 
Okinawa's political movement, while at the same time uncovering "common issues" 
affecting Japan as a whole, that a "true solidarity movement" between mainland Japan 
and Okinawa could be formed. 99 Marxist-influenced historians Kinj5 Seitoku and 
Nishizato Kik5, in emphasizing that Okinawan history was "a part" of the history of the 
"Japanese race" (Nihon minzoku), were also critical of a "George Kerr-type" scheme of 
relations which set "Japan" up against "Okinawa." They saw inequality as founded on 
the discriminatory policy of state institutions and the system of production, and 
historically reinforced by hierarchical relations within Okinawa. The reversion 
movement was a call for "true unification" between Okinawa and mainland Japan from 
below, and the "rousing of a sense of being discriminated against amongst the people of 
Okinawa" was seen to only "serve to weaken the common struggle of the people of 
Okinawa prefecture and mainland Japan."10° Kinjo and Nishizato saw the relations of 
production as foundation of inequality, and conceived their project of emancipation 
within the framework of ethnic nationalism. 
Soon after the publication of The Ugly Japanese, Ota became embroiled in a far-
reaching dispute over issues of discrimination within Japan. The dispute erupted after 
the Osaka Education Association passed a supplementary reader on discrimination for 
use in junior high schools. The reader, entitled Ningen, was produced by the Education 
Research Association for the Buraku Liberation League (BLL ), and sought to raise the 
99 
"Zen Nihonteki kadai ni takame yo: naizai teki mondai no kyilmei o," RS (22 August 1968), p. 12. 
Arasaki was referring in particular to Ota's Sekai article, "Hondo ni totte Okinawa to wa nanika." See 
also Arasaki Moriteru, Sengo Okinawashi, pp. 340-1. In defense of Ota, he did criticize pervasive 
contradictions within Okinawan society and pnlitics in his previous work, The Popular Comciousness of 
Okinawa. In this sense, Hokarna noted that these two works were best read in conjunction: "The seeds of 
The Ugly Japanese were first sown in The Popular Consciousness of Okinawa, and The Ugly Japanese 
must be grasped in its context Moreover, it is also an irrefutable fact that The Popular Consciousness of 
Okinawa was itself a direct product ofOta's war experience" (Hokama '"Minikui Nihonjin' ," Sekai, p. 
345). 
100
" 'Okinawa rekishi' kenkyii no genjii to rnondaiten," Rekishi Kenkyu, No. 357 (January 1970), pp. 47-
57. 
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issue of discrimination in Japan of groups such as Okinawans, Buraku, and Koreans 
within the context of the classroom. 101 
However central figures ~ithin Osaka Okinawa Prefectural Association strongly 
opposed the Ningen reader on the grounds that the Okinawa issue and the Buraku issue 
were fundamentally different in nature and should not be confused with each other. 
Members of the Osaka Okinawa Prefectural Association also sought support from 
politicians within Okinawa, and the issue escalated. Chief Executive Yara formally 
requested to the Osaka Education Association to take the wishes of members of the 
Prefectural Association in aecount. In 1971, the Okinawa Parliamentary Club, made up 
of Okinawans recently eleeted to the national diet, directly requested the head of the 
Osaka Education Association not to approve the reader on the grounds that, amongst 
others, if used it would promote an "image" amongst Japanese that Okinawans were 
similar to "buraku" or "Koreans." Ota, who had agreed to cooperate with the "Ningen" 
project, came under direct fire from those who opposed it, including former Chairman 
of the Reversion Council and Upper House member Kyan Shin' ei. 102 
The issue was in part complicated by Ota's own differentiation between types of 
discrimination. The Osaka Okinawa Prefectural Association (OOPA) employed this 
differentiation to argue that while the Okinawa issue was one of institutionalised 
101 The National Committee for Boraku Liberation, successor of its prewar counterpart, Suiheisha, was 
renamed the BLL in 1955. Government reforms in the early Meiji period stripped "buraku" of official 
stipends for policing and leather-related industries, while persistent prejudices prevented many from 
!inding new occupations. Like their later counterparts in Okinawa, boraku liberation and improvement of 
lifestyle movements of the Meiji era sought equality by attempting to transform themselves into model 
modem Japanese citizens. See Ian Neary, "Burakumin in Contemporary Japan," in Michel Weiner ( ed.) 
Japan~ Minorities (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 50-78; and Noah McCormack, Nation 
and Prejudice: On the 'buralru 'problem 1868-1911, PhD dissertation (Research School of Pacific and 
Asian Studies, Australian National University, 2002). 
102 Partly in response to a display of support by other Okinawans within Osaka and in Okinawa itself, 
eventually the Osaka Education Association decided to authorize use of a rewritten version of the text. On 
the issue, see for example Arasaki Moriteru Sengo Okinawashi, pp. 350-8. See also Okamoto Keitoku, 
" 'Sabetsu' no mondai o toshite k:angaeru Okinawa: fukudokuhon 'ningen' o meguru mondai." Also as 
recounted by Ota in an interview with tl1e author (25 February 2002). 
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inequality, the Buraku problem in Japan rather arose from prejudices that existed on an 
emotional level (shinjo teki sabetsu) within Japanese society. In contrast to Ota, 
however, underlying this stance was a deep-rooted aversion to equating the Okinawan 
issue with other subjugated groups within Japan. Such an aversion was reminiscent of 
way in which many Okinawans in the prewar period opposed and sought to avoid any 
form of differentiation from "Japanese"-a phenomenon which Ota had himself 
examined by cited numerous examples in The Popular Consciousness of Okinawa. 103 
The Ugly Japanese was a ground-breaking work precisely because of the 
forceful way in which it exposed fundamental contradictions within Japan's postwar 
system. The hierarchical relations which placed Okinawa between Japan and the US 
were divulged as inherently related to the vestiges of Japanese imperialism, and 
fundamental contradictions within the Meiji project of national consolidation. 
Moreover, these unequal relations were seen to be perpetuated not only by the policies 
of Japanese government, but through a pervasive indifference towards Okinawa within 
Japan as a whole. Ota challenged the concept of the Japanese "people"-as both an 
immutable entity and as the binary opposite of the Japanese "statc"-through a poignant 
expose on the way in which postwar relations had been founded upon the geopolitical 
and ideological exclusion of Okinawa from mainland Japan. As Hokama Shuzen noted 
in his review of The Ugly Japanese: 
How should Japanese deal with the fact that payment for the "blood of the people 
103 For example, the dispute over Kushi Fusako's "Horobiyuki Ryiikyil onna no shuk:i" (Notes on the Ruin 
of a Ryukyuan women, 1932). The dispute broke out after Kushi, a writer of Oldnawan descent residing 
in Tokyo, published a story in the women's magazine Fiijin Koran (Women's Forum) portraying a 
successful Tokyo businessman who goes to great lengths to conceal his Ok:inawan identity. Tokyo's 
Okinawa Prefecture Student Association publicly objected to the story, in particular the way in which it 
portrayed "Ryilkyuans" as "ruined" in the same way as the backward Ainu and as if they were a separate 
"race" (minzoku) to Japanese. Kushi, while highly critical of the Student Association's stance, published 
an apology of sorts in the magazine, and ceased writing (see Ota Masahide, Okinawa no minshii ishiki, op 
cit., p. 328). 
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of Okinawa Prefecture" during the Pacific War came in the fom1 of a "nuclear 
base"? \Vhy are Okinawans discriminated against, and why have they been 
discriminated against in history? The Japanese government, and the Japanese 
people, cannot avoid facing up to the issues which Ota raises. For they expose the 
need for Japan, reconstituted under the principles of the peace constitution, to 
once again question the essence of its modem experience.104 
At the same time, Ota's analysis raised more questions than it answered. To 
what extent was the differentiation between institutionalised and social discrimination 
useful? Was the "Okinawa issue" merely limited to the former, and if not what 
important insights could be brought through a wider analysis of inequality and 
discrimination in Japan and beyond? Moreover-an all.too neglected issue-how did 
this relate to structural gender inequality in both Okinawa and the rest of Japan? What 
problems existed in placing "Okinawans" against "mainland Japanese"? How were 
unequal power relations between Okinawa and mainland Japan reinforced through 
hierarchical and ideological structures within Okinawa itself? How could this complex 
nexus of intertwining power relations be conceived and transformed? 
The issues were not easily answered, and were inherent to the dilemmas faced in 
negotiating multiple structures of dominance within US-Japan-Okinawan relations. At 
the core of many of these issues lay inherent tensions within Ota's attempts to both 
incorporate and differentiate "Okinawa" within constructions of Japanese national 
identity. Ota called for the recognition of equal rights for Okinawans, while also calling 
for a move beyond a framework where the pursuit of equality necessarily entailed 
regulation within dominant and, in the case of Japan, highly centralized and 
homogenized forms of governance. In accordance with this dual agenda, Ota both 
focused his analysis on the inequalities of the system of discrimination which placed 
Okinawa under US occupation, and broader issues relating to discrimination. A broad 
104 Hokama Shuzen," "Minikui Nihonjin' ," p. 345. 
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frame of analysis also raised important questions relating to Japanese colonialism and 
nationalism which had been deferred both within postwar progressive politics in 
mainland Japan and the Okinawan reversion movement It called into question the way 
in which Japan's embrace of modernity had coincided ¥tith the simultaneous 
incorporation and exclusion of inscribed 'minority' groups such as Buraku, Okinawan, 
and Ainu "'ithin constructions of the Japanese subject. This simultaneous incorporation 
and exclusion had in tum been reproduced in Japanese imperialist expansion in Asia. 
The complexities of negotiating such a dual strategy became integrated into the 
semantics of Ota's analysis. In contesting the ambiguous positioning of Okinawa 
historically and in postwar relations, Ota negotiated the protean construction of"Japan" 
as at times incorporating and excluding Okinawa. With the inclusion of other minority 
groups such as Buraku and Koreans, however, sustaining this (inherently ambiguous) 
binary became far more complex. The endeavour to maintain overlapping subjects of 
reference and multiple alliances resulted in what were at times contradictory frames of 
analysis. The Ningen dispute highlighted the way in which such contradictions may in 
turn became manifested within the conflicting political agendas between groups. As Ota 
himself lamented in 1971: "When I related the Okinawa issue to the Buraku issue, one 
section of those of Okinawan descent sent me a letter in protest. In other words, what is 
so tragic is the way in which, as we can see in this case, the more people are 
discriminated against, the more they tend to put themselves up against other victims of 
discrimination. Thus just because they may be members of the working class, does not 
mean people unite together so easily, in fact sometimes it is just the opposite."105 
Ota's penetrating impeachment of the contradictions of postwar Japan's 
democratic system and the assumptions of Left populist politics in relation to Okinawa 
ironically coincided with the breakdown of a courmon platform within populist politics, 
105 Ota Masahide in "Jahana Noboru: sono shilgai ga kataru mono," a dialogue chaired by Oe Ken7.aburo, 
Sekai (February t972) p. 31. 
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as it was embodied in the perceived struggle for peace, democracy and the attainment of 
an autonomous Japanese subject. A crisis in the representation of "Japanese" and 
"Okinawan" political agendas and their relation to each other was acco~panied by the 
fragmentation of collective political action both in mainland Japan and Okinawa. 
Moreover, opposition against the Ningen project by members of the OOPA as well as 
Okinawans within Okinawa revealed that, in contrast to Ota's hopes and assertions, pro-
assimilationist ideology, a sense of inferiority and a fear of claiming difference was 
strongly embedded within the reversion movement. 
The political fragmentation of the reversion movement was symbolized by the 
breakdown of Okinawa's anti-war anti-B-52 coalition in February 1969. The first B-52s 
had been deployed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to Okinawa a year earlier, on 5 
February 1968, initially in response to the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo on 
23 January. Less than a week after their arrival, on 10 February 1968, the GRI 
legislature passed a resolution calling for their immediate withdrawal from Okinawa. 
Yet despite widespread opposition across party lines to the stationing of B-52s, the US 
JCS authorized the use of Okinawa-based B-52s for missions over Vietnam in the same 
month. In April, with the escalation of the Vietnam conflict, the number of US bombing 
missions over Vietnam increased from 1200 to 1800 per month. Approximately 400 of 
these were flown from Okinawa monthly .106 
The stationing of the B-52s on Okinawa served to bring the Okinawa issue 
further to the attention of rising anti· Vietnam War sentiment in mainland Japan. It also 
became a focus of pro-reversion anti-military political forces within Okinawa. Anti-war 
sentiment amongst local residents further increased when a B-52 stationed at Kadena 
exploded just after takeoff on 19 November 1968, damaging houses in Kadena village. 
After the existence of extensive nuclear weapons in a storage facility located in close 
106 Colm, Hayes and Yager, The Reversion of Okinawa: A Case Study in Interagency Coordination, pp. 
52-4. 
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proximity to the explosion was confirmed in the Okinawan press the following day/07 
the All-Okinawan Military Bases Labour Union decided to participate in a strike ealling 
for the withdrawal of the B-52s. The Okinawa Prefectural Joint Council for the 
Protection of Human Lives, established as an umbrella organization of groups calling 
for the 'l'.ithdrawal of B-52s, agreed to carry out a mass prefecture-wide anti-B-52 
strike. The strike was to be held on 4 February 1969, and to include the Okinawan 
Teachers Union, the Okinawa Prefectural Council of Labour Unions (Okinawa-ken 
rodo kumiai kyogikai or kenrokyo) and the Military Bases Union. 
The planned strike would have marked the first time that the Military Bases 
Union joined forces with pro-reversion groups on an anti-base cause, posing a real 
threat to both the immediate functioning and future of US bases in Okinawa. Previously 
US CAR had used means available to quell anti-base anti-occupation protests. Yet this 
time the Japanese government stepped in, urging USCAR not to introduce controversial 
anti-strike orders, and instead directly pressuring Chief Executive Y ara to advise groups 
against taking strike action. On 30 January 1969 Yara issued a public request asking the 
Joint Council to cancel the scheduled industrial action. On I February 1969, fearing a 
splintering of the Y ara administration and isolated without the support of mainland 
Japanese labour unions, the largest organization within the Joint Council, kenrokyo, 
agreed to cancel their plans to strike. The Joint Council itself followed suit a day 
later.108 
Underlying the breakdown of the anti-war pro-reversion coalition was 
Okinawa's entrenched structure of economic dependence. 109 Prior to reversion, over 
200/o of all Ok.inawan employees worked on base, and it was said that over half of 
107 Fukugi Akira, Okinawa no Ashioto 1968-1972 nen (fnkyo: lwanami Shoten, 1973), p. 34-44. 
w• See for example "\Vhy was Strike Cancelled?" (sic.), Weekly Okinawa Times (8 February 1969), p. 3. 
109 In the words of economist ~1iyamoto Ken'ichi, ''the pre-reversion Okinawan economy was, in one 
word, a base-economy" (Miyamoto Ken'ichi and Sasaki Masayuki, Okinawa: 21 sei/d no chosen (Tokyo: 
Iwanami, 2000), p. 4). 
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Okinawa's total income was derived from the US military bases. The suecesses of the 
island-'h'ide struggle of the 1950s ironically further entrenched dependence, as land-
owners were ultimately able to secure five-year contracts at an annual rent much larger 
than the original amount proffered by USCAR. The reversion movement, as 
fundamentally a call against US occupation, was fuelled by strong anti-base sentiment. 
At the same time, it was not until 1967 and only after extensive debate that the 
Reversion Council (Fukkikyo) took an explicitly anti-base stance. The united front 
established in 1968 to support Yara's candidature in the upcoming Chief Executive 
elections could not reach a consensus on the military base issue after the most 
influential party, the Okinawan Socialist Masses Party, took the position that the US 
base issue should be tackled once reversion was achieved. 110 
Moreover, Yara sought and heavily relied upon Japanese government funding in 
the effort to decrease economic dependence on the bases, curb the economic and social 
dislocations that would accompany reversion, and reduce the income gap between 
Okinawa and the rest of Japan. From 1967, Japanese government economic aid to 
Okinawa dramatically increased, reaching over five times the amount of economic aid 
dispersed by the US government to Okinawa by 1971. The course of events leading up 
to 4 February 1969 revealed that not only USCAR but also the Japanese Government 
would deploy the means they had available to ensure that the common interests of the 
US military and the ruling Japanese LDP were secured. It marked, in short, the 
emergence of a more indirect (post- or neo-colonial) set of relations, where the US 
military presence was effectively sustained through indirect structures of dependence 
rather than direct administrative rule. On the eve of the failed strike, Ota wrote 
despondently: 
Whatever the outcome of 4 February, it is certain that already existent internal 
11° Kiyoshi Nakachi, Ryukyu-US-Japan Relations 1945-1972, p. 127. 
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organizational divisions and the confusion which arose from mutual antagonism 
between groups will have a lasting impact. That they were able to found a 'strong 
alliance' amongst diverse organizations was the pride of progressive forces. [Only 
three months after Yara's electoral victory}, that alliance is already breaking down. 
Needless to say, ruling forces in the US and Japan will greet this turn in events 
¥.ith glee.u 1 
Debating Reversion and Anti-Reversion 
1969 witnessed some of the largest demonstrations in the pre-reversion period. 
The Reversion Council adopted an increasingly radical agenda as the realities of a 
bilaterally negotiated reversion emerged, and the Vietnam conflict further intensified. 
On 22 March, the Council adopted the withdrawal of military bases and the abolition of 
the US-Japan Security Treaty as principle demands of the movement for the first time. 
The Council marked 23 June, the anniversary of the end of the last organized ground 
resistance by Japanese forces in the Battle of Okinawa, as "anti-war day" (hansen no 
hl), and held a mass rally calling for the abolition of the security treaty, the withdrawal 
of the B-52s, and the full and immediate reversion of Okinawa to Japan. 
Less than a month later, on 18 July, a Wall Street Journal article revealed that 
over twenty US servicemen had been injured in Okinawa after a nerve gas leak, 
confirming the long-held suspicion that large amounts of chemical weaponry was stored 
on the islands. On 25 July a group of student demonstrators stormed into USCAR's 
head offices, and pulled down and burnt the American flag in protest. Four days later 
the Reversion Council also presided over a mass rally demanding the immediate 
withdrawal of chemical weapons from Okinawa. 112 On 13 November 1969 an estimated 
I 00,000 Okinawans participated in a mass rally calling for total withdrawal of the US 
111 
"Miotosu na, Hondo seifu e no ikari o," ShiikanAsahi (14 February 1969), pp. 24-5. 
112 Details about v,ithdrav,'al of weapons. On 2 December 1969 the Pentagon announced it would 
transport the chemical weapons stored within Okinawa to US territory. 
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bases in opposition to SatO 's Washington visit, and demanding the full and immediate 
reversion of Okinawa. 113 
Yet while this mass resistance certainly had an effect in expediting the 
v.ithdrawal of both B-52s and chemical weapons from Okinawa, it did not prevent the 
strengthening of bilateral security relations from going ahead. In the Joint Communique 
of 21 November 1969, it was announced that both Sato and Nixon had agreed to return 
administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan in 1972. At the same time, the President 
and the Prime Minister also "recognized the vital role played by United States forces in 
Okinawa in the present situation in the Far East" It was agreed that the "mutual security 
interests of the United States and Japan could be accommodated within arrangements 
for the return of administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan." The Japanese 
government would assume responsibility for the "immediate defence" of Okinawa, and 
the United States would retain "such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required 
in the mutual security of both countries."114 
The communique's wording on the most controversial issue surrounding the 
reversion agreement, the stationing of nuclear weapons in Okinawa, was confirmed 
immediately prior to US President Nixon's meeting with Sato. 115 The final paragraph 
read: 
The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese 
people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government 
reflecting such sentiment The President expressed his deep understanding and 
assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United 
States Government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty 
of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried 
m FukugiAkita, OkinawanoAshimoto 1968-1972 nen, pp. 91-238. 
11
' "Text of Joint Communique White House Press Release dated November 21, 1969," reprinted in Colm, 
Hayes and Yager, The Reversion of Okinawa: A Case Study in Interagency Coordination, pp. I 01-5, 
emphasis added. 
"'As described ibid., pp. 81-2. 
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out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as 
described by the Prime Minister. 116 
Okinawans greeted the negotiated position between the US and Japan on the 
nuclear question v.ith a level of confusion equal to the ambiguity of the communique's 
ovm wording. According to a survey conducted by Ryukyii Shinpo published on 15 
December 1969, 10% of Okinawans believed the joint communique provided for the 
complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa, 22% believed that nuclear 
weapons would not be removed, 24% believed that nuclear weapons would be brought 
back in a case of emergency, and 33% did not know what the communique actually 
meant in regards to nuclear weapons. 111 
116 Ibid., p. 103. 
ll' Cited in Herber A. Kampf, The United States and Okillawa.· A Study in Dependency Relationship 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, City University ofNew York, 1972), p. 627. In 1979 Henry Kissinger divulged that 
he had conducted secret negotiations over the nuclear issue with a Japanese representative referred to by 
the code name "Yoshida." As Kissinger described the exchange: 
"This left the nuclear question. Nixon had agree.d to give up the right to store nuclear weapons in 
Okinawa; we thought it important to retain the right to reintroduce them in an emergency. The result was 
a complicated exchange between 'Yoshida' and me to find a formula to meet the domestic necessities of 
both sides. The Japanese wanted a statement that nuclear weapons would be dealt with in accordance with 
'the policy of the Japanese government as described by the Prime Minister.' This could mean anything; in 
the Japanese context it was bound to be interpreted as prohibiting the introduction of nuclear weapons. 
Our Joint ChiefS, on the other hand, insisted on some formula on which they could base the reintroduction 
of nuclear weapons in an emergency. In a sense we were arguing about window dressing: a decision of 
the magnitude of introducing nuclear weapons would not depend on quoting clauses from long-ago 
communiques but on the conditions prevailing at the time. Still, the reversion would need domestic 
approval in both countries and tbat was unattainable \Vithout some solution to the largely self-imposed 
dilerruna. 
"Alex Johnson and I finally carue up with a formula as ingenious as it was empty. The US-Japanese 
Security Treaty had a provision for prior consultation over emergencies. If we referred to it in the 
corrununique, both sides could satisfy their requirements: Sato could maintain the anti-nuclear stance of 
his government; Nixon conid claim that the clause gave us tbe right to raise the issue of nuclear weapons 
even in advance of an actual emergency." From Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston and 
Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), pp. 354-5. Kyoto Industrial University Professor and 
member of the Okinawa Base Problems Comrnince Wakaizurni Kei later divulged that he played the role 
of'Yoshida' in these exchanges in his memoirs, Tasaku nakarishi o Shinzumu to hossu (Tokyo: Bungei 
Shunjii, 1994). Ac.:ording to Wakaizurni, minutes between Sato and Nixon on the nuclear question were 
agreed to be kept top secret. A draft of these minutes purportedly stated that" ... in time of great 
emergency the Vnited States Government will require tbe re-entry of nuclear weapons and transmit rights 
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In the early hours of 22 November, members of the GRI legislature held a press 
c.onference once the contents of the Nixon-Sam joint communique became known. 
Okinawa's political tables were completely turned. Members of the party which had 
throughout the occupation period taken a pro-military anti-reversionist stance, the LDP, 
now claimed "inexpressible joy" over the joint communique between the two leaders. In 
contrast, members of the Okinawan Social Masses Party, the Okinawan People's Party 
and the Okinawan Socialist Party, who had been at the forefront of the reversion 
movement up to this point, expressed reservations and even outright opposition to the 
negotiated agreement. The Reversion Council also released a declaration opposed to the 
terms of the joint communique and the strengthening of the US-Japan bilateral security 
system. !IS 
Throughout this period Ota continued to contest the stance of both the US and 
Japanese governments. From 28 January to 4 February 1969, he attended a joint Japan-
US conference on "Okinawa and Asia" in Kyoto. The conference was sponsored by the 
Okinawan Base Problems Committee, an informal advisory council to the government-
sponsored Discussion Group on the Okinawan Issue (Okinawa mondai kondankai), 
headed by Ohama Nobumoto. Ohama, dean of Waseda University, had been Ota's 
guarantor in the early 1950s when Ota applied for a scholarship to the US.119 Yet now, 
in Okinawa with prior consultation with the Government of Japan. The United States Government also 
requires the standby retention and activation in time of great emergency of existing nuclear storage 
locations in Okinawa" (Ibid., pp. (iii)). Ota repeatedly questioned the possible existonce of a secret 
agreement on nuclear weapons, and on publication ofWakaizumi's book purportedly contacted 
Wakaizumi on the detaiJs of the negotiations he carried out prior to reversion on behalf of the Japanese 
government (Ota interview with author, 4 May 2001). The agreement on nuclear weapons and the issue of 
prior consultation is discussed in detail in Gabe Masaaki, Henkan to wa nan datta no ka: Nichibei senga 
kiishashi no naka de (fokyo: Nihon Hosohan Kyokai, 2000). For a detaiJed analysis ofUS nuclear 
weapnns in Okinawa and in relation to the rest of Japan during the Cold War, see also Hans M. Kristensen, 
"Japan under the Nuclear Umbrella: US Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War Planning in Japan during the 
Cold War," Working Paper (The Nautilus Institute) (July 1999) (available at 
http://v.ww.nautilus.org/library/security/papers/Japan.pdl). 
118 Fukugi Akira, Okinawa naAshioto 1968-1972 nen, pp. 141-2. 
119 Interview between Ota and the author (25 February 2002). 
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and later in relation to the Okinawa Marine Expo, their opinions direetly clashed. The 
committee was attended by eight representatives from the US, twenty two from 
mainland Japan and four from Okinawa. Two days later Ota published an article highly 
critical of the limitations on Okinawan participation in the conference, the fact that the 
Okinawan issue was being discussed "over the heads of Okinawans," and the way in 
which discussions during the conference "focused not on Okinawa itself, but from the 
perspective of US and Japan joint national interests."120 
On the armouncement of the details of Satii and Nixon's joint communique in 
November! 969, Ota again published a lengthy commentary in a major local newspaper. 
He stressed the importance of looking behind the communique's wording in order to 
comprehend the 'reality' of bilateral negotiations over reversion. In particular, Ota was 
highly sceptical of the communique's wording on the nuclear question. While according 
to the communique the president agreed that reversion should take place "in a manner 
consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government," Ota pointed out that this 
"policy" did not necessary indicate Japan's "three non-nuclear principles." He observed 
that references to the "prior consultation system" had been made not v11ith a view to 
restricting the transportation of nuclear weapons but "with the aim of maintaining 
Okinawa's nuclear deterrent capability." Ota also noted that the government's claim to 
"hondo na.mf' (literally "the same level as mainland Japan") was only supported in the 
text itself by the guarantee that the US-Japan Seeurity Treaty would apply to Okinawa. 
120 Ota stressed "above all" that the US and Japanese governments cannot be allowed to decide the fate of 
Okinawa without the full participation ofOidnawans. "Nichibei Kyoto Kaigi to Okinawa no shOrai," OT 
(6 February 1969), p. 6. The Oldnawan Base Problem Committee report, released on March 8, 
recommended that the date for the return of Okinawa be determined promptly, that this date be 1972 at 
the latest, and that the US-Japan Security Treaty be fully applicable to Okinawa on retnrn of 
administrative rights over Okinawa. In article published in June of the same year, Ota criticized the report, 
noting that what Oldnawans desired was not return to Japan under the US-Japan Security Treaty, but 
return to Japan under the guarantees of Japan's 'peace constitution.' He concluded: "Whatever platitudes 
are given, a 'security' system which is founded on the sacrifice of Okinawa will no longer be tolerated" 
(Ota Masabide, "Okinawa ni lotte anzen to wa nanldka," TenbiJ, No. 126 (June 1969), p. 38). 
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Ota saw this as directly conflicting with the Okinawan desire for 'immediate complete 
and unconditional return' (sokuji mujoken zenmen henkon). He concluded: 
While we are striving against having to live beside massive military bases, and 
seek the 'Okinawa's return to the peace constitution' with this in mind, the fucus 
of discussions between the US and Japanese heads of state is predictably the 
'defense of the Far East,' including the security of Japan. Okinawan reversion is 
merely seen as an effective way to execute American international obligations. In 
other words, the scenario which we most opposed has materialized before us.121 
Ota saw the joint communique as failing to satisfy the demands of Okinawa's 
reversion struggle, and continued to view the achievement of 'trne reversion' as the 
most pressing issue for both Okinawa and Japan "in the coming decade." 122 In the 
period directly following Satii's meetings with the US president, however, there also 
emerged the seeds of a new radical faction from within the reversion movement which 
questioned its core tenets and grew to make a significant impact on Okinawan 
intellectual thought. While Ota and others sought to contest the kind of reversion which 
the US and Japanese governments were unilaterally promoting, a number of young 
intellectuals began to oppose the very call for reversion itself. 
Intellectuals such as Arakawa Akira, Kawarnitsu Shinichi, Okamoto Keitoku, 
and Nakasone KonyU came to be associated ·with what became known as the 'anti-
reversion theory' (honfukki-ron). 123Joumalist and later president of the Okinawa Times, 
Arakawa Akira was one of the tlrst and most prolific writers to take an 'anti-
reversionist' stance. Born in 1931, Arakawa had been heavily involved in the radical 
University of the Ryukyus student magazine, Ryildai bungaku (literature of the 
University of the Ryukyus) during his student years. He published poems opposing US 
121 
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military occupation and the separation of Okinawa from Japan under 1he peace treaty. 
At the same time, in a similar vein to Ota, he also maintained a critical stance and sense 
of ambivalence towards Japan. By the time of 1he joint Nixon-Sato communique, this 
ambivalence had evolved into a vehement opposition towards Japanese nationalism, the 
nation-state as ideological and political construction, and the reversion of Okinawa to 
Japan.I24 
The tenets of 1he reversion movement had come under questioning at least since 
1he SatO-Johnson communique of 1967, as seen in Ota's work and also within the 
political and social struggles of the time. In this period, some politically active students 
began to refer to the "struggle for Okinawa" as opposed to the "struggle for reversion" 
in a cvnscious effort to redefine and expand the aims and agenda of the movement. In 
1950s and 1960s Okinawa the Japanese Rising Sun Flag (Hi-no-maru) emerged as a 
symbol of resistance against US military occupation and land expropriation policies, 
and in direct opposition to the military authority's equation of the flag with anti-
Americanism and communism. Yet by the time of mass demonstrations in early 1969, 
students had begun to bum the Hi-no-maru together with 1he Stars and Stripes as a 
symbolic expression of opposition to not only US military occupation, but the Japanese 
government, Japanese nationalism, and many of the assumptions and tenets of the 
reversion movement. 125 
The radicalisation of groups within Okinawa coincided with the general shift in 
Japan against a liberal progressive concept of democratic revolution founded on the 
awakening of a rational subject, as 1he postwar democratic movement opened itself to 
the embrace of anti-rational, anti-institutional, anti-enlightenment ideologies. With the 
124 For an insightful analysis of Arakawa Akira's literary works in English see Michael Molask)', 
"Arakawa Akira: The Thought and Poetry of an Iconoclast" in Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle ( eds.) 
Japan and Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity (provisional title). 
125 As described by ArakawaAkira, "Momoku teki sanka e no kiken," OT(9 January 1970), p. 3, and 
ArakawaAkira Okinawa: togo to hangyaku (Tokyo: Tsuma ShobO, 2000), p. 120. 
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formation of the Joint Student Struggle Committee (Zengaku Kyoto Kaigi or Zenkyoto), 
Japan's student movement became increasingly violent, anarchist, and inward. As 
Yumiko Iida observes: "(O)ver the course of the 1960s the increasing opaeity of the 
enemy and the increasing intemalisation of systemic control in eflect increasingly 
linked one's personal struggles to forms of anarchistic self-negation .... The rise of the 
Zenkyoto movement demonstrated the extent to which the ideal-typical content of the 
rational autonomous subject, the principal agency of the early postwar democratic 
revolution, had been undermined and replaced by a romantic, collective and agonized 
notion of the subject."126 
The breakdown of the planned joint action of 4 February 1968 highlighted the 
process whereby structures of oppression in Okinawa were similarly becoming 
increasingly opaque through the interlocking of multiple relations of dependence. 
Increasingly ubiquitous operations of control lead to divisions within coalitions of 
political resistance and the fragmentation of collective action. This process coincided 
with a general sense of disillusion--with the Japanese government, with Japan, with 
political organizations within Okinawa, and with the Yara administration. 
Disillusionment with the political process as a means whereby voices of resistance 
could be effectively represented, and opposition to the terms of reversion set out in the 
November 1969 communique, combined to generate a sentiment v.ithin Okinawa 
against participation in the National Diet. As one reader's letter to the Okinawa Times 
declared: "National political representation will by no means expand the rights of the 
Okinawan people, nor will it advance Okinawa's struggle ... In extreme terms, national 
representation signifies nothing but the dispatching of merchants to peddle Okinawa off 
to Tokyo."127 
126 Yumiko Iida, Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan: Nationalism as Aesthetics (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 126. 
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In 1961, the GRI legislature passed a unanimous resolution demanding the 
Japanese government give Okinawan residents rights to political representation in the 
national diet. 128 From 1961-8, six such resolutions were passed by the GRI to no 
avail. 129 Japan's ruling LDP government took the position that while Okinawans had 
Japanese citizenship and the constitution applied to Okinawa "in concept" (kannen teki 
ni), to the extent that Okinawa was under US jurisdiction, residents of Okinawa did not 
have constitutional rights. 130 Directly following the joint communique of 1969, 
however, the LDP revoked this policy, and began to take steps towards allowing 
Okinawans political participation on a level equal to the rest of Japan. 
In an article published as one of a ten-part series entitled "The Suppressed 
Spirit" (hishihaisha no kokoro) in Okinawa Times in early January 1970, Arakawa 
Akira was highly sceptical of this policy revision. He surmised that two ulterior motives 
lay behind the Japanese government's sudden change in stance. Namely, firstly the LDP 
sought to further encourage the fractionalisation of Okinawa's progressive coalition of 
political parties by creating a situation where they had to compete for positions in the 
national diet. Secondly, the LDP were attempting to use national participation as a way 
to whitewash opposition to the joint communique and to present the reversion 
agreement as reflecting "the will of Okinawans." Arakawa saw that in this context the 
only "weapon" left for Okinawans to effectively express their deep-rooted opposition to 
reversion negotiations was to refuse to participate in national politics. For Arakawa, to 
promote the elections now would be to betray the "blood spilt" in the clashes between 
128 
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police and protesters seeking to prevent SatB's trip to Washington in November of 
1969.131 
Arakawa began to speak out unequivocally against reversion, first in this series 
of articles and later in his lengthier work, Han-kokka no kyoku (fhe Formidable Place 
of the Anti-nation, 1971 ). He welcomed the fact that the Reversion Council had begun 
to take an explicitly anti-base, anti-security treaty position. Yet he also criticized the 
"nationalist" (minzaku shugiteki) origins of the reversion movement for being an 
emotive call to return to Japan as the "ancestral land" (sokoku) of Okinawa. Arakawa 
carne to the conclusion that in order to preserve the tenets of the reversion movement as 
an anti-war struggle it was now necessary to directly oppose a reversion which sought 
to strengthen bilateral security relations and the remilitarisation of Japan. In this sense, 
Arakawa's position differed from that of intellectuals such as Ota and Okinawan 
novelist Oshiro Tatsuhiro who continued to hold the pursuit of "true" reversion as ideal. 
Yet it also directly contrasted with hitherto pro-military anti-reversion groups who 
largely focused on the economic loses which Okinawan reversion would bring to base-
related industries. 132 
Like Ota, Arakawa saw the question of reversion and what it was to entail as 
contingent upon profound questions concerning identity, history, politics, the relation 
between Okinawa and Japan, and modernity as historical and contemporary 
experience. 133 In contrast to Ota, however, Arakawa saw that the cause of the reversion 
movement's failures were harboured in its OV\'11 limited agenda. That is, the reason Vvhy 
"'Arakawa noted that prior to the 1969 communique, a widespread move to carry out provision national 
diet elections in Okinawa would have had a significant effect in bringing state policies to question. Yet he 
concluded that this significance was lost now that an agreement for reversion had been made between the 
US and Japan. Arakawa Akira, "Momoku teki sanka e no kiken." 
132 As represented in two main organizations, the Anti-Immediate Reversion Council, lead by President of 
tbe Koza Chamber of Commerce Suehoshi Goshi, and the Okinawa for Okinawans Association, headed 
by former Chief Executive Toma Jugo. 
133 Han-lwkko. no kyoku (Tokyo: Gendai Hyoronsha, 1971), p. 65. 
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the reversion movement was unable to resist appropriation by a redefined US-Japan 
security system lay in its genesis as a fundamentally nationalist movement. 134 
Arakawa surmised that Imperial ideology was so effective in prewar Okinawa 
precisely because of the institutionalisation of discrimination. Even so-called anti-
establishment resistance in Okinawa ended up promoting Japanization as the most 
effective way to overcome discrimination, thereby legitimising assimilationist and 
imperial ideology. Arakawa concluded that prewar Ok:inawan activist Jahana Noboru 
held many nationalist assumptions within his call for equal political representation and 
democratic rights, and that it was precisely for this reason that imperial state forces were 
able to appropriate and incorporate his struggle. In other words, Arakawa saw 
Okinawa's struggle for the abolition of discrimination and assimilationist ideology as 
two sides of the same imperial coin. To the extent that they were founded on a 
(mistaken) faith in the redeeming and liberating powers of the nation-state, for Arakawa 
both the movement for equal representation and treatment under the law in the prewar 
period, and the call for the return of administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan under 
occupation, were fundamentally flawed. 
Arakawa's historical analysis touched on many themes common to Ota's 
previous works: criticism of the way in which assimilationist ideology became 
incorporated into Okinawan popular consciousness; the drawing of connections 
between this ideology and the tragedy which blind subservience wrought during the 
Battle of Okinawa; and denunciation of the Japanese government's policies towards 
Okinawa since at least the Meiji period. Yet for Arakawa, merely divulging mainland 
Japan's exploitative and discriminatory treatment of Okinawa was not enough. Arakawa 
sought to take this criticism to what he saw as its logical end-a denunciation of Japan, 
134 !bid., p. 70. 
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of democratic constitutionalism as a goal within itself, and of the nation-state system as 
a whole: 
Thoughout history Japan has ignored the will of Okinawa, and will no doubt 
continue to ignore this will in the years to come. Impeaching, denouncing, and 
expressing anger towards Japan does not have the power to change this 
probability. The only thing that can is a spirit which fiercely rejects the demands 
of the system which through the forces of state authority mounts pressure upon 
135 
us. 
Arakawa also lambasted another tenet of the reversion movement which formed 
the base of Ota's conception of Okinawa's struggle--Japan's so-called "peace 
constitution." By the late 1960s many left-wing groups in Japan had become disaffected 
by the Japanese government's manipulation of pacifist ideals. Sat<i's policy of the 
"three non-nuclear principles" aunounced in 1967 symbolized the way in which the 
LDP was able to co-opt the tenets of Japan's peace movement to further secure its 
position. Arakawa saw that neonationalist conservative forces were able to appropriate 
the tenets of Japanese pacifism precisely because the ideology of the peace movement 
itself was founded upon nationalist delusions. Postwar Japanese democracy, and the 
"peace constitution" under which it \Vas founded, was a mere chimera, under which lay 
the vestiges of prewar neonationalist calls to "subservience to the nation."136 
Arakawa concluded that in incorporating such delusions, the reverswn 
movement itself ultimately uncritically subsumed many of the assimilationist and 
nationalist assumptions of prewar ideology. It was founded upon the deluded 
idealization of Japan's postwar democracy and its constitution. Some, such as Oshiro 
Tatsuhiro, recognized the gap between these ideals and reality, and emphasized that 
Okinawans desired to return to Japan on the specific basis of a perceived ideal of "the 
135 ArakawaAkira, "Taisei no yosei o kyozetsu: aratana shihai kara nogareru hitotsu no michi," OT(6 
January 1970), p. 4. 
136 Han-kokka no kyi5ku, p. 101. 
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Japan which should be"-that is as part of a demilitarised and democratic nation. Yet 
Arakawa was highly critical of Oshiro's attempts to reconstruct the tenets of the 
reversion movement, as still incorporating the Okinawa issue into a Japanese agenda.m 
Both Ota and Oshiro sought to contest the appropriation of the reversion 
movement into nationalist discourse by emphasizing that the main aims of reversion 
were the pursuit of equality and autonomy for Okinawa: Arakawa concluded that the 
only way Okinawa could fight against Japan's nebulous homogenizing forces was by 
becoming the focal point of resistance against the constraints of the "nation-state" 
system itself. In this sense, Arakawa's thought was strictly deeonstructive. He did not 
seek to assert the existence of an essentialized difterence between "Okinawa" and 
"Japan," but saw Okinawa's "possibility" on the periphery as lying in its ability to break 
down the ideological and political power structures of the modem Japanese nation-
state.m Only through negation of the nation-state system could the ideals of Okinawa's 
postwar struggle as the attempt to construct Okinawa "fortress of peace" (hansen no 
toride) within the Pacific region in direct contrast to its imposed role as the "keystone" 
of the US and Japan's bilateral security system in Asia be upheld. 
Ota's response to the anti-reversion theory was ambivalent. On the one hand, he 
saw the emergence of "anti-nation" anti-reversion thought as an "inevitable" reaction to 
unrelenting state oppression. He also conceded that the reversion movement contained 
within it many elements which tended to promote the further "Japanization" (Nihonka) 
of Okinawa. 139 For the first time, Ota acknowledged certain continuities between 
prewar assimilation processes and popular movements in the postwar period.140 Yet Ota 
doubted that opposition to reversion or to national representation would have any 
"' Ibid., pp. 65-6. 
'" Ibid., pp. 133, 136. 
139 Ota Masahide, "Okinawa: kokka no henyo to gisei no naka de," Ekonomisuto (I April 1972), p. Ill. 
1
4{) See also Ota Masahide. "Okinawa 'hanfukk:i' no shiso tek:i genten," Gekkan Shakaito, No. 178 
(December 1970), p. 119. 
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positive effects for Okinawa: "while there exist numerous problems with the way in 
which the process whereby the right to national representation has been 
implemented ... such problems will not be solved merely by raising voices of 
objection."141 He saw that rather than oppose the elections outright, it would be more 
effective to actively use the Diet as a way to remind people that, contrary to what the 
government was trying to claim, the "Okinawa issue" was not over with the joint 
communique ofNovember 1969. 
While thus on the one hand Ota sympathized with many of Arakawa's insights, 
on the other he did not see anti-reversionist thought as providing a viable political 
alternative to reversion. Ota outlined this issue as he reasserted his commitment to the 
pacifist principles of Japan's constitution in an article published in June, 1971: 
Those who develop "non-nation" and "anti-nation" theories calling for liberation 
from the shackles of state authority fail, in much the same fashion as their 
counterparts in the Taisho period, to provide a clear future vision for Okinawa. 
Whether Okinawa is within or outside Japan, intellectual thought can only be 
effective in the context of Okinawa if it outlines a clear status for Okinawa, 
including the means by which its close to one million people are to survive. I 
continue to work towards the true implementation of the currently unpopular 
"peace constitution" for the very reason that. .. while there is little chance of 
success in attempting to abolish the nation-state, the constitution at least has 
significance .. .in that it upholds a universal principle beyond the national 
principles of the nation-state of Japan, for the whole ofhumanity ... 142 
For different reasons, neither did Ota see an anti-reversion pro-independence 
stance as providing at this stage a possible alternative for Okinawa. While very much a 
minority, there were important Okinawan cultural figures, such Yamazato Eikichi, who 
took an avidly pro-independence stance. Once director of the GRI' s Association for the 
Preservation ofRyukyuan Culture (Ryiikyii bunkazai hogo iinka:), Yamazato was also a 
141 
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recognized playwright of traditional Ryukyuan theatre and a specialist on Ryukyuan 
history. In a feature on different Okinawan positions on reversion in Sekai in June 1970, 
Yamazato declared: 
The return of the administrative rights which the US currently holds over 
Okinawa back to Okinawans, as far as I am concerned this is precisely the one 
thing that can be called the reversion of rights. Just because the Nixon 
administration agrees to pass over administrative rights over Okinawa to the Sato 
government above the heads of one million Okinawans, as far as Okinawans are 
concerned this is in no way the return of these rights. Consequently, Japan should 
immediately give such rights back to Okinawa.143 
Y amazato took the view that Ryukyu Kingdom was an independent country 
until the disposition of King ShO Tai by the Meiji government and therefore Ryukyu, 
not Japan, was the "ancestral country" of Okinawa. He stressed that Okinawans would 
only begin to hold rightful pride in their culture and be "saved" from their colonized 
mentality and sense of inferiority once they were free of the remnants of Japan's prewar 
imperial education system.144 
In a much later interview, Ota specifically singled out Y amazato as one of the 
most interesting and talented figures among those who had advocated a pro-
independence stance prior to reversion. 145 In many ways, it may be said that 
Yamazato's sense of pride in Okinawan history and culture represented a kind of ideal 
for Ota, and later Ota himself lamented that if an anti-occupation, pro-independence 
movement had taken root in early 1950s Okinawa, it may have been able to provide a 
formidable force in Okinawan politics. 146 Yet Ota never took an explicitly pro-
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independence position in the pre-reversion period, nor has he since. In an article in 
1971, as reversion became an ever closer reality, Ota gave a rare exposition on what he 
saw to be the fundamental dilemma preventing Okinawan independence: 
"Can Okina\Va be economically independent?" No five words are so effective in 
beating Okinawa to submission in one fell swoop. It is clear to all who bother to 
see that this issue torments the Yara Administration more than any other. It 
encompasses the fundamental reason why Okinawa's intelligentsia and politicians 
have since Satsuma's invasion in the seventeenth century promoted the 
"Japanization" of Okinawan society to such an abnormal degree. It is also the 
fundamental factor which induces Okinawa towards pursuing its "fated relations" 
with mainland Japan in spite of itself. 147 
Up until the transferral of administrative rights over Okinawa from the US to 
Japan in 15 May 1972, Ota thus did not waver on his pro-reversion position. Yet at the 
same time he became increasingly disillusioned with the reality of the reversion being 
advanced by the US and Japan. ]nis deep-felt sense of disillusiomnent is most clearly 
seen in the transformation of his stance on the issue of national political representation. 
In an article published in July 1969, Ota strongly advocated Okinawans' right to 
national representation. By the end of 1970, however, any expectations Ota had held on 
the power of representation in the National Diet as a political tool were severely dashed. 
On 15 November 1970, National Diet elections were held in Okinawa for the first time 
since the end of World War Two. Less than two weeks later, on 27 November 1970, 
Ota observed from the spectator's gallery of Japan's National Diet as newly elected 
Okinawan diet member Uehara Ki.isuke, highly critical of the goverrunent's position on 
Okinawa, directed his first series of questions to Prime Minister Sati.i. Three days later, 
in a published article on the proceedings, he slammed both the LDP members' apparent 
utrer disinterest in Uehara's appeal, and Sato's equally discouraging well-polished 
147 Ota Masahide, "Okinawa no tenki," Sekai No. 307 (June 1971), p. 26. 
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reply. Embittered by the entire scene, Ota concluded that the assembly; "provided not 
one ounce of hope to hearten Okinawa's younger generation, who, discouraged by 
Japan's dysfunctional parliamentary system, speak of national representation as 
meaningless."148 
Ota's profound sense of disillusionment with the terms of reversion, the process 
of negotiation over reversion, and the democratic institutions of Japan in which he had 
held faith, was even more clearly discernable on the eve of the signing of the final 
agreement on reversion in 1971.149 While a~ critical of the Japanese government as ever, 
Ota also expressed increasing frustration towards the Y ara administration. Ota 
recognized that Y ara was being placed in a difficult position, squeezed by pressure from 
the national government and his responsibility to ensure the well-being of the residents 
of Okinawa. At the same time, Ota stressed that Yara should regard the reversion 
question as one with consequences far beyond the realm of pragmatics. Ota saw that 
there was "some truth" to the criticisms levelled at the Y ara administration from vvithin 
Okinawa since he backed down to national government pressure on the eve of the anti-
B-52 strike of 4 February 1969. Ota also warned that Okinawa's prewar and war 
experience showed the direction towards \\-hlch a path of constant compromise would 
lead. ln directing criticism towards Y ara, Ota hinted that the Okinawan administration 
should follow what he saw as the "will of the Okinawan people," and openly oppose the 
signing of the agreement.150 
As far as Ota was concerned, by this stage it wa~ clear that the transfer of 
administrative rights on the terms agreed to by the US and Japanese governments would 
not guarantee any of what he saw as the three tenets of the reversion struggle-self-
government, pacifism, or the protection of human rights. He even feared that Okinawa 
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would be placed in a worse position after reversion: particularly as the military function 
of bases on Okinawa were being expanded through the strengthening of the US-Japan 
Security Treaty and the stationing of Japanese defence forces, while the small level of 
autonomy enjoyed by the local government was concurrently abolished. Ota concluded 
that under the veil of 'unification' (ittaika), an unequal structure of institutionalised 
discrimination would remain. Far from marking the final realization of Okinawa's 
'rebirth' after the tragedy of war, he carne to equate reversion with the 'funeral march' 
of Okinawa's failed postwar struggle. 151 
The issue of Okinawan education, and in particular the selection process for the 
Board of Education, exemplified the way in which with reversion Okinawa would be 
deprived of certain democratic and self-government rights gained under occupation. 
While since 1955 Board of Education members in Japan were nominated by the 
prefectural administration, Okinawa maintained a system of selection by popular 
election. 152 As early as 1969, Ota expressed fears over the implications of the 
government's 'unification' policy for Okinawa's Board of Education. 153 In 1970, these 
fears were confirmed, as government officials stressed that Okinawa's education system 
would be "reformed according to the system in mainland Japan regardless of the 
question as to which system is better than the other."154 In January 1971, Ota declared 
that "the question as to whether the various democratic values which they struggled for 
across the years can be maintained and further advanced in the future has come to rest 
on the issue as to whether the 'Education Committee selection process' can be 
151 Ibid., p. 27. 
152 Originally through postwar reforms, each local Education Committee in Japan, which had extensive 
powers over education content, were selected through direct election. Yet 1955 nnder an LDP majority, 
the National Diet passed legislation implementing a system of selection through nomination. This was 
despite strong opposition from the National Teacher's Union. 
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preserved."155 With the transferral of rights in 1972, the Japanese nomination system 
was introduced in Okinawa. 
On 17 June 1971, the Okinawa Reversion Agreement was signed by US 
Secretary of State William Rogers and Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi Kichi in a joint 
ceremony in Tokyo and Washington connected via communications satellite. The US 
relinquished all rights to Okinawa claimed under Article III of the Peace Treaty. Japan 
agreed to provide land and facilities for the US military bases according to the US-
Japan Security Treaty.156 In other related documents signed on 20 June, Japan was to 
assume responsibility for the 'immediate defence' of Okinawa. A month previously, the 
ruling LDP's 'Okinawa Defence Plan' had already recommended that 6000 members of 
Japan's Defence Forces should be stationed on the islands. A portion of the land 
returned by the US military were now transferred to the IDF. 157 
Y ara refused to attend the signing ceremony in Tokyo. He criticized the 
agreement for failing to meet the wishes of Okinawan residents particularly on the base 
issue, and on the eve of the ceremony expressly stated his opposition to the stationing of 
Japanese defence forces in Okinawa for the first time. 15& On the day of the ceremony, 
the Reversion Council organized a demonstration. That evening, hundreds clashed 
heavily with police on the streets of Naha, and fourteen demonstrators were arrested. 159 
In an article published only days later, Ota described the day of the signing ceremony as 
"filled with a cold and dark expression, so dark it was difficult to make out." Ota's 
repeated references to the day as "expressionless" reflected his own momentary loss of 
a position from which to speak, as well as the inability for Okinawa to articulate its own 
155 
"72 nen henkan o mukaeta Okinawa no kyoilm," Kyoil<ll Hyi!ron No. 255 (January 1971), p. 73. 
156 Nakachi Kiyoshi, Ryukyu-US-Japan Relations: 1945-1972, pp. 158-60. 
'"Including sections ofNaha Military Airport, White Beach, and the Setake Training Area. Sugeyama 
Sbigeru. Okinawa Henkan Kyotei no kenkyil, p. 312. 
'" Fukugi Akira, Okinawa no Ashioto, p. 354. 
'"Ibid., p. 358. 
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vo1ce. It coincided with Okinawa's absence from the process by which history was 
made and determined, just as Y ara' s physical absence from the ceremony corresponded 
with Okinawa's own exclusion from the reversion agreement. 160 
Between Illusion and Reality: Reversion and its Legacies 
During the occupation period, USCAR sought to emphasize the cultural and 
historical differences between Okinawa and mainland Japan. A stream within 
conservative Japanese thought similarly concluded that Okinawans would concede to 
US occupation because ultimately they saw themselves as different to mainland 
Japanese. The reversion movement emerged in direct opposition to such attempts to 
maintain and legitimise the occupation of Okinawa. In a similar way to the prewar 
period, Okinawans sought to contest the hierarchical set of postwar power relations by 
claiming their rights as Japanese nationals. Under prewar imperial expansion, claiming 
commonalities with the rest of Japan was a way to contest Okinawa's unequal position 
within Japan, and distinguish it from the 'outer' colonial territories of Taiwan and 
Korea. 161 In the postwar period, cultural, historical, and emotional expressions of 
Japanese affinity and nationalism became a means to resist US military occupation. 162 
In this sense, Arakawa's insights-that assimilationism and the struggle for equality 
have historically been intimately connected, and that the reversion movement took on 
many of the assumptions of prewar assimlationist ideology-are highly relevant. 
Ota contested US occupation, and the institutionalised discrimination of 
Okinawa within Japan's postwar system, by claiming the rights of Okinawans under the 
160 
"Sh6rai ni aratana kakon: wasurareta sengo shi no shogen," Komei Shinbun (21 June 1971), p. I. 
161 See Julia Yonetani, "Ambiguous Traces and the Politics of Sameness: Placing Okinawa in Meiji 
Japan," pp. 15-32. See also Oguma Eiji, Nihonjin no kyokai. 
162 David Tobaru Obermiller suggests in this way that USCAR's attempt to promote a sense ofOkinawan 
or Ryukyuan ethnic identity ironically produced a backlash resulting in the further swelling of the 
reversion movement ("The Okinawan Struggle over Identity"). 
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Japanese constitution. He saw the call for reversion as fundamentally different to prewar 
assimilationist ideology: as the pursuit of autonomy and e'luality under the principles of 
peace and democracy born from repentance over the war. Yet in doing so, he evaded 
confronting the continuities between prewar assimilation and the reversion movement, 
divulged in their most blatant form in the revival of anti-Okinawan dialect campaigns of 
the 1950s and early 1960s.163 
As the call for reversion became incorporated into neonationalist and centralized 
government policies, Ota sought to redefine Okinawa's struggle. Ultimately, he 
conceded that the reversion movement was founded on the idealization of the Japanese 
constitution. Yet Ota saw that Okinawa, stuck between a rock and a hard place, had no 
choice but to pursue such illusory ideals even in the face of a more sombre reality. For 
Ota, Okinawa's struggle and the reversion movement was a process of seeking to 
overcome "repeated betrayal" by mainland Japan by negotiating the tyrannical gap 
between "illusion" and "reality" at each step: 
Okinawan residents sought reversion while at the same time opposing it, opposed 
reversion and yet still pursued it. This seemingly cDntradictory position was also 
taken in relation to the constitution. In other words, Okinawans pursued the peace 
constitution while resisting the reality it had taken, opposed the current reality of 
the constitution but still had no choice but to seek to 'return' under it. This has 
been Okinawa's so-called 'lot' (shukumei). 164 
Many of the issues within Okinawa's reversion debate prefigured more recent 
debates over the deconstruction of national narratives, subjectivity, and history. 
Arakawa concluded that Okinawa's potential as resistant and critical space could only 
be realized vvithin a deeonstructive project. That is, in order to uphold the struggle to 
construct Okinawa as the "fortress of peace" against US imperialism, its unique position 
163 Oguma Eiji outlines this campaign in Nihanjin no kyokai, pp. 556-96. 
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as "the 'periphery' within" should be utilized in the cultivation of an "unyielding 
fortress of the anti-nation." He envisaged that by securing Okinawa's presence as the 
focal point of the anti-nation, such a presence held the explosive capacity to "break 
down the nation-state" and "strangle the throat of Japan." 165 As a theory defined 
according to its negative, Arakawa differentiated himself from pro-independence 
Okinawan nationalists, emphasizing that Japan could not be relativised through the 
construction of an essentialized ethnic difference between Okinawalns and Japan/ese, 
but only by breaking down the ideological construction of the nation-state from 
'thin 166 \\-1 . 
Arakawa's analysis provided highly perceptive insights into the construction of 
national historical narratives in the realm of discourse, and contradictions ;vithin the 
reversion movement and postwar Japanese progressive politics as a whole. He saw that 
the reversion struggle was ultimately based on an illusion of the emancipatory powers 
of Japan's constitution, of Japanese postwar democracy, and of the modem nation-state 
system itself. Arakawa denounced Jahana Noboru's movement for equal representation 
in the Meiji era for working within the ideological assumptions of the Emperor system, 
thereby ultimately facilitating the incorporation of Okinawa into the nationalist 
militarist authority of the state. His denunciation of Jahana was intimately connected to 
his rejection of the reversion movement, and opposition to national representation. 
To an extent, Ota conceded this, as well as the fact that, in looking in retrospect 
at the modem history of Okinawa, including the postwar struggle for reversion: "One 
becomes only too aware of the way in which, due to the massive power of state 
authority, the will of the individual or a particular group ... can operate to its own 
disadvantage. In other words, even the great achievements of individuals and groups 
165 ArakawaAkira, Han-kokka no kyoku, p. 80. 
166 Ibid., p. 135. 
163 
can be absorbed into state policies, and work in their service." 167 Yet Ota criticized 
Arakawa for failing to outline how a theoretical position of the "non-nation" could be 
expressed in political practice, particularly in the context of relations whereby US 
occupation was precisely based on an ambivalent positioning of Okinawa within Japan 
and yet beyond its jurisdiction. Ota saw the reversion question as rather largely 
determined by pragmatic politics-and the Japanese constitution as a "weapon" which 
Okinawa could use in the struggle for the guarantee of human rights and "self identity" 
(serufu aidentitii) under US occupation. 168 
On 27 March 1972, less than two months before reversion, Japanese Socialist 
Party member and lower house representative Yokomichi Takahiro disclosed 
documentary evidence in parliament proving that a secret financial agreement had been 
made between the US and Japanese governments over Okinawan reversion. 169 The 
documents cast serious doubt on the Sat5 cabinet's claims to the contrary. Yet far from 
leading to the toppling of the government, after it became apparent that the documents 
had been leaked by a female worker within the foreign ministry and passed on via 
Mainichi newspaper journalist Nakayama Takaichi, both were charged with violating 
Japan's Pnblic Servants Law. Eventually Nakayama wss sentenced to four months 
confinement by the Supreme Court in J 978. 170 In an article published soon after the 
arrest of Nakayama and the Foreign Ministry employee, Ota was highly critical of the 
167 Ota Masahide (dialogue coordinated by Oe Kenzaburo), "Jahana Noboru: sono shogai ga kataru 
mono," Sekai (February 1971), pp. 28-9. 
16
' Ota Masahide, Okamoto Keitoku eta! (dialogue), "Okinawa no sen go shiso: fukki mondai o chiishin 
ni," Sekai No. 362 (January 1976), pp. 92-3. 
169 While the reversion agreement had stated that the US would bear the rehabilitation costs of returned 
base land to placate public opinion, the leaked papers revealed that in actual fact the Japanese government 
had agreed to bear these costs. 
170 More recently disclosed US documents attest to the authenticity of the secret papers quoted by 
Yokomichi. For an outline of events and an interview with Nakayama close to thirty years after the fact, 
see the Shii.kan Kinyobi special, "Okinawa mitsuyaku 30 nenme no shinso," Vol. 341 (24 November 
2000), pp. 9-28. 
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arrest, of the Japanese media's failure to see the implications of the incident for 
Okinawan reversion, and of the government's violation of the public's right to 
knowledge. He noted that the incident drew to question fundamental democratic 
principles, and the entire negotiating process on reversion. He also emphasized that the 
government's stance on Okinawa weighed on the future of democracy in Japan as a 
whole.m 
Just as the fragmentation of Okinawa's reversion movement intertwined with the 
fragmentation of Japanese progressive politics, Okinawan reversion coincided with the 
consolidation of the process whereby "democracy was reduced to a formalized process 
of negotiation, universal peace watered down to a mere quotidian version, and the 
labour struggle to a ritualised and corporate unionism" in postwar Japan. 172 The loss of 
a viable political channel between state and society was accompanied by a 
transformation in the mode of national hegemony, a shift in the government mechanism 
of the state brought about by the maturing process of capitalism, and technological 
changes which brought about a massive transition in relations of production and 
imaginative capacities. 173 The consolidation of one-party LDP rule was also 
accompanied by the further remilitarisation of Japan, which now held a more active role 
v.ithin the US and Japan's strengthened bilateral security system. 
Okinawan reversion played a vital role in securing these trends. The Nakayama 
incident was in tum emblematic of such hlstorical conditions on a number of levels. The 
existence of the documents confirmed the two-faced stance of Japanese government 
m "Okinawa: kenpo no kyoro to jitsuzo no tanima de." 
m Yumiko !ida, Rethinking Identity in Modem Japan: Nationalism as Aesthetics, p. 121. 
m Ibid., p. 7. As Beverley Smith noted the effect of technology on citizen's movements in Japan in 1986: 
"Saturated v.ith television and other alienated fonns of entertainment, the generation of the 1980s 
compares poorly with the politically-aware and literate generation of the 1950s. For a combination of 
reasons, the challenge to conservative power bas been checked. At the local government level, the 
progressive gains have not been su.-:;tained" ("Democracy derailed: citizens' movements in historical 
perspective," in Gavan McCormack an Yoshi Sugimoto (eds.) Democracy in Contemporary Japan, p. 166. 
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policy, and invited further scepticism about whether there did not exist other 
undisclosed deals on nuclear weapons, the US military's freedoms on land and sea 
usage, and other issues. In spite of this, and the serious implications the incident held 
for journalistic freedom, the media largely focused on alleged sexual relations between 
Nakayama and the Foreign Ministry official, indicative of the commodification of the 
mass media and the depoliticization of society in general. 
The implementation of the Okinawan reversion agreement secured the political 
future of the Sato cabinet, and strengthened the LDP' s stronghold over the Diet. The US 
was able to largely maintain its presence in Okinawa, and a political elite in Japan 
complicit with US regional hegemony. The hierarchical power structure on which these 
joint hegemonic relations were based also remained. Okinawa continued to form a core 
nexus of this reified bilateral security structure, and to be excluded from the negotiating 
table. Many of the contradictions which Okinawa's military occupation had posed to the 
democratic principles and so-called peace clause of Japan's constitution were 
incorporated within national institutions. As Ota had warned and as he himself proved 
in 1995, the unequal burden imposed on Okinawa also served to compromise the 
stability of US-Japan security relations as a whole. 
This structure similarly reified many of the contradictions \Yithin Okinawan 
society and politics which had crystallized in the years prior to reversion. Okinawan 
politics, economy, and education became integrated into Japan's highly centralized 
administrative system. At the same time, a large US military presence remained, and the 
ratio of US bases in Okinawa in comparison to the rest of Japan grew. The economic 
significance of the bases in Okinawa gradually declined, yet in its place a system of 
economic dependence on largely centrally-funded public works projects became 
increasingly entrenched under both progressive and conservative prefectural 
administrations. Okinawa's integration into Japan's so-called "construction state 
system" in turn coincided with the commodification of culture, urbanization, and the 
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weakening of the labour movement. Dilemmas born from an entrenched system of 
economic dependence, a cycle of conflict and compromise with the national 
government, and political fragmentation and disillusiomnent-many of the issues which 
had plagued the Y ara administration in the years leading up to reversion would be faced 
by Ota himself over twenty years later. In an ironic repetition of history, Ota also 
became subject to fierce accusations of betrayal and complicity by groups from within 
his support base. 
Meanwhile, in the wake of reversion Ota maintained at once a certain faith in 
postwar idealism, and an ambivalence towards the conceptualisation of Japan as the site 
of individual and collective liberation. As examined in the following chapter, he 
simultaneously sought the "revitalization" of Japan's constitution and democracy, and 
conceived of Okinawa's struggle as the attaimnent of "human" and "cultural" 
(Okinawan) identity in ambiguous relation/opposition to a (Japanese) "national 
identity."174 Reversion was achieved, yet contests over Okinawa's positioning-within 
Japan and in US-Japan relations-were far from over. 
---- ~ ----
174 In April 1972 for example Ota concluded: "That the Okinawa problem is breaking out of its shell as a 
parochial issue and becoming universalized, as an issue of the human race (jinrui no mondaz), is an 
inevitable process" ("Okinawa: kokka no henyo to gisei no naka de," p. Ill). 
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"'=CHAPTER THREE~· 
The Other Within 
Okinawa in Japan 
"When I say 'Okinawa' I am not referring to Okinawa per se. While it 
relates to the real Okinawa per se, what I am referring to is more than 
that. It is the 'Okinawa' which I have continued to hold in my heart, 
that is to say which I have continued to passionately seek, since the 
end of the war. 
I thought this 'Okinawa' had taken root in my soul as I sought 
'rebirth' in the turning point after the Battle of Okinawa. Yet now, 
four years after 'reversion', it is already on the verge of destruction. 
And as the decline of Okinawa's primary industry and the 
devastation of its environment attests, I cannot help fearing that 
Okinawa itself is also coming to ruins." 
Ota Masahide, 19761 
Okinawa in Japan 
Prior to 1972, Ota saw reversion as the struggle to fulfil the ideals of peace and 
autonomy which he equated with his own and Okinawa's postwar "rebirth." He 
repeatedly condemned the ideology of assimilation which marked Okinawa's prewar 
history, and viewed the reversion movement as the antithesis of prewar nationalism. By 
at least 1976, however, Ota reached the conclusion that, in direct contrast to this ideal, 
reversion had in fact taken the form of Japanisation (Nihon-ka). He saw Okinawa's 
'Ota Masahide, Okinawa Hokai: 'Okinawa no kokoro 'no henyo (Naha: Hirugisha, 1976), p. I. Emphasis 
in original. 
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incorporation into Japan as resulting in what he profoundly lamented as the "Joss" of 
Okinawan identity and sense of conununity, and the "destruction" of Okinawa as a 
whole. He traced connections between the dissolution of Okinawan culture, and 
Okinawa's incorporation into a centralized system of economic dependence. 
Ota also came to see not only the national govenunent but the prefectural 
administration as directly at fault for facilitating this destruction and deepening 
dependence. He warned that: "Without a revolutionary transformation in the 
consciousness of its inhabitants, at the present time I do not believe that Okinawa has 
the power to survive the threat of 'destruction' on its own. If the present situation is 
maintained, the 'ruination' of Okinawa is as certain as it is inevitable."2 Okinawans' 
embrace of "GNP-ism"-that is the prioritising of large increases in income over 
quality of life and the survival of local industry and agriculture-paralleled the prewar 
process of "the Japanization of Okinawa." Namely both were "advanced through the 
institutionalisation of the notion that modernization could only be achieved through the 
renunciation of all things Okinawan."3 Ota noted with concern that, as with Okinawa's 
intemalisation of this project of Japanization in the prewar era, the uncritical embrace of 
economic growth ideology had begun to result once more a loss of self (mizukara o 
soshitsu shitsutsu aru). The physical destruction of Okinawa's natural environs and 
agricultural economy through the mass influx of capital in the years directly following 
reversion was seen to parallel the "destruction" of Okinawa in the war. It was also 
accompanied by what Ota conceived as the destruction of Okinawa as ideal-as evoked 
in the postwar struggle for subjectivity, autonomy, and "rebirth." 
Yet Ota did not entirely renege on the ideals of the reversion struggle per se. He 
rejected the suggestion that the reversion movement was entirely to blame for 
Okinawa's post-reversion predicament. In a similar way to Franz Fanon's inscriptions 
2 Ibid., p. 2. 
3 1bid., p. 3. Emphasis in originaL 
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of the "native" and "people"-as at once deprived through colonial relations and 
empowered in their ability to resist these relations 4--0ta's depiction of Okinawa 
wavers with ambivalence. He both despaired of the dissolution of an idealized image of 
Okinawa, and reclaimed this idealization and with it the perceived possibility of 
Okinawa as a site of resistance. In doing so, he also maintained the ideals of the 
liberating potential of Japan's postwar constitution. 
Following reversion Ota called for a "rediscovery" of early postwar idealism 
and sense of community. He came to conclude that it was precisely in the wake of 
defeat and destruction, when Okinawans were denied citizen rights and placed under 
foreign occupation, that they had been able to "regain their sense of self as Okinawans" 
und "rediscDver" a sense of communal sharing, generosity, and autonomous spirit. In 
the face of the post-reversion "ruination" of Okinawa, he sought to "return" and "start 
again" (saishuppatsu) from this historical point.5 As Dipesh Chakrabarty observes, the 
politics of nostalgia involve a "call for the realization of a furure that is also a gesture of 
return to a historical past."6 In the pre-reversion period the postwar project of"rebirth" 
had been construed as a progressive path towards democratic revolution and 
demilitarisation. Following Okinawa's return to Japan, Ota sought to realize reversion's 
failed struggle for autonomy through a metaphoric and nostalgic return to the point of 
this rebirth. 
On the effect of displacement through rampant development in the modem 
world Ashis Nandy observes: 
As in the case of the environment, the sheer scale of human intervention in social 
afthlrs has destroyed cultural elasticities and the capacity of cultures to return to 
4 Rey Chow, Ethics after Idealism: Theory-Culture-Ethnicity-Reading, pp. 71-2. 
' Ota Masahide, Okinawa Hi5kai: 'Okinawa no kokoro ·no henyi5, p. 2. Emphasis in original. 
6 Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Afterward: Revisiting the Traditional/Modernity Binary," in Stephen Vlastos (ed.) 
Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998), pp. 290-l. 
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something like their original state after going through a calamity. 
This massive uprooting has produced a cultural psychology of exile that in tum 
has led to an unending search for roots, on the one hand, and angry, sometimes 
self-destructive, assertion of nationality and ethnicity on the other. As the 
connection with the past is weakened, desperate attempts to reestablish this 
connection have also grown. Paradoxically, this awareness of losing touch with 
the past and with primordial collectivities is mainly individual, even though it 
uses the language of collectivity. It has to use the language of collectivity because 
the community has in the meanwhile perished for many who are a party to the 
search.7 
In Japan, the social and economic dislocation and epistemological ruptures which 
accompanied rapid modernization fuelled a desire to "reclaim" a sense of tradition and 
community. As Yumiko Iida observes, in the prewar era, "Japan" became the empty 
non-signifier embodying all loss, torment, and desire within romantic and reactionary 
anti-rationalist celebrations of nationalism. 8 In the early postwar era, a sense of 
nostalgic authentic rural community as embodied in the notion of kyodOtai (community 
or collective) was integral to efforts to revaluate and promote activities by localists and 
anti-central government forces. 9 From the 1970s competing visions of a nostalgic 
furusato (native place) were drawn on the one hand by conservative and state forces to 
reinforce dominant constructions of homogeneity and gender, and on the other by local 
environmentalists groups opposed to large-scale resort, industrial, and public-work 
investment projects.10 
In the modern era Japan has both embraced and been defined against 
"Westemisation." In Okinawa, however, modernization and national consolidation also 
7 Ashis Nandy, "History's Forgotten Doubles," History and Theory, Vol. 34, Issue 2, Theme Issue 34 
(World Hisrorians and Their Critics) (May 1995), pp. 55-6. 
'Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan, pp. 2·24. 
9 Jennifer Robertson, "It Takes a Village: Internationalization and Nostalgia in Postwar Japan," in Stephen 
Vlastos ( ed.) Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan, p. 116. See also Jenrufer 
Robertson, Native and Newcomer: Making and Remaking a Japanese City (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1991). 
to Jennifer Robertson, "It Takes a Village: Internationalization and Nostalgia in Postwar Japan," pp. 116-7. 
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comprised the ambiguous process of"becoming Japanese." As may be discerned in the 
work of Iha Fuyii, the sense of profound Joss and disruption accompanying this process 
coincided with a double "return"-to a claimed common "origin" with Japan, and an 
immutable sense of Okinawan self. In the post-reversion era, the sense of profound loss 
and social disruption which accompanied rapid development further intertwined v.ith 
identity contests and moves to reclaim a sense of immutable Okinawan-ness. A 
traditional sense of Okinawan community was envisioned in opposition to the process 
whereby Okinawa was reincorporated v.ithin state-centred constructions of a 
homogenized Japanese national culture, centralized structures of capital, and the US-
Japan security framework. 
Ota evoked the communal spirit of early postwar Okinawa-a period when 
"people's spiritual wellbeing stood in inverse proportion to their material poverty"-in 
lamentation of, and in the effort to resist, the very loss of community which 
accompanied social and environmental dislocation after reversion. As examined in 
Chapter One, Ota also envisioned a sense of Okinawan identity and the "Okinawan 
Spirit" through evocations of the peaceful culture and traditions of the Ryukyu 
Kingdom. In a thematic ofloss, and in the attempt to reclaim an autonomous and unique 
collective Okinawan "self' in the present through evocations of the past, Ota's work 
paralleled Iha Fuyii's. In both there lies an inherent ambivalence towards modernity and 
"progress"--envisaged as at once an emancipatory project, and resulting in untoward 
destruction. The past provides a source from which to envisage futures able to redeem 
the profound losses of the present. Perceiving pervasive parallels between prewar 
assimilationism and Okinawa's reincorporation into Japan, Ota also drew directly on 
Iha's evocations of an autonomous Okinawan self, as multiple cross-referential 
"networks of time" intertwined. 
In the period from reversion in I 972 to his retirement from the University of the 
Ryukyus in I 990, Ota published the large body of his academic work to date. Much of 
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the extensive analyses laid forth in these voluminous works is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Vvl1at I seek to explore is the way in which within these works Ota lamented 
the loss of self which he associated with the incorporation of Okinawa into Japan, 
sought to reclaim an Okinawan identity through the past and in the present, and stressed 
the significance of Okinawa's historical experience within Japanese postwar history. 
Identity L{)ss and the "Destruction of Okinawa" 
Development Policies in Post-reversion Okinawa 
The ambivalent inscription of Okinawa as both site of resistance and subjugated 
within multiple structures of dependence most clearly emerges in Ota's analyses on the 
economy. On the one hand, Ota despaired of the way in which Okinawa's centralized 
and vulnerable economic structure promoted toadyism and pork-barrel politics. During 
the occupation, he was particularly critical of the way in which High Commissioner 
ftmds were dispersed amongst local communities directly prior to elections to ensure the 
victory of pro-military conservative candidates in GRI legislature elections.U Ota also 
conceded that while on the one hand the people of Okinawa were fiercely opposed to 
the US military bases, they were also highly dependent on them. Okinawa's economic 
survival, and the economic growth of the late 1950s and 1960s, was to a large extent 
contingent on the bases, a reality which he saw formed the core of Okinawa's 
"contradiction" and its "anguish." In 1967, Ota noted that it would be difficult for 
Okinawa, which had little resources of its own, to break: away from a base economy 
unaided. He called upon the national government to provide assistance to Okinawa and 
advocated the implementation of a long-term plan which aimed to achieve economic 
11 
"Okinawa no osoru beki shosenkyo-ku-sei," Ushio, No. 93 (March 1968), pp. 152-!66. See also 
Chapter Two. 
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autonomy. Neither the base issue nor economic issues facing Okinawa could be solved 
"without the power of the mainland Japanese government (hondo seifu)."12 
While denouncing Okinawan "toadyism," Ota thus also saw that the reversion 
movement held the potential to overcome a cycle of economic dependence. He upheld 
the way in which workers, including members of the All-Okinawan Military Base 
Union, had actively participated in the movement calling for the withdrawal of the US 
military despite their dependence on it. He also championed Yara's election as a victory 
against pork-barrel politics and a clear rejection by the people of Okinawa of the 
"potatoes and barefoot theory" (imo to hadashi ron). According to this theory, espoused 
by the US high commissioner and reiterated by members of the Okinawa LDP, without 
the bases Okinawans would become destitute, forced to walk barefoot and survive on 
sweet potatoes and fish. 13 In 1969, disparaging of mainland Japan's materialism, Ota 
upheld the way in which, in direct contrast, the people of Okinawa were putting their 
wellbeing on the line in the struggle to be liberated from dependence on the military 
bases. For Ota such struggles and ideals embodied the "Okinawan spirit."14 
On the one hand Ota thus saw assistance from the national government as 
necessary in order for Okinawa to break free of the debilitating restraints of a base-
dependent economy. On the other, he upheld the anti-materialist ideals of the reversion 
movement as embodied in the "Okinawan spirit," conceived in direct contrast to the 
consumerism of high growth Japan. Okinawa was seen as entrenched in subjugated 
relations yet also containing the potential to overcome them. This ambivalence arose 
out of the dilemma of Okinawa's own implication within and subjugation to the 
multiple hegemonic regimes-of the Cold War military structure, Japan's LDP-
12 Ota Masahide, "Okinawa kara shinseiken e uttaeru: 'betonamu sansen' no kun6" Ekonomisuto (2 July 
1967), p. 18. 
13 See for example Ota Masahide, "Kakushin shuseki no tanj6 wa, igaika, hitsuzenka," Waseda galcuhO 
(December 1968), pp. 6-7. 
14 Ota Masahide, "Hondo ni lotte Okinawa to wa nanika," Asahi Gurafu (17 May 1968), p. 40. 
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dominated security policy, hegemonic narratives of nation, the nation-state system, and 
centralized economic systems. 
As reversion neared, the complexities of this position became apparent. As Ota 
himselflarnented, economic dependence on the bases formed the central dilemma of the 
Y ara administrationY This dependence also compounded the multiple economic issues 
arising from the transfer of administrative rights over the islands. The national 
government was able to use this situation to it~ advantage in the effort to secure 
Okinawan compliance to the terms of reversion. The promotion of economic stimulus 
and mainland Japanese investment in Okinawa formed an integral component of the 
government's 'unification' (ittaika) policy. In 1969 the national cabinet announced the 
Okinawa Economic Stimulus Plan, and in April of the following year the Japanese 
Economic Planning Association (Nihon keizai chOsa kai), representing mainland 
Japanese business interests, published recommendations on the economic development 
of post-reversion Okinawa. The report warned that if Okinawan inhabitants were 
"sensitive" towards pollution, resisted the introduction of technological innovation, or 
contested the economic integration of Okinawa on the grounds of protecting local 
business and industry, that industrial development and the narrowing of the "economic 
gap" between Okinawa and mainland Japan would be delayed, resulting in severe 
regional depopulation.16 As different interests vied for investment opportunities in the 
islands, friction also arose between US multinationals seeking to utilize investments in 
pre-reversion Okinawa as a stepping stone to bypass Japan's heavy restrictions on 
foreign investment, and Japan's Ministry of Trade and Industries (MITI). MITI applied 
various forms of pressure on the firms in question and on the GRI in an effort to restrict 
" See for example Ota Masahide, "Shin no fukki e no kadai wa nanika," Sekai No. 290 (January, 1970), p. 
110. 
"Cited in Miyamoto Ken'ichi, Kaihatsu to jichi no tembO: Okinawa (Tokyo: Tsukuma Shoten, 1979), p. 
31. 
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foreign investment pnor to the return of administrative rights, and in late 1969 
expressed explicit opposition to investment m Okinawa which would conflict with 
Japanese domestic restrictions. 17 
To a significant extent the Y ara administration worked within the Japanese 
government's restrictions. 18 The GRI lacked the funds required to develop a 
comprehensive plan to foster the diversification of Okinawan agriculture, local small 
and medium-sized businesses, and urban redevelopment while at the same time laying 
down measures to combat economic dislocation as a result of reversion. The mass 
displacement of Okinawan workers from within the bases and US administration, and a 
bloated service sector stemming from Okinawa's base-dependant economy further 
induced the Yara administration to prioritise the promotion of investment. In the face of 
strong government pressure, this investment largely took the form of mainland Japanese 
. 19 
companies. 
In September 1970 the GRI announced its Long Term Economic Development 
Plan ( ChOki keizai kaihatsu keikaku) for the islands. The plan sought the "transferral 
from a base-dependent to an independent economy (jiritsu keizai)" and the "amendment 
of the economic gap between mainland Japan and Okinawa." According to the plan, this 
was to be achieved by maintaining an economic growth average of 13.9% for ten years, 
fed by heavy and chemical industry investment, including crude oil storage facilities, a 
17 Thomas R. Howell, "Foreclosing a Japanese Hong Kong: Okinawa, 1967-1972," Japan Policy 
Research Institute, Occasional Paper No. 16 (March 2000), pp. 1-11. Also discussed by Gavan 
McCormack in "Okinawa and the Structure of Dependence," Glenn Hook and Richard Siddle (eds.) 
Japan and Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity (provisional title) (forthcoming). 
18 Though Thomas Howell points out that Yara did seek to resist the pressure from the governmen~ in the 
effort to promote foreign investment and protect local businesses. Howell notes that on 12 March 1970 
Yara declared at a press conference that: "In induction of foreign capital, we will give priority to the 
prefectural interests of Okinawa and will not be submissive to the homeland government" ("Foreclosing a 
Japanese Hong Kong," ibid. p, 5, Howell citing from Yomiuri Shinbun 14 March 1970). 
19 Miyamoto Ken'ichi, Kaihatsu to jichi no tenbi5: Okinawa, p, 34; Fukugi Akira, Okinawa no ashioto, p. 
236. Miyamoto also cites a distrust of foreign firms as a reason inducing the Yara administration to lean 
towards mainland Japanese companies. 
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refinery, petrochemical plant, steelwork.~, and an aluminium refining plant. To support 
these large-scale industries, the GRI also planned extensive infrastructure development, 
through the building and improvement of roads, bridges, ports, electric power plants, 
dams, telecommunication facilities, and the reclamation of coastal land, including a 
large-scale reclamation and development plan for Kin Bay. In short, the plan 
uncritically incorporated and even expanded the tenets of 1960's Japan's rabid 
industrial development policies while washing over the issue of the military base 
presence, and equated the reversion movement's calls for "parity" and "equality" with a 
deduction in the income gap between Okinawa and the mainland. 20 In this sense, as 
Gavan McCormack observes, "the immediate post-reversion government of Yara 
Chobyo dreamed great dreams of development, but the dreams were fed by [Tanaka] 
Kakuei fantasies."21 
In the face of growing criticism and an upsurge in fears of industrial pollution 
amongst local residents, however, the GRI to an extent reviewed this policy at the end 
of 1971. The legislature passed a recommendation which detailed the benefits of light 
manufacturing over heavy industry, and advocated the prioritisation of welfare, the 
establishment of local autonomy, and "anti-war pacifist principles" as fundamental 
tenets of economic development. In actual fact, however, manufacturing in general 
never prospered and indeed it steadily declined as a ratio of GDP post-reversion. This 
was compensated by a large growth in public works projects ultimately implemented 
with little regard to the "principles of development" outlined in the GRllegislation. In 
1971 Japan's Diet passed the Special Measures Law for Okinawan Development 
(Okinawa shinki5 kaihatsu tokubetsu sochihii), and in December 1972 the national 
20 Ibid., pp. 34-8. Also Gavan McConnack, "Okinawa and the Structme of Dependence." 
2
' Gavan McConnack, "Okinawa and the Structme of Dependence," ibid. 
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govenunent announced a ten-year Okinawan Stimulus Development Plan for Okinawa, 
heavily centred around public works.22 
This formed the foundations of Okinawa's post-reversion economic structure. In 
the year from 1972 to 1973 alone, public investment in Okinawa tripled, and by 1974 it 
was 4.5 times the 1972 amount. 23 In February 1972, on the eve of reversion, the 
govenunent also announced its decision to select Motobu, in the northeast of Okinawa's 
main island, as site for the 1975 International Marine Expo.24 The Okinawa Expo was a 
major catalyst for the massive inflow of national public money into Okinawa in the 
years from 1972 to 1975, and the "golden egg" of the national govenunent reversion 
policy. 25 It both ensured a rapid increase in GDP through the massive influx of 
investment for infrastructure, and served to further entrench a public-works centred 
economy. 
Ota contested the emerging fortification of this economic structure from as early 
as 1971. In a symposium on Okinawan development held at the University of Ryukyus 
in June 1971, Ota saw the way in which economic stimulus policies were being 
advanced, like the reversion agreement itself, as at direct odds with the "spirit of 
Okinawa." He evoked the sense of an "Okinawan spirit" as the antithesis of 
22 Ibid., and Miyamoto Ken'ichi, Knihatsu to jichi no tenbo: Okinawa, p. 34; Fukugi Akira, Okinawa no 
ashiolo, p.41-8. 
23 Miyamoto Ken'ichi, Kaihatsu to jichi no tenbO: Okinawa, p. 44 
24 On the social dislocating effects caused by the Expo, see for example "Kono shinnen 'kaiyohaku wa 
kaihatsu no kibakuzai'," Asahi gu:rafo (1 June 1971), pp. 61-3. 
" In the words of economist Miyamoto Ken'ichi: "Reversion policy sought to incorporate Okinawa into 
Japan's highly centralized administrative system wbile at the same time promoting development with 
maintenance of the bases as a central focus. The Marine Expo served as a way to dissolve the 
contradictions which arose in this tumultuous period through an 'event-based model of mass public 
investment.'" Miyamoto Ken'ichi, Kaihatsu to jichl no tenbi5: Okinawa, p. 42. Miyamoto was one the 
first economic professors from mainiand Japan to conduct extensive research on the Okinawan economy 
and issues related to development and the US bases. He coauthored an article with Kuba Masahiko as 
early as June 1970 critical of the government's reversion and development policies, entitled "Okinawa 
keizai kaihatsu no gensoku," published in Sekai in June 1970 (as cited in Knihatsu to jichl no tenbO, p. 
39). 
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uncontrolled development and materialism. At the same time, he emphasized the 
importance of the establishment of local autonomy as an issue facing all of Japan. 26 By 
May 1972, Ota's concern over economic policies reached a tone of urgency, and while 
admitting he himself was not an economist, he came to the conclusion that as a resident 
of Okinawa he could no longer avoid confronting these issues. He conceived of his 
relation to economic issues as synonymous with the inhabitant of a house-who, while 
not a professional builder, holds the right to judge the structure's design and 
practicality?7 
On one level, Ota sought to open debate on the very meaning of prosperity. He 
stressed that, "through the outbreak of terrible 'pollution' on a world scale, the contents 
of 'prosperity' (yutakasa) are coming under question.''28 In particular, he suggested the 
need to include a "good Jiving environment" together with prosperity as a goal of 
society. Ota saw that to ensure such an environment, one must seek to guarantee 
autonomy in the face of the "allure" (mashO) of capital. Ota stressed that the promotion 
of capital held the danger of evolving into the "self-propagating" pursuit of profit. He 
emphasized the need for people to "able to be in control of their ov.n lifestyle" against 
this potentially destructive force. 29 For the first time, Ota also directly related the post-
reversion rush to promote Okinawan development to Okinawa's prewar "history of self-
identity loss." Prewar imperialist ideology had promoted the indiscriminate pursuit of 
26 Ota's presentation from this symposium was published as "Keizai to Okinawa no kokoro," Chiiki 
lwihatsu (October 1971), and reprinted in Okinawa no halwi, pp. 27-45. 
27 Ota Masahide," 'Mazushisa' o kozi'l shita mono: Okinawa keizai kaihatsu no kako to mirai" (Part One), 
Asahi Jaanaru (19 May 1972), pp. 8-l3; "Shlldatsu o kurikaeashita mono: Okinawa keizai kaihatsn no 
kako to mirai" (Part Two), Asahi Jaanaru (26 May 1972), pp. 88"95; "Kaihatsu no shutaisei o mizukara 
no te ni: Okioawa kei7.ai kaihatsu no kako to mirai" (Part Three), Asahi Jaanaru (2 June 1972): pp. 31·9 
2
' '"Mazushisa' o kozi'l shita mono: keizai kaihatsu no kako to mirai," p. 9. 
29 1bid. 
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assimilation with Japan as well as the expulsion of all 'Okinawan characteristics' and 
individual autonomy, and Ota feared that Okinawa was once more heading down this 
well-trodden path. He warned: "Once we accept the expansion of 'capital', and the logic 
of self-propagation which it contains, it v.ill most likely be almost impossible to return 
once again to this point of departure."30 Under US military occupation the pursuit of 
autonomy had been conceived in union with the pursuit of reversion, in the face of the 
mass influx of mainland Japanese capital it now became defined as "the ability to 
control one's own lifestyle" against the destructive forces of consumerist desire and 
capital expansion. 
On another level, Ota also contested the notion that Okioawa' s structure of 
economic dependence was inevitable. In October 1969 the Prime Minister's Special 
Regional Network Office (sorifu tokubetsu chiiki renrakukyoku) had announced its 
Basic Outline for the Economic Stimulus of Okinawa (Okinawa keizai shinkO no kihon 
koso). The report recognised that it was the "obligation" of mainland Japan to "bridge 
the gap" between Okinawa and the rest of Japan. Yet it also warned: "On the other 
hand, if the Okinawan side makes a deal of the past, holds suspicions, expresses 
opposition to new developments or such like, true economic development cannot be 
guaranteed, and economic grov,1h will soon stagnate." 31 Ota saw this threat as 
revealing of the government's attitude towards Okinawa. He was particularly critical of 
the government's attempts to negate Okinawan claims to history. In contrast, he stressed 
that it was vital to examine history in the attempt to ensure that the same mistakes were 
not repeated: "The more I seek to envisage a positive future, the more I find it necessary 
to delve into the realities of the past."32 Through a historical analysis of Okinawa's 
prewar economic conditions, Ota sought to trace the causal factors in Okinawa's 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., p. 11. 
32 Ibid. 
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economic stagnation and financial dependence, m the effort to conceive of an 
alternative future. 
A series of famines struck the Ryukyu chain from around 1895, when Japan 
annexed Taiwan, to the years follov.'ing the crash in sugar prices in 1920. Some 
Okinawans were reduced to eating the fruit of the Sotetsu (Cycad) Palm, which needed 
to be soaked for up to a week in water to extract its potent poison before being eaten. 
Okinawa as a whole became renowned throughout Japan for its poverty, and referred to 
as the "Sotetsu Palm hell" (Sotetsu jigoku). 33 Ota drew upon extensive historical 
material to argue that Okinawa's economic devastation during this period was in fact 
largely a result of discrimination and neglect on the part of the national government. He 
saw that this neglect was compounded by vestiges of Satsuma's exploitation ofRyukyu 
Kingdom prior to the Meiji period. He concluded that delays in land reform, 
fundamental flaws in the system of tax implemented under Satsuma, and the severity of 
Japan's tax on sugar were factors which contributed to Okinawa's prewar economic 
ailments.34 
The primary factor seen as driving economic delays in Okinawa in the late 
nineteenth century was the national government's policy of "preservation of old 
customs" (kyilkan onzon), which largely conserved the feudal tax system of the pre-
Meiji era. Ota conceded that the national goverurnent had held this system in place 
partly as a way to avoid further confrontation mth the Ryukyuan elite, who had fiercely 
resisted the disposition of the kingdom and held extensive connections with China. Yet 
he also saw that the national government's policies after Meiji were consistent mth a 
historical mode of thinking, entrenched within the Tokugawa system, which viewed 
"See also Alan Christy, "Imperial Subjects in Okinawa," p. 144-9. 
34 Ota Masabide, "Shiidatsu o kurikaeashita mono: Okinawa keizai kaihatsu no kako to mirai," p. 90; 
'"l\iazushisa' o kozo shita mono: Okinawa keizai kaihatsuno kako to mirai," pp. 14-5. 
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Ryukyu as inferior to mainland Japan or Naichi.35 In 1899, thirty one years after the 
Meiji restoration, the government finally introduced land reforms in Okinawa after 
extensive peasant unrest in Okinawa's Yaeyama Islands in particular. Still, however, 
Ota concluded, the government remained primarily concerned with promoting its ovvn 
interests. Hefty sugar taxes prevailed while sugar prices fell, transportation costs from 
Naha to Osaka remained much higher than from the relatively prospering colony of 
Taiwan to mainland Japan, a net drain of capital from Okinawa to the national treasury 
was maintained, and little to no attempt was made to remedy Okinawa's over-
dependence on sugar production. 36 Ota concluded: "It is often said that in relation to 
economic issues, 'Okinawa cannot survive without Japan.' Perhaps this is true. Yet at 
the same time, we should also take due note of historical experience, that 'when we rely 
on Japan, we have continually found ourselves on the verge of death."'37 
The 1975lnternational Marine Expo 
In 1973, on the first anniversary of Okinawan reversion to Japan, Ota also 
expressed anxiety over the way in which the Japanese government, prefecture, and 
businesses ¥<ithin and outside Okinawa were in unison celebrating the holding of the 
International Marine Expo. In particular, he expressed concern over the link between 
the Expo and the maintenance of the US military stronghold in Okinawa-as 
interrelated core components of state policy. In further hinting of this link, he stressed 
the importance of questioning why and for what explicit purpose the Marine Expo was 
""Shildatsu o kurikaeashita mono: Okinawa keizai kaihatsu no kako to mimi," p. 89. 
36 On the economic plight of prewar Okinawa Alan Christy observes: "The problems of the sugar-
centered Okinawan economy were compounded by lowered production of other foodsmffs (and increased 
dependence on imports of fuod), the doubling ofJapanese sugar imports from places such as Java (even 
as other colonial powers were placing tariffs on foreign sugar to protect sugar produced in their won 
colonies), a net drain of capital to the national treasury, and the lack of supporting labor markets in 
Okinawa to absorb excess agricultural labor from an expanding population" ("Imperial Subjects in 
Okinawa," p. 145). 
37 
"Kaihatsu no shutaisci o mizukara no te ni: Okinawa keizai kaihatsu no kako to mirai," p. 39 
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being held in Okinawa.38 By 1975 this anxiety had expanded into direct criticism. In 
the months leading up to the Marine Expo, held in July of the same year, the massive 
increase in the influx of money into the island (by June it was said that over 200 billion 
yen had already been poured into the event) triggered a boom in consumer spending 
(70% increase from the previous year) and accompanying inflation.39 
As Ota noted 'hith concern in an article published in June 1975, it was estimated 
that the prefecture would spend a total of over 5.1 billion yen on the event. In order to 
gather these funds, the prefecture had borrowed 210 million yen from a cDmmercial 
bank, with another 200 million yen loan deemed necessary, at an interest rate of 9 .25%. 
A further 170 million yen of the total approximately 210 million yen required to acquire 
private land within the designated site had been raised through the issuing of bonds. 
Local Okinawan businesses had procured only approximately 13% of the total outlying 
costs of Expo-related construction projects40 As up to 90% of lifestyle necessities in 
Okinawa were imported from the Japanese mainland, Ota pointed out that even with an 
increase in consumer spending a large amount of this profit would be drained out of 
Okinawa. Accompanying sharp rises in inflation moreover placed further pressure on 
those locals most struggling to make a living.41 
Up to this point, Ota had not directed strong criticism towards the Y ara 
administration, which he saw was subject to Japanese government pressure and the 
contradictions twenty-seven years of US occupation had vested on Okinawa's politics 
and economy. Now, however, Ota became explicitly critical of the prefecture's lack of 
an autonomous policy. The Okinawan Prefectural Council of Unions (Okinawa-ken 
"Ota Masahide, "Nichibei anpo no tatemae to Okinawa no genjitsu," Sel::ai No. 331 (June 1973), pp. 18-
30. 
,. Figures cired by Ota in "Okinawa no yUutsu: 'kaiyohaku' infure to aikawarazu no 'kichi' ," Mainichi 
Shinbun (20 May 1975), p. 5. 
4
" Ota Masahide, "Obiyakasareru Okinawa no jichi," Ushio (May 1975), pp. 223-4. Ota 1'.'llS citing figures 
published in the Okinawa Taimusu and Ryiikyii Shinp6. 
41 Ota Masahide, "Okinawa no yiiutsu: 'kaiy5haku' infure to aikawarazu no 'kichi'," op cit. 
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rodi5 kumiai kyogilmi) and labour activists from witbin the Reversion Council opposed 
the holding of the Expo in Okinawa, and farmers and small business owners were 
fearful of the economic spill-over effect of inflation. Many were also opposed to the 
planned visit of Prince Akihito, eldest son of the Emperor and heir to the throne, and his 
wife to Okinawa for the event. In reaction to the planned visit of the Prince, Okinawa's 
leading literary journal, Shin-Okinawa Bungaku, published a special on Okinawa and 
the Emperor system. Intellectuals such as Arakawa Akira, Kawamitsu Shin'ichi, and 
Migayi EishO were highly critical of the Emperor system and its truncated postwar 
version, particularly in the context of Okinawa. 42 Yet the national and prefectural 
governments were determined to go ahead with the Expo. Moreover, in relation to the 
Prince's planned visit, Y ara purportedly stated in a press conference that: "Some talk of 
the sentiment of the people of Okinawa, but we must also consider the sentiment of the 
people of all of Japan. Opposing the Prince's Okinawan visit will not be beneficial to 
the future of Okinawa. "43 
The Expo came to symbolize the interconnection between large-scale public 
works investment and the permeation of nationalist constructions of homogeneity 
within state structures. In opposition to these multiple structures of incorporation, 
struggles over Okinawan identity interwove with contests over national and prefectural 
government economic policy. Within these contests, tensions that had been inherent in 
the reversion movement-as at once containing both pro-assimilationist and pro-
autonomy forces-also came to the fore. Divisions within Okinawa's progressive forces 
became clearly discernable-as manifest in the difference in opinions on the Prince's 
visit. 
42 
"Tokushil: Okinawa to Tenosei," Shin Okinawa Bungalru No. 28, 1975, pp. 6-100. 
43 Ota Masahide, "Okinawa kaiyohaku no kaimaku o mae ni," Asahi Shinbun (13 July I 975). The quote 
ofYara's cited by Ota from OT (10 July 1975). 
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Ota saw the national and prefectural government's prioritisation of the "state-
sponsored event" (kokka gyi'Jji) over the will of local residents as a "re-enactment of the 
pattern of centre-periphery relations which have marked Okinawa's history since its 
integration as a prefecture into Japan."44 He concluded that: "In this sense, neither the 
government nor the prefecture seem to have learnt anything from the harsh experiences 
of the prewar period and defeat."45 In August 1971, the GR1 had unanimously passed a 
resolution endorsing the Expo to be held within Okinawa, and applauding the effect it 
would have in promoting Okinawa's economic development. On reflection, Ota saw 
that such judgements were based on the delusion that increases in GNP alone would 
ensure Okinawa's release from the "shackles" of historical poverty. He stressed that in 
this way: "Okinawa's politicians and administrators in particular ... not only lacked 
political awareness, but the precautionary sense to delve into the substance of 
government and business-sponsored policy outlines from an autonomous local 
perspective.'M 
Ota saw Yara's comments on the Prince's visit, and his decision to seek the 
cooperation of the Japanese Defence Forces in the case of natural disaster (seen as 
amounting to an indirect acknowledgement of their presence in Okinawa), as exemplary 
of the way in which Okinawa was "losing" (si'Jshitsu) its sense of identity and spirit. For 
Ota, the Battle of Okinawa had provided Okinawans with an opportunity to regain a 
sense of subjectivity (shutaisef) "as Okinawan"-a sense which had been forcefully 
abandoned in the prewar period. Yet the road to the Marine Expo was a process 
whereby this identity was gradually being destroyed: "The government ... has not only 
induced the renunciation of people's sense of identity as Okinawans, but through the 
44 lbid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ota Ma.sahide, "Kaiyohaku no yume to genjitsu," Komet Shinbun (27 July 1975), p. 8. 
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Marine Expo has at least for the time being consummated the making of imperial 
subjects in its postwar fonn."'17 
Through this reference to the "making of imperial subjects" Ota drew an explicit 
connection between the emerging post-reversion economic and political system, and 
prewar imperialist ideology. In the prewar era, assimilation and imperial education had 
induced the destruction of an Okinawan self; now it was seen that this sense of identity 
was again being destroyed by an expansion of mainland Japanese private and public 
capital. Ota saw that the push to combine the holding of the Expo with the visit of the 
Emperor's heir reinforced this link, and the continuities between the prewar Emperor 
system and postwar Japan. In the months leading up to the Expo, Ota also drew direct 
connections between the destruction of Okinawan tradition and sense of community and 
the environmental destruction which the massive Expo-related construction boom had 
brought to the main island. 
From at least 1972, criticism of the penneation of mainland Japanese capital, the 
arrival of Japanese Defence Forces to Okinawa, and the fortification of Japan's 
centralized and LDP-dominated structures of authority coincided with images of the 
"destruction" of Okinawa-as also coinciding with the physical destruction of the 
islands' natural environs. 48 In 1973, the Committee of Ten for the Protection of 
Okinawan Culture and Nature, made up of various well known academics, and the 
heads of both the Okinawan Women's League and Okinawa Cultural Association, 
submitted a petition to Okinawan Governor Y ara and the GRI!egislature. lbey strongly 
opposed the way in which the Marine Expo, while promoting the "establishment of a 
new marine culture," was in fact precipitating the destruction of the natural 
41 Ota Ma .. hide, "Okinawa kaiyohaku no kaimaku o mae ni." 
" See for example Fukugi Akira, "Kowasarete yuku Okinawa: hondo shihon no shinto," Sekai :-.lo. 325 
-i'Becember 1972), pp. 181-92. 
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environments which had "protected the Okinawa spirit" for "two thousand years.',49 By 
1974, numerous intellectuals, environmentalists, and scientists in Okinawa lamented 
and strongly opposed Okinawa's environmental, cultural, and social dislocation and 
destruction, drawing explicit connections between the destruction of the agriculture 
industry, village life, a sense of community, and pollution of the islands' subtropical 
landscape. 50 
On the eve of the Expo, the implications of reversion's failure to provide local 
autonomy seemed to increasingly come to light. In this context, Ota endorsed a pro-
independence stance to an extent unseen in his pre-reversion work: "As the movement 
to restore a sense of Okinawan identity gains momentum, a pro-independent type of 
thinking is on the upsurge, including within myself."51 Having himself just returned 
from a year sabbatical in Hawaii, Ota introduced the anti-reversion arguments of 
Kakazu Hashiji, a Hawaiian immigrant of Okinawan deeent. Kakazu had fled to Hawaii 
at the age of sixteen to avoid military conscription, and during the war composed 
pamphlets distributed by the US military urging civilians to try to avoid becoming 
involved in the ensuing military combat. In 1961, he contributed an article to an 
Okinawan newspaper critical of the pro-reversion movement. Ota stressed that Kakazu 
did not oppose reversion from a pro-American, anti-Japanese standpoint, but in the 
name of Okinawan autonomy. For Kakazu, to seek reversion to Japan was tantamount 
to desiring ones own confinement. Ota concluded: "The present condition of Okinawa 
does not resemble the conditions which we sought in the slightest. From this, of late I 
have come to feel that, no matter what our intentions were, those who advocated the 
49 Okinawa no Bunka to shizen o mamoru jilnin iinkai, "Okinawa no bunka to shizen o mamoru 
yobOsho," reprinted in Shin Okinawa Bungaku No. 25 (1974), pp. 208-31. Also cited in Ota Masahide 
"Kotaishi o mukaeru Okinawajin no kokoro," Shukan Yomiuri No. 32 (2 August 1975), p. 136. 
so See for example the feature special "Hokai suru Okinawa" in Shin Okinawa Bungaku No. 26 (1974), 
including Higa!vlasao, "Hokai suru shakai," pp. 57-62; Asato Seishin "Kaihatsu to hakai," pp. 63-73, etc. 
""Kiehl no motorasu eikyo: jiritsu keizai e no iyoku ushinau," Okinawa Taimusu (23 May 1975), p. 6, 
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reversion movement, including myself, cannot repudiate the countenance of these 
criticisms from Hawaii."52 
At the same time, Ota also continued to seek to achieve increased local 
autonomy for Okinawa within Japan-as vital for both Okinawa and the functioning of 
Japanese democracy as a whole. He continued to uphold the constitution and Local 
Autonomy Laws as gnaranteeing decentralization at least on principle, and saw the 
problem as being rather that these principles were not ensured in practice.53 Ota saw 
that in order for autonomy to be guaranteed, tasks and financial resources should be 
separated between national and local government according to the "capacities of each" 
and "on equal tenns." In contrast, in reality: "In the vast majority of cases, even local 
public servants do not hold themselves accountable to the local residents, but to the 
state, which is to all intents and means the supreme ruler." 54 Refomting this 
institutionalised system of centralization required, Ota concluded, a fundamental 
transformation in the mentality of the government. Such a transformation was in turn 
seen as vital for Japan as a whole: "Unless prioritisation of the national treasury is 
supplanted by prioritisation of the will of local residents, and the government 
acknowledges the simple truth that it exists for the sake of local inhabitants, the 
establishment oflocal autonomy will remain nothing but a chimera .... "55 
On 20 July 1975, the opening of the International Marine Expo in Motobu, 
Okinawa, was attended by a host of political and other dignitaries, including Prince 
Akihito and his wife. In preparation for the Prince's visit, an additional2 400 police had 
been sent to Okinawa from the mainland. 56 On 18 July, directly prior to Expo's opening 
52 Ota Masahide, "Okinawa no yiiutsu: 'kaiy6haku' infure to aikawarazu no 'kichi'." 
53 
"Obiyakasareru Okinawa no jichi," pp.220-3. 
54 Ibid., p. 221. 
"Ibid., p. 223. 
56 Arasaki Moriteru, Okinawa gendaishi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), p. 50. 
"Cited inArasaki Moriteru, Okinawa Dojidaishi, Volume One (1973-1977) (Tokyo: Gaiftisha, 1992), p. 
56. 
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ceremony, the royal couple conducted a visit to the Himeyuri Monument, built in 
commemoration of those members of the schoolgirl corps who died during the Battle of 
Okinawa. Only three of the select group of twenty who greeted the couple were actual 
survivors of the Himeyuri Corps, although approximately forty survivors of the corps 
remained. In explanation for her non-attendance, one survivor was quoted as replying: 
"I feared with a fierce sense of dread that from the darkest depths of the cave, where my 
friends fell to their death one upon the other, a voice would demand that I confront the 
true meaning of spiritual remembrance."57 During the Prince's visit to the site, one left-
wing radical threw a makeshift firebomb towards the royal entourage. The couple were 
unhurt. 
The level of investment which poured into Okinawa in the four years from 1972 
to the end of 1975 was equal to the total cumulative amount invested in the islands in 
the twenty-one year period prior to reversion. By 1976, the prefecture was heavily 
dependent on central government funds, with incomings from the national treasury 
reaching four times the level of outgoings from the prefecture. A:; with the Tokyo 
Olympics and Osaka Exposition before it, the Okinawa Marine Expo resulted in a 
massive influx of investment from related public works projects. Yet the primary aim of 
this development was to secure the infrastructure needed for the one-off event, rather 
than improve the residential environment of local inhabitants in the long-term. Much of 
the profits were fuelled back into mainland Japanese companies, and the years leading 
up to and directly after the Expo were accompanied by a flood of local bankruptcies. 58 
The thoroughfare from Nnha to Nago was greatly improved. Yet Okinawa remained the 
"One of the largest of these was the collapse of the Okinawan transportation company, Ryukyii Kaiun, 
which declared bankruptcy in October 1976 with a total debt of 14.67 billion yen. Its losses in the 
previous fmancial year were said to be directly related to the Marine Expo (Arasaki Moriteru, Okinawa 
gendaishi, pp. 49-52). 
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only prefecture in Japan without rail, after the government rejected the prefectural 
administration's appeal for a rail track out of concern over operation costs. 59 
The large influx of public investment into Okinawa in the years directly 
following reversion helped to provide a buffer against much of the economic confusion 
which it was feared would accompany the transfer of administrative rights in 1972.60 
Yet, as Ota had expressed concern over and wamed against, the Expo and related 
investment also formed an intrinsic part of the central government's policy of 
integrating Okinawa into Japan's centralized economic administrative system. At the 
core of this policy was an increase in compensation for public works projects funded in 
part or even whole from the national treasury. 61 
From 1971 to 1976, the amount of compensation paid to the ov.ners of land 
utilized by the US military increased by 8.5 times. This massive increase triggered a 
further increase in land prices, lending a blow to agriculture and further entrenching 
dependence on the bases within an influential section of the population. All these 
policies combined to result, as Ota had feared, in a large concentration of population 
around Okinawa's largest city, Naha. According to a survey conducted in 1975 the 
population of Tomigusuku Village, adjacent to Naha, had increased 90% in comparison 
to five years previously, while all the nine villages which experienced a population 
decrease of over twenty percent were in the northern district of Okinawa's main island 
. l''ld62 or m out ymg IS an s. 
According to one estimate, while in 1972 base revenue made up close to half of 
Okinawa's total GDP, by 1975 this ratio had decreased to less than one fifth. In 
contrast, by 1975 public spending made up close to one third of GDP, which in itself 
59 Miyamoto Ken'ichi, Kaihatsu to jichi no tenhi'i: Okinawa, p. 42. 
60 As also noted by Miyamoto, ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 As cited in Miyamoto, ibid., p. 53. 
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had increased over threefold in four years. 63 In short, Okinawa was able to lessen its 
dependence on the bases as the primary source of revenue for the islands and attain 
massive increases in GDP. Yet base dependence was replaced by the entrenchment of a 
system of fiscal dependence on the national government, and economic growth was to a 
significant extent fed by public spending, largely on often environmentally damaging 
public works. Moreover, to the extent that national government policy advocated 
compliance with the US in support of the maintenance of the large US military presence 
within the islands, Okinawa's newly compounded structure of dependence remained 
intimately linked to the bases. 64 
In June 1976, the progressive candidate and chosen successor of Yara Ch6byo, 
Taira Koichi, was victorious in Okinawa's gubernatorial elections. Not only was it the 
first time in the whole of Japan that the successor of a progressive administration had 
gained office as governor in a nation largely dominated by the ruling LDP, but the 
progressive coalition also gained a majority of seats in the prefectural assembly. Ota 
saw this victory as testimony of deep-seated opposition to the government's centralist 
development policies and pork-barrel politics, and a strong desire for autonomy and the 
upholding of the pacifist principles of the constitution within Okinawa. Yet the urgent 
question as to whether Okinawa's progressive coalition held the power or will necessary 
to resist increasingly indirect and insidious structures of authority remained. Ota 
cautioned that the prefectural administration and newly instated Governor Taira faced a 
mountain of issues in relation to the bases and economic development. He stressed the 
urgent need for the prefecture to draw up a plan detailing specific measures to be 
implemented in order to increase autonomy and transfer Okinawa fully from a "base 
61 Ibid., p. 48. 
64 As Miyamoto Ken'ichi observes; "The prefecture, bogged down with the implementation of national 
treasure-compensated public-works projects and the strings to which they were attached, lost its free 
agency (jishusei), and in the formulation of fiscal and development policy came under the direct control 
of the national government" (ibid., p. 52). 
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economy" to a "peace economy." Such reform required an overhaul of the prefecture's 
bureaucratic administration and a clear awareness of the implications of the crisis facing 
Okinawan society and sense of self. 65 
Yet by the 1976 elections, the opposition movement against the Central 
Terminal Station (CTS) development at Kin Bay had already reached an impasse. This 
development planned to be world's largest oil storage facilities, built on a massive 
expanse ofreclaimed land across Kin Bay. The struggle against this plan grew into the 
largest environmental movement of the early post-reversion period. The Kin Bay issue 
became, as much as the Marine Expo, a symbol of the resistance, incorporation, and 
political fragmentation which marked this period.66 Under the initial support of both 
local and prefectural authorities, Okinawa Mitsubishi, affiliated with the large mainland 
Japanese conglomerate, had begun work on the land reelamation in October 1972. Less 
than a year later, however, in the wake of a large oil tanker leak and the environmental 
destruction accompanying preparations for the Marine Expo, the Prefectural Teachers 
Union and the All-Prefecture Labour Union expressed opposition to the CTS, and a 
large umbrella organization, the Kin Bay Protection Society, was mobilized against the 
project. From 1973, the Kin Bay Protection Society (also supported by the Committee 
of Ten for the Protection of Okinawan Culture and Nature) organized a series of mass 
65 
"Kakushin keizoku o sentaku shita Okinawa kenmin: uchinaru hOkai no kiki o sukueru ka," 
Ekonomisuto (29 June 1976), pp. 52-6. 
66 Miyume Tanji points out that another important dimension of the anti-CIS movement was the 
discovery of a local identity as part of the Ryiikyilko region, as an alternative to the inscription of 
Okinawa as a marginalized part of Japan. The idea of Ryilkyiilw is based on Shimao Toshio's 1ii'Iitings on 
'Yaponesia', which envisioned Okinawa and Amami as a bridge connecting the Japanese archipelago 
with other South Pacific islands such as Polynesia, Micronesia, Melanesia and Indonesia. The term 
presented an alternative way of viewing Okinawa's geographical imaginary and: "The anti-CIS activists 
promoted the use of the term ... to describe the islands of the Ryukyu region and demarcate a new sphere 
of solidarity~ (Miyume Tanji, "The dynamic trajectory of the post-reversion 'Okinawa Struggle': 
Constitution, environment and gender" in Richard Siddle and Glenn Hooks ( eds.) Okinawa and Japan: 
Structure and Subjectivity). For a description ofShimao Toshio's 'Yaponesia', see Philip Gabriel, Mad 
W'rves and Island Dreams: Shimao Toshio and the Margins of Japanese Literature (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1999), esp. pp. !60-225. 
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protests and sit-ins, and in January 1974, facing large pressure from within his support 
base, Y ara ChObyo issued an anti-CTS declaration, backed unanimously by the 
prefectural assembly's ruling progressive coalition. 67 Yet under threat of legal action 
from Mitsubishi, Y ara effectively reversed this decision in October 1975, permitting lhe 
project's completion. 
As Leo T. S. Ching observes: "Colonialism continues, albeit in a different form 
and under changing conditions. In most postcolonial coantries decolonialisation is 
followed by neocolonial practices lhat, despite political autonomy, continue to invent 
and construct new kinds of domination (economic and cultural) lhat strengthen, rather 
than weaken, the dependent relationship of the ex-colonies to the imperial centres."68 In 
a series of articles published in 1977, Ota continued to lament the loss of Okinawan 
identity and the "destruction of Okinawa." 69 Lament was accompanied by self-
questioning and disillusionment, as well as deep-felt criticism of contemporary 
materialism. On the one hand, the failures of reversion presented Ota v.-ilh an impasse 
over how to conceive of a political project and position for himself and Okinawa.70 
Underlying this crisis of representation was the dilemma of a dual disillusionment-
towards the postcolonial condition for failing to ensure the ideal of autonomy envisaged 
wilhin the framework of the restoration of citizen rights under a sovereign state, and 
towards the postwar as an emancipatory project embodying the awakening of the 
Okinawan subject. Prior to reversion Ota celebrated the sense of self which Okinawans 
61 Toyama Seiki, Seiji no butaiura: Okinawa no sengoshi (seiji seiti'ihen) (Naha: OkinawaAki Shob5, 
1987), pp. 513-20. 
68 Leo T. S. Ching, Becoming 'Japanese': Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation, pp. 48-
9. 
69 
"Okinawa no Ayumu beki michi," Kome/ Shinbun (Four Part Series) (12, 16, 19, and 23 Aprill977). 
See also Ota Masahide, "Okinawa minzoku to wa: sono aidentitii o motomete," Kyiishii ki!ron (September 
1977), pp. 56-65. 
70 As Ota wTites: "In one sense, prior to reversion it was feared, and in fact predicted, that Okinawa would 
face the predicament it now faces after reversion. This being the case, it is difficult to say anything 
beyond the filet that we must ackoow!edge that it is our own powerlessness and inahility to prevent such 
conditions which is at limit" ("Okinawa minzoku to wa: sono aidentitii o rnotomete," p. 56). 
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had gained through the profound loss of war. Now, however, he lamented: "I can only 
say it seems as though Okinawans have not learnt anything from their historical 
experience and the legacy of the past. ,m 
Ota drew a direct link between the inability of Okinawans to attain a sense of 
autonomy and the limitations of excessive materialism. Quoting extensively from E. F. 
Schumacher,72 Ota warned of the crisis facing human society as a result of the excessive 
drive for capital and the decline in respect for spiritual values. The growing recognition 
of the importance of indigenous and traditional customs which had hitherto been 
discarded as backward was seen as an "inevitable" part of the re-evaluation of spiritual 
values. In drawing connections between centralizing forces of capital and 
homogenisation of culture within Japan, Ota evoked a sense of Okinawan culture and 
identity directly opposed to the joint subsuming forces of both capital and nation.73 
In reality, however, divisions among progressive groups, the incorporation of 
Okinawan politics within a public works-centred economy, and the efTects of mass 
increases in economic output and consumption levels combined to strengthen 
Okinawa's conservative forces. Only two years after his election victory, Okinawan 
Governor Taira collapsed from a sudden attack of thrombosis, and was forced to retire 
from politics. In the subsequent gubernatorial elections of December 1978 LDP-backed 
Nishime Junji, who had lost to Y ara ten years previously, was victorious. As local, 
domestic, and international structures of authority intertwined within increasingly 
opaque and encompassing relations of power, Ota's analyses also became increasingly 
academic and introspective. In the context of a new wave of conservatism from the mid-
1970s, Ota carne to focus primarily on the retrieval of "Okinawa" as ideal-through a 
metaphorical "return" (Ota used the term "kat/a"') to the essence ofOkinawan identity. 
"''Okinawa minzoku to wa: sono aidentitii o motomete," p. 65. 
72 Small is Beautiful: Study of Economics as if People Mattered (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). 
73 
"Okinawa minzoku to wa: sono aidentitii o motomete," pp. 60-5. 
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In the highly politicised years directly following reversion, Ota provided a 
poignant critique of the process whereby Okinawa was incorporated into Japan's 
centralized administrative, ideological, political, and economic systems. Many of his 
concerns on the lasting effects of economic stimulus policies--the penetration of 
centralized corporate capitalism, mass consumerism, a loss of sense of identity, and 
disintegration of the local cultural fabric and natural environs-proved correct. From an 
early period, Ota struck at root of issues relating to the Okinawan economy and tl1e 
entrenchment of its system of dependence through penetrating criticism on the design of 
the "house" which was economic stimulus policy over Okinawa. 
Yet this analysis did not present in detail an alternative "draft plan" able to lay 
the foundations of economic autonomy. Neither was it alone able to effect a significant 
transformation in systems of dependence. In the years following, Okinawa became 
further integrated in Japan's political and economic system. Its economy became 
centred around public works projects and the bases remained. In the first twenty-five 
years after reversion, 54 percent of all disbursements by the provincial government 
came under the head of "Okinawa Development Works." Many of these projects 
contributed to the severe environmental damage of Okinawa's fragile coastline and 
ecosystem. 74 Reflecting on the significance of the Expo in the year 2000, Kang Sang-
jung observes: "Okinawa's post-reversion development was also a process whereby the 
Okinawan economy became further dependent on central government public spending 
and maiuland Japanese investment activity. The Marine Expo of 1975 symbolized the 
fortification of the neo-colonial structure that was established directly following 
reversion and which remains to this day.'m In its ideology of self-improvement, reform, 
and drive to reach the "constantly receding horizon of parity," the impetus for economic 
74 Gavan McCormack, "Okinawa and the Structure of Dependence." 
75 Guroobaru ka no enkinhO: atarashii kOkyo kiikan o mototomete (Tokyo: lwanami Shoten, 2000) (co-
authored with Yoshimi Shunya), p. 186. 
196 
development in the name of "on parity with the mainland" paralleled the lifestyle 
reform movements of the prewar era. 76 V.nat was entailed by a "peace economy" and 
how could it be envisaged and implemented without relying on central government 
funds? Did Okinawan "development" necessitate "achieving parity vtith," and 
becoming the same as, mainland Japan, and if not what did it entail? Many years after 
the 1975 Expo, Okinawa's "economic question" remained an inherently divisive issue 
within progressive politics. It would become the bane of Ota's own administration 
during his time as governor. 
The Politics of Recovery: Reclaiming an Okinawan Self 
Iha Fuyii, Yanagita Kunio, and the Subject of Nostalgia 
In comparison to the tumultuous years directly prior to and proceeding 
reversion, the second half of the 1970s saw a general retreat from engagement in 
economic and political issues both within Ota's analysis and Okinawan intellectual 
discourse as a whole. Ibis retreat coincided with a wave of conservatism within 
Okinawan politics and the splintering of social movements. It was also strongly related 
to the depoliticisation of society and fragmentation of political opposition throughout 
Japan. Yet in the context of Okinawa at least, a partial retreat from direct engagement in 
political and economic issues of the day did not entail a complete withdrawal from 
politics itself. Needless to say, the overwhelming US military presence remained a 
constantly persistent issue, which Ota also continued to raise?7 The realms of history 
and identity too continued to be sites of resistance, just as contests over Okinawan 
history and identity intertwined with wider struggles concerning such issues as 
76 As pointed out by Christopher T. Nelson, "Huzuki Hayato, the Storyteller: Comedy, Practice and the 
Politics of Everyday Life in Okina\\'ll," p. 191. 
77 See for example Ota Masahide, "'M() 'Okinawa' wa owatta no ka?: hondo no shin bun e no toi/' Sekai 
No. 468 (November 1984), pp. 103-11; and "Okinawa kara mita nichibei bunjijilkyo: ima nokoru beki 
shiso wa nanika?" Ekonomisuto (20 May 1980), pp. 10-15. 
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education, security policy, and the constitution. Within this context, in focusing on the 
retrieval of an Okinawan identity, Ota also sought a discursive space from which to re-
envisage Okinawan subjectivity, rclativise dontinant claims to homogenous Japanese 
culture, and retrieve political agency in the present. 
As Dipesh Chakrabarty observes: 
Nostalgia is located in an experience of loss and calls for a politics of recovery 
and recuperation, and for a political agency adequate to that task. That agency 
could be the state. It could also be the individual. The political task of nostalgic 
memory, whether individual or collective, is to recover and preserve, make the 
past a part of the present. 78 
Calls for the recovery and recuperation of a lost sense of Japanese community and spirit 
have been integral to discourses of resistance seeking to mobilize against the dislocating 
effects of state bureaucracy and the project of modentization, and incorporated within 
hegemonic official constructions of the Japanese national imaginary. This process of 
resistance and incorporation is not necessarily clear-cut. Y anagita Kunio and his studies 
on Japanese folklore (minzokugaku) for example have been concurrently seen as both a 
"scholarship of resistance" and as inherently connected to official prewar ideology of 
Japanese cultural uniqueness and the "family state."79 
In asserting the importance of the marginal over the centre, of rhetorical speech 
over writing, and of romanticism over realism, Y anagita' s evocations of a timeless 
Japanese "folk" stood in direct odds with bureaucratic rationalism and Eurocentric 
discourses on race. As J. Victor Koschmarm points out, a radical posture of disbelief 
with respect to the documents, objectives, and methods that formed the basis of 
78 Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Afterward: Revisiting the Traditional/Modernity Binary," pp. 290- L 
79 On these seemingly contradictory depictions ofYanagita Kunia and their significance, see J. Victor 
Koschrnann, "Folklore Studies and the Conservative Anti-establishment in Modern Japan," in J. Victor 
Koschmann, Oiwa Keibo, and Yamashita Shinji (eds.) International Perspectives on Yanagita Kunio and 
Japanese Folklore Studies (Ithaca, New York: Cornell China-Japan Program, 1985), pp. 131-64. 
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authority in the academic and religious establishments was built into the constitution of 
minzokugaku as a discipline. Folklore studies: "Suggested a different way of thinking 
about history and culture, one which might have encouraged an attitude of scepticism 
toward the overly centralized and homogenized representation of the past sponsored by 
the state."80 At the same time, however, parallels between Y anagita' s depiction of the 
Japanese folk as at once hybrid and yet inherently essentialized, and the dual protean 
and jingoistic rhetoric ofprewar imperial ideology are not difficult to find. 81 As Marilyn 
Ivy notes: "It is possible to see the entire trajectory of nativist ethnology, with its 
emphases on the umvritten, the marginal, and the impoverished, as a species of 
resistance to elite, documentary, modernist scholarship ... Yet to the extent that it 
became constituted as the study of what was uniquely Japanese, that is, outside the 
corruptions of western modernity, Y anagita and his folklore studies ... contributed to the 
chauvinism and cultural nationalism of the wartime period."82 
A tense and yet often mutually reinforcing relation between etlmic and state-
centred nationalisms lies at the core of this dual process of resistance and incorporation, 
and the politics of nostalgic recovery in modem Japanese discourse. Endeavours to 
retrieve a lost sense of Japanese culture and tradition are frequently conceived in 
reaction against government policy and the state-led modernization project. In modem 
Japan at least, however, nationalist tropes of aesthetic romanticism have often served to 
ultimately bolster centralized and totalitarian structures of state authority, capital, and 
militarism. 83 
so Ibid., pp. 156-7. 
" Oguma Eiji also notes the similarities between Yanagita's depictions of the "yamabito" (mountain 
people) of Japan and the state-sanctioned evocations of the Japanese people as the descendents of tbe 
Emperor (tenson minzoku) in Tanitsu minzoku shinwa no kigen (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1995), p. 209. 
51 Marilyn Ivy, Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, !995), p. 94. 
"Dipesh Chakrabarty makes an important observation in this regard. Namely: "A note ofBenjaminian 
suspicion- that the 'aestheticization of the political ... [is a] distinguishing mark of fascism' sounds 
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Yet in relation to the works of Iha Fuyii and the discipline of "Okinawan 
Studies" ( Okinawagaku ), this process of incorporation is complicated by a further 
tension-between the simultaneous evoking of a common (hybrid) Japanese "origin", 
and an immutable Okinawan "self." Iha was himself deeply indebted to Y anagita and 
the folklore studies movement-both intellectually and financially. Though while 
Yanagita sought to discover in Okinawa a surviving Japanese essence, for Iha this 
project also coincided 'A<ith his endeavour to recover a unique Okinawan ethnicity. In 
the words of Ota: "Just as Yanagita Kunio's folklore studies were termed the new 
Nativist studies, and were a 'discipline of self-introspection' to determine what it means 
to be Japanese, 'Iha Fuyfi studies' is also a 'discipline of self-perception' in pursuit of 
what it means to be Okinawan."84 
On one level advocating a "theDry of common ancestry between Ryukyu and 
Japan" in accordance with the Meiji state's project of national consolidation, Iha also 
reclaimed authority to an Okinawan uniqueness which he deemed was unknowable by 
others: 
Regardless of the level of progression in history a particular race (jinshu) has 
reached, every ethnic group (minzoku) has a particular characteristic bestowed 
from god. The fundamental thought held in place by individual characteristics is 
the principle of uniqueness. In other words, each person finds providence in the 
condition of uniqueness and certainty. Providence discovers in Okinawans a place 
naturally legitimate in discussions of modern Japanese nationalist thought. Yet I know from the Indian 
examples of Gandhi and Tagore that there is no inevitable logic or process of historical inevitability that 
must always, anywhere and everywhere, lead romantic/aesthetic nationalism into statist and fascist 
jingoism. This happened in Japan, and happened in particular instances in Indian history, but these v1ere 
instances in which, in my tenns, the state was able to assimilate to its own ends the much richer, older, 
and more complex histories of the training of the senses that the subject of modernity embodied. How this 
happened, and where, is for the historian to explain" ("Afterward: Revisiting the Traditional!Modemily 
Binary," pp. 295..{1), On the connection between a public yearning for nostalgia and totalitarianism in 
China, see Geremie Barme, In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture (New York: CAJ!umbia 
University Press, 1999), especially Chapter Twelve ("Totalitarian Nostalgia"), pp. 316-44. 
" "lha Fuyil no gakumon to shiso," lha Fuyii Tanjo Hyakunen Kinenkai ( ed.) Okin(I;ta-gaku no Tomei 
(Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1976), p. I 03. 
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which those who are not Okinawan can by no means find. If a place which can 
ultimately never be discovered by those who are not Okinawans is found by 
Okinawans (themselves), then Okinawans also possess a reason for being 
(ikigai). 85 
Iha's (re)discovery of an uniquely Okinawan discursive space and site of knowledge 
coincided with and was integral to his ovm attempts to retrieve and transcribe the 
history, songs and language of the Ryukyuan Kingdom. 1brough a dialogue with 
Ryukyuan history and language, Iha sought to reclaim an Okinawan cultural identity 
within, and yet also in ambivalent opposition to, a Japanese national historical narrative. 
In the reawakening of Ryukyuan history and culture, Iha evoked an autonomous 
Okinawan uniqueness known only by the subaltern self: and thereby impervious to 
Japanese integration and the calamitous transitions of the present. As Okinawa became 
reincorporated into Japanese state structures following reversion and twenty years after 
his own death, Iha again emerged as central to an Okinawan politics of recovery 
through a major revival in interest amongst Okinawan intellectuals in his life and body 
of work. 
In 1961, fourteen years after lha' s death, his monument was erected in the 
grounds within Urasoe Castle ruins in Okinawa from funds contributed privately from 
throughout Okinawa as well as Hawaii and mainland Japan. 86 During the anti-reversion 
debates of 1971-2, Iha's framework of analysis became an issue of contention, and in 
the same period a joint short study oflha's life and work was published.87 Yet it was not 
until the post-reversion era, and particularly during the second half of the 1970s, that 
Iha' s life and work was revived in lengthy analyses and discussions. Debate about the 
possibilities and limitations of his vision of an Okinawan autonomous self (lwsel) came 
"As cited in Hiyane Teruo, Kindai Nihon ro lha Fuyii (Tokyo: Mitusichi Shobo, 1981), p. 189. 
86 As recoW1ted in for example Kano Ma.sao, Okinawa no fuchi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993), p. vi; and 
Hiyane Teruo, Kindai Nihon to Iha Fuyii, pp. 273-4. 
87 Kinjo Seitoku and Takara Kurayoshi, Iha Fuyii: Okinawa shizo to so no shiso (Tokyo: Shimizu Shoin, 
1972). 
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to both unite and divide intellectuals in their endeavour to conceJve of Okinawan 
agency and identity in the present. Two events very directly served as catalysts to this 
surge in interest-the publication of lha's body of collective works, 88 and the one 
hundredth anniversary of his birth. 89 More abstractly, it was also significantly fuelled by 
the perception that important parallels linked the Meiji period to contemporary 
Okinawa. As Ota himself took note: 
People have turned their eyes to the past out of the fact that the conditions during 
the time Iha was active have been reproduced in posnvar Okinawa-from the fact 
that history has repeated itself. Faced by the multiple issues which plague 
Okinawa in the present, the first thing that comes to mind in the endeavor to find 
a solution to these issues is the desire to take note of the lessons of the past. I 
think that is why our attention is drawn to these historical works.90 
Ota and "Iha Fuyu Studies" 
In an article in 1976, Ota outlined at least three reasons why Iha Fuyii remained 
central to the study of Okinawa. Firstly, because the issues which he raised and pursued 
"have not been solved, and remain real questions for us today." Secondly, because of 
the vital inroads that Iha made within the study of Okinawan history and culture. 
Thirdly, and to Ota the most important factor drawing him to Iha was the fact that; 
"because, more than anything else, I believe the distinct consciousness and passion 
(what I view to be ethnic pathos) as an Okinawan which lies at the core of Iha's thought 
and work, provides us with a guide on how we can live v.ithin Okinawa as human 
beings."91 If Iha's field of intellectual study could be summarized within a few words, 
"The first volume of!ha Fuyfi's collection of works was published in 1974 (Iha Fuyu zenshii (Tokyo: 
Heibonsha, 1974)), and the fmal eleventh volume completed in 1976. For a complete list of works 
published by and on Iha Fuyii see Hiyane Teruo, Kindai Ni/wn to Iha Fuyii, pp. 275-88. 
89 Which resulted in the publication, lba Fuyu tanjo hyakunen kinen kaihen (ed.) Okinawa-gaku no tomei 
(Naha: Okinawa Bunkakyokai, 1976). 
"" "Iha Fuyfi to gendai: so no konnichi teki igi o kangaeru," Shin Okinawa Bungalru No. 31 (February 
1976), p. 25. 
91 Ota Masahide," 'lha-gaku' no keishO to batten," Omara to Okinawagalru no chichi (booklet) (lha Fuyfi 
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Ota concluded, "it was the pursuit and confirmation of the identity (proof of existence) 
of Okinawans." 92 lha carried out this pursuit primarily thmugh the transcription, 
translation, study, and analysis of "Omoro," a collection of 8,886 songs composed 
under ancient Ryukyu which chronicled the traditions, political events, natural 
environment and lifestyle of the kingdom. Omoro, Ota observed, was "for Iha not only 
a mirror reflecting the society of ancient Ryukyu, but also the most powerful channel 
from which to pursue the origins and trace the sentiment, thought, and language of 
Okinawans." 93 In a similar way, in the fifth year after reversion, as "the unique 
individuality of Okinawa becomes completely subsumed within Japan in its 
totality ... and factors leading to the 'destruction of Okinawa,' as revealed in the 
depletion of cultural legacies and devastation of the environment, only increase by the 
day," Ota embarked on an analysis of Iha's work. Just as Iha had evoked through the 
poetics of Omoro a condition of nostalgic permanence to fulfil and overcome the 
profound ruptures and losses of the present and empower a reclaimed Okinawan subject 
in the future, Ota thus returned to the life and work oflha himself. 
On the one hand, Ota acknowledged that Iha's theory of common Ryukyuan and 
Japanese ancestry was a product of, and served to promote, assimilationist policies. He 
also to an extent acknowledged that lha' s research on "the southern islands" ( nantoron ), 
which traced the ancient Ryukyll Kingdom's expansion southwards, was ultimately 
utilized in the production of an imperial ideology promoting Japan's "southern 
advance" (nanshin) during the war. Yet Ota stressed that primarily Iha's work focused 
upon the issue of how to maintain a sense of Okinawan self while also seeking equality 
under the Japanese state. Ota also stressed the contemporary relevance of these issues: 
tanjohyakunenkinen)(March 1976), p. 14. 
92 Ibid., p. 15. 
93 
"Iha Fuyii no gakurnon to shisa," p. 109. 
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Theoretically it is said that minority ethnic groups are guaranteed equality, and 
officially this may be so, but in reality often they are not. At the same time, how 
can minority groups within the state system ensure that their self is not anuihilated 
but survives? I cannot help thinking Iha predicted from long ago these very 
contemporary problems.94 
Ota saw that it was precisely in response to this dilemma that Iha took a seemingly 
contradictory stance-on the one hand advocating national unification in accordance 
with the theory of common ancestry, while on the other emphasizing the uniqueness of 
Okinawan culture. Iha sought to envisage a program of national unification that 
guaranteed "happiness for Okinawans" and the "thriving of Okinawa's uniqueness," 
and it was in this respect that Ota saw his work as providing a vital lead in the present 
Pro-assimilationist ideology-as promoted by the national government and 
institutionalised within Okinawa's prewar education system and organs of public 
opinion-advocated the abolition of all "things Okinawan" (Okinawa teki na mono). In 
contrast, Ota noted, Iha had focused on the importance of preserving Okinawan culture 
while at the same time promoting national consolidation. Ota placed Iha's theory of 
common ancestry in the context of the Meiji state's annexation of Okinawa, noting that 
it was integral to Iha's attempt to confirm "common ground" (icchilen) between 
Okinawa and mainland Japan in the face of forced and inevitable integration. Moreover, 
Ota stressed, while on the one hand Iha emphasised commonalities between Okinawa 
and mainland Japan, he also promulgated the unique features of Okinawa-that excess 
difference not subsumable to or confined ¥<ithin this claim to sameness (icchi shinai 
ten). Just as it was important to respect each person's individuality, Iha saw respect for 
the autonomous "individuality" (kosei) of Okinawa as vital to its own survival and to 
the functioning of the Japanese state (kokka) as a whole. 
94 
"Iha Fuyi1 to gendal: sono konnichl teki igi o kangaeru," p. 50. 
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Ota concluded that Iha's vision of national consolidation directly contrasted v.ith 
the arbitrary and one-sided policies of the central government. Iha emphasized the 
importance of respecting and preserving difference against the central government's 
lack of respect towards the wishes of local entities. Ota drew direct parallels between 
the central government's discriminatory policies and forceful denial of Okinawan 
identity criticized by Iha in the prewar period, and what Ota saw as the continued 
institutionalisation of this structure of discrimination and denial in the postwar era. 
Through Iha's conceptualisation of an immutable Okinawan self and his emphasis on 
the importance of difference, Ota thus sought to uncover a discursive site of resistance 
to contest the way in which Okinawa was once again being arbitrarily incorporated 
within Japan. Ota conceived of this issue in terms of national versus cultural identity: 
In the context of assimilation, when Okinawans are conferred an identity as 
Japanese, national assimilation (as national identity) is prioritized above all else 
as the only goal to be achieved, and the sacrifice of Okinawan (human) identity to 
this process is not even considered an issue. However, Iha considered both the 
consolidation of a national identity and the preservation of a cultural identity as 
equally important, and advocated the appropriate integration of both .... Moreover, 
the form of national integration which lha advocated as desirable, that is as I 
phrase it the appropriate unification and fusion of the attainment of national 
identity and the attainment of cultural identity, has still not been achieved, and 
remains a vital issue today.95 
Ota thus focused on the empowering potential of Iha's conceptualisation of an 
autonomous Okinawan self in the context of contemporary relations. Other Okinawan 
intellectuals such as Arakawa Akira, however, were far more critical oflha's complicity 
within the Meiji state's project of consolidation. Carrying on from pre-1972 debates 
over reversion, in a dialogue with Ota and other intellectuals in 1976, Arakawa rejected 
the emancipatory potential of Iha' s thought. Arakawa took the view that on the 
95 
"lha Fuyil no shiso to so no jidai" in t.Jta Masahide et al, Iha Fuyii: hi to to shiso (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 
1976), pp. 204-5. 
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contrary, in advocating national unification and assimilation according to the 
assumptions of a homogeneous Japanese ethnicity ( doitsu minzoku ), Iha reinforced the 
totalising ideology of the state. Arakawa also argued that these assumptions had in turn 
formed a fundamental part of Okinawa's reversion movement. To the extent that an 
emphasis on local uniqueness worked Vlithin totalising assumptions of a homogenous 
ethnic nation, Arakawa concluded that "ultimately only conformity to centralized 
structures of state authority and the annihilation of local difference will remain."96 Ota 
continued to take the position that unless an alternative political program to Okinawa's 
incorporation within Japan could be envisioned, such criticisms did not provide a vision 
that overcame the dilemmas inherent to Iha's project.97 In response, Arakawa argued 
that the issues at hand were not reducible to the question of whether or not an alternate 
vision for Okinawa's status could be put forth. 
Arakawa and Ota's divergent evaluations of Iha's thought were a reflection of 
their differing position on the relation between theory and practice, and their differing 
conception of Okinawa's relation to Japan. Araka>v11 traced the way in which Iha's 
analysis was complicit in the formation of an ideology of national consolidation and 
modern theories of evolution. Ota in contrast to an extent conceded this complicity, but 
saw Jha's dilemma as inevitable in the context of Okinawa's political and economic 
predicament. Played out in discussions over Iha' s thought, the polemic between 
Arakawa and Ota was symptomatic of the dilemma involved in conceiving of agency 
and community in the postcolonial aftermath. 
As Arakawa pointed out, it is certain that Western-influenced theories of 
evolution lay at the foundation oflha' s theory of common ancestry and assimilationist 
ideology. 'W'hile conceived in opposition to centralized state policies and even 
modernity itself, both Yanagita's new-Nativism and Iha's "Omoro studies" 
96 
"lha Fuyu to gendai; sono konnichi teki igi o kangaeru," pp. 54-5. 
97 lbid., pp. 52·3. 
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( Omorogaku) incorporated western-inspired modern notions of civilization and 
sovereign national territory. Through privileging the periphery, Yanagita sought to 
reverse the hierarchy between periphery and centre--and therein a return to a lost 
Japanese essence neither tainted by nor representable vvithin (Western) modernity and 
modern rationalist lexicons. Yet in evoking this essence, however, he also maintained 
the periphery-periphery dichotomy and reified constructions of Japan's margins as 
Japanese and yet (in Tessa Morris-Suzuki's phrase) "stranded in an earlier phase of 
historical evolution." 98 Such constructions formed the core of state-centred 
assimilationist discourse--where the civilizing project of progress of the "bad.-ward" 
frontier was defined according to the process of "becoming Japanese." 
In his earlier work in particular, Iha embraced Meiji Enlightenment ideals of 
civilization and the evolutionary assumptions of social Darwrninism.99 He conceived of 
the abolition of the Ryukyu Kingdom as encompassing the "emancipation" of 
Okinawans from their exploitation under Satsuma-wherein the Ryukyu Kingdom was 
''prostituted" for the sake of material gain. In viewing subordination nuder Satsuma as a 
form of female prostitution, and finding cause for Okinawa's backwardness in the 
(female) superstitions of Yuta Shaman, Iha also perpetuated a perceived association 
between "Okinawa", "backwardness" and "women." While promoting women's 
education, the need to "educate women", as with the process of J apanization itself, was 
conceived within a discursive framework which simultaneously placed the (backward) 
objeet-as "women" or "Okinawan"-in opposition to the civilizing (modem) centre. 
9
' Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "A Descent into the Past The Frontier in the Construction of Japanese Identity," 
in Denoon et al. ( eds.) Multicultural Japan, pp. 90-1. 
99 On the influence of Social Darwinism within Iha's thought, see for example Kinj<l Seitoku and Takara 
Kurayoshi, Iha Fuyii: Okinawa shizo to sono shiso, in particular "Shlnkaron no tachiha," pp. 143-9. On 
the impact of social-Darwinian thought in Japan in general, see for example Michael Weiner, "The 
Invention ofldentity: Race and Nation in Pre-war Japan," in Frank Dikotter, The Construction of Racial 
Identities in China and Japan: History and Contemporary Perspectives (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1997), pp. 96-110. 
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Ota does not problematize either Iha's (and Yanagita's) perception of Okinawa as fixed 
within a natural historical state (whereby "time" is transformed into "space"), nor his 
fierce rejection of the "superstitious"-as associated with "female" and Yuta. As a 
result, the way in which discursive constructions of periphery/periphery and 
male/female have been employed to legitimise patriarchal and hierarchical structures 
within the imagined national commnnity is left unexplored. As others have examined in 
relation to the work of Franz Fanon, passing over such issues ultimately serves to 
perpetuate a politics of exclusion.100 Ota, Iha, and most central (male) figures within 
Okinawan intellectual debate have unquestioningly incorporated patriarchal 
assumptions embedded within the construction of an Okinawan (Japanese) 
subjectivity. 101 
This is not to negate, as Ota stressed, the fact that Iha resisted state-centred 
assimilationist ideology and constructions of Japanese particularism-by relativising 
differences between Okinawa and the rest of Japan, and evoking a nnique Okinawan 
ethnicity. Ota's analysis of the way in which Iha contested dominant constructions of 
Japanese-ness were similarly in turn integral to Ota's mvn dual project of incorporation 
and differentiation. In attempting to conceive of an Okinawan subjectivity, Ota 
duplicated Iha's ambivalence 1.vithin his own frame of analysis. This became manifest in 
Ota's conceptualisation of the problematic of "cultural" versus "national" identity. On 
one level, Ota saw that the ideal form of national consolidation involved a fusion of 
(Okinawan) "cultural" identity and (Japanese) "national" identity without subsuming 
one into the other. Yet an inherent tension can be discerned between this 
'
00 Rey Chow, Ethics after Idealism.· Theory-Culture-Ethnicity-Reading, pp. 55-73. 
101 Iha's perceptions on gender and analysis of women's history is critiqued in for example Wakao Noriko 
"Okinawa josei-shi kenk7"ii e no kiso shi.kaku: Yanagi.ta Kunio to Iha Fuyil," Hosei Daigaku Okina·wa 
Bunka Kenkiijo (ed.) Okinawa Bunka KenkyUNo. 12. Tokyo: Hosei Daigaku Okinawa Bunka Kenkiljo, 
1986, pp. 179-215; and Higa Michiko, "Feminizumu kara mila Iha Fuyil," Ryilkyii Shinpil (19-23 May 
1997). 
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conceptualisation of Okinawan "cultural" and 1 apanese "national" identity-and at 
times within his analysis Ota places Okinawan "cultural identity" and a sense of 
"identity as humans" in opposition to essentialized difference within national 
identity. 102 Ota thus also maintained the tension which he had seen at the core oflha's 
work-between seeking equality through an embracing of assumptions of national 
consolidation and endeavouring to (re)claim an autonomous sense of (Okinawan) self. 
Ota thus sought to uphold political and historical agency and an agenda of political and 
social liberalism as conceived within the modem framework of the nation-state yet also 
to an extent move beyond this framework. 
Both Iha's and Ota's endeavours to reclaim a unique Okinawan self are 
embedded in problematic assumptions and c<Jntradictions. At the same time, these 
contradictions are intrinsic to the process whereby cultural, social, and economic 
dislocation accompanying modernity and national consolidation has produced and been 
contested through (in the words of Dipesh Chakrabarty) a nostalgic "politics of 
recovery" within (to use Ashis Nandy's term) the "cultural psychology of exile." 
Notions of the historical subject and a sense of cultural permanency have been 
repeatedly evoked in the attempt to redeem the losses of the present and envision a 
program of action for the future. They have thus been central to discourses of political 
mobilization both by and against the state. 
Both Iba and Ota sought to assert Okinawa's "sameness" and right to equality as 
"Japanese" against what Tomiyama Ichiro terms a "presentiment of violence." In the 
case of Iha, this "presentiment" was the fear of the inherent violence of Japanese 
colonialism-Qf a concurrent erasure of Ryukyuan history and subjugation of 
Okinawans as "barbarian" (seiban) Other. 103 For Ota it was the violence of US military 
occupation. Iha and Ota appealed to Okinawan!Ryukyuan "individuality" and "cultural 
'
02 See for example his analysis in Okinawajin to wa nanika (Naha: Greenlife, 1980), pp. 221-4. 
'
03 Tomiyama Ichlrii, Boryoku on yokan: Iha Fuyil ni okeru kiki no mandai. 
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identity" respectively in the effort to resist and contend the concurrent loss of self 
through the forces of assimilation. 
As Ota himself observed in his Vvriting on Iha, the dilemmas and ambivalence 
inherent to Ota's own dual project of incorporation and differentiation became more 
pronounced as the ideals of emancipation remained unanswered. In the late Meiji period 
Iha still endorsed Ryukyu's integration into Japan in 1879 as promising Okinawa's 
emancipation from Satsuma's system of "slavery." In the Taisho period, however, he 
came to doubt that any such emancipation had in actuality been achieved. 104 In the 
context of Okinawa's reincorporation into Japan folloVving reversion, Ota too took an 
increasingly equivocal stance towards Okinawa's postwar reversion movement. 
While in the pre-reversion era Ota had celebrated the reversion movement as 
embodying the pursuit of Okinawan autonomy, in his Who are Okinawans? 
(Okinawajin to wa nanika, 1980), he is much more critical of the movement's 
fundamental tenets. He does not reject the reversion movement as a whole--and 
continues to stress the way in which, in contrast to prewar assimilationism, the 
movement had sought not only a national identity but an identity for Okinawans "as 
human beings." For the first time, however, Ota also traces the continuities between the 
pre- and postwar eras, and the way in which Okinawa's postwar struggle inherited the 
ideological assumptions of the prewar and wartime regime. While in the pre-reversion 
era Ota had been particularly critical of the group of Okinawan elite closely tied to the 
US occupation administration, now he also became highly critical of the elite group 
whom he saw had initially instigated reversion itself. Ota observes that this elite group 
were generally much more assimilated than Okinawa's general populace, and had 
internalised the process of "becoming Japanese" Vvithin the prewar era to the extent that 
104 On lha's transition in the TaishO period see Kano Masanao, Okinawa no fuchi, and Hiyane Teruo, 
Kindai Nihan to Iha Fuyii, This transition has been directly related to Okinawa's economic crisis in the 
1920s. 
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they viewed it as natural to seek a restoration of their identity by seeking to "return" 
(lmiki) not to Okinawa but Japan. Okinawa did not experience purges following war 
defeat even to the scale of mainland Japan. As a result, Ota carne to conclude, 
Okinawa's elite had largely maintained the elite consciousness and nationalist ideology 
of the pre- and wartime eras. 105 
In contrast, Ota saw that his own war experience had transformed his thought 
and awakened his sense of Okinawan "cultural identity." In a rare analysis of his war 
experience in relation to questions of identity, Ota significantly concluded that he was 
able to discover his sense of (Okinawan) self through his contact with the "Other" 
(tasha)-in the form of the supposedly "friendly" Japanese army: 
By seeing the "Other" on the battlefield ·within the friendly army, I was forced 
into the position of having to think about my own self -conception and origins.106 
Ota also surmises that many Okinawans-in contrast to the elite--similarly faced their 
"internal Other" (uchi naru tasha) through their experiences on the battlefield. Through 
this, and their experience within the internment camp separated from "Japanese," 
Okinawans were able to confirm their sense of autonomous subjectivity. 
Ota thus carne to see that, stripped of their Japanese citizenship in the wake of 
defeat, at the onset of the postwar period Okinawans were in fact provided with a 
"unique opportunity" to regain their "self' as Okinawans-a self which had been 
relinquished through the process of Japanization.107 In this way, he maintained his belief 
in the emancipatory potential of the postwar era for an Okinawan subjectivity, but 
lamented that Okinawans had not been able to utilize this self-discovery in the pursuit to 
attain subjectivity and "cultural identity." He did not explicitly state that Okinawans 
10
' Okinawajin to wa nanika, p. 46, 66, 111. 
to6 Ibid., p. 28. 
107 Ibid., p. 104. 
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should have sought independence over reversion. Yet he did lament the fact that no 
movement against reversion able to provide a clear and achievable blueprint for 
Okinawa had emerged in the 1950s.108 In either case, Ota noted, by the early 1950s, 
pro-independence movements were largely subsumed by the pro-reversion movement. 
The reversion movement in turn did not adequately incorporate nor was it able to utilize 
an "autonomous mode of thinking" (shiso teki jiritsusel). Consequently, Ota concluded, 
the reversion movement had not provided a contesting force "against the state" (kokka 
• to taiketsu suru), and in this regard "various issues which were conferred upon 
Okinawan reversion are still to be solved." 109 
In September 1975, Ota lamented the way in which with the onset of the 
International Marine Expo the traditional Okinawan folksong "Ashi mijibushi" (literally 
"Beads of Sweat"), symbolic of the Okinawan island "way of life", seemed to have 
"suddenly disappeared from people's lips." The disappearance of such songs, which 
forrned a base of traditional agricultural lifestyle, was seen as symbolic of the post-
reversion "destruction of Okinawa." 110 In the preface to Who are the Okinawans?, 
published five years later, Ota recount.~ how, in the ship on the way back from his 
studies in the US over twenty years previously, he and other Okinawan passengers had 
become overwhelmed with emotion when the sound of Okinawa's sanshin (three-
stringed instrument) had suddenly blared from the ship's radio speaker as they neared 
the islands. Just as Ota had equated the disappearance of traditional Okinawa song with 
the loss of community, now its nostalgic remembrance was evoked as a prelude to 
conceiving ofthe significance of an Okinawan sense of identity. 
'
0
' See also Ota's discussion in Ota Masahlde, Okamoto Keitoku et al. (dialogue), "Okinawa no sengo 
shiso: fukki mondai o chiishin ni," Sekai No. 362 (January 1976), pp. 92-3. 
'
09 Okinawajin to wa nanika, p. 240. 
'"' Ota Masahlde, "Kotaishi o mukaeru Okinawajin no kokoro," Shilkan Yomiuri No. 32 (2 August 1975), 
pp. 134-5. 
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In the conclusion to Who are the Okinawans?, Ota notes with regret that he does 
not have a "cure-all" to solve the "identity crisis" currently facing Okinawa. In an 
attempt to begin to solve the issues left over from reversion, however, he explains that: 
"I have in this book considered the possibilities of actively promoting the formation of 
an identity as human beings able to attain a global (sekai teki) universality, and the 
restoration of an identity as Okinawan ( Okinawa:iin toshite no aidentitii)." 111 Also 
citing Franz Fanon's call for a national consciousness removed from ethnic nationalism, 
he ultimately expresses agreement \vith novelist and colleague Oe Kenzaburo's 
observations on the concept of the nation: "While on the one hand it comprises an ideal 
indicating a place to conceive of a person's individual identity, on the other hand and at 
the same instant it is representative of and hides \vithin it a sinister force which on the 
contrary cancels out this very identity."112 Ota observes that in the realm of theory at 
least, globally there is a move towards recognition of the importance of guaranteeing 
cultural plurality vvithin nations. In conclusion, he maintains the hope that the current 
crisis in Okinawan identity may be overcome through this trend: 
I hope that we too may maintain our sense of hope and strive towards the 
attainment of self-identity, without being defeated by the very real barriers we 
currently face. For, such a pursuit also signifies the proof of our existence as 
human beings ... 
In reality, however, claims to internationalism in the late 1970s and 1980s also 
became interspersed with conservative nationalism and the reassertion of assumptions 
of ethnic homogeneity. As Jennifer Robertson points out, the catchword of 
''jnternationalisation" (lwkusaika) was "not antithetical to 'Japanese culture': rather it is 
both a product of and central to the ongoing ... formation of a Japanese national cultural 
'" Okinawajin to wa nanika, p. 242. 
"' Ibid., p. 241. 
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identity."113 The fragmentation of the subject and even the breakdovlll in the legitimacy 
of the nation-state in late modem capitalist society has proved far from antithetical to a 
rise in state and/or ethnic nationalism. In the 1990s, the so-called phenomenon of 
"globalisation" has been accompanied by the celebration of a particular depoliticised 
form of multiculturalism conducive to consumerist desires for difference. In this 
context, as we shall see in Chapter Five, in a way reminiscent of Y anagita' s "theory of 
the South Islands" study group of the prewar period, ambiguous claims to an Okinawan 
uniqueness have become appropriated within new nationalist discourses. 
Okinawa, Japan, and the Ghosts of ShOwa 
Placing Okinawa in Postwar Japan as History 
Ota's analysis of Iha's views on the post-Meiji incorporation of Okinawa into 
Japan, his reflections on the significance of an Okinawan "cultural identity," and his rc-
evaluation of the reversion movement were thus intimately connected to contests over 
Okinawa's position within Japan in the post-reversion period. Ota lamented both the 
"loss" of Okinawan identity and the fact that many of the goals of reversion remained 
unachieved. lbe predicament facing Okinawa was seen as symbolic of the general 
hollowing out of Japan's postwar democratic institutions.ll4 In the context of increasing 
nationalist conservatism within political and academic discourse in Japan from the late 
1970s onwards, Ota also focused on the significance of Okinawa's position within 
Japan's postwar history--as essential in order to revaluate and retrieve the ideals of the 
early postwar period. In other words, as Ota noted in 1979: 
Those of us who seek to protect the merits of the postwar era caunot deny the fact 
113 Jennifer Robertson, "It Takes a Village: Internationalization and Nostalgia in Postwar Japao," p. 128. 
Emphasis in originaL 
"" Ota :\iasahlde, "Okinawa ni totte no sengo minshU shugi," Ekonomisuto (20 May, 1980), p, 65, 
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that one factor contributing to an increase in attempts to negate these merits has 
been the inability to adequately grasp Okinawa's postwar experience ... (l)t has 
become increasingly clear that an analysis of Okinawa during the period [from the 
Battle of Okinawa to Okinawan reversion] not only provides us with an important 
opportunity to reevaluate Japan's "postwar reforms," but can widely benefit such 
al . 115 a reev uat!on ... 
Ota placed Okinav.= postwar history in the context of Okinawa's "one hundred 
year history" of"Japanisation." He was highly critical, among others, of the analyses of 
former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, particularly the fact that Yoshida hardly gave 
Okinawa a mention in his publication The Hundred Years which Determined Japan 
(Nihon o kettei shita hyakunen) even though he had played a central role in securing 
prolonged US occupation of the islands. The omission of Okinawa's history from 
analysis of postwar Japan was seen as indicative of unequal and centralized policy-
making structures-and intimately connected to questions pertaining to Okinawa's 
modern relations with Japan. As Ota observed, "US postwar occupation policy toward 
Japan and toward Okinawa are essentially two sides of the same coin."ll6 To ignore 
Okinawa's postwar historical experience was to overlook the structure behind postwar 
Japan. He stressed that just as the separation of Okinawa was central to US occupation 
policy towards Japan, it was an essential component of postwar Japanese history. 
Failing to take note of the central role which Okinawa played in the consolidation of 
Japan's postwar system was thus seen as ultimately fatally detrimental to postwar 
Japanese studies as a whole. 117 
Ota sought to draw attention to Okinawa's central position in Japan's postwar 
historical experience and US occupation policy. He also drew direct connections 
us Ota Masahlde. "'Okinawa' saiko no histuyo ni tsuite," Sekai No. 401 (April1979), p. 52. 
116 Ota Masahlde, "The US Occupation of Okinawa and Postwar Reforms in Japan Proper," in Robert E. 
Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (eds.) Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 284. 
mOta Masabidc," 'Ryi1kyU shobun' hyakunen e no shiten," Sekai No. 389 (April, 1978), pp. 18-21. 
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between this experience and Japan's historical discrimination against Okinawa. In 
particular, he rejected the claim that the "separation of Okinawa was an unavoidable 
consequence of Japan's unconditional surrender." He carne to conclude rather that 
Okinawa's separation was a result of a coincidence of interests between occupier (the 
US) and occupied (Japan)-as, in short, the "product of US-Japanese collaboration, 
albeit collaboration between somewhat unequal partners." Through joint US-Japan 
negotiations, Okinawa was "not only detached from Japan proper but, against the will 
of its people, was compelled to play the role of a military and political pawn."u8 
From numerous research trips to the US both alone and with University of 
Ryukyu colleagues M.iyagi Etsujiro and Hosaka Hiroshi, Ota gathered extensive 
historical material on the US and Japanese government's policies towards Okinawa 
from the wartime period onwards.ll9 In his subsequent historical analyses, very broadly 
it may be said that Ota made at least two significant and controversial conclusions. 
Firstly, he noted that the plan to separate Okinawa from Japan and place it under US 
control was largely decided prior to US military forces landing on Okinawa in March 
1945. Secondly, he concluded that as revealed in both Prime Minister Konoe 
Fumimaro's wartime draft of possible conditions for Japanese surrender and Yoshida 
Shigeru's assertions prior to the singing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Japanese 
government was willing to sacrifice Okinawa for the sake of its perceived national 
interests. Ota saw this stance as indicative of the fact that "Okinawa was not considered 
as an integral part of Japan," and symbolic of "the Japanese attitude toward 
liS Ota Masalride, "The US Occupation of Okinawa and Postwar Reforms in Japan Proper," pp. 284-5. 
See also Ota Masahide, "US Occupation of Okinawa in Relation to Postwar Policy toward Japan (1943-
1953) in Ota Masalride (ed.) A Comprehensive Study on US Military Governmefl/ on Okinawa (An Interim 
Report) (University of the Ryukyus, 1987), pp. 5-35, and in Japanese; and Ota Mas abide, "Okinawa bunri 
wa Nihon no gassaku," in Sekai-shi no naka no Ninon senryo (Tokyo: Nihon Hyi:ironsha, 1985), pp. 101-9. 
ll 9 Ota discusses this research process in a discussion with Kawamitsu Shin'ichi in" 'Okinawa' o dO 
wtaika suru ka," Shin Okinawa Bungaku No. 70 (Winter, 1986), pp. 156-70. 
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Okinawa."120 During and after the war, the US military also sought to exploit the fact 
that Japanese have historically discriminated against the islands for their own ends. The 
principle of "divide and rule" in Okinawa, Ota surmised, "was not a unilateral decision 
by the United States but had the active support of the Japanese government and, at least 
to that extent, was the product of a joint US-Japanese effort."121 
Ota concluded that the prolonged US military occupation of Okinawa was both 
an integral part of the occupation policy towards Japan, and the focal point of inherent 
contradictions within this policy. For while the US occupation forces came to view the 
separation of Okinawa as a precondition to Japanese demilitarisation and 
democratisation, US military attempts to democratise Okinawa itself while securing it 
as a major military base in the Pacific were tantamount, Ota observed, to "trying to 
square a circle." 122 Moreover, Ota pointed out that these contradictions expose to 
question the democratic system of Japan as a whole. For, he asked: "What is one to 
think of a Japanese government willing to detach part of its own territory and cede it to 
foreign military rule in blind pursuit of its O\'.'II narrow interests?"123 
Ota cited the so-called "Emperor's Message," thought to detail Emperor 
Hirohito's position on the possible separation of Okinawa in the wake of Japan's defeat, 
as exemplary of the way in which the will of Okinawans was ignored in the name of 
such self-interests. The "Emperor's Message" is a historical document in fact made up 
of two letters composed by US Political Advisor for Japan William J. Sebald to the US 
Secretary of State and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers General Douglas 
MacArthur on 20 and 22 September 1947 respectively. In his communication to 
MacArthur, Sebald describes in detail the Emperor's position on Okinawa as conveyed 
120 Ota Masahide, "The US Occupation of Okinawa and Postwar Refonns in Japan Proper," pp. 284-302, 
121 Ibid., p. 302 .. 
m Ibid., p. 293. 
123 Ibid., p, 294, 
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by Terasaki Hidenari, an adviser to the imperial CDUrt. According to Sebald, the 
Emperor conveyed his "hope" that "the United States continue the military occupation 
of Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyus." The Emperor purportedly felt that the 
occupation would "benefit the United States and also provide protection for Japan," and 
would no doubt "meet with widespread approval among the Japanese people.'' 124 
The contents of these letters were first divulged and analysed by Tsukuba 
University professor Shindo Eiichi in an article in the journal Sekai in April 1979. In the 
same month, its implications became the subject of parliamentary debate after 
Communist Party member and Okinawan representative Senaga Kamejiro questioned 
the constitutional legality of the Emperor's involvement in crucial questions of national 
pDlicy. 125 The historical and political significance of the letters was discussed and 
analysed in mainland Japanese press, and has been the subject of repeated outrage and 
controversy in Okinawa-in 1979, on the eve of Emperor Hirohito's scheduled visit to 
Okinawa in 1986-7, and after the historical validity of their content was confirmed in 
the publication of high court official Iriye Sukemasa's diaries in 1989.126 
While acknowledging that historical opinion is divided as to the extent to which 
Sebald's letter or the will of the Emperor affected US pDlicy, Ota drew the conclusion 
that whether directly or indirectly, the "Emperor's Message" did have an effect on 
policy making. He cites as evidence the fact that US State Department Policy Planning 
Staff Director George Kennan outlined the Emperor's stance on Okinawan separation in 
a policy document in October 1947. 127 "Ultimately, as can be discerned from [Sebald's] 
tZ4 See tor example Ota Masahide, "US Occupation of Okinawa in Relation to Postwar Policy toward 
Japan (1943-1953)," pp. 23-5. 
12
' As outlined by Robert Eldridge, "Showa Tenno to Okinawa: 'Tenno messeeji no saikosai," Chiio 
Koron Vol. 144 No.3 (March 1999) pp. 152-71. 
126 As disclosed in the Asahi Shinbun on 11 January, 1989. See Ota Masahide, KenshO: Shawano 
Okinawa (Naha: Naha Shuppansha, 1990), p. 315. 
127 Ota Masahide, "US Occupation of Okinawa in Relation to Postwar Policy toward Japan (1943-1953)," 
p. 24. 
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letter," Ota concluded, "the [Emperor) was completely unconcerned with the fate of the 
residents of Okinawa, who were to be separated from Japan and placed under a foreign 
military administration. He had in mind only the safety of the Japanese polity (lwkutai) 
centred around the Emperor himself or the Japanese mainland." 128 Moreover, Ota 
related this to the Battle of Okinawa, and the fact that the Japanese Minister for Military 
Affairs announced preparations for the final battle on "Imperial soil" (kiido) after the 
battle on Okinawa had already begun. Just as Okinawa was considered outside the 
imperial territories which had to be "protected at all costs," this perception was seen to 
persist within the imperial court and government even after Japan's defeat, and 
ultimately to have assisted in securing Okinawa's prolonged military occupation.129 
Modem narratives of nation, as Prasenjit Duara points out, incorporate an 
inherently ambivalent conceptualisation of linear time. A commitment to the 
Enlightenment discourse of modern civilization is, as a commitment to modernity and 
progress, a commitment to "the celebration of the new, the breaking of old shackles." 
At the same time, however, the nation is constantly reconceived and reproduced in its 
national essence--as "an already-always of the nation-space." As a result: "Thus while 
on the one hand, nation-states glorify the ancient or eternal character of the nation, they 
also seek to emphasize the unprecedented nature of the nation-state, because it is only 
in this form that the people-nation has been able to realize itself as tl1e self-conscious 
subject of History."130 In Meiji Japan, the Emperor-as the restoration of a perceived 
national essence and the central symbol of a modern lwkutai (nation-body) nation-state 
system-became a powerful signifier in the incorporation of these dual frameworks of 
ns Ota Masahlde, KenshO: Shawano Okinawa, p. 3 I 7. 
129 This historical interpretation is still debated. Robert Eldridge concludes that the "Emperor's Message" 
is rather proof of the Emperor's efforts to try tn ensure that Japan maintained residual sovereignty over 
Okinawa rather than forfeit it to US military strategic trusteeship. See Robert Eldridge, "SMv.-a Tenno tn 
Okinawa: 'Tenno messeeji no saikosai," pp. 152,71. This still, however, exposes to question the Imperial 
court's stance towards Okinawa during the war and under US occupation. 
llO Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing His lory from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China, p. 29. 
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time. Moreover, as Western-inspired conceptualisations of civilization became the 
central schema both within and against which Japanese narratives of nation were often 
defined, the kokutai served as an over-determined signifier encompassing past and 
present, both particularised essence and universalised civilization project. The Emperor 
became the central symbol of a protean construction of Japan-as concurrently essence 
and universal centre able to subsume difference v.ithin through the process of 
. "1 . 131 ass1m1 atwn. 
In Okinawa, at the border between Japanese nation and empire, the 
contradictions inherent to this project of "becoming Japanese imperial subjects" were 
often acute. As Ota himself has outlined, the symbol of the Emperor was both pivotal to 
the ideology of national consolidation in Okinawa in the prewar era and a central 
component of the contradictions embedded within assirnilationist policy. OkinawrulS 
were both upheld as the subjects and children of the Emperor and estranged from Japan 
proper. As Ota notes, this antimony of incorporation and estrangement forms a core 
component of Okinawa's modem history.132 
In historical debates within postwar Japan, as Carol Gluck observes: "It was 
impossible to discuss the past without corning up against the emperor system. Yet it was 
admitted of no easy explicability. It was like a ghost at the historical feast, always in 
attendance, related to both the past and the present, both elusive and morally and 
politically charged."133 This is all the more the case in Okinawa-not only site of the 
only ground war, but also historically highly ambivalcntly placed ffithin Japan's so-
called ''imperial territories." In tracing the pervasive connections between the 
ambiguous positioning of Okinawa within Japan's kokutai in the prewar period and its 
"'Tessa Morris-Suzuki draws important connections between the subsuming of racial and cultural 
difference and gender within Japanese nationalist tropes in Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space. Nation 
(Armonk and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 119, 
mAs Ota outlines for example in the Asahi Tapes (8 February 1999). 
"' "The Past in the Present," in Andrew Gordon ( ed,) Postwar Japan as History, p. 79. 
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postwar separation, Ota touched upon issues central to perceiving both postwar Japan 
and Japanese modem history as a whole. In particular, his analysis raised vital questions 
regarding connections between inequalities and contradictions embedded within Japan's 
postwar system, and legacies of Japan's colonialism. It also problematized the way in 
which the ambiguity of Okinawa's prewar position was utilized within US wartime 
military strategic planning, carried over in US occupation policy, and formed a central 
component of US cold war policy in the Pacific. In the context of Okinawa, this policy 
in tum contained its ovvn set of contradictory claims to democracy nnder the rubric of 
direct military occupation. 
The End of an Era and the Ghosts ofSh15wa 
At the same time, the issue of consistency between prewar, wartime, and 
postwar Japan and Okinawa posed a central dilemma for Ota, and formed an inherent 
tension in his analysis. The weaker left-wing progressive forces in both mainland Japan 
and Okinawa became, the more Ota sought to revive the postwar ideals of peace and 
democracy-based on conceptualisation of the postwar period as a break with the past. 
This endeavour was also connected to the attempt to "revive" the sense of Okinawan 
subjectivity which Ota saw was awakened through Okinawa's war experience. Ota also 
began to delve into the historical roots of the weakening of these forces by tracing the 
continuities between pre- and postwar Japan, and ultimately between prewar 
assimilationist ideology and the reversion movement itself. In Ota's historical analysis 
of the evolution of Japan's postwar system and the emergence of Okinawa's reversion 
movement, pervasive tensions can be discerned between his endeavour to perceive of 
the postwar era as a personal and collective social and political "rebirth", and his critical 
tracing of parallels and direct connections between pre- and postwar systems of 
relations. When nihonjinron (theories of Japanese uniqueness) emerged as an influential 
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discourse and served as a nurturing ground for claims to Japanese homogeneity in the 
1980s, these tensions increased. 
As Yumiko Iida observes, in contrast to the politicised identity of social 
mobilization which Leftist progressives sought to defend in the 1960s, the identity 
pursued in nihonjinron discourse in the 1980s was "an abstract, idealized and 
homogenized, collective identity, seeking to assert Japan's national right on the 
international stage." Most significantly, in this shift "the element of social resistance 
was completely lost, resulting in a situation where popular sentiment, formerly a 
motivating cause for progressive movements, carne to be channelled in and articulated 
for the benefit of conservative politics."134 The insular discursive space of nihonjinron 
often erased minority claims to cultural and historical pluralism. It also corresponded 
with the state-nationalism of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, who in 1986 was 
fiercely criticized by groups within Japan for claiming that no minorities existed in 
racially pure Japan. 135 1n the summer of 1985, Nakasone announced a "nationalist 
manifesto" critical of the "self-tormenting ideological trend" which spread after the 
Tokyo War Crimes Trials, and asserting the need for the Japanese state and people to 
discard their sense of shame and "aim for glory". He also became the first Prime 
Minister in the postwar period to attend an official mourning ceremony at the 
controversial Y asukuni Shrine.136 
Around the same time, in September 1985, the Ministry of Education sent a 
notification to Municipal Board of Education heads throughout the country, advising 
them to take an "appropriate and thorough stance" towards those schools which did not 
raise the Rising Sun Flag or sing the Kimigayo (Reign of Our Lord) anthem during 
'" Yumiko !ida, Rethinking Identity in Modem Japan: Nationalism as Aesthetics, p. 201. 
135 Richard Siddle notes that Nakasone's comments actually led to a boost in Ainu activism after being 
received with much resentment {"Ainu: Japan's Indigenous People" in Michael Weiner Japan's 
Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity, p. 43). 
"
6 Ibid., pp. 194-5. 
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official ceremonies. A month earlier, the ministry had announced the results of its 
national survey on school observance of these patriotic activities. Nationally, an average 
of 92.5% of elementary, 91.2% of junior high schools, and 81.6% of senior high schools 
raised the llising Sun at official ceremonies, while 72.8% elementary and 53.3% of 
senior high schools sang the Kimigayo. Okinawa ranked far below any other 
prefecture--v,rith only a 6% average observance for the fonner, and zero for the latter. 
The prefectural superintendent of education was highly critical of Okinawa's low 
figure, and called upon all schools to "strengthen guidance" in regards to the flag and 
anthem. The Okinawan Teacher's Union, in contrast, expressed "pride" in these figures, 
and directly related them to the fact that Okinawa was the only place in Japan which 
had experienced a ground battle during the war. 137 Once again, a struggle over the 
nature of education in Okinawa ensued, and interspersed with contests over history, 
autonomy, and identity. 
Ota saw that, while the rusing Sun!Kimigayo issue was on the surface merely 
one concerning the format of official school ceremonies, it touched at the foundation of 
issues on education. He related it to the issue of the Board of Education selection 
process which had arisen on the eve of reversion, and warned that, as in that case, 
Japanese government policy threatened to extinguish the important gains for education 
which had been made in Okinawa under occupation. He saw such government-induced 
attempts to "homogenize" (kakuitsuka) education according to a "neo state-nationalist" 
(shinkakkashugi) ideology as indicative of the "fascist education" system of the prewar 
era. 
The Ministry of Education's attempts to further promote the popularisation of 
the flag and anthem as national symbols also coincided with contests over preparations 
137 As outlined by Ota in "Kenmin yoron o nibun suru 'hi no maru, kimigayo' mondai: genten ni kaette 
fusen no chikai o," Shakaiti'i No. 377 (June 1987), pp. 26-38. See also Norma Field, In the Realm of a 
Dying Emperor: Japan at Century's End, pp. 54-6. 
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for the National Athletic Meet, to be held in Okinawa in 1987. The Emperor's 
attendance at the annual event had become ritualised since the second National Athletic 
Meet was held in Ishikawa Prefecture in 1947. The Emperor had not attended the 
Commemorative Arbour Festival nor the International Marine Expo, held in Okinawa in 
the years directly following reversion, and Okinawa remained the only prefecture he 
had not visited during his reign. By the mid-l980s, however, it was deemed that, while 
Okinawan feelings towards the Emperor remained "complex", now an appropriate 
environment existed for the Emperor's visit. Indeed, according to an Asahi Shinbun poll 
conducted in Okinawa in early September 1987, only 11% of respondents opposed the 
Emperor's visit while 57% welcomed it-although over half (54%) of respondents felt 
"nothing in particular" towards the Emperor, and "old battle sites" were deemed by far 
the place Okinawans most wanted the Emperor to see on his visit. 138 
Ota saw both the government's attempts to ensure the singing of the anthem and 
raising of the flag at the National Athletic Meet and the Emperor's visit as, together 
with the Ministry of Education's earlier notification, indicative of the rise of"neo state-
nationalism." He directly related the National Athletic Meet to the Marine Expo of 
1975, reminiscing of the way in which, in spite of the Expo's claims to "establish a new 
marine culture," the Okinawan Committee had warned of the way in which the Expo 
threatened Okinawa's traditional culture and environment. In a similar vein, Ota warned 
that the outcome of contests over the government's attempts to enforce the rising sun 
and Kimigayo at the National Athletic Meet stood to affect the future of both Okinawa 
and Japan as a whole. 139 
"'As cited in Ota Masahide, "US Occupation of Okinawa in Relation to Postwar Policy toward Japan 
(1943-1953)," pp. 26-7. 
139 Ota Masabide, "Kaiyohaku akisaiji omoiokose: kokutai wa honrai no shushi ni," Ryukyu Shinpo (20 
September, 1987), p. 3. 
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By the holding of the Meet, however, after a series of bills passed in the 
Prefectural Assembly and LOP-dominated municipalities, the percentage of schools 
which raised the Rising Sun flag during official ceremonies in Okinawa had soared to 
close to 100%. 18.5% of elementary, 8.1% of junior high, and 8.8% of senior high 
schools also sang the Kimigayo. 140 On the eve of the National Meet, Ota expressed 
strong apprehension towards the extent to which schools had yielded to national and 
prefectural pressute, and related it directly to the "beast-like devotion" of Okinawans 
during the war. In the face of a "second kominka" and a "return" to the ideologies of the 
prewar period, Ota called upon Okinawans to remember the ideals of peace, democracy 
and autonomy as laid down in the constitution.141 While critical of what he saw to be 
the "institutionalisation of violence" in the form of Japan's remilitarisation, he did not 
criticize the economic policies of the prefectute nor the impact of the national 
government's public works-centred funding at all to the extent he had on the eve of the 
Expo. This was in turn indicative of the extent to which public-works centred 
development had become embedded \Vithin Okinawan politics and society, conservative 
trends in Okinawa's political conditions, and, while still present, the general 
fragmentation of environmental and pro-autonomy movemcnts.142 
140 As cited in Norma Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor, p. 54; and Ota Masahide, "Kenmin yoron 
o nibun suru 'hi no maru, kirnigayo' mondai: genten ni kaette fusen no chikai o," p. 38. 
141 Ota Masahide, "Senzen teki gyakuryl!.jiwajiwa: Okinawa o doku shitsutsukeru jidaishugi," RS (15 
November 1987), p. 3. 
1
'
2 One important environmental movement of the 1980s was the political opposition mobilized against 
the planned building of an new Ishigaki Airport off the coast ofShiraho, reknowned for its rare 
formations of coral. In July 1983, locals opposed to the plan formed the Concerned Citizens' Group 
against the Airport (Kiiko Mandai o Kangaeru Shimin no Kai), and in Tokyo the Yaeyama and Shiraho 
Ocean Protection Group (Yaeyama Shiraho no Umi o Mamoru Kai) was formed. The building of the 
airport emerged as an election issue in the gubernatorial elections of 1990, and in 1991 01a announced his 
decision to move the airport to an alternative site further inland. However, in Mareh 200 I, tbe lnarnine 
prefectural government returned the construction site of the New Ishigaki Airport to the Kara Mountain 
area, next to Shiraho. For a swnmary of this movement see Miyume Tanji, "The dynamic trajectory of the 
post-reversion 'Okinawa Struggle': Constitution, environment and gender" in Richard Siddle and Glenn 
Hooks ( eds.) Okinawa and Japan: Structure and Subjectivity. 
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This is not to say that resistance to the implementation of the flag and anthem in 
both schools and at the National Athletic Meet, and toward conservative LOP-centred 
defmitions of national belonging in general, did not exist. At Yomitan High, students 
snatched the flag from its stand during graduation ceremony and threw it in the 
gutter, 143 and at Naha City's Labour Cooncil workers went about setting preparations 
for the National Athletic Meets bearing badges that read "The Emperor's War 
Responsibility Will Not be Forgotten." 144 Progressive Yomitan Mayor Yamauchi 
Tokushin (later to become prefectural treasurer onder Ota's administration) backed 
down to pressure to fly the Rising Son and play the anthem at the National Athletic 
Meet after the head of the Japan Softball Association threatened to take the games 
elsewhere otherwise. Yet on 26 October 1987, on the day of the Meet, anti-war 
landowner, supermarket owner, and vice-president of the Yomitan Chamber of 
Commerce Chibana Shoichi tore down the flag and burned it, for which he was 
prosecuted for violating state property. 145 
Moreover, while Prefectural Governor Nishime had hoped the occasion would 
finally mark the "end" of Okinawa's postwar, Hirohito himself never made it to the 
National Athletic Meet, nor would he set foot in Okinawa as Japan's Emperor. Falling 
ill v.1th cancer, he died two years later, on 7 January, 1989. The Emperor's death 
symbolized a closure in Japanese history and society, and evoked the atmosphere of 
nostalgia, reflection, and amnesia which marks the end of an historical epoch. Yet this 
sense of closure wa~ also clouded by the pervasive issues of rupture and perpetuation 
embroiled within Japan's two eras of Showa-the pre- and postwar periods. Whether 
143 Nonna Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor, p. 55. 
144 
"Tenno no senso sekinin yurusanu: wanpen mune ni gyomu," Rl> (19 September 1987), p. 7. 
145 Nonna Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor. See also Chibana ShOichi, Yakisuterareta Hi no Maru: 
Kichi no Shima Okinawa Yomilanson kara (Tokyo: Shinsensha, 1988). Emperor Hirohito's planned visit 
also prompted the publication of an anthology of ruminations on the Emperor and Okinawa, Aniya 
Masayald et al. (eds.) Okinawa to Tenno (Naha: Akebo Shuppan, 1987). 
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they were seen to provide an inviolable link between the nation's prewar and postwar 
eras, were rewritten into a narrative of democracy and peace, or were damned as the 
personification of the failures of Japan's postwar reforms, the two ghosts ofHirohito---
as the centre of Japan's imperial lwkutai and as the symbol of a nation reborn-
remained to haunt historical narratives of his period of reign. 
In an article in the wake of Emperor Hirohito' s death, Ota greeted the extent of 
the nationalist commercialism which accompanied the Japanese media's coverage of the 
events with a mixture of cynicism and despair, noting: "The fact that, on the day of the 
funeral ceremony, all television stations covered in length the entire proceedings 
without commercials was as predicted. Yet I still hoped that if the media is going to 
rush in unison to present ShOwa retrospectives, at least one station, somewhere, would 
provide serious coverage of war responsibility, and the losses caused by the war."146 
The massive funeral ceremony, attended by dignitaries from around the world, was 
upheld as an indication of Japan's influential international status. Yet Ota concluded 
that on the contrary, it rather "exposed the poverty in spirit of Japanese."147 Ota was 
particularly critical of Prime Minister Takeshita No born's statement doubting whether 
Japan's had been an aggressive war, and cynical of the way in which Takeshita 
subsequently rushed to account for his statement in the face of domestic and 
international criticism. While Hirohito himself had passed away, in relation to 
Okinawa's military bases, Ota also sarcastically noted, "Showa is not over, nor does it 
look to end any time soon."148 In the context of Okinawa, not only did the two ghost~ of 
Hirohito take on a particularly controversial and problematic significance, but they 
persisted in the forrn of the legacies of Okinawa's wartime and postwar experience. 
146 Ota Masahide, "[zen toshite 'ShOwa' wa owarazu," Minpo (Aprill989), p. 14. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
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Yet willie the legacies of Showa remained, the end of the 1980s and the onset of 
a new decade were also marked by two other major domestic and international events: 
the end of the Cold War and the arrival of the "new world order" and the collapse of 
Japan's "bubble economy" and onset of prolonged economic re~ession. These endings, 
as Yumiko Iida points out, "were simultaneously the beginning of something new, 
whose structuring principle is yet to be defined in the continuing process of history in 
the making."149 As Rick Siddle and Glenn Hook observe, a "combination of geography 
and strategic significance has historically meant that the 'Okinawa problem' becomes 
most acute precisely at key moments of transition or crisis within the modem Japanese 
state: the early Meiji transition to modernity; war, defeat and the Occupation after 1945; 
and most recently the post-Cold War realignment."150 As Japan's political, social, and 
economic structure was transformed, redefined, and stagnated in the tumultuous and 
"forgotten" decade of the 1990s, Okinawa's position within US-Japan bilateral relations 
and Japan's domestic political, social, and historical structures once again emerged as a 
pervasive, and highly volatile, question. 
With the onset of the Persian Gulf crisis and subsequent war of 1990-1, intense 
antagonism between those political "hawks" who sought to ensure the deployment of 
Japan's Self-defence Forces (SDF) through the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill 
(Kokuren Heiwa Kyoryoku Hoan) and those "doves" who opposed the legislation 
resulted in a paralysis in foreign policy. In Okinawa, where the deployed US forces 
played a direct if peripheral role in the Gulf crisis, the implications of the "new world 
order" were immediate, just as the deployment of Japanese forces remained a 
particularly divisive and controversial issue. The election battle between incumbent 
LOP-supported Okinawan Governor Nishime Junji, who sought to stress the success of 
149 Yumiko !ida, Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan, p. 208. 
150 Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle, "Introduction" in Hook and Siddle (eds.) Japan and Okirwwa: 
Structure and Subjectivity. 
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his economic stimulus policies, and opposition candidate Ota Masahide, who called for 
the realization of a "peaceful Okinav;a", occurren in the midst of this crisis. As Nishime 
expressed implicit support for the deployment of Japanese forces, and activity on 
Kadena Airbase intensified in preparation for war in the Persian Gulf, Ota' s pleas for 
peace took on a direct significance. On 18 November, 1990, boasting the lead by a 
significant 30,000 votes, Ota became the first progressive party-backed candidate to 
take office as governor of Okinawa in twelve years. 151 
As has been pointed out: "The void left by the collapse of the Cold War order 
has in fact openen up possibilities for more diverse, localized, and contradictory 
narratives and memories about the past to emerge and compete in the various public 
spheres."152 It was precisely in this context that the Ota administration arose. Post-Cold 
War fluidity, however was also accompanied by a nationalist historical revisionist 
backlash, and a crisis in party agenda-making across Japan's political spectrum. Less 
than two years after Ota's victory and in the wake of international and in particular US 
criticism over Japan's lack of direct logistical support in the Gulf War (although the 
Japanese government did contribute $13 billion towards the coalition against Iraq), the 
Peacekeeping Bill was passed by the Diet in June 1992. By May 1994, close to half of 
Japan's public (48.4%) expressed support for SDF participation in peacekeeping 
operations. In the same year, in what has been described as the "most dramatic moment 
in the history of the Socialist Party," the party made a historical decision to reverse 
course on a number of key policy issues. This included now recognizing the SDF as 
constitutional, expressing support towards the US-Japan Security Treaty, and accepting 
151 OT(19 November, 1990), p. 5. For a detailed analysis ofOta's election victory and early years in 
office, see Egami Takayoshi, "Ota kakushin kensei no kenshO to kichi mondai (I 990-4 )"in Egami 
Takayoshi ( ed.) Gendai Okinawa no seiji to shakai (Nishihara, Okinawa: Ryukyu Daigaku Hogakubu, 
1997), pp. 87-107. 
'" Fujitani, White and Yoneyama (eds.) Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s), (Introduction), p. 5. 
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the Rising Sun and Kimigayo as Japan's national flag and anthem respectively. 153 In 
another historical irony, just as Japan's postwar political system-as embodied in the 
1955 parliamentary system which placed the "conservative" ruling LDP hegemony 
against the "progressive" Socialist and Communist Party opposition-itself collapsed, 
Ota sought to enact his vision of the postwar ideal. 
In the context of emerging post-Cold War relations, the tensions of rupture and 
continuity embedded within Japan's postwar system, as well as the historical legacies of 
the Showa era as a whole, continued to haunt Okinawa's volatile political landscape. 
Within the reaffirmation of security relations, the US and Japan sought to incorporate 
these legacies-in particular the large US military presence which remained in 
Okinawa-under a reified and strengthened security framework. In this context, Ota 
emerged to take a decisive role within struggles over the making of this history. 
---- ~ ----
153 For an analysis of these events see for example Gavan McCormack, The Emptiness of Japanese 
Affluence (Armonk, New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), in particular pp. 185-225. 
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""=CHAPTER FOUR;;--;;;-
Trials of History 
Negotiating Base Politics and the 
"Okinawa Issue" (1995-8) 
"'Resolutions' often change the course of history. Governor Ota's 
recent refusal to act as proxy [in the signing of the leases of land used 
by the US military in Okinawa] is precisely such a historic decision, 
and one which poses a direct challenge to the modem Japanese 
nation-state system. Governor Ota is at this very moment, while 
placing himself within the' system,' also attempting to move beyond 
it-exposing himself to the most difficult trial of history ... " 
Hiyane Teruo, 19961 
The 1995 Rape Incident and Ota's Refusal to Act as Proxy 
It was a pre-meditated and anticipated moment, the result of extensive 
discussions and negotiations \\ithin the governor's offices and amongst various 
supporting groups which had only come to an end in the late hours of the previous 
night2 On the afternoon of 28 September 1995, during question time in the Okinawan 
prefectural assembly, member of the progressive coalition Tomoyori Shinsuke 
requested that governor Ota clarify his "true sentiment and intentions" in relation to the 
recent rape incident. Less than one month previously, it had been alleged that an 
Okinawan schoolgirl had been abducted and raped by three members of the US military. 
1 Kindai Okinawa no seishinshi (Tokyo: Shakai Hy5ronsha, 1996), pp. 8-23. 
2 OT (29 September 1995). 
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In response, Ota rose to the floor. In a prepared speech, he expressed his anger at the 
"violation of human dignity" which had occurred, and noted the "historical conditions" 
of Okinawa under which the land utilised by the US military had been "arbitrarily 
requisitioned" under occupation. He stressed the fact that while only 0.6% of the total 
national land mass, Okinawa was host to approximately 75% of US military facilities 
within Japan. He also expressed regret towards the fact that, contrary to his hope that 
the breakdo\\n of the Cold War structure would lead to the demilitarisation of Okinawa, 
the planned reaffirmation of the US-Japan Security Treaty that coming November 
threatened to only further entrench the US military presence. Ota declared that, on the 
basis of these conditions, he could not comply with the leasing procedures for land 
utilized by the US military, and intended to notifY the Japanese government as such.3 
On 4 September 1995, three US military soldiers had allegedly abducted a 
twelve-year-old Ok:inawan schoolgirl at knife-point in the small northeast town of Kin. 
They forced her inside a rented car, sealed her month with tape and bound her, and then 
raped her on a nearby remote beach. Once the men had left, the girl dragged herself up 
to a neighbouring house overlooking the beach and give a description of the car and 
men, who were apprehended within hours.4 Less than a week later, the incident was 
leaked to the local Ok:inawan press. Almost immediately it became connected to the 
issue of the US bases in general, and the fact that Japanese authorities were not given 
the right to demand the handing over of criminal suspects for custody prior to 
indictment in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between the US and 
Japanese government. 5 
3 Okinawa-ken gikai (teireikai) kaigi kiroku (Naha: Okinawa-ken Gikai, 1995) (28 September, 1995), p. 
107·8. 
4 As recounted in Linda lsako Angst, "The Sacrifice of a Schoolgirl: The 1995 Rape Case, Discourses of 
Power, and Women's Lives in Okinawa," Critical Asian Studies 33:2 (2001), pp. 245·8. 
5 The SOFA agreement between Korea and the US had similarly emerged as a point of fierce contention 
after a spate of suspected sexual abuse/rape cases a few months previously, a fact also extensively 
reported "ithin Okinawa. As Yoicbi Funabasbi notes, demands to revise Article I 7 of the agreement, 
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On 11 September, representatives from each major party in Okinawa visited 
prefectural offices and the Defence Facilities Administration Agency (DF AA) branch in 
Naha, the central agency charged with dealing with issues relating to the US military 
bases stationed in Japan, in protest against the incident. On the same day, major 
women's groups held a joint press conference, protesting against the rape incident and 
outlining several demands including the expeditious handing over of suspects to 
Japanese police.6 On 13 September, prefectural administration representatives protested 
to the US Embassy, Japan's Foreign Ministry, and the DFAA, calling for the 
expeditious turning over of suspects and restrictions on the movement of US military 
members outside the base.7 Ota met with US Ambassador Walter Mondale and made 
similar requests a week later. 8 
"The moment Ota made clear his decision to refuse to act as proxy for the 
government," a local newspaper reported, "cheers of support echoed across the 
prefectural assembly floor, and the observation gallery burst into applause." 9 
Landowners who had refused to comply with the leasing process welcomed Ota's 
"historic" move and pledged support in working towards withdrawal of the bases. Even 
the Okinawa Chapter of the ruling LDP, while criticizing Ota's obstruction of the 
which outlined this provision, soon also escalated into calls for more comprehensive revisions of the 
entire agreement (Alliance Adrift (New York; Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), p. 299. 
6 OT (12 September 1995), p. 19. The editorial in the Okinawa 1lmes on the same day denounced the rape 
as a "criminal act that belies the army of a supposed democratic country which upholds 'human rights' 
and 'equality' as its motto," and warned that: "If the US wishes to maintain friendly relations with Japan, 
and an alliance formed by 'equal partners', it is strongly urged the unequal SOFA be revised 
innnediately." 
7 The US Embassy expressed regret over the incident, but did not immediately guarantee the early 
transfer of the suspects over to Japanese authorities. 
'In the days prior to Ota's announcement on 28 September. a series of protests were held across the main 
island of Okinawa demanding the revision of SOFA and the reduction and withdrawal of the US bases 
(OT (26-7 September 1995)). The three US servicemen who carried out the rape were eventually charged 
by the Naha district attorney on 29 September, and handed over into Japanese police custody the same 
day. 
9 OT(29 September 1995), p. 22. 
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administrative process for "political gains," was hesitant to denounce Ota's decision.10 
Government officials and national LDP representatives sought to take a strong stance 
against Ota. 11 Yet Ota also took an obstinate stanec back-not even meeting ~ith 
Director-General of the DFAA Hoshuyama Noburu who travelled to Naha following 
Ota's announcement. Anti-base sentiment further swelled, and on October 21 an 
estimated eighty to ninety thousand people gathered in Ginowan City and other 
locations across the Okinawan archipelago in a bipartisan "Okinawan People's Rally for 
Peace." In a direct reference to the large-scale protests which had followed USCAR's 
land expropriation policies in the 1950s, activists and the local media quickly 
designated it Okinawa's second "island-wide struggle." 
In a series of interviews with Asahi journalist Sotooka Hidetoshi, Ota described 
his wish to be accountable to and take responsibility for his ovm opinions and analysis 
as the main factor which motivated him to originally stand in the gubernatorial elections 
of 1990.12 As a scholar, Ota's intellectual writings and thought were always infused 
with a strong political consciousness, a sense of ideals, a discontent with existing 
conditions, and a desire for change. Vvnile himself much more an analytical and idealist 
thinker than a strategist, he also quickly grew impatient with intellectual pontificating, 
and with a detached academic mindset that was divorced from everyday political issues 
and social action. At the same time, Ota' s frank personality were in many ways at odds 
with the secret manoeuvrings and underhanded negotiations which are most often seen 
to typify Japan's political world. As Yoichi Funabashi put it, Ota's had too sharp a wit 
as an activist to be an academic, while his historical consciousness was "too 
10 LDP assembly member Ishil Seigen went as far to concede that ifOta had consented to signing the 
documents in the midst of the current wave of protest, he would be forced to resign from office ( OT (30 
September 1995)). 
" On 29 September, the Naha Branch ofthe DFAA refused to accept Ota's official notification of 
noncompliance. LDP Policy Committee Head Yalllll7aki Taku pronounced that "if Ota does not change 
his stance" he would make the utmost effort to "persuade" him to comply. OT (30 September 1995). 
12 The Asahi Tapes. Ota also recounts this in his Okinawa no ketsudan, p. Ill, 
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consummate" for being a politician.U In Ota's political career, these incongruities in 
fact served as a source of political strength, as his charismatic personality helped him 
gain widespread popular support, as well as a weakness, particularly in negotiations. 
Both widespread indignation over the rape and Ota' s subsequent historical 
decision to refuse to act as proxy in the signing of the leases worked to impel the 
subsequent upsurge of a mass anti-base movement in Okinawa such that it is difficult to 
separate one factor from the other. The rape became a focal point for conceptions of a 
sense of collective self around which Okinawans rallied, and the highly politicised 
climate which directly followed the rape incident undeniably worked to further secure 
mass support behind Ota's stance. 14 Ota in turn incorporated tropes of Okinawan 
victimhood and challenged dominant discourses of nationality and security in a counter-
narrative of mobilization--against the US military presence and in the name of local 
Okinawan autonomy .15 
"Alliance Adrift, p. 149. Also with reference to Japanese original, Di'imei hyoryi!. (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 1997), p. 166. 
14 Yoichi Funabashi observes: "The rape in September definitely acted as a trigger for the ensuing 
antibase protests in Okinawa. It is also certain that it made Ota's refusal to sign the public notice and 
inspection papers inevitable. Nor is there any room for doubt that his refusal was an indictment of the 
government's lack of sincerity up until that time" (Alliance Adrift, p. 312). Opinion differs on the 
rhetorical question as to whether Ota would have signed the leases supposing the rape incident and 
subsequent mobilization of anti-base sentiment had not occurred. Political scientist Egami Takayoshi 
suggests that Ota did look as if he would sign prior to the rape incident ("Okinawa no sengo seiji ni okeru 
'68-nen taisei' no keisei to hOkai," Ryiikyii Daigaku lfobun Gaku-bu Kenkyii Kiyo No. 57 (September 
1996), p. 26). On the other hand, legal professor Takara Testumi recounted in an interview w:ith the author 
that he discussed the possibility of forcing the issue into the courts by refusing to act as proxy with dose 
advisors to the governor as early as July 1995 (interview with author, 20 April 2001 ). Deputy Governor 
Yoshimoto also attests that Ota had decided to refuse to act as proxy by the beginoing of August, and that 
Yoshimoto himself notified Murayama's government as such prior to the rape incident (Interview with 
author, (25 May 2001)). In any case, it is certain the possibility of refusing to act as proxy already existed 
prior to the rape incident 
13 For the te>.1: of Ota's speech at the October rally, see Okinawa kara 'Nihan no shuken • o tou (Tokyo: 
Rimusha, 1995), pp. 37-S. As LindaAogst observes, these tropes ofOkinay,'llD victinthood were also 
gendered, and drew on images of Okinawa aw pure and innocent female body already prevalent in 
depctions of the Himeyuri (Aogst, "The Sacrifice of a Schoolgirl: The 1995 Rape Case, Discourses of 
Power, and Women's Lives in Okinawa,"). 
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Yet this seemingly unified voice of dissent also incorporated a variety of at 
times competing agendas. 16 The rape was appropriated by different groups as a political 
metaphor for the defilement of the sovereign Japanese body politic, the dual subjugation 
of Okinawa to the US and Japan, and the violation of women's rights, attesting to 
competing constructions of both gender and (Okinawan!Japanese) ethnic identity. 17 Ota 
attempted to negotiate competing positions within Okinawa while also contesting 
Okinawa's position in Japan and under US-Japan security relations. As a consequence, 
he was faced with ultimately irresolvable tensions between his legal obligations to the 
eentral government as head of the prefectural administration and his focal role in the 
anti-base movement. He also faced deep-seated dilemmas in his endeavour to both 
negotiate within as well as contest the framework of the Japanese nation-state, and in 
his attempt to conceive of an economic program for Okinawa that would promote 
autonomy and sustainable development. 
The "Okinawa issue" exposed to question Japan's democracy and system of 
governance, and challenged dominant discourses of national security and Japanese 
cultural homogeneity. 18 Ultimately, however, the contest between Ota and the Japanese 
16 As pointed out by Linda Isako Angst, "The Sacrifice of a Schoolgirl: The 1995 Rape Case, Discourses 
of Power, and Women•s Lives in Okinawa." 
17 As also pointed out in detail by Angst (ibid.). Gendered discourses which presented the rape 
metaphorically as the defilement of Okioawa and/or the national body politic of Japan worked to 
reinforce patriarchal assumptions. In contrast, Okinawan women activist Takazato Suzuyo strongly 
protested against the rape a.s a violation of woman's rights while also criticising the way in which (male) 
politicians denied the subjectivity of the young girl by conceiving of the rape as a political "opportunity" 
to promote their o'\\n agendas (Interview with Takazato Suzukyo by Urashima Etsuko, "Kiehl w josei no 
jinken," Impakushon, No. 96 (20 January 1996), p. 15). Linda Angst also critici?.es the process whereby 
the girl's subjectivity was denied by objectifying the incident and appropriating it within political agendas, 
and women's issues tend to become differed within identity politics (ibid.). At the same time, as Miyume 
Tanji points out, it may be said that the fragmentation and diversity of political agendas and strategies 
within Okinawan social movements has served as a source of both strength and weakness (.Miyume Tanji, 
"The Dynamic Trajectory of the Post-reversion 'Okinawa Struggle': Constitution, Environment and 
Gender" in Rick Siddle and Glenn Hook (eds.) Okinawa and Japan: Structure and Subjectivity). 
18 As Aurelia George Mulgan observes: "How the Okioawa base problem has been handled by the central 
government since late 1995 generates insights into the workiogs of Japanese democracy: the extent to 
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government highlighted the limitations and dilemmas faced by local politicians who 
"attempt to sustain a policy of challenge against the national government." 19 The 
combination of mass citizen activism with Ota's recalcitrant stance focused national and 
international attention on Okinawa, provided an unprecedented challenge to centralized 
administrative processes, forced a response from both the US and Japanese 
governments, and even resulted in qualified gains in base reductions. Yet through a 
series of judicial, legislative, and economic measures, the "Okinawa issue" was also 
largely contained and reduced to the question of financial compensation, as the 
contradictions embedded within Okinawa's economic and political structure remained 
and even became further entrenched. This process reveals the indirect mechanisms of 
control and structures of dependence integral to local-national relations in Japan, and 
symptomatic of contemporary post/nco colonial conditions. 
Ota was the spearhead of a movement which sought to transform these relations, 
and yet also highly compromised within them. In his academic work, the historical and 
political conditions by which Okinawa was incorporated within hegemonic and 
centralized power relations formed a core philosophical dilemma for Ota as he 
attempted to conceive of Okinawan subjectivity. As governor, the dilemmas of 
Okinawa's conditions became crystallized in the trials of his own position. Ota stood at 
the centre of, and found himself embroiled within, the process whereby these conditions 
were fiercely contested and reproduced. 
which individual property rights are subordinated to national policies; the level of jodicial independence 
from political interference; the use of economic compensation as an adjunct to more coercive instruments 
of state authority; the balance of power between central and local governments; the level of state 
responsiveness to minority interests; and the effectiveness oflocal protests movements in eliciting 
concessions from national policymakers" ("Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa: A Test for Japanese 
Democracy," p. 159). 
19 Sheila A. Smith, "Challenging National Authority; Okinawa Prefecture and the US Military Ba.ses" in 
Smith (ed.) Local Voices: National issues, p. 81. 
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While the US, Japan, and Okinawa form three vital elements in the axis of US-
Japan security relations, they do not appear as equal parties at the negotiating table. The 
US goverrnnent has often taken the position that the "Okinawa issue" is a domestic 
issue for Japan. As a result, from the Okinawa side contests over base issue since 
reversion have largely involved negotiations with the Japanese government and are 
intimately linked to the pursuit of economic, political, and cultural autonomy. This 
chapter traces these contests from the announcement of Ota' s refusal to act as proxy in 
September 1995 to his electoral defeat of November 1998. It focuses in particular on 
how Ota sought to negotiate relations with the central government, structures of local 
economic and political dependence, and related internal divisions within Okinawa It is 
important to note that within subsequent negotiations the US itself often remains an 
"absent centre"-a fact itself symptomatic of the indirect relations of power which have 
become intrinsic to the contemporary condition. 
Land Expropriation Procedures and Court Action 
Procedures for Utilizing Expropriated Land and Refusal to Act as Proxy 
The complex set of procedures which have applied to the leasing of expropriated 
land in Okinawa are legacy to the reversion process, whereby aspects of the structural 
inequalities produced by prolonged occupation became institutionalised within Japan's 
legal and administrative system. 2° Following the protracted contest over land 
expropriation policies in the 1950s, in 1958 USCAR agreed to abandon its lump 
payment policy in favour of five year land leases at an annual rent of more than six 
20 Aurelia George Mulgan observes: "The US bases in Okinawa have unquestioningly constituted a form 
of institutionalised discrimination against the Okinawan people. The issue they raise is fundamentally one 
of the equitable distribution of the social, environmental and economic costs of the American military 
presence in Japan" ("Managing the US Base Issue in Okinav.11," p. 160). 
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times the amount originally offered in 1953.21 As a result a majority of landovmers 
acceded to land leasing procedures, although there remained a number of "non-
contract" landovmers particularly in municipalities where US military facilities 
comprised a significantly large ratio of total land area. 22 At the time of Okinawa 
reversion in 1972, initially approximately 3,000 of a total of 25,000 holders of land 
utilized by the US military within Okinawa refused to enter into contracts with the 
Japanese government. They galvanized within the Anti-war Landovmers Committee 
(Hansen jinushikai). The DFAA initially sought to legalize the expropriation of this 
land by drafting a law on the "Provisional Expropriation of Land for Public Use." After 
this expired in 1977, a revised law on land boundary clarification was adopted to 
legalize occupation, ostensibly until land boundaries within the region were fully 
clarified. 23 In 1982, the Japanese government resuscitated a controversial law originally 
used in relation to land utilized by US military facilities in mainland Japan, the "Special 
Measures Law on Land Utilized by the US Military," and applied it to Okinawa. The 
last time this legislation had been used in mainland Japan was 1961.24 In protest against 
the 1982 application of this law, and in the effort to revitalize the force of the anti-war 
landovmers movement, a campaign was organized where supporters of the landowners 
cause bought small plots of the land in contention and mobilized into the One-Tsubo 
Anti-war Landovmers Association.25 
21 Miyagi Etsujiro, "The Land Problem (1952-1958)" in ~fasahlde Ota, A Comprehensive Study on US 
Military Government on Okinawa, pp. 36-87. 
22 Such as Chatan, Iejima, and Oroku (Naha). Arasaki Moriteru, "Beigun yoehi kyosei shiyo to dairi 
shomei," Sekai (November 1995), pp. 54-9. Also outlined in detail in Arasaki Moriteru, Shinpan: 
Okinawa hansenjinushi (Tokyo: Kobunken, 1995). 
23 The clarification of land boundaries was historically a complex issue in Okinawa after much relevant 
documentation and many landowners (and sometimes whole families) died during World War II. 
24 Arasaki Moriteru, "Beigun yochi kyosei shiyo to dairi shornei," p. 54. See also Sheila A Smith, 
"Challenging National Authority: Okinawa Prefecture and the US Military Bases," in Smith (ed.) Local 
Voices, National Issues, esp. pp. 86-8. 
25 Arasaki, Shinpan: Okinawa hansenjinushi, and Smith, ibid., p. 88. 
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According to land legislation as it applied to the Special Measures Law up to 
and including 1995, consent from the owner of the land in question was requested 1\vice 
during leasing procedures. The first time is when the DF AA originally requests use of 
the land (shomei dairi). The second is when the DF AA discloses its intention to use the 
land and requests public inspection of it (kokoku juran). This takes place after the 
Prefectural Land Expropriation Committee has carried out public hearings on use of the 
land in question (which on average take between six months to a year). If at either of 
these times the landowner refused to consent, then the head of the local municipality 
was obliged to act as proxy by sealing the documents themselves. The local government 
was required by law to carry out this so-called "delegated function" on behalf of the 
central government. "Delegated functions" have been a core feature of Japan's system 
of centralized administration, in which local officials are often perceived as the agents 
of central government-controlled policy.26 If the local municipality head refused, the 
prefectural governor, as head of the local administration, was required to seal the 
2' documents in the landowner's stead. ' 
Soon after gaining office, in the first months of 1991, Ota was requested to act 
as proxy at the second stage of these procedures, in relation to public notification and 
inspection. During this time he was in the midst of carrying out negotiations with the 
central government over Okinawa's Third Development Plan (1992-2001). After three 
months of intense negotiation and in the face of opposition from within his support 
base, he agreed to consent to the leasing procedure. In return the government agreed to 
work towards base reduction-a promise which, Ota stressed when the issue again 
26 See fur example Aurelia George Mulgan, "Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa," p. 162. 
27 Arasaki Moriteru, "Beigun yochi kyosei shiyo to dairi shomei"; and Smith, "Challenging National 
Authority: Okinawa Prefecture and the US Military Bases." 
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arose in 1995, was not fulfilled.28 Up untilOta's announcement in September 1995, no 
Okinawan governor had refused to carry out either of these proxy functions. 
The documents Ota refused to sign were at the first stage of the leasing 
proeedure. The mayors of Okinawa City, Yomitan Village, and Naha City had already 
refused to act as proxies on the leases, which involved close to 3,000 land ov.ners, 
roughly 367, 705 meters squared of land, and 13 different US military facilities. Most of 
the leases, generally five or ten years in length, were set to expire on 14 May 1997. Yet 
there was also one twenty-year leased-plot within So be Communications Facility which 
was owned by anti-war activist Chibana ShOichi and which was set to expire on I April 
1996. According to land expropriation laws at the juncture of 1995, in the case that 6ta 
refused to act as proxy, the prime minister could "advise" and then "order" the governor 
to implement his designated functions. If 6ta continued to refuse, the prime minister 
must file a lawsuit against the governor. Moreover, this was only the first stage of the 
leasing process: once this issue was resolved in the courts, the Prefectural Land 
Committee still had to carry out public hearings on the land, and after this the governor 
was again required to act as proxy for public notification of the lease and land 
inspection. In short, from the moment of Ota' s announcement of his refusal there 
existed the very real possibility that the land leases would expire in the meantime, 
placing the US armed forces in the position of unlawfully occupying Japanese 
. '9 temtory.· 
28 Egami Takayoshi details the negotiations made at this time in "Ota kak:ushin kensei no kenshO to kichi 
mondai 1990-1994-nen," pp. 90-5. 
29 As representative of the One-Tsubo Anti-war Landowners movement, Arasaki Moriteru put it: "The 
arbitrary legal applications [used to expropriate land up to this point] have in unison backfired, and the 
chickens come home to roost" (Arasaki Moriteru, "Beigun yochi kyosei shiyo to dairi sbomei," p. 59). 
Arasaki is a representative of the One-tsubo .'\.nti-war Landowners Association and one of its founding 
members. In the words ofYoichi Funabashi: "By refusing to sign ... Ota markedly weakened the Japanese 
government's Achilles' heel in dealing with the bases" (Alliance Adrift, p. 312). 
241 
In "taking on" the US and Japanese governments, as one New York Times article 
phrased it, by refusing to act as proxy, Ota caused major ripples in both Tokyo and 
Washington?0 Up to this point Okinawan attempts to influence the formulation of a 
post-cold war security structure, and Okinawa's role within in it, had been largely 
ignored. Yet as a result of Ota' s ardent stance against the bases and the land 
expropriation process, US-Japan security relations were shaken at their foundation and 
Ota was able to take a leading role within political processes. 31 His action highlighted 
the extent to which the "Okinawan issue" implicated the core foundations of US-Japan 
security relations and the democratic principles of Japan's postwar system. Okinawa 
emerged repeatedly within international headlines.32 On the historical significance of 
Ota's action, Ryukyu University Professor Hiyane Teruo later reflected: 
Ota's decision to refuse to act as proxy was one local head representative's 
impeachment against the national government (kuni), and in the sense that it 
shook the foundations of national policy, was an epoch-making event It was an 
act unparalleled in the postwar history of local government, and in this sense will 
no doubt become a historical and ideological symbol for local autonomy. Behind 
Ota's decision, and compelling him to make it, lay I believe, Okinawa's past.33 
30 Andrew Pollack, "Okinawa Governor Takes on Both Japan and US," New York Times (5 October 1995). 
31 Kamo Toshio describes this policy as the "Ota Initiative" ("Okinawa, jichi moderu no sentaku," in 
Miyamoto Ken'ichi and Sasaki Masayuki (eds.), Okinawa: 21 seki e no chOsen (Tokyo: lwananti Shoten, 
2000), p. 264). 
32 See for example Andrew Pollack, "Okinawa Governor Takes on Both Japan and US," New York Times 
(5 Ocmber 1995); and Richard Lloyd Parry, "Gl rape case is last straw for Okinawans," Independence (22 
September 1995). Press coverage also escalated after the 21 October rally. See for example "Rape case 
puts t:S role on Okina;va in jeopardy," San Francisco Examiner (22 October 1995); "Tens of thousands 
rally against bases in Okinav."a," Japan Times (22 October 1995); "85 000 protest military bases on 
Okinawa," Washington Post (22 October 1995); and CNN World News, "Thousands rally against US 
bases in Okinawa" (21 October 1995). 
"As cited from an interview in Ota Masahide, Okinawa no ketsudcm, pp. 179-80. 
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Court Action: The "Okinawa Issue" and post- "1955 System" Japan 
Ota thus took advantage of an administrative loophole w-ithin leasing procedures 
to mount a forceful challenge against the disproportionate ratio of US bases within 
Okinawa. Ota' s criticism was directed at the historical position imposed on Okinawa 
within US-Japan's bilateral security structure, and the reification of this role ·within a 
post-Cold War framework. In an appeal to the constitutional ideals of peace and 
democracy, it was also made against the further remilitarisation of Japan under 
strengthened US-Japan security relations?4 
However, conservative trends in public discourse and calls for a more active 
military role for Japan particularly after the Persian Gulf War had resulted in the 
increasing estrangement of pacifism on a national level. The end of the Cold War and 
the bursting of Japan's bubble economy saw the breakdown of the LOP's political 
stronghold, accompanied by fragmentation in ideology and poliey within the national 
political system as a whole. From the beginning of 1993 the Social Democratic Party of 
Japan (SDP) made concrete moves towards changing its traditional opposition to 
Japan's Defence Forces, the US-Japan Security Treaty, and the enacting of a military 
role for Japan. These moves increased in pace following the LOP's electoral defeat of 
July 1993, as influential elements within the SDP schemed to take hold of power in a 
non-LDP coalition goveroment. The following mismatched coalition of rivalling left, 
moderate, and right-wing groups under the leadership of New Frontier Party leader 
Hosokawa Morihiro and later Hata Tsutomu lasted less than a year, and in April 1994 
the SDP announced its secession from Hata's goveroment. At the end of June 1994, 
"US plans to maintain the existing number of US military personnel (approximatoly 47, 000) within 
Japan had been outlined in the Pentagon's "Nye Report" of February 1995. Officially entitled "U.S. 
Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region" or EASR, the report was released by the US 
Department of Defense in February 1995, See lor example "Pentagon affirms Asia commitment," The 
Japan Times, Tuesday, February 28, 1995, p. !. Ota mentioned both the Nye Report and the scheduled 
November meeting in his statement outlining his reasons for refusing to act as proxy, republished in Ota 
Masahide, Heiwa no ishiji, pp. 127-32. 
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Murayama Tomiichi became the first socialist leader to be prime minister in close to 
fifty years. 35 Yet this was as a leader of a minority party in a coalition together with the 
LDP, who had up to this point been the socialist party's main political rivals since the 
emergence of what came to be known as the "1955 political system" almost forty years 
previously. 36 
The Okinawan chapter of the Social Democratic Party was a major supporter of 
Ota's administration, and while extremely tenuous, Murayama's position as head of 
govermnent certainly provided an important channel for concerns over the base issue.37 
Yet the SDP's about-tum over fundamental aspects of policy at the national level from 
the Hosokawa cabinet onwards also hastened its subsequent near-demise both nationally 
and locally. No clear consensus was reached on an alternative vision for the party as a 
substitute to orthodox pacifist ideals. This situation contributed to the party's severe 
weakening, and a general popular disillusionment with politics. It also resulted in the 
fragmentation of the party and the dissipation of any political alternative to the LDP. 
The "Okinawa issue" exploded in this midst, and tested the alliance between the SDP 
and LDP as well as factional rifts within the SDP itself to their limit. The weakening of 
the SDP at a national level as a perceived bulwark on anti-base, pacifist issues 
compromised the position of the progressive political coalition which supported Ota 
35 The last socialist leader to head a ruling C<lalition within the Diet was Katayama Tetsu (1947-8). 
36 For a history of the LOP's structure of governance under the '"1955 system", see for example Masumi 
Junnosuke, Contemporary Politics in Japan (translated by Lonny E. Carlile) (Berkeley: Cniversity of 
California Press, 1995). On the JSP's policy changes and its effect particularly on Okinawa, see 
Fukushima Yoshikazu, "Shakaito no seisaku teokan to Okinawa-ken no hano,'' Ryiikyii Daigaku Hobun 
Gakubu (March 1993), pp. 107-27. 
37 In one example, as a result of extensive lobbying largely through the JSP, legislation was passed in May 
1995 detailing the government's obligations in relation to base land marked for return, including 
guarantee of compensation revenues for three years following return (Law on Special Measures in 
Relation to the Return of Foreign Base Land in Okinawa Prefecture). Ota and Yoshimoto recount the 
process leading to the drawing up of this legislation in Ota Masahide Okinawa no ketsudan, pp. 153-6. 
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within Okinawa. It thus also ultimately served as a factor in the fragmentation of 
Okinawa's progressive movement as a whole.38 
From the outset there was little eonsensus within the government over how to 
respond to Ota's stance on the proxy issue or demands for the revision of the SOFA. 
Left-wing factions and Okinawan members within the central SDP were strongly 
opposed to Murayama carrying out the procedures necessary to enforce the leasing 
process. 39 Officials within the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and 
Japan's Defence Agency (JDA) as well as key figures within the LDP were in contrast 
primarily concerned with smoothing bilateral relations in preparation for the 
reaffirmation of the security treaty scheduled in November.40 SDP members within the 
cabinet wavered between attempting to respond to the requests of the Ota administration 
and demands of left-wing groups on the one hand, and working primarily to maintain 
their tenuous position within the LOP-dominated coalition government on the other. 
In his meeting with Murayama on 4 November 1995, which lasted over five 
hours, Ota outlined requests for the revising of SOFA and reiterated his refusal to sign 
the documents. Murayama expressed deep regret over the rape incident and sympathy 
for the plight of Okinawans, and agreed to establish a high-level consultative body 
"For a detailed analysis of the dilemma the Okinawa chapter of the JSP faced over the proxy issue and 
its impact see Fukushima Yoshikazu, "Nihon Shakaito (Shamin!O) ni okem 'genjitsu' to 'rinen' ," Nihon 
shiso no chihei to suimyaku (Tokyo: Perikansha, 1998), pp. 577-605. 
39 Vice Chairman of the SDP and member of the House of Representatives elect from Okinawa, Uehara 
Kosuke, was particularly assertive in calling for the need to draw out a specific plan for a reduction of the 
bases in Okinawa, and a revision of SOFA. In an interview with Mainichi Shinbun, Uehara explained that 
he had detailed his proposals for base reduction to SDP Secretary General Kuho Watarn, and called on the 
need for the prime minister and cabinet to take the initiative in policy-making over bureaucrats on the 
Okinawa issue (Mainichi Daily News (1 5 October 1995)). 
40 In a meeting with Ota soon afrer the rape incident, Foreign Minister Kono replied that Ota was 
"pushing too far too quickly" (hashirisugi) by making demands for revision, a comment which further 
incensed Ota and was widely reported in mainland Japanese and Okinawan press (See for example 
Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, p. 303-4). Kono also confirmed with US Ambassador Walter Mondale that the 
government had no intention of requesting revision, though both governments agreed to review the way 
in which the SOFA's criminal procedures were implemented (See for example Pacific Stars and Stripes (5 
October 1995), p. 6). 
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between the national and prefectural governments to discuss base issues, including 
possible reductions.41 At the same time, under the direction of SDP Secretary General 
Kubo Wataru, the SDP made preparations to outline a specific proposal for the 
reduction and realigmnent of US military bases in Okinawa. In an interview directly 
following Ota's announcement of his refusal, Kubo stressed that "the govermnent 
should not force the governor to sign by exercising its authority to order" the carrying 
out of functions, and that the solution to the issue at hand "ultimately lay in outlining a 
set of specific guidelines towards the decrease and withdrawal of the military bases. "42 
According to this subsequent proposal, made public on November 8, the size of 
Okinawa's US bases was to be cut in half by the year 2020. The SDP called for the 
"necessity of an early review" of Japan's recognition of the Pentagon's policy on 
maintaining US military presence at the current level, 43 and outlined its opposition 
towards the government's new defence program, including the dispatch of Japanese Self 
Defence Forces overseas. 44 
Yet even these proposals did not nearly meet the requests that Ota outlined to 
Murayama on 3 November in his Okinawa "Action Program"-which called for the 
complete withdrawal of US bases from Okinawa by the year 2015.45 Nor did the SDP 
have enough influence in either the Diet or government agencies to implement policies 
"This was to become !he Committee on US Bases in Okinav.ta, formally established by a cabinet 
decision on 17 November 1995. The Committee's aim was "to discuss issues concerning facilities and 
areas [utilised by the US military] under Article 6 of !he security treaty signed between the United States 
of America aod Japan." Primury members included vice cabinet-secretary, director general of the North 
American Affairs Bureau, director general ofDFAA, the Okinav;an vice-governor, and policy affairs 
adviser (see Okinawa Prefecture Base Affairs Department (Okinawa-ken kichi taisaku-shitsu) (ed.) 
Okinawa no beigun kichi (Naha: Kiehl taisaku-shitsu, 1998) p. 231; and Smith, "Challenging National 
Authority," p. 91). 
42 Fukushima Yoshikazu, ''Nihon Shakaitii (Sharnintil) ni oketu 'gelljitsu' to 'rinen'," p. 585. 
43 Ibid., p. 587. 
44 
"Japan Social Democrat Unveils 'More Pacifist' Defence Plan", Kyoda News Service, Tokyo (II 
November 1995). 
" On details of the Action Program see Okinawa Prefecture Base Affairs Department (Okinawa-ken kichl 
taisaku-shitsu) (ed.) Okinawa no beigun kichi, p. 240-1. 
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clearly in contradiction with those outlined by top bureaucrats and the LDP. 46 On 
Kovember 13, officials confirmed that the prime minister would convey to US President 
Bill Clinton in their scheduled meeting the following week that he intended to use his 
authority to force through the leases.47 On 19 November, Murayarna met with US viee-
President AI Gore, filling in for US President Clinton who had cancelled his Jap<)ll visit 
in the midst of a domestic budget crisis. Both leaders reaffirmed the importance of US 
troops to the peace and stability of the region, and announced the establishment of a 
bilateral Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). Assenting to pressures within 
the ruling coalition and from government agencies, Murayarna confirmed his intention 
to Gore to use his authority to push through the Okinawa land leases.48 
Since the swell of a nation-wide pro-reversion movement in the 1960s, the 
Socialist Party, like left->.ving political groups in general, historically upheld the 
Okinawa base issue in particular as a central tenet of the anti-war, pacifist principles 
which formed the foundation of its political agenda. As Communist Party members 
berated Murayarna in the Diet, only a very short time ago the socialists themselves had 
taken an opposing view against the treaty, the SDF, and the bases. Murayama's decision 
to carry out the procedures which would directly lead to the filing of a court action 
against Ota was highly revealing. It exposed the limits of the SDP' s tenuous hold on 
power within the LOP-dominated coalition. It confirmed the extent of the dissolution of 
postwar liberal ideals, and the breakdown in political consensus and clear agendas 
within Japan's parliamentary party system. It may also be seen as exemplary of the 
46 In meetings between US Defense Secretary William Perry, and Japanese Foreign Minister Kano and 
Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director-General EIO Seishiro on I November, both governments had 
confirmed there would be no cuts in US furces stationed in Japan. The extent of conflict between the SDP 
and government agencies over the Okinawa issue was clearly exposed after Director-General of the 
DFAA, Hoshuyama Noboru, was quoted as calling Prime Minister Murayama "stupid" in his handling of 
it. Hoshuyama was forced to resign over the incident on 19 October 1995. 
47 In particular, Cabinet Secretary Nosaka Koken. OT (14 November 1995), p. 3. 
" See for example OT (20 November 1995). 
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"differences in perception" between progressive political groups in mainland Japan and 
Okinawa which Ota had lamented of at least since the publication of The Ugly Japanese 
over twenty-five years previously. The Okinawan chapter of the SDP was in particular 
placed in a dilemma as it sought to uphold Ota's stance against the position of the 
party's central organs. 49 
On hearing that Murayama had agreed to push the lease process through on the 
night of November 19, Ota announced an emergency press conference. The closing 
ceremony of the World Uchinaanchu (Okinawan) Congress, which unites people of 
Okinawan descent from around the world, was just over, and the press packed into a 
room in the convention centre where it had been held. In high spirits from the lively 
ccngress proceedings, Ota flared up as the topic of the bilateral meeting and security 
treaty arose. Prefectural officials looked on with increasing alarm as Ota flung 
criticisms towards both the central government and mainland Japan. "I denounce the 
fact that Okinawa should become the means to protect the fortune of mainland 
Japanese," Ota declared. Turning to the topic of the Battle of Okinawa, he concluded: 
"We already made too many sacrifices for the fortunes of others during the war." Ota 
was highly critical of the government's refusal to respond to calls for compensation for 
Okinawan war-malaria victims and for Japanese aggression in Asia in general. He 
declared: "What kind of people are the Japanese? That is why they are not trusted in 
Asia!" He also lamented Okinawa's complicity-as an "aggressor" through the hosting 
of bases-and declared his desire to "end these conditions." At the end of the uniquely 
emotional and unreserved press conference proceedings, Ota's final indictment 
reverberated throughout the room as he made his exit: "Is Okinawa Japan?"50 
49 Fukushima, "Nihon Shakaito (Shaminto) ni okeru 'genjitsu' to 'rinen' ," 
50 OT(21 November 1995), p. 2.ln a regular press conference the following day, Ota was much more 
careful with his words, conceding that the Prime Minister had his "position" as head of national 
government and the "bilateral treaty" to consider, but that at the same time Ota had the "position of the 
prefecture" to keep in mind (transcript of Governor's regular press conference, 20 November 1995, p. 2). 
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In response to the central SDP' s turnaround in basic policies and as the prime 
minister moved towards going ahead 'lvith leasing proceedings, the head of the SDP 
Okinawa Chapter Aragaki Zenshun observed: "Murayama has dug his own grave."51 
Indeed, just over a month after his meeting with Vice-President Gore, on 5 January 
1996, Murayama armounced his resignation from the post of prime minister, ostensibly 
over factionalism. Yet not before the leasing procedures had been carried through. On 7 
December 1995, after Ota continued to refuse the prime minister's order to carry out 
proxy on the leases, Murayarna filed legal suit against Ota for failing to fulfil the duties 
reqnired by his office. 
Contest: The Court Case and the Prefectural Plebiscite 
The Legal Case and Political Mobilization 
With the onset of a legal battle between Ota and the national government, both 
sides also galvanized for a political contest which extended far beyond the courts. 
Japan's Supreme Court has a consistent record of supporting the central government 
position in controversial legal eases. This is particularly so in cases involving Japan's 
security policy and interpretations of the peace clause of the constitution, where the 
court has consistently abstained on what it has seen as a "political issue" and therefore 
beyond jurisdiction. 52 From the outset, it was predicted to be highly unlikely that Ota's 
counsel would win. 
"Cited in Fukushima, "Nihon Shakairo (Shaminto) ni okeru 'genjitsu' to 'rinen'," p. 591. 
52 The fifteen justices of !be Supreme Court are directly appointed by Cabinet, and as a result of 
prolonged one-party rule, Ibis bas ensured extensive LOP influence in the courts (as observed by Aurelia 
George Mulgan, "Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa," p. 164). Mulgan also notes that the tendency 
for the courts to avoid taking a stance in opposition to the government on political controversial case has 
been a legal tradition in Japan since the famous Sunagawa case of 1959, which also involved the Special 
Measures Law on Land Utilized by the US Military, and involved charges of trespass by Japanese 
demonstrators on the Tachikawa US Air Base. 
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Yet the court case was still conceived as vital as part of a larger citizen 
movement and an important forum to air Okinawan issues. As Eric A. Feldman points 
out, the assertion of right~ through the courts has formed a vital part of legal and 
political contest in Japan. 53 Legal proceedings have been utilized both to seek concrete 
judicial remedies and provide a forum within which to legitimise political claims. 54 
The extent of the legitimacy crisis which the US military faced in Japan 
following the end of the Cold War, as well as the widespread support which Ota's anti-
base pro-autonomy stance received in Okinawa, should not be underestimated. 55 By 16 
November 1995, Ota had received 13,682 letters in response to his refusal to act as 
proxy, the large majority of which expressed support for his stance. 56 By May 1996, this 
number had reached 55,000.57 On 9 November 1995, head of the Okinawa Prefectural 
Federation of the Japan Trade Union Confederation (Rengo Okinawa), Toguchi 
Masahiro, handed over a collection of over half a million signatures supporting Ota's 
cause to then Prime Minister Murayama. 58 The prefectural administration and Ota's 
progressive support base sought to utilize this backing through two primary means: by 
exploiting the court case itself as a public and publicized forum to present the historical 
and political conditions facing Okinawa, and through implementing a prefectural 
33 Eric A. Feldman, The Ritual of Rights in Japan: Lmv, Societ}: and Health Policy (Cambridge, UK: 
University of Cambridge Press, 2000), p. I. 
'
4 Ibid., p. 111. 
"In a public opimon poll jointly conducted by Asahi newspaper and the Okinmva limes in May 1997, for 
instance, support for Ota's stance against the bases stood at over 90% (46% strongly support, 45% 
support). Only I 0% of Okinawans agreed that the US bases should be maintained at the present level, 
with over 85% calling for either gradual reduction or immediate withdra·wal. Only a minority (37% 
agreed in contrast to 49% disagreed} of Okinawans thought that maintenance of the US military presence 
in East Asia was necessary at all (Asahi Shinbun, 12 May 1997, p. 15). 
56 Ota Masahide Seikei Bunka Kenkyii .Kaihen (ed.) Ota Okinawa-ken chiji: Heiwa de katsuryoku ni 
michiuruoi no aru Okinawa o mezashite (Naha: Ota Masahide seikei bunka kenkyii kaihen, 1995-1999), 
Vol. 5 (1994-5), p. 105. 
57 Ota Masahide, Heiwa no ishiji, op cit., p. 158. 
"Egami Takayoshi, "Okinawa no ken-min tohyo," Ryiikyii Daigaku Hobun Gakubu Seiji Kokusai Kankei 
Ronshii, First Edition (March 1998), p. 4. 
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plebiscite on the base issue. Academics versed on Okinawan issues spoke at forums 
throughout Japan and the US, the prefectural administration and peace and women's 
groups in Japan and the US placed advertisements on the base issue in the print press, 59 
and Ota himselfled an Okinawan delegation in a highly publicized visit to Washington. 
These activities saw intellectuals, lawyers, activists, politicians, journalists, and 
even high school students throughout Okinawa and beyond who supported Ota's stance 
working in corporation with local bureaucrats and the prefectural administration. 
Historically, local officials in Japan have often been seen as servants to the national 
government rather than representatives of their local electorate. 60 In direct contrast, Ota 
carne to play a highly unusual and exceptionally visible role as at once the 
administrative head of the prefectural government and the spearhead of a wide legal, 
political, and citizen-based movement against national government policy and the US 
bases and in the name oflocal citizen will, welfare and autonomy.61 
On 8 December 1995, only the day after Murayarna filed suit against Ota, the 
High Court set the date to initiate hearings for two weeks later. The court case was 
carried out with exceptional speed-in four separate hearings over the space of three 
months. The court refused repeated requests from Ota's legal counsel to allow anti-war 
landowners to testify and limited the testifiers to only one from each side-an official 
from the DFAA representing the government, and the defendant, Governor Ota. Ota's 
59 See for example "Who can take it?", an advertisement published in the New York Times (15 November 
1995) (Al7) and sponsored by the Military Base Affairs Office, Executive Office of the Governor of 
Okinawa; and "The Women of Japan Again Appeal to the Peace-Loving People of the World," published 
in the New York Times (12 April 1996) (A25), and sponsored by the "Japanese Women's Appeal." 
6il See for example Patricia G Steinhoff, "Kan-Min Relations in Local Government," in Sheila Smith (ed.) 
National Voices: Local Issues, pp. 115·29. 
61 In this regard Shiela Smith observes: "VI'hile local politicians have refused to abide by national laws in 
other instances of social protest in Japan, Ota played a strikingly visible role in the protest of US bases in 
Okinawa. Summoned by the citizens who organized the prefectural rally in October 1995, he was in 
essence given the mantle ofleadership of the movement" ("Challenging National Authority: Okinawa 
Prefecture and the US Military Bases," p. 79). 
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legal counsel and anti-war lando\'mers fiercely criticized this decision and the rushed 
nature of the entire proceedings as revealing of the court's pro-government bias. 
Both in the High Court proceedings and later in the Supreme Court appeal, the 
question at issue centred on whether or not Ota's refusal to carry out the acting of proxy 
could be regarded as a violation of the "public interest" (kOeki). The national 
government argued that the functioning of the US-Japan Security Treaty and SOFA was 
a highly political issue which touched the basis of foreign policy and national defence 
and therefore clearly lay within the authority of the prime minister. The prefecture 
argued in contrast that the national government could only enforce delegated functions 
to the extent that they did not violate loeal autonomy law. The prefecture also 
challenged the legality of the entire leasing process. It was argued that the Special 
Measures law, as legislation which applied solely to Okinawa, violated the 
constitutional principles of equality, 62 as well as property rights and the right to a 
peaceful existence (heiwa teki seizonken ). In short, the prefectural side placed the 
fundamental inequalities and contradictions of Okinawa's location in Japan's postwar 
system within a broad historical and political context. The national government avoided 
debating these issues, focusing rather on the way in which Ota's refusal to carry out 
administrative procedures obstructed the implementation of a fundamental aspect of 
national policy and therefore the public interest. 63 The case had far reaching 
implications for the legal interpretation of delegated functions and the Special Measures 
Law and raised central issues concerning the balance of power between central and 
local governments. 64 
62 The constitution states that legislation which applies only to one particular regional group must obtain a 
majority consensus by ballot in the region in question. 
63 For a summary of both arguments presented see for example "Dairi shomei kyohi," Jidai o yomu 
booklet, No.3 (Tokyo: Rimuhsa, 1996) (also in cooperation with the Okinawa Taimusu). For a summary 
in English see Sheila A. Smith "Challenging National Authority: Okinawa Prefecture and the US Military 
Bases," pp. 90-4. 
64 RS (28 August 1996), p. 1. 
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Directly following Ota' s announcement of his refusal to act as proxy, teachers 
and students from the seven universities located in Okinawa mobilized in his support. 
As it became clear the issue would most probably be fought out in court, this group 
formed the "Citizen's and University Members Association" (shim in, daigakunin no 
kaz). Wbile Ota's legal team drew up the strategic legal argument for the case, the 
University Association, which included academics from numerous fields, assisted in 
incorporating a historical and political framework. The Association also served as a 
bridge between the counsel and thousands of supportive citizens mainly in Okina>\'a but 
also across Japan. Throughout the court proceedings, members participated in 
explanations of each hearing, lined up in hundreds to attend the hearings, passed 
resolutions in support of Ota, and conducted protests outside the courts. Citizen groups 
thereby directly participated in the process whereby legal argument was formulated and 
the legal case made in tum encompassed wider historical, social, and political issues.65 
Members of the University Association became key figures in conceiving and 
promoting the prefectural plebiscite, and within the nation-wide forum, "Message from 
Okinawa," sponsored by Okinawa Prefecture as part of proceedings for the fiftieth 
anniversary since the end of the Battle of Okinawa.66 The formation of the "Women 
Acting against Military Violence" group in the wake of the rape incident and 
subsequent court case also coincided >\'ith a rise in the public profile and influence of 
women's organizations within the anti-base citizen movement.67 
63 The record of the Citizens and University Association is detailed in; Okinawa kara heiwa o tsukuru 
shimin, daigakunin no kai (ed.) Dairi shame kyohi saiban: tomo ni kangae, kiidil shita kiroku (Naha, 
Okinawa University 1999), 
66 Kichi to heiwa to bunka o kangaeru Okinawa kara no messeeji (Naha: Okinawa Prefecture, 1997). Also 
recounted in interviews with Takara Tetsumi (20 April 2001) and Miyagi Etsujiro ( 4 May 2001). 
61 The first general meeting of the "Women Acting Against :Military Violence" was held on 29 November, 
1995. The organization lobbied in Okinawa, Tokyo, and the US, including within the "Okinawa Women's 
America Peace Caravan." See for example Takazato Suzuyo, Okinawa no onna-tachi. Information on 
activities of the organization also kindly provided by Asato Etsuko. 
253 
In the first court hearing, Ota presented a statement calling for the court to 
"deliver a decision which will ¥.ithstand the judgement of history according to the 
principles of independent judiciary, the constitution, and local autonomy." In his 
subsequent testimony to the High Court on 11 March 1995 Ota drew upon the tenets of 
his previous historical analyses. Many of these issues were also reiterated in Ota's later 
statement to the Supreme Court delivered on 10 July 1996.68 In outlining his reasons for 
refusing to carry out the proxy functions, he emphasized the three principles of "peace, 
coexistence, and autonomy" which his administration upheld. He stressed the fact that 
his election platform had included the promise that he would build a "peaceful Okinawa 
prefecture." He recounted his experiences in the Battle of Okinawa, and the unique 
history and perceived peaceful traditions of the Ryukyu Kingdom. He also drew upon 
pacifist principles whieh he saw to be symbolized in the Cornerstone of Peace and its 
commemoration of all those who lost their lives during the Battle of Okinawa. In short, 
Ota presented a criticism of the ideology of cultural, linguistic, and historical 
homogeneity in Japan, Okinawans' sense of inferiority, policies of assimilation, and 
historical discrimination against Okinawa. He also mounted a challenge against the 
fundamental tenets of national security discourse-in particular the assumption that 
dominant definitions of the national interest coincided with the protection of people's, 
and in particular Okinawans', safety. 
Ota criticised the fact that the land in question was originally forcefully 
expropriated by the US military under occupation. He saw that the so called "Nye 
Report" of February 1995 confirmed the maintenance and even possible strengthening 
of the US military presence and thus the continued expropriation of this land. He 
stressed that he saw 1 apan' s bilateral relationship ¥.ith the US as vital and did not take 
an anti-US stance. Rather, he argued, it was precisely because he valued bilateral 
68 For the full text of the Supreme Court statement see Ota Masahide, Okinawa: Heiwa no !shiii, pp. 168-
81. 
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relations that he saw it as essential that the base issue in Okinawa be resolved. 
Recounting the failures of reversion, Ota concluded: "Historically, Okinawa has not 
been able to determine its own livelihood but has been forced to submit to the will of 
others!' He expressed the desire for autonomy, and endeavoured to emisage a future 
that would "enable Okinawa to stand on its o'hn, or to put it more simply, to enable 
Okinawa to determine its own destiny. "69 
On 25 March 1996, the day of the High Court's ruling, a group of Japanese 
intellectuals, including such nationally renown figures as Maruyama Masao, Yamada 
Yoji, Ueno Chizuko and Ienaga Saburo, placed an advertisement in the Okinawa Times 
expressing their support for Ota and stressing that the rule of law exists in the name of 
"humanity" and justice!' The High Court judgement however found in full favour of the 
plaintiff, rejecting the claim that the Special Measures Law conflicted with 
constitutional principles. Ota' s refusal to carry out the proxy function was found to be a 
violation of the "public interest." A day later, on 26 March, Hashimoto himself acted as 
proxy in the signing of the leases. 70 
Futenma Return, the Plebiscite, and the Final Judgment 
The government was thus able to break the standstill on the leasing procedures. 
Yet tension over the Okinawa issue and between the national government and the 
prefectural administration far from ceased. On the morning of I April 1996, the day his 
land lease expired, landowner Chibana ShOichi and hundreds of his supporters were met 
by police in full riot gear as they arrived at the gate of Sobe Communications Base 
demanding access to Chibana's land. The DFAA sought emergency rights to access, 
69 The full text of Ota's testimony to the High Court is printed in "Okinawa kenchiji shOgen: kichl no nai 
heiwa na shima e," (Tokyo: Niraisha, 1996). 
70 Aurelia George Mu!gan observes: "The way in which the ... Court handled the Ota ca.'e and the method 
of the courts' rulings support argoments that the Japanese judiciary is a tool of executive, especially on 
matters that embody a challenge to state policy and authority" ("Managing the US Base Issue in 
Okinawa," p. 165). 
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arguing that the US-Japan Security Treaty required continued use of the base land. Yet 
the US military was now undeniably placed in the position of "unlav.ful" occupation. 
This situation was "fraught with political overtones,"71 as Okinawa's political protest 
had become "gripping news on national television."72 
The same day, Ota announced his decision to appeal on the High Court's 
judgement to the Supreme Court of Japan. He criticised the High Court for "failing to 
adequately consider the issues at hand," and in particular for its failure to take account 
of the fundamental legal principles of the constitution and of local autonomy. 73 
Following the High Court defeat, groups in Okinawa also strengthened their resolve to 
carry out a prefectural referendum on the base issue. Rengo Okinawa union leader 
Toguchi Masahiro initially conceived of the possibility of a prefectural-wide plebiscite 
as a powerful means to appeal the Okinawa issue both domestically and to the world. At 
an early stage the Ota administration expressed its support for the idea. 74 With the 
prospects of the Supreme Court overturning the original judgement extremely slim, it 
was hoped that the plebiscite could serve as an important display of majority support for 
Ota in his enduring legal battle.75 As Okinawan political scientist Shimabukuro .Tun 
observed: "While the government also held the power of authority in the courts, the 
prefecture did not have an opposing counter force. The only power enabling the 
71 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, p. 311. 
72 Sheila A. Smith, "Challenging National Authority: Okinawa Prefecture and the US Military Bases," p. 
95. 
73 Transcript of Press Conference (l Aprill996). 
74 As recounted in Robert Eldridge, "The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on US Base Reductions: One 
Question, Several An.sv,-ers," Asian Survey, Vot 37, No. 10, October 1997, pp. 883-4. Egami Takayoshi 
also notes that a top representative from the governor's office visited Toguchi prior to Ota)s 
announcement of his refusal to act as proxy and confirmed Rengo Okinawa's support (see Egami 
Takayoshi, "Okinawa no ken-min tohyo," p. 3). 
75 Egami Takayoshi, "Okinawa no ken-min t6hyo," p. 6. See also Shimabukuro Jun. "Dairi shomei kyo hi 
to kenmin tohyo o meguru Okinawa no seiji teki doko to haikei" in Egami Takayoshi ( ed.) Gendai 
Okinawa no seifi to shakai, p. 150. Rengo Okinawa had first hoped to carry out the referendum prior to 
Clinton's April visit, yet the complex procedures for implementing the referendum took much longer than 
originally expected. 
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prefecture to carry through the refusal to act as proxy was support from the prefecture's 
eitizens."76 On April 10, enough signatures to satisfY the requirements necessary to 
request a referendum were presented to local election administration committees. Just 
over a month later, Ota strongly argued in support of the plebiscite in an extraordinary 
session of the prefectural assembly, noting: "For the people of Okinawa prefecture to 
display independently (s hutai teki ni) their own will and for that will to be reflected in 
prefectural policy is an essential principle of local autonomy. It also holds the 
significance of working to increase the opportunity for citizen participation in the 
workings of public administration and promote decentralization."77 
Meanwhile, Ota also utilized various means to lobby the US government and 
bring further attention to the Okinawa base issue within the US. Soon after his 
announcement to refuse to act as proxy, Ota had met '.Vith Hawaiian Governor Benjamin 
Cayetano to discuss the possibility of relocating military facilities to Hawaii, a 
suggestion Cayetano made in a personal letter to Ota. 78 In March 1996, Ota wrote a 
letter to US President Clinton, in which he noted the "unfair and discriminatory burden" 
placed on Okinawa through the disproportionate US military presence, and stressed that 
the Okinawan base issue must be "addressed fully" in order to "enhance cordial 
relations between our two countries." Ota persistently requested Japanese government 
assistance in the attempt to arrange a direct meeting with Clinton during his visit to 
Japan in April in vain. Yet through the assistance of US Ambassador Mondale, Ota was 
able to greet Clinton briefly at a luncheon during the president's Japan visit. 79 On 
76 Shimabukuro Jun, "Dairi shomei kyohi to kenmin tiihyo o meguru Okinawa no seiji teki doko to 
haikei,"' p. 153. 
n Cited in Egami Takayoshi, "Okinawa no ken-min tohyo," p. 7. 
7
' See for example, "Hawaii, Oki governor discu.ss bases," Stars and Stripes (16 November 1995); and 
"Hawaii says OK to bases," Japan Times (17 October 1995). 
19 See for example Ota Masabide, Okinawa no ketsudan, pp. 216-7. 
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meeting the president, Ota appealed to Clinton to visit Okinawa and see the situation 
there for himself. 
In June, Ota headed an Okinawan delegation to the US. It was not the first time 
an Okinawan governor sought to take issues relating to the US bases directly to 
Washington. Even conservative Governor Nishime, frustrated with MOFA'S failures to 
communicate or address Okinawan concerns, lobbied through the American Okinawan 
Association to arrange a meeting with Pentagon heads in May 1985, to the chagrin of 
the Japanese government. 80 Ota had lobbied in the US every year since entering office. 
Yet in 1996, the explosion of the Okinawan issue now brought unprecedented publicity 
and swiftly opened doors to the offices of top military and government officials, 
including Defence Secretary William Perry and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence 
for Asia and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell.81 Ota was accompanied by policy advisor 
Matayoshi Tatsuo, senior members of the prefectural government, mayors from 
municipalities with a large US military presence, and reporters from the Okinawa 
Times, the Ryukyu Shinpo, and Television Ryukyu.82 
By the time of Ota' s Washington visit in June of 1996, however, the political 
leverage that mass international publicity on the Okinawan issue had given his 
administration since September 1995 had already begun to wear thin. In preparation for 
Clinton's visit to Japan in April 1996, together with US officials the Hashimoto 
government sought to respond to anti-base sentiment by presenting a program for the 
"consolidation, realignment, and reduction" of US military facilities in Okinawa. At an 
"Ryilkyl1 Shinpo (ed.) Sengo-shi seiji o ikite: Nishime Junji no nikki (Naha: Ryi!kyil Shinpo, 1998), p. 
434. 
81 For a full schedule of the trips Ota made to the US see Okinawa Prefecture Base Affairs Department 
(Okinawa-ken kichi taisaku-shitsu) (ed.) Okinawa no beigun kichi, pp. 237-9. In 1997 Deputy Governor 
Tomon Mitsuko also led a women's delegation to Washington and made various requests on US military 
base issues including in relation to crimes cmnmitted by US military members, the environmental impact 
of military activity on the islands, etc. 
"See Funabashi, Alliance Adr!ft, 152-6. 
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official level, this program was drawn up by the SACO group, comprising military and 
civilian members of government on both the US and Japanese side, yet without 
Okinawan representation. At an unofficial level, negotiations on the Okinawa issue also 
progressed outside of SACO through the top echelons of both governments. These 
resulted in the surprise announcement on 12 April 1995 of the decision to return 
Futenma Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS). Three days later, the SACO Interim 
Report detailed proposals to also return and relocate various other facilities. 
The agreement to return Futenma, a large airbase in the centre of Okinawa 
Island surrounded by the sprawling and overcrowded city of Ginowan, was the trump 
card of Hashimoto's political manoeuvrings on the Okinawa issue. 83 As a symbolic and 
timed gesture, it ensured that the Okinawa issue did not overshadow the joint 
Hashimoto-Clinton declaration on the US-Japan "global security partnership" 
announced less than a week later. From the time of this announcement and the 
publication of the SA CO interim report, both the US and Japanese governments took 
the position that the "realignment, consolidation, and reduction" outlined by SACO 
comprised an adequate resolution to the Okinawa base issue. 
The SACO report outlined some significant steps towards lessening the impact 
of the military presence on Okinawa, including the transferral of live ammunition 
training (which had hitherto been regularly carried out across Highway 104, a major 
thoroughfare) to mainland Japan. 84 Yet the SACO agreement was also severely 
criticized as m many respects comprising rather a mere "reshuffling" of existing 
facilities. If all of the items listed in SACO were implemented, a decrease of 
approximately 20% in land utilized by the US military in Okinawa could be achieved. 
83 See also "Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theater: Futenma Relocation, the G-8 Summit, 
and Okinawa," Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 33 No. I (March 2001), pp. 70-95. 
84 Other reforms made to US military base operations in Okinawa include the cessation of military hikes 
on public roads, the building of noise baffles on Kadena, and new regulations which require US personnel 
to obtain car license numbers. 
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However, Okinawa would still hold a ratio of 70% of all US military facilities in Japan. 
Seven of the eleven facilities marked for return included the condition of partial or 
whole transferral to an alternative site within Okinawa prefecture. As of March 2002, 
the Aha Training Area at Kunigami Village was the only site in Okinawa which had 
actually been returned as stipulated within the SACO agreement." 
Within Okinawa, as it became fully apparent that "complete return" in fact 
entailed the relocation of large-scale heliport facilities to another location within 
Okinawa, the "Futenma relocation issue" also fiercely intensified divisions within and 
between local municipalities. These divisions ultimately worked to fragment the support 
base of Ota's administration. In the face of increasing political division between 
conservative and progressive camps within Okinawa, the foundations of Ota's 
administration began to shake. The SACO agreement marked the point at which 
divisions within the non~partisan prefecture-wide anti-base sentiment that had swept 
across the Okinawan archipelago in 1995 became manifest. 
The entrenchment of divisions between conservative and progressive camps in 
Okinawa in tum exerted a direct impact on the implementation of the prefectural 
plebiscite. The referendum ordinance was passed in the prefectural assembly on 21 
June. Yet the Okinawan Chapter of the LDP decided to oppose the ordinance and thus it 
failed to gain the unanimous vote which organizers had originally hoped for. 86 At the 
beginning of August, Major General Murata Hidenobu declared to 1,800 members of 
the SDF residing in Okinawa that "there was no point in voting for or against the 
"OT (2 March 2002). See also Kawase Ma!ayoshi, "Kichi shinsetsu to jichitai zaisei," Working Paper, 
School of Administration and Informatics, March 2002. 
'
6 Though fhe LDP cited "disavowal of the democratic parliamentary system" as fhe reason, Egami 
Takayoshi observes "fhe true fact was that fhey took fhe return ofFutenma aod fhe SACO Interim Report 
as a positive outcome, turning against the progressive party initialed prefectural plebiscite in order to 
actively cooperate v.ifh fhe government." Egami Takayoshi, "Okinawa no kenmin tilhyo," p. 7. See also 
Shimabukuro Jun, "Dairi shomei kyohi to kenmin t6hyo o meguru Okinawa no seiji teki doko to haikei," 
p. 154. 
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questions in the referendum as the plebiscite is meaningless."87 At the end of the same 
month, LDP Okinawan Chapter head Nishida Kenji followed suit by calling on voters to 
boycott the plebiscite. Two other important groups also announced their opposition. 
They were the Okinawan Federation of Landowners of Land Utilized for Military 
Purposes (Okinawa-ken Gwryo Tochi Jinushi-kai Rengokai), and the All Okinawan 
Foreign Military Base Workers Labour Union (Zenchuryiigun JugyOin Rodo Kumiai). 
In the words of Egami Takayoshi: "After the decision to return Futenma Airbase, with 
conditions, within between five to seven years, base workers and owners of!and v.ithin 
the bases became perturbed about uncertainties in the future, and the unified prefecture-
wide movement calling for base reduction began to break down ... "88 
The hope that the referendum would provide a powerful display of popular 
support for Ota in his legal battle was further dashed when the Supreme Court 
announced at the end of July that it would make its ruling on the proxy issue much 
earlier than had been expected. The date for the referendum had already been set at 
September 8. The Supreme Court set the judgment date for Ota's case at August 28, 
eleven days prior to this. Once again the courts were severely criticized for displaying 
b. b h' ed' 89 pro-government 1as y rus mg proce mgs. 
The massive preparations necessary for the implementation of the plebiscite still 
went ahead. The prefectural administration had to walk a fine line between promoting 
the plebiscite and not appearing biased. ISO million yen was delegated to promoting 
voters to take part in the plebiscite, and well known Okinawan musicians, actors, and 
87 His comment generated criticism for working to influence the voting behaviour of SDF members from 
the media, after which Defence Agency director Usui Hideo reprimanded Murata. As recounted in Robert 
Eldridge, "The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on US Base Reductions: One Question, Several Answers," p. 
895. 
" Egami Takayoshi, "Okinawa no ken-min tohyo," p. 16. 
"Egami, ibid.; Eldridge, "The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on US Base Reductions: One Question, 
Several Answers"; and Shimabukuro Jun, "Dairi shomei kyohi to kenmin tohyo o meguru Okinawa no 
seiji tek:i d5k5 to haikei," p. 155-6. 
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cultural figures featured in a large scale advertisement campaign, which included 978 
television and 830 radio conunercials, over 50 different press advertisements, 20,000 
posters and over a million pamphlets. Resources were plentiful, but from the out~et the 
referendum was a race against time. The Prefectural People's Plebiscite Promotion 
Committee was only established in late June, its office did not start fully functioning 
until August II, and local offices were never even formed in many municipalities. 
Apart from the prefecture itself, Rengi'i Okinawa was the only organization to invest a 
major effort into promoting the plebiscite, with other groups merely playing a 
peripheral role.90 
Meanwhile, on 28 August 1996, all fifteen of Japan's Supreme Court judges 
unanimously rejected Ota's appeal. Ota's failure to carry out his "delegated functions" 
as agent of the central govermnent was deemed a "serious infringement of the public 
interest." The legal counsel for the Okinawa side was forced to admit unqualified 
defeat. In a press conference following Supreme Court's ruling, Ota expressed his 
strong regret that Okinawa prefecture's claim had been rejected. He once again took 
note that, in spite of the judgement, "the conditions surrounding the US military bases 
in Okinawa persist in their severity :m He added: "While the fact that the strong wishes 
of the people of Okinawa prefecture were largely ignored in the final judgement was in 
a sense predictable, it is also a direct reflection of the state of so-called 'democratic 
politics' in Japan today."92 
The ruling also confirmed the extreme likelihood of an early defeat in the case 
on the second proxy function, in relation to public notification and inspection of the 
land. On July 12, Hashimoto had filed a lawsuit against Ota for his persistent refusal to 
90 Shimabulnrro Jun, ibid., pp. 156-9. 
" Ota Masahide, "Chiji komento" (28 August 1996). 
•
2 Transcript of the Press Conference of Governor Ota Masahide follawing Supreme Court Ruling on the 
Order to Carry out Delegated Functions (28 August 1996), p. I. See also OT (29 August 1996), p. 1; and 
RS (29 August 1996), p. I. 
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carry out delegated functions in relation to the second stage of leasing procedures on 
July 12, and by August this case was already being considered by the High Court. 
Speculation was raised that Ota's office was preparing to back down on this second 
proxy case, yet Ota refused to comment, merely reiterating his support for the upcoming 
referendum. He stressed the importance of the plebiscite given the "historical 
conditions" where "Okinawans have been denied the right to determine their own 
course." In this context, Ota reaffirmed: "The chance for Okinawans to determine their 
own will and to express this will through a social means is extremely important, and it 
is with these reasons in mind that I fully support the referendum. "93 
The plebiscite was held as scheduled on September 8. It marked the first of its 
kind in Japan on a prefecture-wide scale and the first time that the issue of the now fifty 
year-long US military presence had been put to the Okinawan people. Of a voter turnout 
of 59.53%, approximately 89% voted in agreement with the reduction of US military 
bases in Okinawa and the revision of SOFA. This amounted to a total of 53% of all 
eligible voters. In a press conference following the result announcement, Ota vowed to 
"work towards solving the base issue and respecting the will of the people of Okinawa 
prefecture."94 While voter turnout was particularly low in those municipalities with a 
high ratio of US military facilities, Ota commented that such as result was "inevitable" 
given the way in which the military base structure had become "institutionalised in 
Okinawa for over half a century." Stressing the fact that over half of Okinawans voted 
for reduction of the bases, he noted: "It is my understanding that an overwhelming 
93 Transcript of the Press Conftrence of Governor Ota Masahidefol/owing Supreme Court Ruling on the 
Order to Carry out Delegated Functions (28 Augustl996), p. 5. In a statement a day later, on 29 August, 
Ota similarly noted: "The prefectural plebiscite is an additional complement to parliamentary democracy 
based on the principles of direct citizen participation in polities. I believe that it provides a great 
opportunity for the people of Okinawa to perceive the conditions which Okinawa has been placed under, 
and begin building Okinawa's future \>\ith their own hands" (Ota Masahide, "Kenmin Tobyo ni !suite no 
meseeji" (29 August1996)). 
94 RS (9 September 1996). 
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number of people perceive the bases as a hindrance to their wellbeing and the natural 
environs of Okinawa, and that this perception was reflected in the plebiscite results."95 
Trials of History: Negotiation and Compliance 
The Impending Decision 
Ota faced increasingly contradictory demands between his legal obligations as 
the head of a local administration in the implementation of policy, and his leading role 
as representative of Okinawa's citizen movement Having exhausted all possible legal 
channels in the face of defeat in the Supreme Court at the end of August 1996, the 
tensions arising from these conflicting pressures reached a tumultuous head. On 
September 9, the day after the prefectural plebiscite, Ota left Okinawa for Tokyo in 
anticipation of a meeting with Hashimoto scheduled for the following afternoon. The 
original purpose of the visit was to convey the results of the plebiscite and Okinawans' 
strong desire for base reduction to the central government. However n!timately the 
plebiscite and its significance became overshadowed by speculation that Ota was 
planning to back down on the second stage of the proxy issue, and the trip itself was 
dominated by negotiations with Hashimoto over finalizing such a deal. 
The prefectore, and in particular Deputy Governor Yoshimoto, had been 
exploring the possibility of reaching an accord with Hashimoto since at least the end of 
July.96 Yoshimoto was formerly the Chief Secretary of the Reversion Council during 
the Yara era, and following reversion was Executive Committee Head of the Okinawa 
Prefecture Public Servants Union and Executive Secretary of the Prefectural Labour 
Cooperative. He was a central organizer behind the first mass human chain around 
95 Transcript of the Press Conference of Governor Ota Masahide following the Announcement of the 
Results of the Okinawan Prefectural Plebiscite on the Reduction of Military Bases and the Revision of 
SOF/1 (8 September I 996}. 
96 Egami Takayoshi, "Okinawa no ken~rnin tohyo," p. 13. 
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Kadena Airbase in 1986, a highly symbolic protest against the bases, and was a long-
time player in progressive political circles. In 1990 he was appointed policy advisor to 
the governor, and in 1993 deputy govemor.97 He was undoubtedly the central political 
broker behind the Ota administration. It was Yoshimoto, along with other progressive 
party representatives, who had originally approached Ota when he was still a university 
professor on two separate occasions and beseeched him to stand as a candidate in the 
gubernatorial elections. 98 It was also Yoshimoto who utilized ties with the JSP and later 
a direct channel through National Land Development Council Chairman Shimokobe 
Atsushi to negotiate with the Hashimoto government over issues concerning the bases 
and Okinawa's economy. 
Shimokobe Atsushi was former Undersecretary of the Land Development 
Agency, and brain of the Tanaka Kakuei government (July 1972- December 1974). He 
had in other words played a central role in the consolidation and expansion of the 
structural system of public works-centred development which integrated LDP 
politicians, construction companies, and government bureaucrats within what has 
become knov.'ll as Japan's "construction state" system. He had been involved in the 
implementation of central government economic development policies towards 
Okinawa since the reversion period, and now played a pivotal role as Hashimoto's 
"secret envoy" in the effort to win over the Ota administration. 99 
On the afternoon of September I 0, directly prior to meeting Hashimoto, Ota met 
with Yoshimoto in Tokyo. Yoshimoto detailed the specifics of the deal which had been 
finalized with the government, largely through Shimokobe's contacts. In return for Ota 
settling the proxy issue, Ha~himoto would set an additional five billion yen "adjustment 
91 Inteniew \\otb autbor (25 May 2001 ). See also published inteniew v.ith Yoshimoto, OT (18 June 2002), 
p. 4. 
" lntemew \\ith author (25 May 2001 ). 
99 On Shlmokobe's role, see also Ota Masahide, Okinawa no ketsudan, pp. 239-40. 
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fund" for Okinawa, and establish a new top-level organization to discuss issues relating 
to the US military presence in Okinawa and economic development, to be entitled the 
"Okinawa Policy Council." The prime minister would visit Okinawa in the next few 
days and present the government's policies to the Okinawan people. According to this 
deal Ota was required to announce his agreement to back dov.n on the second proxy 
issue within the week. Yoshimoto agreed to explain Ota' s position to citizen support 
groups for Ota. 
Yoshimoto later criticized Ota, forever the deliberative academic, for being 
inexorably indecisive. 100 Whether seen as obstinately irresolute or prudently guarded, 
there is no doubt that Ota was incessantly plagued by the dilemmas of his position. He 
asked Yoshimoto to seek to delay Hashimoto's visit to Okinawa for a few more days, 
yet Yoshimoto argued that this would be impossible. The negotiations had been 
finalized on the condition that Hashimoto would enter Okinawa on September 17 and 
that Ota announce his decision to comply with the leasing process before this, that is 
within the week. Yoshimoto implored to Ota to finalize his resolve on the deal. 
Only hours later, Ota met with the prime minister. As planned, after the meeting, 
Hashimoto announced in a cabinet resolution his will to "take with utmost seriousness 
the Okinawan people's wish for a realignment and decrease in the US military presence 
and for the revision of SOFA, as was displayed in the recent prefectural plebiscite. " 101 
Three days following, from the early morning hours of September 13, anti-war 
landowners and their supporters conducted a protest in front of the Okinawa Prefectural 
Offices. Media reports had speculated that Ota would soon back down on the second 
proxy case, and the landowners sought in some way to prevent this scenario. At around 
noon, Ota finally agreed to meet with the protesters. Several representatives from each 
100 Interview with author (25 May 2001). 
"' "Okinawa mandai ni tsnite no naikaku sori daijin danwa." reprinted in Okinawa Prefecture Base 
Affairs Department (Okinawa-ken kichi taisaku-shitsu) (ed.) Okinawa no beigun kichi, pp. 234-5. 
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group, including activist Chibana Sh6ichi, whose land within the Sobe military 
communications site was still occupied unlawfully, crowded into the governor's office. 
They reiterated their support for Ota's stance against the leases, and implored the 
governor to continue the "struggle of the people of Okinawa" against the central 
government and the US military presence in accordance with the results of the 
"historical" prefectural referendum. Ota reiterated his strong will to resolve the base 
issue, yet stressed the fact that unfortunately Okinawa did not enjoy an equal voice 
within US-Japan relations. Forced to abide by the law of Japan, and facing unanimous 
defeat in the courts, Ota lamented: "There exists real limitations as to what one local 
government can do using administrative methods [to resist the policies of the central 
government]."102 
Compensation Politics and Consent 
On the afternoon of the same day, Ota officially announced his decision to 
comply with the land expropriation process. This moment marked the end of almost a 
year of political and legal contest between the prefectural and national government on a 
scale unprecedented in postwar Japan. In a press conference following his 
announcement, Ota confessed that this decision was the most difficult he had had to 
make during his entire time in office. He continued: "Having to decide as a part of my 
duties in office to comply with procedures for leasing land which both landowners 
themselves and the municipalities to which they belong have refused to undertake is 
truly difficult and painful." As Ota explained it: "This decision essentially conflicts with 
the beliefs which I have maintained. Yet I carne to the conclusion that to the extent that 
102 The entire conver,sation between the two sides is transcribed in" 'Kokokujiiran daiko hantai: Ota 
Kenchiji to no kaikenroku," (Urasoe: Hansenjinushi-kai, hito-tsubo hansenjinushi-kai, 1996). 
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I hold responsibilities as administrative head of the prefecture, I felt I must overcome 
the sense of anguish [which comes from taking this decision)."103 
As reasons for his decision, Ota cited: his unqualified defeat in the first proxy 
case; the fact that the US and Japan had shown a "pro-active stance" in response to the 
base issue through the implementation of various measures including the establishment 
of SACO; and the additional measures outlined by Hashimoto in the prime minister's 
recent cabinet resolution in relation to Okinawa's base issue and economy. 104 Behind 
these official reasons, as he hinted in his confrontation with anti-war landowners, there 
also lay at least two other major factors motivating Ota. The first was the fear that if he 
did not back down legislative revisions would be made to the Special Measures Law. 
Such revisions would likely endow the prime minister with the direct authority to 
intervene in the leasing process and act as proxy without having to resort to legal action. 
The second was the fear that a prolonged standoff between the government and 
prefecture might increase tensions between the LDP and SOP in the central government 
coalition. This would in turn likely prove a negative factor in upcoming Diet elections, 
and perhaps in the worst case scenario even lead to a breakdown in the current coalition 
government. 
From early in the contest with Okinawa prefecture, conservative and right-wing 
forces within the government held the belief that legislative measures should be 
introduced to deprive Ota, as prefectural governor, of his existing powers to delay the 
procedures. Such measures could be implemented either by re>'ising the existing Special 
Measures Law, or drawing up an entirely new law giving the prime minister direct 
power over the functions currently "delegated" to local authorities. In light of the 
103 Transcript from Press Conference (13 September 1996). 
104 Ota Masahide, "Chiji happyo: kokokujiiran no daiko mondai" (13 September 1996). The prefecure 
also later published an pamphlet outlining reasons for complying with remaining leasing procedures, 
"Kokokujiiran daiko ni ojita riyil ni !suite" (10 November 1996). 
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upsurge in anti-base sentiment and extensive media publicity over the Okinawa base 
issue in early 1996, the latter alternative was not actively pursued. Yet particularly after 
the lease expired on Chibana's land on I April 1996, influential LDP members and 
Defence Agency Director-GeneralUsui Hideo explicitly advocated the need to consider 
legislative revision. 105 
This opinion further gained ground in conservative circles after the Okinawan 
Land Expropriation Committee refused the DFAA's request for emergency use of 
Chibana's land on May 11. Hashimoto had overestimated central bureaucratic influence 
over the committee. Three days later, as a result of a provisional ruling in the Naha 
District Court, Chibana was given temporary aceess to his land. On May 14, Chibana's 
family and friends danced inside the base's large wire fence to the sound of the 
Okinawan sanshin. This symbolic picnrre of defiance against the US and Japan was 
publicized nationwide. Meanwhile, on the same day Hashimoto and Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Kajiyama Seiroku declared that the government was considering legislative 
revisions to the Special Measures Law. The government clearly sought through such 
statements to intimidate the Ota administration into negotiations. 
By mid-1996, it was also becoming more and more likely that the remaining 
land in question would also come under unla\\ii.!l occupation when the leases expired in 
May 1997, affecting land owned by close to 3,000 people. Ota refused Hashimoto's 
requests to place pressure on the Okinawan Land Expropriation Committee to speed up 
the hearing process, on the grounds that it would undermine the committee's 
independence. 106 Fearing the revision of legislation, and the predicted severe impact this 
legislation would have on SDP-LDP relations on the eve of general elections, however, 
105 The Special Law Revision issue and its impact on the central government coalition is analysed in 
Fukushima Yoshikazu, "Nihan Shakaito (Shaminto) ni okeru 'genjitsu' to 'rinen"'; and Fukushima 
Yoshikazu, "Shakaito no seisaku tenkan to Okinawa-ken no han5," R)'iikyii Daigaku Hobun Gakubu 
(March 1993), pp. 107-27. 
106 Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, pp. 313-4. 
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the prefectural administration and in particular Yoshimoto did begin exploring the 
possibility of reaching a deal with the central goverurnent on the second proxy case. 
Ota lamented that as a minority >vithin Japan Okinawans had virtually no power 
within the national diet to prevent the passage of legislation which increased the prime 
minister's powers over the expropriation process. Ota particularly expressed the fe<~r 
that, if the Hashimoto cabinet fell and a coalition goverurnent between conservative and 
right-vving factions emerged, the prefecture would only be placed in a worse negotiating 
position than before. 107 On the one hand, the SDP' s compromises over policy 
undermined their own dwindling support base. Yet on the other the presence of the SDP 
within the goverurnent coalition also provided, or so Ota hoped, a line of defence 
against more hard-line policies on Okinawa and the further expansion of Japan's 
defence role. 
Economic issues were also a central underlying factor working to induce the Ota 
administration's turnaround in policy on the second proxy case. Central goverurnent 
compensation policies in particular held far-reaching implications for the Ota 
administration and Okinawan politics as a whole. As defined by Aurelia George 
Mulgan, compensation politics is "a government strategy for inducing specific 
corurnunities, groups and individuals to accept large-scale public works with potentially 
deleterious social and environmental consequences." Along with utilizing the "sticks" 
of lav.-suits and special legislation, the "cartot" of economic incentives has formed an 
essential component of the Japanese goverurnent's strategy over the Okinawan base 
issue. Compensation politics "exploits the economic weakness and subsidy dependence 
of Okinawa, because financial stimulus and government handouts have become such a 
necessary prop to the prefectural economy."108 Compensation strategies may act as a 
107 As he argues for example to anti-war lando'>'ners on the morning of 13 September, as transcribed 
within in" 'Kokokuj!iran daiko hantai: Ota Kenchiji to no killkenroku." 
108 
"Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa," pp. 166-71, 
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form of "soft coercion" in order to obtain agreement v.rith government objectives. They 
carry the advantage of not appearing as "patently authoritarian" as legal compulsion, 
and thus not further inciting opposition to government policy. Yet ultimately they have 
a similar effect, with the additional side-effect of increasing apathy and cynicism 
towards political processes. 
Around the crucial period of August-September 1996, during which the 
Supreme Court ruled against Ota and the prefectural plebiscite was held, the 
government introduced a series of additional economic compensation packages for 
Okinawa. Firstly, on August 6, Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama announced the 
establishment of an Informal Council on Okinawa Municipalities Hosting US Bases. 
This was to be an "advisory body" (shi teki shimon kilcan) to the prime minister. The 
idea for the advisory body was said to have been first proposed by Okamoto Yukio, a 
former MOF A official who held his own Consultancy on US-Japan affairs and who 
would months later (November 1996) be appointed as "special advisor'' to Hashimoto 
on Okinawan affairs. The advisory body v.-as to be headed by Keio University professor 
and well-known economist Shimada Haruo, and came to be known as Shimada's Group 
or Shimadakon, in reference to Shimada's leading role. Under the Shimadakon proposal, 
suggestions from municipalities on desired economic "projects" were made to the 
Shimada Group's Principal Council (yiishokusha kondankai). This council was made up 
of five members from Okinawa and six from Tokyo, including Shimada and Okamoto. 
Inamine Keiichi, president of Okinawa's leading petroleum company and later 
victorious candidate over Ota in the gubernatorial elections of 1998, was appointed vice 
president of the group. Okinawan economist and acting auditor of the Bank of Ryukyus, 
Makino Hirotaka, who later become Okinawan Deputy-Governor under Inamine's 
administration, was also a member. Other Okinawan members included Okinawa Rengi5 
head and organizer of the prefectural plebiscite, Toguchi Masahiro, and the presidents 
of Okinawa's two leading newspapers. 
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The group's role was to advise the eabinet on which economic stimulus projects 
to implement. All projects were funded directly by the central government, and the 
group was given a budget of one hundred billion yen over a seven year period. 109 In its 
policy statement, Shimadakon argued that: "Taking account of the fact that the burden 
[of US bases] is concentrated in Okinawa and in particular in those municipalities 
which host bases, special consideration should be given by the government in these 
areas."llO In the words of Shimada, the group was set up in the attempt to "ease" the 
"insularity" (heisokukan) of the residents of these municipalities and work to obtain 
"people's trust" in order "ensure security for the twenty-first century." This was to be 
done by "supporting autonomous economic development from the perspective of the 
residents" of these municipalities.111 
In short, "improvement" of the base problem and Okinawa's unique opportunity 
for "autonomous" economic development may be interpreted in this context as a cash-
for-base deal. Okamoto was most explicit in divulging the cash-for-base logic at the 
foundation of government policy: "Up to now, Okinawan economic development has 
largely been implemented through the Okinawa Development Agency. Security Policies 
have been the domain of MOFA, the JDA and the DF AA. There has been no exchange 
linking these two together. Politics is where these Jinks can be made. Politics must 
provide the political balance between disproportionate burdens and special 
measures ... " 112 
Financial aid has been employed in Okinawa since US occupation as a means to 
placate opposition to US military policy and the forced expropriation of private land for 
109 For various testimonies on the making of Shimadakon see Ota Masahide, Okinawa no ketsudan. From 
1997-2000, II of the 35 proposed Shimadakon projects were completed. The peak for the implementation 
and completion of further projects was predicted to be from 2000-2001 ( OT (l June 2000), p. 1 ). 
110 Sll!11llla!]' and full text avnilahle at http:/Jkantei.go.jp/jp//singilokinawalokinawa-1127 .html. 
111 Shimada Haruo, "Okinav.'a: kusano ne no koe o kike," ChUa Karon, May 1997, 60-69. 
112 Okamoto Yukio," 'Okinawa mondai' wa k5 kaketsu seyo," Toyi5 Keizai (November 1996}, pp. 96-103. 
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military use. 113 Yet Shimadakon was unprecedented in at least two ways. Firstly, it 
brought together the Prime Minister's aides, key members of Okinawa's business 
community, and the heads of local municipalities that host US military bases within 
Okinawa under one informal umbrella organization. Secondly, although informal and 
thus politically unaccountable, Shimadakon had the power to approve large-scal.e public 
projects financed directly and in full by the national government. As the group's 
principal report boasts, this marked a first for central government policy towards local 
municipalities.114 
As Shimada himself recounts, following the rape incident in Okinawa in 
September 1995, the Japanese government responded to the Okinawa base issue: 1) on 
the bilateral front through the establishment of SACO; 2) on the national domestic front 
through the establishment of the Okinawa Policy Council (see below); and 3) on the 
local front through Shimadakon. Shimadakon was the national government's attempt to 
"ease" (kanwa) anti-base sentiment by deepening the connection between the US 
military presence and economic stimulus packages at the most local leveL 115 In 
strengthening links between local politicians, business interests, and national 
113 Of course, in other regions within Japan too, compensation politics has long been a government 
strategy for inducing specific communities to accept large-scaJe public works projects with potentially 
deleterious aod undesirable consequences, such as in the case of nuclear power plants. This is aJso 
pointed out by Aurelia George Mulgan in "Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa: A Test fur Japanese 
Democracy," pp. 166-7. 
"'A report of the Shimadakon s Principal Council reads: "The promotion of such projects through direct 
funding from the government (kuni) is a first not only for Okinawa but for any local municipalily in 
Japan" (PrincipaJ Council Report on the Implementation of the Proposal of the Discussion Group in 
relation to MunicipaJities Host to US Bases in Okinawa, 13 May 2000}. Cited in Miyagi Yasuhiro, "Tanko 
no kanaria no utagoe: 'Shimada kondankai' jigyo hihan," Kenchiku to machizukuri, no. 282, (II 
November 2000), 40. Shimadakon thus had paraJlels "ith the system oflocaJ financiaJ subsidies 
promoted by the US High Commissioner under occupation, the difference being this system bad now 
become a part of Japanese government domestic policy. 
liS Shimada himself uses this expression, see his testimony in Ota Masahide Okinawa no ketsudan, p. 249 
and Shimada Haruo, "Okinawa: kusa none no koe o kike,"pp. 64-5. 
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government funding, it also worked to further compromise local autonomy and 
democratic processes. 
The second set of compensation measures implemented by the central 
government on the eve of the plebiscite were announced on 24 August I 996 by a 
government delegation to Okinawa lead by LDP Secretary-General Kato Koichi. In a 
meeting with Yoshimoto, Ota, and other prefectural ofticials, the government 
delegation, which also included LDP heavy-weights Nonaka Hiromu and Suzuki 
Muneo, outlined a two-part package to help boost Okinawa's flailing economy. The 
package included the promise to provide government support in the effort to effect a 
3000 yen decrease each way on airfares between Okinawa and mainland Japan, and 
fund an investigation into ways to revitalize Naha's largely defunct free trade zone.U6 
Kato refrained from directly linking the package to the base issue. Yet in light of the 
visit's timing, the measures offered, and the close aftiliation between its highly 
inlluential bearers and the prime minister's office, the package can be interpreted as part 
of Hashimoto's policy of "soft diplomacy" towards Ota. t t 7 
The third set of compensatory measures announced around this time were those 
outlined by Hashimoto in the cabinet resolution of September I 0 and included the 
formation of the Okinawa Policy CounciL The council was made up of national cabinet 
members and prefectural heads and was chaired by the Chief Cabinet secretary. 
According to a JDA document, the aim of the council was to "see to it that the quality-
of-life in Okinawa prefecture will be improved under the current situation of USFJ 
facilities and areas, and that Okinawa prefecture will be rebuilt as a region contributing 
to Japan's socio-economic development.''us It became a core instrument by which the 
"
6 RS (25 August 1996), p. I. 
'"As pointed out by Robert Eldridge, "Tbe 1996 Okinawa Referendum on US Base Reductions," p. 901. 
118 As cited in Aurelia George Mulgan, "Managing the liS Base Issue in Okinawa," p. 169. 
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government could secure a political framework that, as Okamoto envisaged, would 
directly link Okinawan economic development '->ith the bases. 
Fissure 
As Ota's recourse to legal and administration channels was severely limited by 
the Supreme Court ruling of August 1996, he was left with a series of limited options. 
These options differed in the level of compromise or conflict with the central 
government which they signified. They included the option of either taking the deal 
which Yoshimoto had secured with Hashimoto, of at least waiting until the High Court 
ruled on the second proxy case, or of resigning from office in protest and taking the 
issue once again directly to the Okinawan people by calling another election. In the 
context of increasing divisions within Okinawa, the relatively low voter turnout in the 
prefectural plebiscite, contradictions emerging from Okinawa's economic weaknesses 
and its entrenched system of public works-centred development, prolonged recession 
and increased unemployment rates (double the national average and the worst in 
Japan), 1!9 and the quagmire of Japan's political system as a whole, Ota sought the 
former of these alternatives, and took the deal arranged with Hashimoto. 
Later Ota recounted that he did consider resigning from office, but eame to the 
conclusion that this would not guarantee a more comprehensive solution to the base 
issue. He also recounted that he considered at least continuing his refusal to comply 
with the land expropriation process until the final judgement on the second proxy case 
had been brought down. Yet with virtually no hope of a legal victory, upcoming Diet 
elections, and the looming possibility that revisions would be made to the Special Land 
Law, Ota determined that his administration's position would ultimately be worse 
119 At this time, the unemployment rate of Okinawa was approx. 7.2%, with youth unemployment approx. 
double this figure (As recounted by Ota in Heiwa no ishij1). 
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off. 120 Given the speed and force with which the national government was able to 
subsequently implement extensive legislative revisions to land expropriation measures, 
it is certainly doubtful Ota could have played the "trump card" of refusing to comply 
v.ith proxy functions for much longer.m 
For many of those who most avidly supported Ota's anti-base stance and 
devoted extensive energies towards promoting the prefectural plebiscite, however, Ota's 
recant directly in its wake amounted to a painful betrayal. It is certain that the results of 
the prefectural plebiscite-and in particular the voter turnout, which was lower than the 
last two prefecture-wide elections--reflected the deep divisions within Okinawan 
society and politics. 122 It is also certain that these divisions were at least in part the 
direct consequence of fifty years of US military presence and corresponding multiple 
systems of dependence. Yet the prefectural plebiscite still confirmed that a majority of 
Okinawans desired military base reduction. It also provided a fornm for direct citizen 
participation in local political processes on an unprecedented scale. In this sense, Egami 
Takayoshi observes: "By using the prefectural plebiscite as a tool for political 
manoeuvring ... in what strongly appeared as underhand negotiations with the central 
government, ultimately the prefectural heads, who should have been sufficiently aware 
of the significance of the referendum for local government, undermined the will of the 
people of Okinawa and the original force and meaning of the plebiscite .... This was the 
greatest pity of all. "123 
As survivor of the war, historian, public figure, long-time critic of the role 
imposed upon Okinawa in postwar US-Japan relations, and defiant governor, Ota's 
multi-faceted, charismatic, and focal presence undoubtedly provided a centrifugal force 
120 As recounted in Ota Masahide, Okinawa no Ishiji, pp. 204-12. 
"'Also pointed out by Kama Toshio, "Okinawa,jichi moderu no sentaku," pp. 266-7. 
122 The voter turnout for the prefectural assembly elections of June 1995 was 66.4%, and for the 1994 
gubernatorial elections was 62.5%. 
123 Egami Takayoshi, "Okinawa no ken·min tohyo," p. 16. 
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and inspirational symbol galvanizing the largest citizen movement in Okinawa since 
Japanese reversion. It is precisely for this reason that the widespread frustration, 
cynicism, and despair which followed his decision to back down on the second proxy 
function was so intense. Ota, still no doubt himself anguished over making a decision 
which he admitted ran against his ovin principles, also avoided appearing in front of 
citizen groups to explain his position. As had been earlier agreed, it was Yoshimoto 
who collected opinions from various citizen and business groups within Okinawa on the 
desired direction of prefectural policy and set about explaining the prefecture's stance to 
Ota's support network. The day Ota armounced his intention to back down on the 
second High Court case, the University Association issued a declaration in protest. In a 
gathering a week later, several participants were fiercely critical of Ota. Grasping the 
microphone, others burst into tears the moment they tried to gather their thoughts into 
words. 124 
On October 26, Ota did agree to meet with a group of university and high school 
students protesting against his decision to back down on the second proxy case. On the 
eve of the prefectural plebiscite, an identical mock referendum had been carried out in 
all public high schools across Okinawa Several students who had played a central role 
in organizing these mock elections formed a protest group following Ota's 
armouncement of September 13, entitled '"What was the Prefectural Plebiscite 
Anyway?' Committee." Their meeting with the governor was originally scheduled to 
last only twenty minutes, yet it went for over an hour. In the transcript of the intense 
debate which ensued, it almost reads as if Ota, in actively encouraging and even 
provoking argument, was endeavouring to confront his own ulterior conscience. One 
high school student questioned the governor: "The reason there are military bases in 
"
4 Okinawa kara heiwa o tsukuru shimin, daigakunin no kai ( ed.) Dairi shomei kyohi saiban: tomo ni 
kangae, kodo shit a kiroku, op cit.. It was also reported that the number of letters of support arriving at the 
governor's office each day dropped dramatically (Asahi Shinbun (12 November 1996)). 
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Okinawa is because of the US-Japan Security Treaty. But do you think the US bases 
protect the people of Okinawa?" Ota replied: "No, I don't." The student continued: 
"Then, if we can take care of ourselves, I think we should be able to get rid of the 
bases!" Ota bitterly answered: "You say to get rid of them, but if you deelare 'leave!' 
and they don't go, then what do you do? Tell me, how do you get them out?"125 
Nothing could be resolved, Ota came to argue, without sitting at the negotiating 
table together with Hashimoto. He later contended: "I came to the difficult realization 
that it was necessary to seek a solution to the base issue in a different form to political 
groups and citizen activists .... "126 Ota continued to identifY himself with the anti-base 
pro-autonomy cause, while differentiating the means he used-and advocating 
compromise over conflict. Yet in stressing the weight of his legal duty as the 
"administrative head" (gyiisei no chi'i) of the prefecture to abide by the Supreme Court 
judgement, Ota affmned to the very tendency to prioritise bureaucratic process over 
democratic principle to which he had mounted such a forceful challenge. 
As Ota distanced himself from anti-base citizen support networks a schism 
between them and his administration also inevitably emerged. Hashimoto and his inner 
circle of influential brokers were in turn able to use and exacerbate these divisions to 
their advantage while further securing the compensation system which had been 
methodically laid down in the preceding months. The deal between Ota and Hashimoto 
strengthened linkages between the economic and the military presence, increasing 
Okinawa's "economy" versus the "bases" predicament, leading to further local 
divisions, and ultimately undem:rining Okinawa's progressive political support base 
from within. From a strengthened position, Hashimoto's cabinet was also able to enact 
"'Transcript of meeting between members of "'Wbat Was the Meaning of the Plebsicite Anyway?' 
Committee" ('ken min tohyo tte nan datta baa'jikoiinkai) and Governor Ota (8 November 1996). 
126 Heiwa no ishiji, p. 202. 
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the very legislative revisions which Ota had sought to prevent with less fear of the 
political ramifications. 
Ota strongly refuted accusations that in taking the deal he had used the proxy 
rssue as a bargaining chip in return for financial subsidies. Certainly, the Ota 
administration sought to incorporate central govermnent-initiated economic subsidy 
plans within an agenda which aimed to achieve economic autonomy and base 
withdrawal. Days before Kato' s delegation to Okinawa, Yoshimoto submitted a series 
of requests to Hashimoto calling for the implementation of special measures to ease 
trading and custom regulations in Okinawa as conceived within the prefectural 
administration's "Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept" (kokusai toshi keisei kOso). 
This concept sought to utilize Okinawa's central location within the Asia-Pacific region 
to promote sustainable development and Okinawan economic independence. The Ota 
administration sought to implement this concept according to the three principle tenets 
of "peace, coexistence, and autonomy," and in conjunction with the "action program" 
on the reduction and withdrawal of US bases. The concept was an attempt, in other 
words, to break out of a cycle of economic dependence by drawing up a blueprint for an 
economically autonomous Okinawa-seen as in turn an essential condition for the 
realization of base reduction and withdrawal. m 
Yet for Hashimoto's influential circle of power brokers, economic subsidies 
held the very different aim of securing Okinawan cooperation with national policy. For 
the central govermnent, concurrence with the implementation of SACO and the 
redefinition of the US-Japan security treaty was an essential proviso of new economic 
stimulus measures towards Okinawa.128 As negotiations between the government and 
prefecture progressed without this fundamental difference being addressed, underlying 
127 
"Kisei kanwa nado sangy6 shinko tokubetsu sochi ni kansuru yobOsho," (Okinawa Prefecture, 19 
August 1996). 
128 As also noted by Kamo Toshio, "Okinawa, jichi moderu no sentaku," p. 267. 
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contradictions intensified and ultimately came to a head over the Futenma relocation 
issue. 
Negotiating Base Politics and the Futenma Relocation Issue 
Emergence of the Futenma Relocation Issue 
When they announced the return of Futenma on 12 April 1996, Hashimoto and 
Mondale also listed three conditions for return: the consolidation of part of the functions 
of the marine airbase facilities into nearby Kadena Airbase; the construction of a new 
heliport to equip the marine helicopter corps within Kadena; and the relocation of 
refuelling facilities to Iwakuni in return for transferring Iwakuni-based Harrier aircraft 
back to the US. 129 This agreement was included within the SACO interim report, 
announced three days later. 
Ota appraised the agreement to return Futemna as a "step in the right direction" 
towards base reduction and the building of a "bright future" for Okinawa in the 
twentieth century. 130 On the disclosure of SA CO's interim report, Ota welcomed the 
fact that progress was being made towards base reduction and expressed gratitude 
towards the agreement to cease live munitions training exercises across the prefecture's 
Highway I 04, but was also critical of the fact that almost all of the sites marked for 
return included the condition that existing facilities be transferred to other sites v.~thin 
the prefecture. Without detailed knowledge of the options available on relocation, Ota 
stopped short of stating that he would refuse to consent to the agreement of Futenma' s 
129 OT (13 April 1996), p. 1. 
130 Directly after Hashimoto and Mondale's announeement, Ota held his own press conference in Naba. 
Ota described how he had received a telephone call from Hashimoto earlier in the evening explaining that 
an agreement to return Futenma in its entirety within five tu seven years had been reached ordy hours 
before. As Ota explained it, he had thanked both the prime minister and the ambassador on the phone for 
their efforts, and stressed the need for the government's cooperation in working to provide adequate 
compensation to landowners, and in implementing an agreed plan on the land use following return 
(Transcript of Press Conference (12 April 1996)). 
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return if it included the condition of relocation of functions within Okinawa prefecture. 
He reasoned to the press: "At a point when two separate countries are negotiating and 
determining policy completely regardless of what we ourselves think or perceive, ean 
we afford to take a stance which will take us back to the question, 'well then, should 
Futenma be left as it is '?"131 
In short, from the outset Ota oscillated over how to respond to the SACO 
agreement. As by far the largest and most controversial of the facilities marked for 
transferral by the US and Japanese governments, this was especially the case for 
Futenma. On the one hand he refrained from overtly denouncing the SACO process out 
of fear that any possible gains would be lost before they were ever made. On the other, 
there was a real possibility that the relocation of functions would ultimately only 
prolong the US military presence. Fierce opposition was also certain to emerge in the 
areas designated as alternative sites for facilities marked for transferral within the small 
and densely populated prefecture. By not initially taking a strong stance against 
relocation, Ota further alienated anti-base groups, leading to increased fragmentation 
within his support base. 
Local municipalities cited as possible alternative sites for the Futemna heliport 
quickly mobilized in opposition. Kadena, Chatan, and Y omitan local assemblies all 
unanimously passed resolutions against Futenma relocation within a month of the 
SA CO interim report. 132 Yoshimoto worked behind the scenes in an effort to obtain a 
consensus on the consolidation of Futenma' s functions ·within Kadena Air Station, as 
the most workable and least environmentally damaging alternati ve. 133 Local residents in 
Kadena, already suffering severe noise pollution from Kadena Air Station, fiercely 
1
" Transcript of Press Conference (15 Aprill996). 
"'For an outline of these events see Shimin Tohyo Hokokushil (ed.) Nago shimin moeyu (Nago, 
Okinav;a: Heri kichi hantaikyo, 1999). 
133 As recounted in Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, especially pp. 177-96. 
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opposed this plan. Heavyweights from within the US Marines and the Air Force also 
strongly opposed this proposal. In a clear rejection of the Kadena Airfield consolidation 
proposal, at the end of July the US armounced three other possible alternative areas for 
the relocation of Futenma. t34 However local municipalities again expressed fierce 
opposition. In the midst of this, Hashimoto unexpectedly announced during his pre-
election visit to the islands on September 17 a proposal to build a mobile offshore 
heliport off the coast of northern Okinawa. 
The decision-making process which led to the adoption of the mobile "offshore 
heliport" proposal is unclear. While Hashimoto was the first to publicly armounce the 
offShore proposal as an option, it is thought that it was originally conceived by the US 
side. It also only recently (at least from April 2000) emerged that a US military plan to 
build an offshore base off the coast of Camp Schwab has existed since 1965. This, 
combined with the speediness of negotiations, has lead to allegations from within 
Okinawa that the deal over Futenma was in fact no more than an effort to replace the 
outdated and inconveniently located Futenma Airbase with new facilities better 
equipped to house controversial MV -22 Osprey tilt-·wing aircraft. I3S In any case, just 
over two months later, the SACO Final Report of 2 December 1996 advocated the 
construction of a "sea-based facility" (SBF) off the eastern coast of Okinawa to "absorb 
most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station."136 The report did 
134 Kadena Munitions Storage Area, Camp Hansen, or Camp Schwab. 83% ofKadena Town was taken up 
by US base facilities. See also Yoichi Funabashi, ibid .. 
135 See Makishi Yoshikazu, "Naze ka keita kaigai isetsu keikaku," Shiik:an Kinyobi (7 April 2000), pp. 16-
19; Makishi Yoshikazu et al ( eds.) Okinawa wa mo damasaranai (Tokyo; Kobunken, 2001 ). Also reported 
in Asahi Shinbun (21 May 2002). Ota also later conjectures on the possibility that US military officials 
sought to redirect anti-base sentiment in order to realise this 1960s scheme in OkimN;a, kichi naki shim a 
e no di5hyi5, p. 97. 
136 
''The SACO Final Report On FutenmaAir Station" (an integral part of the SACO Final Report) 
(Tokyo, Japan; 2 December 1996). The report detailed; "This facility will be approximately 1500 meters 
long, and will support the majority ofFutenmaAir Station's flying operations, including an Instrument 
Flight Rules (IFR)-capable runway (approximately 1300 meters long), direct air operations support, and 
indirect support infrastructure .... " The requirements of the base arc further specified in "SBF Sea Based 
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not specifY a proposed alternative area within the eastern coast region for fear of further 
inciting local opposition. Yet from documents leaked to Okinawan press, it was clear 
that the US and Japanese governments had reached an agreement amongst themselves 
that the coast off Camp Schwab be designated the relocation sitc.137 
Residents, politicians, and local media within Nago, the municipality host to 
Camp Schwab, and throughout Okinawa strongly criticised SACO's final report and the 
fact that Okinawa was excluded from the entire SACO process. On the eve of the 
SACO report release, over 2,000 people attended a protest in Nago against relocating 
the Futenma heliport within the municipality. The day after the report's release, a local 
newspaper editorial deelared: "The US and Japanese governments should appreeiate the 
sincere desire of the people of Okinawa that alternative sites outside the prefecture be 
considered, rather than decide on Camp Schwab from the very outset. We have been let 
dmm by the Final Report of SACO. I protest the way in which the Okinawan people's 
call for base consolidation and reduction has been brushed aside. This is no doubt the 
sentiment of the majority of people within the islands." 138 On December 21 
approximately 22,000 people gathered in Ginowan in protest against SACO and in 
opposition to the relocation of facilities within Okinawa. 139 
However, in contrast to the mass people's rally at Ginowan just over a year 
previously, where his emotional speech had been met with an outburst of applause, Ota 
did not attend the anti-SACO protest. He did stress the fact that "strong local 
opposition" existed against the relocation of facilities Vlithin Okinawa during comments 
to the press on the SACO Final Report. 140 Yet he avoided taking a clear stance on the 
Facility Functional Analysis and Concept of Operations MCAS Futenrna Relocation" (3 September 1997), 
FA CD VoL I Executive Report, US Department of Defense. 
mRS (1 December 1996). 
"' OT (3 December 1996). 
139 OT (22 December !996). 
140 Transcript of Press Conference (2 December 1996). 
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Futenma relocation issue, maintaining the position that at this stage it was a question 
which should be deliberated between the national government and the local 
municipality in question. 141 
From the onset of the contest over Futenma relocation, prefectural heads were 
acutely wary of the fact that the dispute held the potential to topple the entire 
administration. 142 If Ota rejected relocation ·within Okinawa outright, his administration 
would be forced to face the political implications of both a standstill on the agreement 
to return Futenma, and a breakdown in negotiations with Hashimoto over economic 
measures. The national government did not hesitate to make either of these threats. One 
figure close to the prime minister was reported as declaring that "Without the return of 
Futenma, realization of Cosmopolitan City Concept and economic stimulus policies -will 
also reach an impasse." On the one hand claiming that the government would "not go 
above the heads of local residents," Ha.~himoto himself also stated; "I just want to make 
it clear that if a relocation site cannot be found, then Futenma cannot be returned."143 
Ota attempted to avoid mounting pressure by abstaining from playing a role 
within negotiations. Yet the contest over the Futenma issue continued to brew. Without 
prefectural support, local politicians were even further susceptible to government 
pressure, and divisions within Nago and across Okinawa deepened. Influential local 
construction lobby groups galvanized in support for the base construction, and local 
union, citizen, and women's movements began to mobilize in opposition. 144 As 
community divisions grew, local politicians, media, and interest groups on both sides 
pressed the prefecture to clarify its position. 145 \Vhile the US and Japanese governments 
141 Ibid .. See also OT (3 December 1996). 
141 As one top prefectural official was cited as stating: "lf the prefecture rushes on this issue, . .it will be 
the end of the governor's political career" (RS(l December 1996). 
143 RS (22 January 1997). 
144 On these movements see especially Shimin Tobyo Hokokusbii (ed.) Nago shtmin moeyu. 
143 The RSwas critical of the prefecture's stance for example in an editorial on 22 January 1997, calling 
for the prefectural administration to "sit down at the negotiating table" together with the national 
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maintained their stance that the SACO proposals provided a workable resolution to the 
Okinawa base issue, in Okinawa the release of the SACO Final Report only marked the 
beginning of a new protracted struggle. 146 As Ota himself reiterated at an end-of-year 
press conference, while the tumultuous year of 1996 had come to a close, the Okinawa 
base issue was "far from over."147 
Same Bed, Dijjerent Dreams: Negotiating Futenma, Negotiating Japan 
In playing both sides of the cDurt by· remaining obstinately removed from the 
Futenma issue, Ota attempted to avoid being pressl!red by the national government into 
choosing between "no bases" and the "economy" while at the same time he promoted 
the Cosmopolitan City Concept. In advocating "economic autonomy" (keizai no 
jiritsuka), Ota in particular sought to lessen Okinawa's economic dependence on both 
the bases and national government funding. As Ota outlined in an interview >~<ith 
economist Nishikawa Jun, from the time of reversion public expenditure ratios in 
Okinawa ranged between 30% and 40% of total expenditure, tmce the national average. 
Okinawa continued to be highly dependent on central funds, hold the lowest average 
income of all prefectures, and have a weak manufacturing base (6% of output, in 
comparison to the national average of 24%). 148 Both Yoshimoto and Ota took the view 
that under these conditions it was essential to promote autonomy in order to be able to 
break away from the structures of dependence which prevented Okinawan politicians 
from withstanding pressure from Tokyo and resolve the base issue.149 
government and Nago municipality. 
"
6 As noted in OT (7 December 1996). 
141 OT (29 December 1996). 
148 
"Tok:ubetsu taidan," Shiikan Daiyamondo (25 October 1997), pp. 138-41. 
149 A1J Yoshimoto outlines, one of the major objectives of the Okinawa Development Plans was "to 
facilitate economic independence: it was assumed that if the basic foundation was provided, the economy 
would gradually become independent over time. But as we know, this scenario has not come to pass in 
Okinawa. The reasons for this failure are related to the inability of the Okinawan economy to switch from 
a base-dependent economy: the continued presence of the bases prevents this" (Interview with Hoshino 
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Economic issues were never Ota's strong point, and the Cosmopolitan City 
Concept was seen as largely the initiative of Yoshimoto. An outline of this concept was 
completed in November 1995, and in April 1997 a deliberative committee was 
established to make recommendations to the prefecture. Based on the results of these 
recommendations, a draft of the "Policy on the Stimulation of New Industry Towards 
the Formation of a Cosmopolitan City" was outlined by the prefecture in November of 
the same year. 150 The concept sought to utilize Okinawa's geopolitical position to 
promote "international peace through exchange," "technological cooperation," and an 
"economic and cultural network within the Asia-Pacific region." It called for policies 
including the relaxing of stringent tariff, trade, and visa regulations according to a "one 
country two systems" principle. The administration's vision of a new regional 
economic, cultural, and political role for Okinawa within the East Asian region strongly 
drew upon historical ideals of Ryukyu as a peaceful independent kingdom. Through 
relativising mainland Japan, Ota's administration endeavoured to re-conceive of 
Okinawa's location not as a periphery of Japan but as the centre of an Asia-Pacific 
network of relations. In the words of Yoshimoto: "If we consider ... Okinawa as the 
centre, then we should interact with Japan as a country in the same manner as we do the 
other countries on our doorstep. I think this approach makes the most sense given the 
realities of our post-cold war world."151 
It is certainly debatable as to whether trade liberalization should be seen as the 
key to promoting an autonomous sustainable economy, and the Cosmopolitan City 
Shinyasu, available at http://gate.nira.go.jp/publireviewi97springlokinawa.html). As Ota lamented, the 
base issue "is intimately and complexly linked to the institutionalisation of base-related income within the 
financial budget oflocal municipalities as well as to the question of employment" (Transcript of Press 
Conference {2 December 1996)). 
150 
"Kokusai toshi keisei ni muketa aratana sangyo shinkosaku" (draft) (Okinawa Prefecture: November 
1997). See also a series ofinterviews with Yoshimoto "Okinawa no kaizu", OT(J&, 19, and 20 June 
2002). 
Ill Interview v.ith Hoshino Shinyasu, available at 
http:iigate.nira.go.jp/publ/review/97springiokinawa.html 
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Concept was the subject of extensive discussion and criticism within Okinawa. 
Economist Miyamoto Ken'ichi, a long-time supporter of Ota, raised the point that the 
implementation of an extensive free trade zone system in Okinawa threatened to merely 
replace a public works-dependent economy with a multinational enterprise-dependent 
economy. 152 Agricultural industry and Communist Party representatives were also 
critical of extensive deregulation and the predicted effect it would have on local 
industry. 153 These criticisms highlighted the problems involved in attempting to 
conceive of economic autonomy and sustainable development within the framework of 
free-market neo-liberalism. 154 
Yet in any case, and regardless of these large and intractable economic issues, 
the most immediate obstacle facing the attempt to negotiate an increase in local 
economic autonomy for Okinawa lay in the discrepancy between prefectural and 
national government agendas over the bases. The essential differences between the Ota 
and Hashimoto agendas were highlighted in clashes over revision of the Special 
Measures Law in April 1997, and came to a head in the wake of the Nago City 
plebiscite on Futenma relocation in December of the same year. 155 
152 Miyamoto "Okinawa no iji kane na hatten no tame ni" in Miyamoto and Sasaki (eds.) Okinawa: 2 I 
seki e no chosen, pp. 20-4. 
'"In an explanatory meeting on the issue with prefectural heads, Communist Party Representative 
Uehara Kameichiro questioned: "The easing of regulations for whose benefit? If an easing in regulations 
is promoted, it will result in increases in foreign competition, but is that beneficial to Okinawa?" 
("Kyosanto setsumeikai (12 August 1997)). Economist Kurima Yasuo also criticisad: "Ultimately it is 
most likely impossible to fight against the global tendency towards 'liberali7..ation.' But this is the 'logic 
of the fittest,' and should not be voluntarily promoted by the 'weak' such as Okinawa" (OT(5 August 
1997)), 
154 Frances Negr6n-Muntaner and Ramon Grosfoguel discuss similar issues in relation to Puerto Rico, 
also a small island economy with a large US military presence, in the "Introduction" to Negr6n-Muntaner 
and Grosfoguel ( eds.) Puerto Rico Jam: Rethinking Colonialism and Nationalism (Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 1-35. 
155 From an early stage Okinawan criticArasaki Moriteru was highly sceptical of the prefectore's attempts 
to play the Futeoma card to enact economic measures to increase autonomy, stating: "The prefectural 
government seeks financial subsidy and system refonn (a one country two systems-style easing of trade 
regulations) in the attempt to envisage a blueprint for economic development in a base-free Okinawa, The 
287 
From the beginning of 1997, with the expiry of over 3,000 leases looming on 
May 15, the LDP began taking concrete moves to revise the controversial Special 
Measures Law. In principle SDP members of the coalition were strongly against the 
passing of any revisions to the law. Yet initially they also sought the possibility of 
reaching a deal with the LDP on supporting legislative revisions in exchange for the 
passing of a resolution which called for a reduction in US Marine presence in Japan, 
and particularly Okinawa. 156 As Ota later outlined, the US Marine Corps comprise the 
majority of the US military presence within Okina\1!11-75% of the total land area 
utilized by the US military, and 17,000 or 60% of the total 28,000 military personnel 
stationed on the islands.157 Calls to decrease the number of US Marines in particular 
were repeatedly made from within the anti-base movement, and became a major 
demand of the anti-SA CO protest of December 1996.158 From the beginning of 1997, 
Ota pushed the government and in particular Okamoto to work towards negotiating a 
reduction in the US Marine presence in Okinawa.ll9 He again strongly appealed for a 
reduction in the Marine presence after an article in the Washington Times in February 
divulged that in 1995 the US forces had ftred approximately 1500 depleted uranium 
bullets into the ocean surrounding Okinawa, close to Ota's birthplace, Kume Island. 160 
central government in turn promises whatever fmancial subsidies necessary to ensure the maintenance of 
current military base functions. They sleep together with their different dreams (doshi5 imu}, but does 
there exist a future hope for Okinawa beyond [this pretence]?" (OT (3 Aprill997)). 
156 On negotiations between the SDP and LDP on the issue of the revision of the Special Measures Law 
see Fukushima Yoshikazu, "Beigun yochi tokubetsu sochihO kaeisei to shakalminshuto." 
157 
"Governor Ota's Message to the Japan Policy Research Institute Confurence on Security and Stability 
in East Asia," reprinted in Masahide Ota, Essays on Okinawa Problems (Okinawa: Yul Shuppan, 2000), p. 
270. 
1
" OT (22 December 1996). 
159 01' (9 January 1997). It is also thought that Yoshimoto worked behind the scenes in the attempt to 
negotiate a consensus between SDP and LDP members within the national government coalition on 
calling for US Marine reduction (As recounted in Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, especially pp. 328-30. 
See also Ota Masahidc, Okinawa no ketsudan, p. 250). 
Wl The Washington Times (10 February 1997). 
288 
However Hashimoto strongly resisted calls to request such a reduction. The SDP 
had experienced a massive defeat in the Kational Diet elections of October 1996 and, 
though still a member of the coalition, held even less negotiating power than previously. 
The LDP displayed little interest in negotiating the issue, and instead sought support for 
revision of the Special Measures Law from the conservative opposition New Frontier 
Party, lead by former LDP member Ozawa Ichir6. Hashimoto notified Ota of his 
intention to revise the law in a meeting on March 25, and on April 3 Ozawa agreed to 
cooperate with the LDP to ensure that the legislation was successfully passed before 
Hashimoto's scheduled trip to Washington at the end of the month. 161 Only a week after 
the proposed amendments had been submitted for deliberation, they passed through the 
lower house with an overwhelming majority. 162 The revisions allowed the DFAA 
temporary use of land occupied by the US military even after leases expired. 
The legislation met with fierce criticism throughout Okinawa, particularly from 
anti-war landowners and their supporters, who denounced the legal amendment as "the 
second abolishment of Ryukyu Kingdom." On the submission of the revisions to the 
Diet, Japan's Bar Association (Nichi Benren) strongly opposed the legislation in a 
statement which declared: 
From the period prior to reversion we have held a strong interest in the Okinawa 
base issue and conducted numerous ground investigations in Okinawa, based 
upon which we have made recommendations and proposals. The current proposal 
for the revision [of the Special Measures Law] not only brings about a further 
infringement on the rights of the residents of Okinawa prefecture, but is against 
constitutional and democratic principles, and threatens to lead to general 
despondency Vlith the law. 163 
161 OT ( 4 April 1997). See also Fukushima Yosbikazu, "Beigun y5cbi tokubetsu socbiho kaeisei to 
shakaiminshutO." 
162 Only the SDP and Communist Party opposed the bill. 
163 Cited in Ota Masahide, Okinawa: kichi naki shima e no dohyo. pp. 130"2. 
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From the onset of the proxy issue in 1995, Ota fiercely opposed national 
government attempts to implement such a revision. What he had most feared now 
eventuated-the LDP and splinter right-wing parties cooperating to pass legislation to 
limit Okinawan gubernatorial powers over the land expropriation process. Later Ota 
cited the sv.ift implementation of this highly controversial legislation as the Japanese 
government's worst act of betrayal of Okinawa during his time as governor. 164 On the 
day of the bill's passing, Ota left Japan for his sixth trip as Governor to the US to lobby 
the Okinawa issue. At the airport he spoke to reporters on hearing of the passing of the 
amendment: "Firstly, I can only say that I am totally lost for words .. .I have pleaded 
over and over to the government not to amend or enact legislation which only applies to 
Okinawa, and which is likely to be taken as discriminatory." He continued: "One has to 
question exactly what Japan thinks Okinawa to be. I hoped that there would be more 
earnest deliberation over the effects of the bases for the over one million people who 
live in Okinawa, yet the bill was passed with hardly any discussion at all."165 
In the US, Ota lobbied government and military officials, and presented a speech 
to a Senate study group on the US-Japan alliance. Yet without the support of the 
Japanese government, calls for a reduction in the US Marine presence in Okinawa had 
little political weight. Meanwhile in Nago as the Japanese government sought to 
progress with plans for the offshore base, local groups opposed to the plan mobilized 
into an umbrella organization calling for a referendum on the issue. On August 13, the 
Nago Committee for the Promotion of a Plebiscite submitted a petition to Nago Mayor 
Higa Tetsuo calling for a referendum on the heliport relocation plans with the signatures 
of close to half the eligible voters within the municipality. Two months later, the 
municipal council agreed to endorse the referendum in a revised form. '66 
164 Interview with author (4 May 2001). 
,., Transcript of interview (II April 1997). 
166 The petition included 17,539 signatures, 46% of all eligible voters. Mayor Higa Tetsuya changed the 
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As divisions between opposing camps in Nago intensified and split the 
community, Ota' s administration crune under increasing criticism within Okinawa for 
failing to clarify its stance on Futenma relocation plans-in local newspapers, from 
"'ithin Ota's support base, throughout Nago, and from both sides of the prefectural 
assembly floor, In October, a majority of Nago assembly members from both the LDP 
and progressive opposition parties petitioned Ota to clarify his position, Ota argued that 
he could not take a definitive stance on the issue without knowing the specifics of the 
planned base and the position of the majority of Nago residents on the relocation 
issue, 167 The extent of division within Okinawa's progressive coalition was revealed 
when on October 17 the Communist Party, suspicious of the Ota administration's 
dealings with the Hashimoto government, rejected Yoshimoto's application for an 
extension of his term as deputy governor. 168 
The Catch 22 of the Ota administration's endeavour to avoid confronting the 
national government over the Futenma relocation issue-in the attempt to negotiate 
economic reforms in the name of base reduction and withdrawal-became fully 
concentrate<! within Nago. With a population of approximately 55,000, this northern 
municipality is on the periphery of Okinawa's peripheral economy. Even prior to the 
implementation of the post-SACO economic stimulus packages, the ratio of national 
funding for public works projects was roughly double that of Naha, and the income 
from public land utilized by US bases close to half of total municipal revenue, 169 In 
wording of the proposed plebiscite, however, to include four instead of two alternatives. For a detailed 
discussion of this issue see also Jutia Yonetani, "Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theater: 
Futenma Relocation, the G-8 Summit, and Okinawa." 
1
'
7 
":c-!ago shigikai to no mendan ni tsuite" (Transcript of proceedings) (13 October 1997). 
168 On this issue see for example Ota Masahide, Ohiarrwa no hetsudan, pp. 265-6. 
169 Kawase Matayoshi, "Kichi shinsetsu to jichitai taisei," Working Paper Series (Shizuoka, Japan: 
School of Administration and Informatics, University ofShizuoka, 2002). As Kawase points out, in 
contrast to Kadena Town, the vast majority of land utilised by the US military in Northern Okinawa is 
owned by the local council, not private landowners (see also Kawase "Fukki seisaku to chiM jichi" in 
Miyamoto and Sasaki (eds.) Okinawa: 21 seki e no chosen, pp. 51-77). 
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short, the institutionalisation of the bases and public-works projects within local 
economy and political structures which is typical of municipalities in Okinawa takes 
concentrated form in Nago.170 
While Ota and Yoshimoto negotiated with Hashimoto over introducing 
measures which they hoped would lead to increased economic autonomy for Okinawa, 
the national government worked to win local politicians' cooperation over Futenma 
relocation plans by introducing a new set of economic compensation packages for 
Northern Okinawa. In January 1997 Oknmoto visited all municipalities host to US bases 
in Northern Okinawa and outlined government plans to provide supplementary 
subsidies for economic stimulus projects. In a meeting with Higa in March Okamoto 
outlined compensation packages for Nago in the endeavour to attain the Mayor's 
cooperation on a feasibility survey of the Camp Schwab area. As the date set for the 
referendum neared, Okinawa Development Agency Director Suzuki Muneo and top 
defence agency officials repeatedly made clear that financial compensation would be 
given only on the proviso that local municipalities cooperated with the central 
government.m On December 17, on the eve of the referendum, top officials laid do\\'ll a 
further set of economic stimulus measures in a meeting Vvith Higa and other local 
representatives \vith the proviso that they cooperate with Futenma relocation plans.1 72 
In spite of these moves, and extensive pressure from the LDP, central 
government agencies, m and local construction lobby groups, in the local plebiscite of 
170 Under the influence of a strong construction lobby, attracting government funding for large public 
work schemes has been an integral part oflocal politics, and Ota already carne into direct conflict with 
Riga after he relocated the national Arbour Day festival away from Nago for environmental reasons. The 
municipality planned to cut approximately I 0, 000 trees in order to build new facilities for the national 
convention-the purported aim of which was to promote the greening of Japan's countryside. See for 
example "Shokujusai Haman ni naitai: hokubu chiiki no hanpatsu hisshi" (OT(23 January 1991)). Ota 
recounts his side of the conflict in Okinawa no ketsudan, op cit., pp. 136-7. 
171 As outlined for example in Shlmin Tohyo Hokokushil (ed.) Nago shimin moeyu, op cit., pp. 224-34. 
172 OT (1 8 December 1997). 
173 In one of the most controversial examples, employees of Japan's Defence Facilities Administration 
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December 21, 54% of those who voted (51% of all eligible voters) opposed the base, 
regardless of the "economic benefits" it was expected to bring. Three days later, 
however, after meeting once again with Okamoto in Okinawa, Higa announced to Prime 
Minister Hashimoto his decision to simultaneously accept the base and resign from 
office. Pro-base construction and business groups v.ithin Okinawa praised Higa's 
"heroic" actions. Opposition groups, journalists, and intellectuals fiercely criticized 
Higa for not respecting the majority will of local residents and the central government 
for laying insurmountable pressure on the mayor. Criticism was also directed towards 
Ota, who had refused to meet with Higa on the morning of December 24, and who now 
had to face the consequences. Ota was completely taken by surprise by the mayor's 
announcement. 174 In a meeting with the prime minister the same night, Hashimoto 
strongly pressured Ota to respe.ct the. "sacrifice" made by the N ago mayor and also 
announce his acceptance of the base, yet Ota continued to refuse to clarify his position 
on the issue. 
The "Take Women's Voices to Heart Network" (kokoro ni todoke, joseitachi no 
koe nettowaaku), a prefecture-wide women's group centred in Nago, played a vital role 
in mobilizing citizen participation in the Nago plebiscite. On January 9, over thtee 
hundred women from the group conducted a protest in the lobby of the prefectural 
offices. From the release of SACO's interim report, groups in Okinawa strongly 
criticized US and Japanese policy for effecting a "shuffling" of bases as opposed to any 
concrete reductions. The Japanese term was "tarai maw as hi" or literally "passing 
around the washtub," and in a symbolic act of protest women handed over a washtub 
filled with messages against Futenma re-location plans to Ota. Since the confrontation 
Agency were flo\\n in from armmd Japan and conducted extensive door knocking around the Nago 
district prior to the plebiscite. 
174 OT (24, 25 December 1997). These events are also recounted in detail in for example Ota Masahide, 
Okinawa no ketsudan; Shimin Tohyo H1ikokushi1 (ed.) Nago shimin moeyu; and Okinawa Times (ed.} 
Mini to ketsudan: kaijo heripooto mondai to Nago shimin tohyo (Naha: Okinawa Taimususha, 1998}, 
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with anti-war landowners over the proxy issue over a year previously, relations between 
Ota's administration and anti-base groups had been tense. Yet now Ota smiled and 
danced as he played along with the joke, passing the washtub around to on-looking 
subordinates, expressing his gratitude that "women have raised their political voice," 
and reassuring the cheering crowd that he "would not make the wrong decision."175 
A month later, on 6 February 1998, Ota officially expressed his opposition to the 
plan to build a new military airbase/heliport oil' the coast of Camp Schwab in Nago. As 
reasons for his decision, he cited the fact that a majority of residents had voted against 
the plans in the recent plebiscite, the fact that the prefectural assembly had passed a 
unanimous resolution against the relocation of Futenma within Okinawa, fear of 
environmental damage to what was one of the prefecture's most precious natural 
regions, and the anti-base principles of his administration.176 Top officials within the 
central government denounced Ota's decision in unison. Suzuki Muneo declared that 
Ota's announcement "displayed an utter lack of faith," and Hashimoto criticized Ota for 
not discussing the issue directly with him. This was despite the fact that Ota's policy 
advisor had since January been trying to arrange a meeting between Ota and the prime 
minister to no avail.177 Eighteen months after Ota backed down on the second proxy 
issue and sought to negotiate v.'ith Hashimoto, renewed conflict between Ota's 
administration and the central government had "become a certainty.''178 Now, however, 
Ota faced a weakened support base and interns! conflict together with a central 
government campaign to ostracize his administration from policy-making and 
negotiation processes. 
"'OT (10 January 1998). One activist later recounted: "That is when we knew for sure that Ota would 
not let us down this time" (Interview with Makishi Yoshikazu (22 March 2001)). 
176 See for example OT and RS (6 January 1998) (Evening Edition). 
177 See for example" 'Shingi ihan' to seitu hanpatsu" RS (6 January 1998) (Evening Edition). Ota 
explains his side of the story in Okinawa: kichi naki shima e no di5hyi5, pp. 79-81. 
118 RS (6 January 1998) (Evening Edition). 
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Electoral Defeat and the End of the "Ota Era" 
Ota met with Hashimoto to negotiate base and economic-related issues 
concerning Okinawa seventeen times from January 1996 to December 1997. Yet their 
extended heated meeting of 24 December 1997 became the final time Ota was able to 
meet personally with Japan's Prime Minister during his term in office as governor. 
Once Ota announced his refusal to accept the offshore base plans, top government 
officials declined to engage in discussions with Ota unless he agreed to change his 
stance. Negotiations over Futcnma relocation were shelved, and the central government 
indefinitely suspended meetings of the Okinawa Policy Council, effectively preventing 
the prefectural administration from implementing policies on the bases or the economy. 
Ota in tum solidified his stance against Futenma relocation, and became increasingly 
critical both of the fact that Okinawa had been totally excluded from the SACO 
decision-making process and of SACO's final recommendations. For the first time he 
also explicitly took the line that if the relocation of Futenma was necessary, the central 
government should take the responsibility of finding an alternative site in another part 
of Japan. 179 
Following the SDP's decision to withdraw from the LDP coalition and the 
establishment of a new cabinet under Obuchi Keizo in July 1998, tensions between the 
Ota administration and the central government further intensified. Newly appointed 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka Hiromi severely criticized Ota for not personally 
coming to Tokyo to pay his respects to Hashimoto as "against human morality."180 This 
'-"<lS in spite of the fact that Ota had expressed his sincere gratitude towards Hashimoto 
for his policies on Okinawa follo\.Ving Hashimoto's resignation from the office of prime 
179 See for example OT(l2, 29 March 1998). Ota also strongly criticizes the SACO process in Okinawa: 
kichi naki shima e no dilhy/5, p. 55, 
180 See for example OT (7 August 1998). 
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minister. Nonaka himself refused to meet with Okinawan Deputy Governor Miyahira 
Yo, and maintained he would agree to meet with Ota only on the condition that Ota 
showed a "pragmatic" stance on the heliport issue. 181 Soon after Obuchi took office, the 
central LDP and its Okinawa Charter agreed to endorse lnamine Keiichi as candidate to 
oppose Ota in upcoming gubernatorial elections. Inamine was president of the Ryilseki 
Petroleum Company and the son of long-time LDP politician and leading Okinawan 
power-broker Inamine Ichiro.182 
On the eve of the gubernatorial elections in November 1998, the central 
government announced its decision to withdraw plans for the offshore base. 'Ibis did not 
amount to a change of policy in regards to SACO, and Futenma return was still 
premised on relocation of the heliport within Okinawa prefecture, but the move was an 
important political tactic to defuse the relocation issue as an election topic. Local 
construction companies had long been pushing for the base to be built off the coast 
itself, involving a massive land reclamation project which would guarantee a larger role 
and greater profits for the less technically-savvy local construction industry. lnamine 
advocated the construction of a "joint civilian and military airport" with a fifteen year 
time limit for military use. 
Inamine's electoral campaign focused on the prolonged economic recession 
which had resulted in an unemployment rate of close to ten percent within the 
prefecture. Ota took the stance that the recession itself was largely a result of LDP 
policy: Inamine focused on the impact of the breakdown in relations between the central 
181 OT(l9 August 1998). A readers contribution to the Okinawa Times criticized Nonaka's comments as 
reflecting a "Tokugawa Shogun" mentality. Following the Satsuma invasion of Ryulcyu the Ryukyuan 
court were required to carry out tributary ntissions to Edo (Oshiro Osamu, "Kenryoku shlkogata no 
Nonaka hatsugen," OT (22 August 1998), p. 5). 
182 Inantine Ichiro was an official of the South Mancurian Railway in the wartime era, profited from 
building and services the US ntilitary bases in the pre-1972 period, and served three terms as an upper 
house LDP Diet member (as cited in Chalmers Johnson, "Okinawa Betv.;een the United States and Japan," 
Joseph Kreiner (ed.) Ryukyu in World History (Bonn: Bier'sche Verlagsanstalt, 2001), p. 379 
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and prefectural governments. In the words of Mulgan: "In his campaign, Inamine 
emulated the classic LDP electoral technique of turning the financial vulnerability of 
local government to partisan advantage by arguing that the LDP's pipeline to the centre 
would keep the local community supplied vvith development projects and subsidies."183 
On 15 November 1998, Inamine defeated Ota by approximately 30,000 votes. 184 
Notably downcast after the unexpectedly \vide margin of defeat, a sedate Ota quietly 
stated: "I worry about the future Okinawa will now take."185 
Economic issues were undeniably a central underlying cause of Ota's defeat. 
From prior to Ora's decision to reject the offshore base, Okinawa's Business Council 
(keizai dantai kaigl), an umbrella orgauization incorporating Okinawa's most influential 
business groups, lobbied Ota to accept the base plan. 186 Promising the restoration of 
relations with the central government and a direct pipeline to the ruling LDP, Inamine 
was able to gain popular support and instrumental backing from the large majority of 
Okinawa's business sector. 187 Other factors cited as reasons for Ota's defeat include the 
effectiveness of Inamine's election campaign (which was devised using the assistance 
of marketing experts hired on commission from the advertising giant Dentsfi), Ota' s 
prolonged stalemate with the central government, the impact of compensation policies 
and stimulus packages, lack of coordination and fragmentation vvithin Ota's progressive 
supporting coalition, and the sense of disillusionment initially brought about after Ota 
backed down on the proxy issue. 188 The Okinawan Charter of the Komei Party had been 
1
" ~1ulgan, "Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa," p. 170. 
184 Inamine won 374, 833 voles to Ota's 337, 369. 
185 OT(I6 November 1998). 
186 OT(5 February 1998). 
"'Including two of Okinawa's largest companies, Ryiiseki and Okinawa Electric. Groups which had 
previously supported Ota such as the Okinawan branch of Japan Agriculture (JA) also lent support to 
Inamine. 
mAs discussed in for example Fukuchi Hiroaki, Kiehl tojinken: Okinawa no sentaku; Arasaki Moriteru, 
Seiji o minshii note ni (Tokyo: Gaiflisha, 1999); andArakawaAkira, Okinawa: togo to hangyaku 
(Arakawa most specifically cites Shimadakon as an important factor). 
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a part of Ota's support base, and from the 1970s Ota had contributed articles to the 
Komei Party newspaper. Yet under Obuchi the party's central organs joined the LDP· 
coalition, in the gubernatorial elections for the first time in Okinawa it baeked the 
conservatives, providing a vital source of votes for lnamine. Ibis showed how the 
further weakening of progressive parties at the national level affected Okinawa's 
progressive coalition. 
Writing after Ota's electoral defeat, Hiyane Teruo reflected: 
Ota's announcement on his refusal to act as proxy and the preceding rape incident 
of 1995 marked the beginning of a tumultuous period stretching across over three 
years. In various ways, this time tested the principles and assertions of each 
individual. Historians of the next generation will no doubt position and view the 
transition in opinions across this turbulent period in such a light. In this sense, it 
became a litmus test for postwar intellectual thought itself. 
Okinawa's Decision (Okinawa no Ketsudan) is to date the most detailed and 
personal aecount ofOta's period as governor. In it, Ota recounts that on the night of 13 
September 1996, the day he announced his decision to baek down on the second proxy 
issue, he sat up late reading historical materials relating to the career and policies of 
Higa Shiihei (1901-1956) and Yara Chiibyo. Higa Shiihei, Chief Executive of the 
Government of the Ryukyus from 1952 to his sudden death in 1956, faced multiple 
conflicting pressures in his position as negotiator between Okinawan landowners 
fiercely critical of the US military for stripping them of their land, and USCAR and the 
US government. Yara Ch5by5 similarly met with multiple obstacles in his endeavour to 
influence and contest negotiations over Okinawan reversion. Ota recounts: "Thinking of 
the way in which those before me were continually forced to make such decisions, I felt 
my very being pierced by the vivid reality of these historical materials from the past."189 
189 Okinuwa no ketsudan, p. 243. 
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As an academic and intellectual, Ota was highly despondent towards and critical 
of the institutionalised structure of relations which he saw severely limited postwar 
Okinawan politicians. At the same time, he was also critical of at least some of the 
political compromises which Y ara for example made on the eve of reversion and after. 
As Okinawan governor, Ota found himself also compromised with these relations in all 
their political immediacy. Moving from academia to politics, the fundamental dilemma 
of how to reconcile theory to practice, and ideals of peace, democracy, coexistence and 
autonomy with the requirements of political pragmatism became a matter of constant 
and immediate concern. The weight of Ota's analyses as an academic--and the 
voluminous commentary which he produced as a highly public intellectual-lay upon 
each crucial decision which he had to make during his term in political office. This fact 
sets him apart from the vast majority of politicians. Moreover, in contrast to the 
detached world of academia, where often intellectual analysis is perceived as divorced 
from questions relating to intellectuals' own everyday mode of ethics, the tensions and 
discrepancies between Ota's intellectual discussions and political efficacy were subject 
to direct public scrutiny. As Hiyane Teruo suggests, the way in which these tensions 
were played out in the highly significant period from 1995-8 will also come under the 
scrutiny of historians in the years to come. 
:vteanwhile, it may be said that Ota's position against the expropriation process, 
his appeal to the High and Supreme Court of Japan, and the enactment of a prefectural 
plebiscite on the base issue exposed to challenge hierarchical structures \'vithin local-
national relations in Japan and in relation to Okinawa's position in US-Japan relations. 
It served to promote the "spirit of democracy," as conceived as the expression and the 
unsettling of the connections between personal and collective identity. William E. 
Connolly observes: 
Democratic turbulence disturbs established commonalities: it shows them to be 
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complex contrivances; it brings out elements of contestability within them; it 
exposes possibilities suppressed and actualities enabled by contestable settlements. 
By fostering the experience of contingency and relationality in identity, 
democracy disturbs the closure of self-identity and, sometimes, provides a 
medium for modifying the terms of collective identity. This combination increases 
the chance--when this destabilization is part of struggle against existential 
resentment-that a larger variety of identities will be allowed to contend with one 
another on democratic terms. 190 
Ota both appealed to principles of equality and democracy within the framework of 
sovereignty and institutions of the state, and destabilized hegemonic claims to collective 
identity and historical paradigms of Japanese ethnic and cultural homogeneity. He 
sought to find a medium to modify the terms of collective identity according Connolly's 
perception of "democratic turbulence" and thereby increase the possibilities available 
for plural identities to contend with one another on more democratic terms. 
Ota's stance on the proxy issue was made in the context of and in turn itself 
fuelled a mass movement of critical reflection and analysis within Okinawa. The years 
from 1995-8 saw a proliferation of works on Okinawan history, culture, and economy, 
some of which explicitly called for independence or at least a significant increase in 
local autonomy. 191 During this period a tremendous amount of critical effort was 
directed at reconsidering the Okinawan past-not merely in relation to the history of 
American military occupation, but also Japanese colonialism. In newspapers and journal 
contributions, on local radio and television, in public forums, and in private 
conversations people in Okinawa debated issues relating to the Battle of Okinawa, 
militarism, modernization, and the incorporation ofRyukyu into the Japanese nation 
state. As Christopher T. Nelson describes: 
190 William E. Connolly, identity/Difference, p. 200. 
191 Koji Taira provides a list of works calling for independence andior increased autonomy in "Okinav.'a's 
Choice: Independence or Subordination" in Chalmers Johnson (ed.) Okinawa: Cold War Island, p. 185. 
On this debate see also for example" 'Okinawa dokuritsuron' o kangaeru," Shiikan Kinyobi (20 June 
1997), pp. 9·17; and "Okinawa ga "dokuritsu' suru hi," Newsweek Japan (21 June 1997), pp. 14-25. 
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Questions of Okinawa's subjection to nativist analysis and cultural 
commodification were aired in the mass media. Angry commentators and 
politicians revisited Okinawa's history of discrimination at the hands of both the 
American and Japanese states. Calls were heard for greater regional autonomy, for 
recognition of Okinawa's unique status in the Japanese nation, even for 
independence. 192 
Yet following Ota's ultimate decision to back do"\\-n on the second proxy issue, 
the atmosphere in Okinawa also became permeated within a feeling of tirudai, a state of 
disappointment and loss.193 This sense of disillusionment and powerlessness increased 
as people witnessed the forthright dismissal of their claims by an overwhelming 
majority of the National Diet with the passing of the legislative revisions of April 1997, 
and fed into a general political apathy. 
Ota was unable to utilize conditions to effect a radical change within Okinawa. 
To this extent, it may be said that he failed to take full advantage of political 
opportunity. Throughout 1997, Ota argued that the heliport base issue was a local and 
not a prefectural issue, and sought to avoid conflict with the central government by 
remaining distant from negotiations. 194 However this opened him up to criticism from 
those who had most avidly supported his earlier stance against the proxy issue. With the 
prefecture attempting to maintain a distance from the issue, politicians and residents 
within Nago became even more vulnerable to pressure from the central government and 
increasing divisions and tensions within the community.195 Ota did not directly cDntest 
192 Christopher T. Nelson, "Huzuki Hayato, the stDryteller: comedy, practice and the politics of everyday 
life in Okinawa," p. 190 
193 Also described by Nelson ibid .. 
194 Ota further outlines his reasoning for not taking a stance against Futenrna relocation plans earlier in 
Kiehl naki shim a e no dohyo, pp. 69-70, Ota explains that be did not want to conflict with government 
any more than was necessary: "As I believed that in working to solve the base issue it was important to 
draw a line, to cooperate with the government in areas where we could cooperate and to clearly refuse 
when we could not." 
195 Sheila Smith concludes that Ota "missed an opportunity to claim his mantle as the representative of 
Okinawan citizenry. Citizen activism carried the day in Nago, while the prefectural government appeared 
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the central government's strategies of financial subsidy as exemplified by Shimadakon. 
His administration was not able to provide obstacles substantial enough to combat the 
petpetuation and further entrenchment of Okinawa's compensation system and subsidy-
centred economic development. 196 
Yet these failures were not solely the fault of Ota and his administration, nor 
Ota's inability to make the most of political opportunity. Ota sought at least to an extent 
to frame his cause within counter-hegemonic national narratives which upheld the 
ideals of peace and democracy that were seen to be laid do""n in Japan's postwar 
constitution. However his decision to refuse to act as proxy occurred at a time when 
progressive parties and their support bases were becoming increasingly fragmented, and 
when voices calling for Japan to play a more active military role were gaining ground. 
In a similar way to the reversion movement, the upsurge of the "Okinawa issue" from 
1995-8 ironically intertwined with processes which have led to the further 
fragmentation of a clear political opposition within Japan as a whole. 
Furthermore, restrictions on local political and economic autonomy and the 
multiple structures of dependence brought about by centralized financial control and 
prolonged US military presence underlay Ota's anguish and his vacillations between 
conflict and compromise with the central goverrnnent. "Colonisation" signals direct 
colonial occupation and rule: "post-colonial" relations are characterised by "forms of 
economic development dominated by the growth of indigenous capital and their 
relations of neo-colonial dependency on the developed capitalist world, and the politics 
indecisive and disengaged at precisely the moment when the governor's arguments oo the US bases most 
needed to be validated" (Sheila A. Smith, "Challengiog National Authority: Okinawa Prefecture and the 
US Military Bases," p. 112). Kamo Toshl makes a similar argument though with a differeot frame of 
analysis in "Ok:inawa,jichl moderu no sentaku," Miyamoto and Sasaki (eds.) Okinawa: 21 seki e no 
chOsen, pp. 249-84. 
196 After leaving office, Ota referred to Shimadakon as the "High commissioner mode of rule," in 
reference to US compensation policies towards Okinawa during occupation of the islands (Interview with 
the author, 4 May 2000). Yet he did not publicly criticize the inception of Shimadakon during his time as 
governor. 
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which arise from emergence of powerful local elites managing the contradictory effects 
of under-development."197 In Okinawa, the vestiges of colonialism complexly intermix 
with postcolonial systems of relation. Structures of internal colonialism perpetuate 
dependency, yet they may also ironically provide comparative economic stability-that 
is in relation to the economic and social realities faced by peripheral post-colonial 
nation-states under contemporary international capitalist relations. Attempts to conceive 
of a blueprint for economic autonomy face this paradoxical condition. 198 
Central government policy towards Okinawa combined financial compensation 
(the "carrot") with political, legal, and administrative restrictions (the "stick"). In tum, 
"Okinawans' love of the carrot and their hatred of the stick show up as political 
vacillation between a prefectural government supported by the Japanese government 
and one representing indigenous forces for reform."199 In the elections of 1998, Inamine 
was able to utilize the predicament posed by a "cash-for-base" ultimatum to his political 
advantage. As a direct beneficiary of central government compensation policies, 
however, it is far from clear that he provided a solution to the hierarchical structures of 
dependency inherent to this system, or to resulting social, economic, and political 
tensions and contradictions within Okinawa. 
197 Stuart Hall, "When was 'the Post-Colonial'? Thinking at the Limit," in lain Chambers and Lidia Curti 
(eds.) The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons (New York and London: Routledge, 
1996), pp. 247-8. 
198 A similar paradox is observed by Negr6n-Muntaner and Grosfoguel in relation Puerto Rico as an 
internal colony of the US (Negr6n-Muntaner and Grosfoguel ( eds.) Puerto Rico Jam, pp. 4-16). 
199 Koji Taira, "Okinawa's Choice: Independence or Subordination" in Chalmers Johnson (ed.) Okinawa: 
Cold War Island, pp. 171-2. 
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··~CHAPTER FIVE=-
Contested Identities in Contemporary Okinawa 
The Inamine Administration and the 
(Re)making of History 
"It was a struggle over history in multiple ways, with heated 
passions, with feverish polemics ... to all history clearly mattered. 
The question was, who would shape it?" 
Barton J. Bernstein, 19951 
"As I stand in the sun, the voices locked in my skull from the dark 
museum room burst out and release their agony into the air.ln 
Mabuni, the wind over the dazzling sea is heavy with the shrieks of 
the dying." 
Norma Field, 1991 2 
Contested Identities in Contemporary Okinawa 
In early December 1998, directly after Inamine's inauguration, the central 
government agreed to hold a meeting of the centrally controlled Okinawa Policy 
Council (Okinawa seisaku kyogikai) for the first time in thirteen months. In a 
momentous gathering attended by the entire cabinet, then Prime Minister Obuchi Keizii 
1 
"Afterward" in Philip ~obile (ed.) Judgment at tlw Smithsonian: the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki (New York: Marlow 1995), p. 285. 
' In tlw Realm of a Dying Emperor, p. 86. 
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immediately pledged a 10 billion yen 'stimulus adjustment package' to Inamine's 
administration, double Ota's monetary 'reward' for backing down on the lease issue in 
September 1996. Obuchi personally pledged his commitment to Okinawa and the 
govermnent's resolve to "work towards a solution to the issue of Futenma's return 
through cooperation between the prefecture and govermnent."3 In April, 1999, Obuchi 
announced his decision to select Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture, jointly with Miyazaki 
Prefecture in Kyushu as the site to host the G8 Surmnit in the year 2000, despite its low 
ranking in terms of existing facilities and security capacity levels, As Aurelia George 
Mulgan observes: "The decision to host the G-8 summit in Nago in July 2000 was yet 
another gesture to shore up the prefectural economy and to appease Okinawan 
sentiment over the Futenma relocation issue.'' 4 Ota was highly critical of both the 
central govermnent and Inamine: "The view that the Summit and base relocation in the 
name of regional stimulus are mutually implicated does not cDme from mere conjecture, 
but as a result of over half a century of the [Japanese] Govermnent's policies towards 
Okinawa and the existence of a section of opportunist politicians and entrepreneurs who 
bow at their service."5 
In mid-December, 1999, the government announced its pledge to pour a 100 
billion yen supplementary stimulus package into Northern Okinawa over a period often 
years, with the first 10 billion yen to be injected into the area in the year 2000. Jn return, 
Obuchi's cabinet was anxious to secure an alternative site for MCAS Futenma "before 
the end of the year," in heed of Clinton's request that the Futenma relocation issue be 
resolved well before the President arrived in Okinawa for the G-8 Summit. 6 In 
3 OT(4 December 1998) Evening Edition. 
4 Aurelia George Mulgan, "Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa: A Test for Japanese Democruy," p. 
170. 
'Ota Masahide, Okinawa: kichi naki shima e no dOhy/i (Tokyo, Shueihsa Shinsho, 2001 ), p. II. 
6 It is thought that Clinton made this clear at a meeting with Obuchi at the 1999 G-8 Summit in Cologne. 
See for example Kamo Toshio, "Okinawa,jichi moderu no sentaku," in Miyamoto Ken'ichi and Sasaki 
Masayuki (eds.). Okinawa: 21 seiki e no chOsen, p. 255. 
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September 1999, the prefectural assembly passed a resolution calling for the prompt 
resolution of the Futenma relocation issue, and in November, Inamine declared the 
waters of Camp Schwab to be the most desirable site for "speedy" relocation of 
' 
Futenma facilities. At the end of December, after a marathon 19-hour deliberation, first 
the Nago City Assembly and three days later Nago Mayor Kishimoto Tateo consented 
to the building of new facilities at Henoko on seven conditions. These included 
consideration of environmental impacts and that the government "substantially engage" 
(gutaiteki na torikumi) in negotiations with the US to secure a fifteen-year military use 
limit on the facilities. 
Leading up to the Summit, the prefectural government worked in conjunction 
with the central government to promote a sense of national belonging more conducive 
to the ideology of the LDP ruling coalition and its national security policies. Inarnine's 
administration, in other words, became the spearhead of a movement to advance an 
Okinawan collective identity and historical consciousness more fitting with 
conservative nationalist credos, and in direct opposition to Ota's conceptualisation of 
the "Okinawan Spirit." This movement was moreover integrally related to a rise in 
state-induced and populist nationalism in Japan as a whole, spurred on by sustained 
economic stagnation, increasing popular distrust in politics, and a legitimacy crisis in 
Japan's system of governance-as had been long symbolized in the intimate alliance 
between business, bureaucracy, and the LDP-ruled government. Building upon 
conservative politicians' attempts to secure a more active military role for Japan in the 
international arena in the wake of the Persian Gulf Crisis, an influential campaign 
promoting a neo-nationalist historical revisionism emerged in 1996 in the form of the 
Liberal View of History Group (Jiyiishugi Shikan Kenkyiikai), and expanded a year later 
to include the Society for the Making of New School Textbooks in History (Atarashii 
Rekishi Kyi5kasho o tsukuru Kai). As Yumiko Iida observes, feeding off a crisis in 
identity and social hegemony: 
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(N)ew nationalism, with revisiomsm as its vehicle, is a symptomatic 
manifestation of greater historical problems which encompass all spheres of 
hwnan life, including the breakdown of the subject and discursive meaning, the 
eclipse of the transcendental perspective, and the resultant collapse of the 
structuring frame of objective thought and temporality. Beyond this symptomatic 
character, however, revisionism also proposed to offer a 'remedy' for the troubled 
sense of self felt by many Japanese. It attracts resentful souls who seek to ground 
themselves in concrete history and generate an insular communal space, at the 
expense of fixing the subject, meaning and history to idealized, singular and 
homogenous modes. 7 
Both the attempt to secure a site for the relocation of Futenma base, and the 
endeavour to redefine Okinawan collective consciousness, however, also met with 
considerable protest. This chapter traces in particular two highly politicised and intense 
debates over Okinawan identity and conceptualisations of Okinawan historical 
experience and its significance, which emerged on the eve of the G-8 Sununit, from 
1999 to 2000. The first was a controversy over how Okinawa's martial past should be 
represented in permanent exhibits within two different "peace memorial musewns" 
recently constructed in Ok-inawa: the Y aeyama Peace Memorial Musewn, which opened 
in May 1999 on the southern island of Ishigaki, and the New Prefectural Peace 
Memorial Musewn, which finally opened one month later than scheduled on 1 April 
2000 in the Peace Memorial Park, Mabuni. Alterations made at the behest of the 
Prefectural Government to displays at Y aeyama served to highlight similar surreptitious 
attempts to change the content of exhibits at Mabuni. The extent of the attempted 
changes gradually became known through extensive reporting in the local press from 
August to October 1999, and a fierce political debate over the displays in the two 
museums ensued. 8 
7 Yumiko !ida, Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan: Nationalism as Aesthetics, p, 252. 
'From August to October 1999, over four htmdred news articles and numerous editorials concerning the 
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The second dispute, known as the "Okinawa Initiative Debate" (Okinawa 
inishiatibu ronso) emerged over two policy-orientated papers, formulated and 
sponsored by separate Tokyo-based think tanks and announced respectively in March 
and April 2000. The origins of both papers can be traced to the highest echelons within 
the Inamine administration and the national government. They were integrally linked to 
Japanese government compensation strategies towards Okinawa, as well as 
comprehensive domestic and foreign policy goals for Japan in "the new millennium." 
The Okinawa Initiative was more subtle and employed a distinctly different tactic to the 
Inamine administration's earlier more blatant attempts to "change" history within the 
museum displays. The Initiative papers implicitly acknowledged Ota's position that 
Okinawans had a different history from other Japanese. They sought to disavow the 
importance of, rather than rewrite, Okinawa's history, thereby avoiding debate over 
history per se. While advocating compliance with Japanese and US security policies, 
they similarly presented this compliance as providing the key to ensuring Okinawan 
autonomy. Yet these tactics also met with strong opposition from numerous intellectuals 
and anti-base supporters and activists in Okinawa. In the months leading up to the 
Summit, prominent writers, journalists, academics and artists throughout the islands 
published numerous articles and essays disputing or defending the Initiative's claims 
and analyses.9 
Both the attempted museum alterations and the Okinawa Initiative formed part 
of an attempt to formulate a counter ideology to the Ota administration, as well as to the 
museum displays appeared in the two main Okinawan newspapers, Okinawa Taimusu (OT) and Ryiikyii 
Shinp/5 (RS). Significantly, the dispute was accorded very little notice in the mainland Japanese press, the 
exception being the weekly magazine Shilkan Kinyobi [Friday weekly], which featured several articles on 
the peace memorial controversy in conjunction with the Futenma Base relocation issue. 
9 While a minority, several mainland Japanese intellectuals and journalists also contributed to the debate. 
The vast majority of all published contributions were critical of the Okinawa Initiative paper. A 
comprehensive list of these articles is provided in Takara Kurayoshi, Maeshiro Morisada and Oshiro 
Tsuneo (eds.) Okinawa Jnishiatibu: Okinawa hatsu chiteki senryaku (Naha: Okinawa Bunko, 2000), 168-
175. 
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credo of progressive movements and liberal intellectuals which had formed the core of 
his support base. From the summer of 1999, the political stakes involved in 
representations of peace and the past seemed only to increase with the heat, as a battle 
of a different kind began to rage over the cliffs of Mabuni. Journalists, intellectuals, war 
survivors, and anti-base peace groups mobilized in opposition to the prefectural 
administration, and struggles over history, the war, memory, and the US bases became 
increasingly fused together. As historical and political struggles intertwined, the ensuing 
dispute had far-reaching implications for the way in which Okinawa's historical 
experience was perceived, relations between Okinawa and mainland Japan and the 
central government, cultural pluralism and democracy in Japan in general, as well as 
Japan's security policy and relations with the US and Asia as a whole. It also raised 
pertinent questions concerning the commemoration and memorialisation of history, the 
formation of collective identity, and the intimate relation between economic structures, 
policy formation, and contests over conceptions of culture, identity, and the past. 
History was in the making. Who would shape it? 
The New Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum Dispute 
Conceiving of a New Peace Memorial Museum 
Museums and memorials, as Laura Hein and Mark Selden (1997) remind us, are 
major organs of the state "dedicated to the instruction and edification of the public" that 
have served as a means to control the act of commemoration. 10 Yet as public spaces 
involved in the reproduction of memory, they remain inherently contentious. Earlier 
disputes in both Japan and the US over museum exhibits planned to commemorate the 
w Hein and Selden, Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age 
(New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, !997), Introduction. As sites by which the nation may be 
remembered and authenticated, they also contribute to naturalizing the state of nationbood in the 
landscape. See Marshall Johnson, "Making time: historic preservation and the space of nationality,'' 
Positions No.2 Vol. 2 (Fall1994), pp. 177-249. 
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fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II demonstrated the difficulties involved in 
reflecting on the historical implications of war in a public setting. Ultimately, absences 
from the exhibit displaying the shiny revamped body of the Enola Gay at the 
Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum (NASM) in Washington and within the 
polished glass showcases of Tokyo's Showa Museum, bore testimony to missing 
historical complexities. 11 Since 1995, peace museums have increasingly become the 
target of criticism and at times outright intimidation from a grov.'ing historical 
revisionist movement in Japan. 12 It was within this climate, and in the midst of the 
Futenma relocation issue, that attempted changes to the new Yaeyarna and Mabuni 
museum exhibits took place. 
" For an analysis of the different issues raised by these two disputes, see Yui Daizaburo, Nichibei 
sensi5kian no si5koku (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1995). There have been a number of books published on the 
Smithsonian dispute, including Philip Nobile ( ed.) Judgment at the Smithsonian: The Bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, (New York: Marlow, 1995); Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt, History 
Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996); 
and LauraHein and Mark Selden (eds.) Living With the Bomb. See also Gavan McCormack, "Apologies 
and Apologias," in Peter Dennis (ed.) 1945 War and Peace in the Pacific, Canberra: Australian War 
Memorial, 1999 and Mike Wallace, "The Battle of the Enola Gay," Radical Historians Newsletter No. 72 
(May 1995), pp. 1·32. 
"In 1996, plans to include exhibits on Japanese military aggression in Asia within the Nagasaki Atom 
Bomb Museum were fiercely denounced by the Nagasaki City branch of the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) and other right-wing and nationalist groups. As a result, several hundred revisions of content were 
made following the museum's reopening. Similar campaigns, led by right-wing groups and supported by 
the LDP and conservative sections of the press, have been launched against the Sakai City Peace and 
Human Rights Museum, and the Osaka International Peace Center. In October 1996, an LDP 
Parliamentary Committee report on the exhibit content ofiocal peace museums, ordered by the then 
Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryiitaro, criticized the Sakai and Osaka sites, the original Okinav.'a Prefectural 
Peace Museum at Mabuni, and various other local museums as promoting a "biased ideology." These 
events are outlined in Ueyama Kazuo, "Heiwa kinen shiryokan mondai to :r.enkokuteki na kagai tenji e no 
kogeki no ugoki," Keesi Kaji No. 25 (December 1999), pp. 48-50; Ishihara Masale, "Shin-Okinawa 
Heiwa Shiryokan tenji naiyo henko no keii to ruondaiten," Rekishigaku kenkyiiNo. 772 (February 2000), 
pp. 43-7; Nakakita Ryiitaro, "Heiwa hakubutsukan e no kogeki o ika ni kanekaesu ka," Sekai No. 674 
(May 2000), pp. 231-5; and Okinawa-ken Rekishi Kyoilmsha Kyogikai, "Rekishi no shinjitsu wa 
yugarnete wa naranai," Rekishi to Jissen No. 20 (December 1999). On negotiating histories in national 
museums see also Darryl Mcintyre and Kirsten Wehner (eds.) Negotiating Histories (Canberra: National 
Museum of Australia, 2000). 
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The original Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum was officially 
opened in 1975-also directly prior to a highly publicized international event (the 
Okinawan Marine Exposition) and in a wave of controversy. In anticipation of the 
arrival of Prince Akihito and his wife for the Marine Exposition in 1975, plans for the 
Prefectural Museum progressed with little or no public debate or input from 
professional historians and researchers. Management was entrusted to the Okinawa 
Prefectural War Dead Memorial Committee (Okinawaken senhotsusha irei hosankai), a 
nationalist remembrance foundation. The entrance to the resulting exhibit featured a 
large Rising Sun flag suspended from the museum's wall, complete with a photo of 
Lieut-Gen. Ushijima and a poem dedicated to his memory. Outraged, various peace 
groups and research committees protested to the prefectural assembly and relevant 
authorities. Y ara' s administration responded to the protest, and over two years later a 
completely revamped peace memorial was reopened to the public. The museum's 
newly-established founding principles cited the Battle of Okinawa as "unique in that the 
number of civilian victims far outweighed military casualties." Some of these victims, 
the passage continued, were "driven into taking their own lives, some fell from 
starvation or malaria, and some were sacrificed in the hands of the Japanese army." The 
people of Okinawa "experienced with their own flesh and blood the horrors and 
absurdity of war," and this experience formed the basis of the "Okinawan spirit," 
fostered in the post-war period while "opposing the oppressive control of the US 
military." 13 The modified museum featured military documents, propaganda posters 
including a poster campaigning against "espionage activities" on Okinawa, photographs 
depicting the US military onslaught, and a large darkened room devoted to the display 
of vivid oral testimonies of the war. Here, reading page after page of oral history 
13 Heiwa no shOgen (Guidebook to the original Prefectural Peace Memorial Musell!ll) {revised edition), 
Naha: Okinawa Prefecture, 1991, pp. 2-3. See also Shima Tsuyoshi, Okinawasen o kangaeru, especially 
pp. 148-56. 
312 
records, one could learn, as Norma Field observes, that "even Japanese soldiers didn't 
die shouting banzai to the emperor."14 
Yet, even revamped, the original museum structure had serious limitations in 
storage facilities and availability of space. Ota released an outline for 1he relocation of 
the Prefectural Museum in 1995. Toge1her \vith the Okinawan International Peace 
Research Institute and the Cornerstone of Peace monument, this new museum was 
conceived as a founding backbone of his "peace promotion" policy. It was ensured that 
in the construction of the new facilities, the spirit of the (revamped) original museum's 
"Founding Principles" would be respected, and the "realities of the Battle of Okinawa" 
would be depicted "without omissions." The new museum, projected to be a massive 
nine times the size of the original, \Vas to be erected on a more prominent site than 1he 
original building, on the northern side of the Peace Memorial Park facing the 
Cornerstone. The new museum's exhibits were also to include an account of "the 
historical process leading to war, including the histories of the countries of the Asia-
Pacific, taking into account (Japan's) responsibility for inflicting suffering on the 
countries of Asia."15 While the original museum concentrated on the battle for the main 
island of Okinawa, new displays would encompass the entire war in Asia and the 
Pacific, from the period of the "fifteen-years war" starting with the Manchurian 
Incident, and including material on the postwar US occupation. A supervisory planning 
committee comprised of thirteen historians was formed in September 1996, and the 
committee visited many war museums in Japan and abroad in devising plans for the 
new museum. An extension of the oral history component of the displays was to 
"In the Realm ofrhe Dying Emperor, p. 85. 
15 OT (! 0 November 1997). See also Miyagi Estujiro, "Shinheiwa Kinen Shiryokan kensetsu no keii," in 
Okinawaken Rekishi Kyoikusha Kyogikai, "Rekishi no shinjitsu wa yugamete wa naranai," Rekishi to 
Jissen No. 20 (December 1999), pp 27-8. 
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constitute a vital part of the museum, and by May 1998, over 210 testimonies of the war 
had been recorded on video as part of the permanent exhibit. 
The official ceremony that initiated the construction of the new complex took 
place on 7 November 1997. This endorsement of the site, however, revealed the 
conjunction of competing claims to public space and a collective past Before work on 
the four-storey building, complete with an Okinawa-style red-tiled roof, had begun, the 
question of how "peace" should be construed had emerged as a contested issue. ln a 
revealing editorial contribution to the Okinawa Times, a schoolteacher from mainland 
Japan criticized the inclusion of a Shinto purification ceremony for being a 
manifestation of "State Shinto" (kokka shinto), which should be a target for criticism in 
a site that purportedly sought to document the "imperialization" (kominka) of education 
in pre-war Japan. Such a ceremony, the schoolteacher wrote, sits uneasily in the context 
of Ryukyuan culture, which has a unique set of rituals and beliefs, and contradicts the 
constitutional principles of separation of state and religion .16 
Disclosure of Alterations and the Ensuing Controversy 
The alteration issue was compounded by two other events. In late June 1999, it 
was reported that Inamine had indefinitely delayed plans to construct the Okinawan 
International Peace Research Institute in Okinawa, purportedly due to a lack of funds. It 
was originally envisaged that this institute would manage the Cornerstone of Peace and 
the new Peace Museum, as well as conduct research on "war and history in the Asia-
Pacific, with an emphasis on the Battle of Okinawa." By June 1999 it also became 
clearly evident that the prefectural administration had tampered with the contents of 
another exhibit at the new Yaeyama Peace Memorial Museum, located on the southern 
island of Ishigaki. The museum had been constructed to commemorate victims of "war 
16 OT (17 November 1997). 
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malaria," namely local inhabitants of the southern Yaeyama islands who had contracted 
the fatal virus after being expelled to malaria-infested areas by the Japanese army. 17 
The Y aeyama Museum opened on 28 May 1999 in the midst of fierce wrangling 
between committee members entrusted with planning the exhibit and the staff from the 
Department of Peace Promotion. On the public opening of the exhibit, it became 
apparent that eleven captions out of a total of twenty-seven for photos and diagrams in 
the exhibit had been significantly altered without the knowledge of Ryukyu University 
Professor Hosaka Hiroshi, supervisor of the original exhibit plans. Alterations included 
replacing the phrase "forced expulsion" (kyosei taikyo) with ''ordered to take refuge" 
(hinan meiret). The caption underneath a photograph panel thought to depict a scene of 
suicide was altered from "purported death by collective suicide" to ''victims of the 
Battle of Okinawa." A 5 x 3-meter panel outlining the chronology of Battle of Okinawa 
and "war malaria" was also omitted, purportedly due to a "risk of fire." 18 
The revoking of plans for a peace research centre and alterations to the Yaeyama 
Museum exhibit hinted at a change in direction in prefectural "peace promotion" 
policies and suggested a concerted attempt on the part of the prefectural government to 
alter the way in which the Battle of Okinawa was presented to the public. They also cast 
serious doubt on the reliability of the government's assurances that alterations were 
17 The Okinawa Relief Committee for Forcefully Expelled Malaria Victims was founded in 1988 to seek 
compensation from the central government for the bereaved families of malaria victims. Eight years later, 
while unsuccessful in their claim, the committee agreed to accept a concession that the government 
allocate 300 million yen to the construction of a monument and a museum in remembrance of the victims. 
The history of "war malaria" is summarized by Aniya Masaaki, "Sensii mataria" in Shiite okitai Okinawa, 
(Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1998). A detailed account of malaria amongst the irthabitants ofHateruma Island is 
given in Ishihara Masaie, Mo hitotsu no Okinawa-sen: mararia jigoku no Hateruma-jigoku, (Naha: 
Okinawa Bunko, 1983). 
18 In an article in the Okinawa Times, Ota Shizuo states that the term "expulsion" emerged at the time the 
inhabitants ofYaeyarna met their deaths, and "is essential to clarifying war responsibility and breaking 
do"'n the nation's (kuni) impenetrable stance on the malaria compensation issue, which refuses to 
recognize expulsion as a military order." Similar contentions over wording occurred earlier in relation to 
the epitaph of a monument as part of the same "War Malaria Compensation Project." 
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only at a "deliberating" stage and that the committee members' opinions would be 
"strictly adhered to" in the Mabuni museum. 
The prefectural administration continued to deny that a coordinated plan to 
change the exhibits existed, or that such a plan had been instigated by Inamine or at the 
governor's behest. Yet throughout the summer of 1999 local newspapers reported other 
changes that were unauthorized by the supervisory plaaning committee and revealed 
documents that implicated Inarnine and his two deputies (Ishikawa Hideo and Makino 
Hirotaka) in a plan to make comprehensive alterations. As the issue exploded into a 
political fireball, the administration's earlier stance became untenable. On 4 October, 
opposition parties refused to participate in parliamentary proceedings on the grounds 
that the government had failed to answer parliamentary questions with integrity after 
local newspapers reported that further documents had been obtained that implicated the 
governor. The following day, the leading coalition parties agreed to disclose all 
administrative documents relating to the museum, and proceedings were normalized. 
On the morning of 7 October, a large number of relevant internal papers were 
handed out at a parliamentary committee hearing, and deliberation on the issue 
continued for almost ten hours. For the first time since the surfacing of alleged changes, 
Deputy Governor Ishikawa conceded that prefectural heads had played a decisive role 
in the process and apologized for inciting the distrust of the people and the parliarnent. 19 
The documents submitted to the parliamentary hearing and published in the 
press the following day revealed that prefectural heads had referred to fundamental 
differences in "perceptions of the state" between themselves and members of the 
museum's supervisory plaaning committee. The minutes of the meetings of prefectural 
heads and bureaucrats were in note form and lacked full details. Yet they still revealed 
that as early as March 1999, Governor Inamine had stated that the exhibits "should not 
19 Deputy Ishihara's statement was published in full in RS (8 October 1999), p. 2. 
316 
be too anti-Japanese," and that as Okinawa "only amounts to one prefecture v.-ithin 
Japan," commentaries on the war should take into account "museum displays elsewhere 
in the country." At a subsequent meeting on 23 July, Inamine chided the bureaucrats for 
not changing the exhibit content enough, commenting that the plans still hardly varied 
from the originals "in spite of the change in government." He further pointed out that 
"various people" throughout Japan, who presumably may take otience at explicit 
historical museum displays, were to visit Okinawa in conjunction with the G-8 Summit. 
In the same meeting, Deputy Governor Makino Hirotaka had even suggeste<i that a 
totally new plarming committee should be set up in order to devise the necessary 
changes. 
From the Barrel of a Gun: Shaping and Reshaping the Tenets of History 
The attempted changes in content fell into three broad categories: those relating 
to the Battle of Okinawa, those depicting World War II in general, and those depicting 
the post-war US occupation of the islands. 20 The most blatant curtailments occurred 
with respect to displays of Japan's military role in Asia during World War II. The 
prefectural officials ordered that the entire section entitled "Japan's aggression as 
depicted on film" be eliminated, including pictures of Japanese forces "closing in on 
Nanking," a scene showing Unit 731 (the Kwantung Army's euphemistically-entitled 
"Epidemic Prevention and Water Supply Unit") experimenting with and producing 
biochemical weapons, and photographs of the excavation of victims in Singapore. 
Historical documents and materials concerning popular opposition to Japanese rule, and 
a stamp in commemoration of Korean resistance were to be withdrawn. Material on the 
comfort women issue, and territorial disputes such as the Kurile and Senkaku Islands, 
were also marked for removal. 
20 The changes were subsequently outlined in RS (7 October 1999), following the public disclosure of the 
relevant materiaL 
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Lisa Yoneyama observes that the mutually reinforcing relationship between 
conservative politicians in Japan and the United States during the Cold War affected the 
LOP's stance on the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.21 In the case of Okinawa, 
conservative forces continue, at least for the time being, to maintain a direct interest in 
legitimising the US military presence on the islands. Prefectural administration 
documents explicitly stated that the museum should include material on the "role that 
the US-Japan treaty has played in maintaining security" in the Asia-Pacific region, and 
that an "anti-Security Treaty" (han anpo) stance should be avoided. On the sensitive 
question of accidents and crimes involving the US troops and Okinawans, it was 
suggested that "the fact that there are more accidents/incidents in Okinawa not 
involving the US military than base-related occurrences must be taken into account 
within the displays." On 7 August, just prior to the disclosure of attempted alterations in 
the local press and less than three weeks after being chided by Governor Inaminc for 
not changing the exhibits enough, prefectural bureaucrats ordered that a timeline 
depicting all US. military-related incidents since reversion in May 1972 should be 
integrated into a general display on the history of post-reversion Okinawa. 22 It was 
decided that documents on controversial issues relating to the presence of the bases-
such as manuscripts of the 1997 Special. Measures Law amendment, an outline of the 
controversial final report of SACO, and former Governor Ota's testimony before the 
Supreme Court in 1996 (See Chapter Four)-should be replaced by a display on the 
peace-making role of the United Nations. In relation to displays on the US occupation 
period, where prefectural heads suggested replacing a sample of a hypothetical 
21 Hiroshima Traces, p. 25. In an article on the Smithsonian issue, Yoneyama also elaborates: "(I)nsofar as 
such national assumptions remain unquestioned, it will not be possible to recognize that during most of 
the twentieth century, the conservative elite in the United States., .and the conservative forces in 
Japan .. , are in many respects cornplicit v.ith each other in their capitalist and nationalist desires" 
("Critical Warps: Facticity, Transforrnative Knowledge, and l'oslnational criticism in the Smithsonian 
controversy," Positions No, 5 Vol. 3 (Winter 1997), p, 797), 
22 RS (9 October 1999). 
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"Ryukyuan National Flag," a picture of the controversial document addressed to the US 
State Department known as the "Emperor's Message" (see Chapter Three), and 
documents depicting the suppression of political groups under US military 
administration, with the "positive" consequences of the US occupation, such as 
infrastructure development and the establishment of the Ryukyu Bank. 
The theme was to be, in other words, that of a "natural" peace. In the entrance to 
the museum, plans for a map illustrating the US military advance in the Battle of 
Okinawa were scrapped in favour of a design displaying the sea and mountains. The 
Inarnine administration sought to promote a less controversial self-image more 
conducive to mainland tastes, and one that was in harmony with the islands' status as 
popular tourist spot for money-spending leisure-seekers. "It is natural," LDP 
representative Ajitomi Osarnu claimed, "that alterations and compromises should be 
made given the fact that many people will visit the exhibition, including people from 
mainland Japan." Such a reinvented image of Okinawa does not dwell on the "lessons 
of history" but emphasizes the island's iridescent future: "rather than lamenting over the 
past, it is better to firmly grasp the future."23 
The aspect of war most irreconcilable with such an image are depictions of the 
gama, the caves that dot the Okinawan landscape and that were used as air-raid and 
battle shelters during the war. As in the earlier textbook disputes of the 1980s, cases of 
"collective suicide" emerged as a highly explosive issue. By far the most widely-
reported incident in the controversy over Mabuni concerned alterations to a life-sized 
diorama depicting enforced or so called 'collective' suicide within a recreated scene of 
the gama. The diorama was to portray a Japanese soldier pointing his rifle at an 
Okinawan mother and ordering her to kill her baby because the baby's cries might be 
heard by tlte invading US military. Another scene showed a medical officer forcing 
23 OT(5 September 1999). 
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cups of condensed milk laced with potassium cyanide onto injured soldiers. However, 
when Hoshi Masahiko, a member of the supervisory committee, visited the workshop 
on the eve of the outbreak of the revelations over the attempted changes, he found that 
the soldier no longer had a rifle but was merely staring at the family hiding in the cave. 
The soldier with cyanide had disappeared. 
Museum plarming committee member Oshiro Masayasu reflected 011 the 
meaning of the Japanese soldier diorama in the reconstructed gama stating: 
The gun 011 the foot soldier at the entrance to the cave is not pointed towards any 
one person in particular, but towards all the civilian refugees. The gun symbolizes 
the rationale of the military, which holds the power of life or death over the 
civilians. At any moment, the civilians may be murdered, they may commit mass 
suicide, or they may be blasted by flame throwers from the US army's 
indiscriminate onslaught. An extreme situation, where you have no idea what is 
going to happen next-this is what we re-enacted in the gama display?4 
Work on the diorama ceased after the alterations became publicly known. Following 
Deputy Governor Ishikawa's apology, the museum plarming committee ordered that the 
gun be restored but agreed to slightly lower its position so that it did not point directly 
at the mother, making it ambiguous as to whether the soldier is threatening or protecting 
the civilian family. A month later, the Bereaved Families Association, trustees of the 
Break of DaWil Monument, met lnami:ne to submit a formal complaint about the soldier 
display and its potential to "discourage national sentiment . ..z5 
In the Name of Peace: Memory and Protest in Okinawa 
In his epic work, Embracing Defoat, John Dower traces the process through 
which Japan as a defeated nation came to remember and atone for its dead. The 
'
4 Oshiro Masayasu, "Kenjli wa dare ni mukerareta ka," in Okinawaken Rekishl Kyoikusha Kyogikai, 
"Rekishi no shinjitsu wa yugamete wa naranai," Rekishi to Jissen No. 20 (December 1999), p. 35. 
"RS(ll November 1999). 
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emergence of a rhetoric of democracy and peace was, he observes, in many respects a 
"nationalistic plea to forgive the dishonoured dead"; a "smoke screen" which obscured 
the horrendous realities of Japanese war atrocities, and inevitably worked upon a sense 
of victim consciousness.26 Yet though the ideology of the peace movement in Japan was 
from the outset tied to a nationalist narrative, its critical stream of thought should not be 
underestimated nor discounted.27 This is especially pertinent in the ease of Okinawa. As 
with Ota's analyses on war, the Okinawan peace movement as a whole has 
accommodated a complex conjunction of at times contradictory elements-including 
both a sense of victimization and a radical critique of Japanese nationalism. 
Critics spoke out against the Inamine administration's alteration plans for the 
Mabuni Museum as soon as they were made public. The protests focused on four 
related issues: the secrecy surrounding the attempted alterations, the lack of consultation 
with the respective oversight committees, the goverrunent's continual denials that 
alterations had been made, and the attempts to alter the "truth" of the Battle of 
Okinawan. In reality the decisive feature viewed as encompassing the "truth" of the 
Battle of Okinawa, expressed by the phrase "Okinawasen no jisso," was not always the 
same. A shared collective memory and sense of critical thought, however, did exist, 
working to ensure solidarity between the disparate groups which make up the "peace 
movement" in Okinawa. The urgency and importance of displaying the "realities" of 
war in the context of the museum was also repeatedly expressed in association with the 
dwindling numbers of war survivors, and the sense of a prevailing crisis of memory of 
the war. 
26 Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake ofWarld War II, p. 521. 
27 See for example the important discussion of war remembrance within Japan's anti-Vietnam War 
movement and after in Ishida Takeshi, Kikoku to bokyaku no seijigaku (Tokyo: Meiseki Shoten, 2000), 
especiallypp. 181-237. 
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Shimabukuro Muneyasu, committee director of the Socialist Popular Party, 
stated that the inescapable historical truth of the Battle of Okinawa lay in the fact that 
"the Japanese army had directed their guns towards the people of Okinawa prefecture, 
and that the atrocities of collective suicide occurred."28 In an emotional meeting with 
high-level prefectural bureaucrats who had monitored the alteration process, the 
Director of the Okinawa Prefectural Teachers Association, Aragaki Hitohide, 
condemned their actions as "a serious betrayal of the people of Okinawa."29 On 18 
September, a symposium was organized by peace groups in protest of the attempted 
alterations, entitled "How Should the Realities of the Battle of Okinawa be Portrayed? 
Urgent Symposium on the New Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum Issue." At the 
gathering, anti-base peace activists, often the most vocal at such meetings, fell solemnly 
silent while survivors from the war took the stage and recounted their personal 
experiences. 
In his paper given at the symposium, Aniya Masaaki focused on the sufferings 
of Okinawans during the war, concluding that: "A determined stance which perceives 
objectively the realities and causes of the war, which brings to light the injuries incurred 
by the people, and which prosecutes those who inflicted this harm, is needed. 
Otherwise, the distortion of the Peace Memorial will prevai1."30 An editorial piece in the 
Okinawa Times rather sought to move beyond historical perceptions which promoted a 
sense of victim consciousness through the separation of the "state" from the "people", 
noting: 
In issues relating to the Battle of Okinawa, the presence of a strong sense of 
victimization has been the target of frequent criticism. However, from this debate 
is has also come to be perceived that Okinawans were also the aggressors in 
28 OT (1 September 1999). 
29 RS (2 September 1999). 
"RS (19 September 1999). 
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Japan's wars ... From there, people reflected on war as something carried out by 
both states and the people. These are vital factors which form the basis of 
"Okinawan pacifism." 
In another well-reported act of protest, Kudeken Kentoshi, a local historian and 
collector of war memorabilia, visited the original Mabuni museum and retrieved the 
first portion of the 150 items that he had donated to it, including an iron canteen dented 
with bullet holes, army documents containing regulations for the administration of 
"Comfort Women" stations in Okinawa, and a wedding dress made from a parachute. 
Asked why he was withdrawing the items, Kudeken stated: "I have heard that the 
Governor is prohibiting any displays which may conflict with the central government. 
As all my material conflicts v.ith the government, it has become at odds with the exhibit 
content advocated (by the prefectural administration)."31 
Local newspapers were flooded with letters on the controversy. A poem entitled 
"The Battle of Okinawa and Consoling the Spirits" contributed to Ryilkyfi Shinpo by 
Shimabukuro Tetsu was a highly critical rendering of war, expressing the necessity of 
remembrance through anger and remorse. It begins: 
The 32nd Division was the 'sacrifice' offered 
by Imperial headquarters and the Emperor. 
It was just as in Saipan and Ijjima. 
They were the 'sacrifices' placed into the hands of the US military 
as a means of biding time, in the face of imminent defeat. 
Soldiers who killed the defenceless in China 
now, in Okinawa, were themselves killed by overwhelming forces, 
Embroiling Okinawan civilians into the battle, even more defenceless. 
It was just as in the Philippines. 
The last four lines read: 
31 RS (11 September 1999). Also reported in the Okinawa Times Weekly (21 August 1999). 
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The irresponsibility, recklessness, terrorism, stupidity, debauchery, 
amorality, and cruelty of the Imperial Army had no confines. 
Do not tell lies to those fallen. 
If you v;ant to console the spirits, 
Speak to them of the true rationale for their deaths.32 
Of the readers' contributions on the peace memorial issue, the one which most 
succinctly avoided a "traffic accident" version of war (that which made out that no one 
wanted it and that everyone was a victim) 33 was a letter to the Okinawa Times 
("Opinion", 29 September 1999) submitted by a "construction worker" from Urasoe 
City, Okinawa. The letter directly associated the obscuring of responsibility for the war 
in Japan, the object of criticism by other countries in Asia, with the institutionalisation 
of unaccountability in domestic politics---a system to which the people of Japan seem 
oblivious. The contributor concluded that the prefectural government should take 
responsibility for having attempted changes to museum exhibits, as a step towards 
breaking free of this system. 34 
In a book published on the eve of the Summit, Ota Masahide himself stressed 
the difference between his and lnamine's conceptualisations of "peace," and placed the 
Peace Memorial Museum issue in the context of lnamine's position on Futenma 
relocation. He was particularly critical of the so-called "fifteen year limit" which 
lnamine at least officially held as a condition for accepting base construction. If such a 
limit was conceivable, Ota reasoned, there was no reason to relocate the base at all. In 
reality, Ota concluded, the "fifteen year-limit" was a patent ploy. He disparaged: "It is 
precisely because the current prefectural administration holds such a totally 
32 RS (5 October 1999). 
33 Brian Ladd citing a comment made by historian Reinhart Koselleck in relation to c<>ntroversies over the 
building of the national memorial in Neue Wache, Berlin (Ladd, Ghosts of Berlin, (New York: W. W. 
Norton/ New Press, 1999), p. 221). 
34 OT (29 September 1999) ("Opinion," p. 5). 
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contradictory ideology that they show no compunction m changing the exhibition 
content of the Peace Memorial Museum."35 
Much of the protest centred on the lnamine administration's attempts to curry 
favour with the Japanese government. For many, this was the most alarming aspect of a 
dispute-the symbol of a historical and political Rubicon which Okinawa seemed on 
the brink of crossing. At the end of December, 1999, under pressure from Inarnine and 
the national government and after a nineteen-hour marathon debate, the Nago City 
Assembly and Mayor Kishimoto Tateo agreed to accept relocation of Futenma Base to 
Camp Schwab, adjacent to Henoko village on the northeast coast of Okinawa. For the 
first time in the history of Okinawa, the prefecture's head and local elected 
representatives had actually requested the construction of a new base on the island. 
Ironically, the most tangible position taken by Inamine throughout the museum 
controversy (apart from denying his connection to the alterations) was a relativist one. 
There are, he suggested at the end of August, "various choices available in conveying 
the realities of the Battle of Okinawa," because there are "various 'truths' of the war" 
(sensa no jissi5 wa iroiro aru). While the truth was always to be conveyed, the issue of 
which opinion was "the best" was "a matter of choice" (sentak:u no mandai). However, 
Inarnine never clarified the substance of these different "truths." Far from encouraging 
historical debate on the issue, the process of alteration was conducted behind closed 
doors and, until public outrage made it untenable, in the utmost secrecy. As James E. 
Young observes in relation to Holocaust memorials in Europe, in planning a memorial, 
debate and the disclosure of information are both essential in ensuring that the act of 
remembrance does not become the unshouldering of memorial burdens-and the end of 
memory itself. 36 Lack of public disclosure on the memorial issue also coincided with 
attempts to ostracize anti-base political activists, as the prefectural assembly passed 
'
5 Ota Masahide, Okinawa: Kichi naki shima e no dohyiJ, op cit., pp. 199-200. 
'
6 At Memory :SEdge; After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture. 
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legislation in early 2000 recommending that members of Okinawa's Anti-war 
Landowners Association should not have the right to become public servants within the 
r prefecture. ' 
The Okinawa Initiative Debate 
Less than a year after the museum dispute erupted, Okinawa became embroiled 
in yet another fierce debate over its identity, history, and the base issue in what was 
known as the "Okinawa Initiative" dispute. The "Okinawa Initiative" was actually two 
different but interrelated papers. The first, entitled "Toward an 'Okinawa Initiative': A 
Possible Role for Okinawa in the Asia-Pacific"38 was a presentation made by Inamine's 
"brain trust," professors Takara Kurayoshi, Oshiro Tsuneo, and Maeshiro Morisada at 
the Asia Pacific Agenda Project forum held in Okinawa at the end of March, 2000. The 
other was an earlier and more detailed report entitled "Okinawa Initiative: Okinawa, 
Japan, and the world" compiled by a committee of four members including Takara and 
chaired by Shimada Haruo, a professor at Keio University. It was sponsored by the 
Japan Productivity Centre for Socio-Economic Development (JPC-SED). The four 
authors compiled the paper in their capacity as members of an "Economic Stimulus 
Workshop" (keizai kasseika bukai) established by JPC-SED in anticipation of the 
Okinawa-Kyushu G-8 Summit. 39 The Initiatives disavowed the significance of 
Okinawan history and called for a re-evaluation of the role played by the US-Japan 
security alliance, as well as Okinawa's "contribution" to this role.40 
37 OT (30 March 2000). 
"The title of the English translation presented at the fortrm is: "Toward an 'Okinawa Initiative': A 
Possible Role for Okinawa in Asia Paciilc" (sic.). All citations are my ov.n translation from the Japanese 
original 
39 While the content ofboth the APAP and the JPC-SED Initiative is very similar, the JPC-SED paper is 
lengthier and includes more detailed policy formulations. 
40 
"Okinawa inishiatebu: Okinawa, Nihon, soshite sekai" was compiled by the Japan Productivity Center 
for Socioeconomic Development (JPC-SED), at http://www.jpc-sed.or.jp/indexlhtml. 
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The JPC-SED, formed in 1994, was designed to prepare Japan to be 
economic.ally competitive in a new global environrnent.41 The JPC-SED's "Okinawa 
Initiative" lays out their ideas on how to incorporate Okinawa into that larger goal. 
While similar to the APAP Initiative, the JPC-SED Initiative's tone is in parts very 
different. For example, the APAP Initiative asserts the need for Okinawa "to display an 
independent governance .. .in contrast to an extremely Tokyo-centred form of 
governance," but that concern for autonomy is missing in the JPC-SED-sponsored paper 
(herein referred to as the "Shimada Okinawa Initiative" after workshop leader Shimada 
Haruo).42 
In his chapter in the Shimada Okinawa Initiative, Takara advocates a 
"pragmatic" solution to the Futenrna relocation issue, one that is not dominated by 
"historical issues" such as the fact that the land within the base was originally 
appropriated by force in the early stages of the cold war. Uehara calls for a new airport 
and special infrastructure in the northern and more "backward" region of Okinawa. 
Both propositions mirrored Inamine administration and central govermnent attempts to 
secure Nago, in the northern area of Okinawa, as the site for the new base, now under 
the concept of "Joint Civilian and Military Airport." The Shimada Initiative 
endeavoured to reaffirm the political, economic, and ideological 'foundations' 
necessary to secure this site, as well as US and Japanese strategic interest in Okinawa 
41 It was created when the Japan Productivity Center (JPC) and the Social and Economic Congress of 
Japan (SECJ) merged, and its honorary board includes representatives from some of Japan's largest 
companies, such as Sumitomo and Toshiba, as well as the chainnan of the Japanese Trade Union 
Confederation. JPC was established in 1955 and was at the forefront of promoting a policy of tripartite 
cooperation among management. labor, and academics in Japan, a fundamental aspect of the Japanese 
management system. Facing the breakdown of Japanese-style 'consensus' management in the 1990s, the 
revamped JPC-SED upholds as it> founding principle the creation of a "highly productive society," and 
the need for Japan to, "through the attainment of structural reform, come out on top in this era of mega-
competition and in the midst of the advancing globalization of the world, and carry out a role worthy of 
its economic power." See http:www.jpc-sed.or.jp/englengOLhtrn. 
42 Summary and full text available at http://www2jpc-sed.or.jp/fil. See also summary and analysis by 
Egami Takayoshi, '"Shinhoshu no ronri' tenk:ai 3kyoju to seisansei honbu no teigen," RS (5 June 2000). 
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on a broader leveL A focal point of this policy, and the Initiative proposal, is the 
holding of the G-8 Summit in Nago. "Just at this tiroe, in July of this year," Shimada 
noted in the introduction, "the G-8 Head of States meeting v.':ill be held in Okinawa." 
"Utilizing this Okinawa Summit as an opportunity," Shimada claimed, "Okinawa is 
being asked to redefine its own potential, and, as an Okinawan initiative, to conceive of 
and advance a plan as active player." "For the first time ever," he continued, "Okinawa 
possesses in its hands the opportunity to pragmatically and rationally improve the US 
military base issue through its own judgement, and furthermore use this as a chance to 
autonomously develop the Okinawan economy."43 
As well as leading the workshop, Shimada authored the first section or 
approximately half of the total final paper. As examined earlier (see Chapter Four), 
Shimada holds intimate ties to the national government and played a key role in the 
conception and implementation of government compensation policies in the wake of the 
surge of the anti-base movement in late 1995. The Okinawa Initiative sought to disarm 
the anti-base movement by building the ideological foundations of a pro-base, pro-
Japanese government stance for Okinawa. In the context of compensation policies, the 
alliance linking local business (including influential construction lobby groups), the 
LDP, and the Komei party ally has proven particularly effective in securing election 
victories for Okinawa's conservative coalition in recent years-notably in the Nago 
mayoral election of February 1998, the gubernatorial election in November of the same 
year, and the Naha mayoral election of November 2000. At the same time, however, 
anti-base sentiment still exists. In a joint Asahi/Okinawa Times opinion poll taken in 
December 1999, a large majority (59% against, 23% for) of Nago residents remained 
opposed to the relocation ofFutenma Airbase to Nago.44 
" Summary and full text available at http://www2jpc-s&!.or.jp/. 
" Cited in editorial, OT (22 June 2000}, p. 5. 
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The Okinawa Initiative was thus part of the contemporary process whereby a 
depoliticised idea of Okinawan-ness is reappropriated into reified hegemonic 
conservative constructions of the nation state. In a presentation to Obuchi's Prime 
Ministerial Commission in July 1999, Takara made the point that: "Okinawa's unstable 
local sentiment and a perception of being historically victimized has the tendency to 
obstruct future debate on the US-Japan security system."45 In other words, Okinawa's 
sense of identity and longstanding unequal treatment holds the potential to conflict 
with--or for the Inamine administration and the Japanese government "obstruct"-
future attempts to secure US and Japanese government interests in Okinawa. Takara 
warned that unless a way was found to "incorporate" and "absorb" Okinawan local 
sentiment within national policy-making processes, the "stability" of Okinawa could not 
be ensured. Takara's commission paper, the APAP Okinawa Initiative, and the Shimada 
Okinawa Initiative may be seen as an attempt to find this "way." 
This is not to say Takara's position is in complete consonance with central 
government interests. In comparing the two initiative papers, Inarnine's brain trust was 
more inclined to support Okinawan "autonomy" than were the central government or 
Shimada. Takara and his colleagues, Maeshiro and Oshiro, presented the "Okinawa 
Initiative" as an Okinawan-based proposal aimed to empower Okinawans. They called 
for Okinawa to display an "independent" role beyond the framework of Japan within 
the Asia-pacific region. Yet at the same time, the three Okinawan professors acquiesced 
in national policy-above all, by accepting the bases, including the construction of the 
new base in Nago--in return for financial benevolence. In coordination with the 
Shimada Initiative, the AP AP paper is integrally connected to the type of compensation 
policies epitomized by Shimadakon. As Takara suggested, the Initiative itself was part 
of a "cognitive strategy" endorsed by the Japanese government: while indulging in an 
45 Notes from the workshop available at: ht1p://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/2l century/9908! ObW'lkal-7.htm1. 
Downloaded November 2001. 
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etiolated form of multiculturalism, it would thereby "absorb" a sense of Okinawan 
identity and call for political autonomy within hegemonic national claims.46 
From "History Problem" to "Soft Power Solution": Taking the Initiative 
Takara, Maeshiro, and Oshiro called for a shift from an "emotional" position on 
the US military bases to a more "logical" one.47 They argued that Okinawans, who had 
been unable to devise an effective policy to resolve the base issue, should accept their 
role as host to the bases as the only eeonomically viable option. Takara in particular 
articulated his stance in direct opposition to Ota's-which he saw as exemplifying the 
tendency for Okinawans to see themselves as "historically victimized." In an interview 
with the Asahi newspaper in May 2000, Takara elaborated: "The former governor Ota 
Masahide's argument puts an excessive emphasis on the relevance of the past in the 
present conte:>.'t. In other words, he utilizes history-as in his assertions as to why 
Okinawans love peace, etc .. He is not necessarily wrong. But there are other issues. 
How do we view the issue of the bases or security, problems that we should responsibly 
consider? It is not enough to leave these issues in the air, and merely explain the cause 
of your actions through past experiences. At the same time that we face up to history, 
we must also face up to the problems we meet today."48 
As in the case of the attempted museun1 alternations, Takara's argument against 
"victimization" sought in particular to counter criticisms of the Japanese military's 
actions during the Battle of Okinawa. Unlike the Okinawa Times editorial on the 
attempted museum alterations, Takara did not expand his criticism of this consciousness 
46 Miyagi Kimiko explores these issues in" 'Shlnwa' e no shitcn," Uramaneshia, no. 2 (February 2001), 
p. II. 
41 Aspects of the Okinawa Initiative argument were anticipated in two previous books, Takara's 
'Okinawa • hihanjosetsu, ('Okinawa' Critique: an Introduction) (Naha: Okinawa Bunko, 1997); and 
Okinawa no jiko kenshO, (Verifying the Okinawan Self) (Naha: Okinawa Bunko, 1998), co-authored with 
Maeshiro and Makino Hirotaka. Ota Masakuni points out common threads between these works in 
"Misugosenai tosal..'ll no rongi: haijo dekinu chiiki kuno," OT (6 May 2000). 
48 Asahi Shinbun (15 May 2000). 
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to include a historical analysis of the way in which Okinawans had also played a role as 
aggressors within Japanese imperialism and military actions. Rather, his argrunent was 
made in the context of Japanese historical revisionism, and attempts to envisage a more 
active and positive Japanese subjectivity in the past as integral to conceiving a wider 
military role for Japan in the present. 
Takara included in his analysis many of the historical factors which have 
become tenets of Okinawa's anti-war movement. The Okinawa Initiative group even 
recognized that the Japanese military had carried out "barbarous" actions towards 
Okinawan civilians during battle. It discussed modern Japan's rejection of "its own 
Asian-ness" in the pursuit of a Western model of industrialization, contempt of 
Okinawan culture for its "Asian" or backward elements, and Okinawa's 
disproportionate burden of the bases. Yet this historical analysis was followed by the 
call for a "break" with history. "The important thing," the Initiative group argued, "is 
the question of how we face our 'history' and our future, not remaining controlled by 
history, but assuming our responsibility and subjectivity as people living in the present. 
It is precisely we, in the present, who possess the capacity to take on our history in its 
entirety, and the 'regional assets' supplied by history to the future are also only realized 
through us, living in the present, as its heirs."49 
Takara, Oshiro, and Maeshiro employed a similar tactic in their observations on 
Okinawa's historical relation to mainland Japan. The three professors initially conceded 
that Okinawa possesses a unique history which is different from the rest of Japan. They 
outlined a historical narrative of Okinawa, beginning Vvith the formation of the Ryukyu 
Kingdom. They emphasized the hardships which Okinawa had experienced-the 
lingering wounds of war; US occupation, and the unfair base burden. 50 While 
49 Takara Kurayoshl, Maeshlro Morisada and Oshiro Tsuneo (eds.) Okinawa Inishiatibu: Okinawa hatsu 
chiteki senryaku, p. 47. 
50 The entire text of the APAP paper is reproduced in Okinawa Inishiatibu, 38-55. 
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rhetorically affirming Okinawa's historical uruqueness, however, the Initiative 
emphasized the need for Okinawa's integration within Japan, and argued that 
Okinawans had always desired that integration. 
The authors asserted that Okinawa possesses a unique culture different from that 
of mainland Japan, yet qualified Okinawa's uniqueness by stressing that this culture is 
"not 'totally foreign' (kanzen na gaikoku) to Japanese culture," and that its "roots are 
the same." 51 Analysing the Okinawan reversion movement under US occupation, 
Takara and his colleagues stress that "for the people of Okinawa, Japan was culturally 
their closest presence." The Initiative paper concluded that the people of Okinawa 
"chose Japan as the country to which they should belong."52 In the analysis of both 
Okinawan culture and the reversion movement, the authors maintain this conflation of 
distinctiveness and Japaneseness by separating "origins" from "history:" "If origins are 
emphasized, both Okinawa and Japan maintain a close affinity, but if one emphasizes 
historical outcomes, they are comparatively separate."53 
The Initiative also claimed that the Okinawan reversion movement from 1952-
72 was fuelled by an Okinawan desire to reunite with Japan and was inherently 
nationalist in character. In other words, in direct opposition to Ota's stance, the 
Okinawa Initiative v.Tote over the long history of Okinawa's anti-base movement and 
disappointment with the terms of reversion, and instead stressed the positive aspects of 
reversion. 
The Initiative group acknowledged that Okinawa carried the burden of hosting 
approximately 75 percent of all US bases in Japan, and recognized that anti-base 
sentiment was "deep rooted" in Okinawa They outlined the rea~ons why Okinawans 
opposed the bases-the legacy of the Battle of Okinawa, the forceful expropriation of 
51 Ibid., 42. 
52 Ibid., 45. 
53 Ibid., 42. 
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base land from Okinawan landowners in the 1950s, and the ongoing damage the base 
inflicted on local communities. Yet the Initiative also attempted to "separate" these 
reasons from the contribution the bases made to Japanese national security. In an 
implicit attack on Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution, the group rejected what 
they referred to as "absolute pacifist" ideals, and affirmed the importance of military 
intervention to ensure security. "The present issue of the US bases is not an issue of the 
propriety of the bases," the group concluded, "but an issue of how their effective 
operation and the security of local residents may be reconciled."54 The Initiative praised 
Okinawa for making the "greatest contribution" to Japan's security of any region of 
Japan. 
The Initiative sought to diffuse Okinawa's history of discrimination and strong 
pacifist sentiment by conceiving of them in "universal terms" (fuhen teki na kotoba ). 
Here too it presented a counter ideology to Ota's envisioning of both an "Okinawan" 
and "human" identity in ambivalent opposition to a Japanese "national" one. In 
contrast, the Initiative's definition of universalism was premised on the primary 
importance of a homogenous national identity: "In the present, when the foundations of 
the nation-state have begun to crumble, it is vital not to side with this trend, but rather 
for Okinawa to conduct a new self-definition that helps construct Japan's emerging 
national image."55 The Initiative argued that Okinawans' concern for their O\Vn history 
was a "problem" that must be "overcome" for Okinawa to "become a joint partner in the 
process of constructing a new national image in the twenty-first century." History was a 
tool for state-building: "We in the present are the ones who define history, and for this 
very reason, our responsibility and awareness in possessing 'universal terms' will be 
scrutinized by history."56 
54 Ibid., 49-51. 
"Ibid., 52-5. 
"Ibid., 48. 
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Those "universal terms," the Okinawa Initiative argued, required Okinawans to 
reaffirm their commitment to Japan's national project. In return, the Japanese 
Government promised greater financial compensation to Okinawa. The Initiative 
authors used the logic of the capitalist market to support their reasoning. Takara 
observed: "Economic factors, as expressed in the term market economy, are in this day 
and age the determining factors which govern the world and our lives. I believe that a 
realistic debate is one which holds a comprehensive perception, knowledge, and 
stance."57 Expanding on Takara's observation, Oshiro spelled the base-ibr-cash logic 
out as follows: "The Japanese government will not recognize it officially, but the reality 
is that, in order to maintain the stability of the bases, the cornerstone of the US-Japan 
security alliance, a form of economic management has been employed that links the 
bases with the economic stimulus of Okinawa." 58 The Initiative's prioritisation of 
national ideology and financial subsidy over local sentiment and history in the name of 
"universalism" was an implicit call to recognize and accept this "reality." 
Yet the Initiative also supplemented appeals to the importance of financial gain 
v.'ith a focus on the issues of cultural identity. It suggested that Okinawa's place in the 
new millennium may be "discovered" at the intersecting point of two inscriptions, 
which read: "Here Japan Ends and Asia Begins," and "Here Asia Ends and Japan 
Begins." Reaffirming the very construction of Japan apart from Asia that they earlier 
had criticized as the dilemma of Japan's modernity, the Initiative treated Okinawa as 
both part of and not part of Japan or Asia. It claimed that Okinawa can be the "nexus of 
a problem-solving solution" (chi teki na kaiketsu sochl) linking Japan with the Asian 
region. Ultimately this entailed not only the negation of Okinawans' own cultural and 
historical experience, but the separation of Japan from "Asia."59 
57 Ibid., 24. 
58 Ibid., 24-5. 
59 Laura Hein and Ellen H. Hammond provide insightful observations on Japan's ambivalent and 
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The Initiative group hoped to use Okinawan difference to pave the way for 
better Japanese relations with other Asian nations. In the AP AP paper, Takara, Oshiro 
and Maeshiro concluded that the Initiative concept comprised: "our self-awareness and 
sense of responsibility in seeking a solution to various 'historical problems' within the 
Asia-Pacific region, using the 'soft power' of Okinawa as a key."60 Maeshiro defined 
"soft power" as the ability "to hold pride in our culture, to utilize the suffering felt as a 
minority, to hold a strong will in the love for peace and hatred of war, and furthermore, 
to speak in universal terms of the fact that Okinawa is a region which desires to convey 
such experiences to the people of the world."61 Yet the Initiative evaded, rather than 
provided a solution to, the issue of past Japanese military aggression. It sought to play 
down the significance of historical responsibility, and emphasize the importance of 
national paradigms. 
Within visions of Okinawa as the cultural and historical stepping stone to Asia, 
the Initiative also reconfirmed Okinawa's paramount role as Japan's most vital military 
strategic link to the US, within a framework which both expanded Japan's military role 
and maintained its subordination to US global military power. The Initiative was itself 
intimately connected to JG policy tools set in place in an effort to ensure Okinawan 
deference to this designated role. In this sense, critics of the Initiative pointed out that 
the Initiative's calls to "soft power" were in fact premised on, and complicit with, the 
"hard power" ofthe US military and US-Japan security relations. 
Opposing Claims to "Okinawan" Peace, Place, and Past 
economically drawn efforts to "home'' in on Asia in the context of the early 1990's in ''Homing in on 
Asia: Identity in Contemporary Japan," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 27:3 (July- September, 
1995). pp. 3-16. 
60 Okinawa Inishiatibu, p. 55. 
61 Ibid., p. 129. 
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The claims of the Initiative paper were significant precisely because of the 
politicised context in which they were made, and because they represented a stance 
intrinsic to Inamine's new administration. While numerous Okinawan economists and 
business entrepreneurs had long supported the bases for eeonomic reasons, the Initiative 
questioned the very importance of Okinawa's history. The majority of Okinawa's 
prominent postwar historians, including Takara himself in earlier years, were critical of 
Japan's assimilationist policies and homogenizing forces. The Okinawa Initiative 
countered the historical perception and political position of Ota and his supporters, and 
it bore the imprimatur both of the national and prefectural governments. Moreover, it 
was applauded by the right-wing Sankei newspaper as leaving a "deep impression" on 
its audience. At least since the eve of reversion, claims to Okinawan identity had been 
intimately connected to attempts to resist both the terms of reversion and the way in 
which Okinawa was incorporated into Japan. Yet the Okinawa Initiative was indicative 
of the process whereby constructions of Okinawan-ness themselves were being 
reincorporated within neonationalist discourse. 
Follo"ing publication of the full text of the AP AP presentation in local print 
media, Arakawa Akira severely criticized the paper as displaying a "sycophantic 
mentality" (dorei shiso). 62 Takara's subsequent defence and counter-attack was 
followed by a flood of responses, almost all critical of the Initiative. These criticisms 
focused on four interrelated issues: military security, Japan and Okinawa's role in Asia, 
the historical significance of Okinawa reversion to Japan, and the Initiative's 
"assimilationist" and "collaborationist" stance towards the central government. 
Many respondents reiterated that the key lesson of the Battle of Okinawa was 
that the military protected the interests of the Japanese state, at the expense of 
62 ArakawaAkira," 'Togo' ni koo suru gensetsu: gunji yonin no 'kokka shugi'," OT (15 May 2000); and 
ArakawaAkira, "Koso naku 'doreishiso' arawasu: kenryoku e shis1isha toshite no chishikijin," OT (17 
May 2000). 
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Okinawan civilians. In an interview in the Asahi newspaper, Ota claimed that the 
Initiative "could only be made by those who do not know war, or the sufferings of the 
people." Ota connected the lessons of 1945 to the debate on security strategy today: "If 
Okinawa is said to contain some potential, it is precisely in the cherishing of peace. For 
what purpose, and to protect whom, was the Battle of Okinawa fought? Does the 
military really protect the safety of the people? How can one merely affirm that security 
is gained by the use of military force while brushing these issues aside, as is the current 
trend?"63 
Others criticized the Okinawa Initiative for not differentiating between limited 
military intervention based on international cooperation and the military role of the US 
bases in Okinawa. Shimabukuro Jun, University of the Ryukyus associate professor and 
a central supporter of the prefectural plebiscite on the base issue held in September 
1996, acknowledged that limited military intervention may be a legitimate means to 
resolve international conflicts in cases where diplomatic measures fail. Yet he criticized 
the Initiative's security analysis for failing to state the site, circumstances, or form by 
which military action would or should be carried out. He called for a coherent Japanese 
foreign policy which strictly confined the US-Japan military alliance to defence, 
restricted use of military force to instances in accordance with UN procedures and 
international law, and prioritised "above all else the building of relations of mutual trust 
with neighbouring countries," rather than one iu which Japan sought to exercise military 
force ou a global level with the US as joint hegemonic power.64 
Ota rejected outright the notion that Okinawa contributes to Asia by hosting the 
US military bases. In a direct reference to World War II, he asserted rather that such 
63 
"Senso shlranu kokka. shugi teki shuchO," interview v.'ith Ota lv!asahide, Asahi Shinbun (\6 May 2000). 
A similar view is expressed by Ishihara Masaie," 'HihOryokyu shugi' e no chOsen: wasureta shomin no 
manazashi," OT(IO May 2000). 
64 Shimabukuro Jun, "Chiiki kibo no domei ka: kinrin shokoku to shinrai kocbiku mo kaku," RS (13 May 
2000). 
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militarisation holds "the potential to once again inflict suffering on the region." 65 
Ok:inawan poet and former journalist Kawamitsu Shinichi went even further, suggesting 
that Japan's "initiative" towards Asia backed by the US-Japan Security Treaty is 
dangerously close to the aims and rhetoric of the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity 
Sphere" prewar and wartime ideology. 66 Journalist and editor Nakaz.ato Susurnu 
concluded that the increase in information flow and cultural exchange through 
globalisation provided opportunities to open up new transnational networks across Asia, 
and should not be met by a reaffirmation of national ideals and further militarisation. In 
short, the Initiative's critics opposed both the US military bases in Okinawa and the 
increased militarisation of Japan. They saw both this military presence, and the 
Initiative's rhetorical moves to depict Japan as apart from Asia, as only further 
reinforcing Japan's separation from, and increasing tensions within, the region. 
Critics rejected the Initiative's analysis of Okinawa's historical relations with 
Japan. In particular, they did not see the Okinawa reversion movement as solely 
premised on a sense of c.ornmon nationhood. Both Shimabukuro Jun and academic and 
activist Arasaki Moriteru emphasized that Okinawans' aspirations to realize democratic 
and civil rights were the c.ore aim of the movement to return to Japan. The reversion 
movement was, from this perspective, primarily a c.all to uphold the pacifist and 
democratic ideals of the Japanese constitution. Arasaki quoted the reversion efforts to 
struggle against both the US military control of Okinawa and the militarisation of Japan. 
He noted that the reversion movement had aimed for the reduction or complete 
withdrawal of the US bases. But reversion to Japan actually strengthened the US-Japan 
" Interview with Ota Masahide, Asahi Shin bun (16 May 2000). 
66 Kawamitsu Shinichi, '' 'Ajia' gainen ni gimon: kokka shugi wa rekishi teki tanraku," OT (13 June 
2000). See also Tanaka Yasuhlro, "Chilshin shiko to ani na sutansu; Ajia to Nihon o kibetsu suru ishi" 
(Centralism and the easy position: the v.ill to separate Japan and Asia), OT (25 May 2000). 
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alliance and preserved intact the inequitable base structure. In other words: ''they asked 
for bread, and were given stone."67 
All critics rejected the Initiative's claims that reversion was accomplished 
according to the terms and wishes of Okinawans. However, they did not all agree 
among themselves as to how to evaluate the reversion movement. In a carry over from 
the reversion debates of thirty years previously, Arakawa in particular criticized what he 
saw as Arasaki's idealization of the reversion movement. Reminiscent of his anti-
reversion stance in the early 1970's, Arakawa argued in the Initiative debate that even if 
the reversion movement had been premised on an ideal of Japan's potential, as opposed 
to how it actually was, by working within Japan's national framework it still played into 
the hands of Japanese conservative nationalists. 68 Arakawa also questioned the 
nationalist reversion-era slogans such as the call for Okinawa to "catch up" (kakusa 
zesei) and "become the same" (Hondo nami) as mainland Japan. Arakawa saw such 
slogans as inherently assimilationist, and accepting of the system of public works-
centred development in Okinawa today. 69 Arakawa explicitly criticized economic 
stimulus and development policies which he saw as increasing Okinawa's economic 
dependency and environmental degradation. He challenged the idea that "prosperity" 
(yutakasa) should be the goal for Okinawans, and argued that satisfaction lay not in 
reinforcing the modern system of nation-states, but through what he termed "spiritual 
prosperity" (seishin no yutakasa) and the "indigenous" (dochaku). He concluded that all 
of us in the contemporary world need to discover a set of values to fight against the new 
61 Arasald Moriteru quoting Nakano Yosbio. Arasald Moriteru, "Genjo tsuinin ronja no kotoba asobi: 
fukki wa beigun shihai kara no dakkyaku," OT (29 May 2000). For a similar view see also Kuruma Yasuo 
"'genjitsu taioton' to 'Okinawa inishiatibu'," OT(29-31 May 2000) (Three-part Series). 
"'Arakawa Akira laid out his anti-reversionist stance in Hanko& no kyoku, (Tokyo: Gendai hyoronsha, 
1973). See also Oguma Eiji's analysis of Arakawa in 'Nihonjin 'no kyokai; and Arakawa Akira, "Kokka o 
sotai taki ni toraeyo," Shiikan kinyobi, 6 June 2000. 
69 For an analysis of the impact of these policies see Gavan McCormack, "Okinawa Dile=as: Coral 
Islands or Concrete Islands?" in Chalmers Johnson (ed.) Okinawa: Cold War Island, 261-83. 
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"wave" of nationalist "assimilation" symbolized by the Okinawa Initiative in order to 
live in the twenty-first century. "The intellectual struggle necessary to critique and 
overcome the new form of 'assimilationist' ideology propounded by Takara et a!.," 
Arakawa concluded, "is certainly not only an Okinawan problem."70 
The most detailed criticism of the Japanese government's "economic stimulus" 
compensation policies and what was seen as their "morally hazardous" effect on both 
local politics and democratic procedures was made by Miyagi Yasuhiro, Nago City 
councillor and former representative of the citizen group that had fiercely called for a 
referendum on the building of the new base off the coast of Nago in 1997. In Nago, in 
the northern region of Okinawa-in economic and development terms the periphery of 
Japan's periphery-the links between economic stimulus and the base issue are the most 
pervasive, as are the damaging effects on the environment of the proposed base 
expansiOn and public works-centred development. Miyagi pointed out that, in an 
obvious bid to buy local support for the base, N ago city was the beneficiary of seven 
out of twenty-three of the projects advanced by Shimadakon, the highest of any 
municipality. Japanese government funds related to the bases jumped from 6.5% of the 
Nago municipal budget in 1996 to 21.3% in 2000. The overall budget increased by 
approximately 25% over the same period. Shimadnkon projects already implemented 
within Nago include the construction of a "Multi-media Centre" that provides free space 
and facilities to private multi-media companies. 
Miyagi argued that such projects mark the breakdown (and privatisation) of the 
public sphere at the locaJ level, as taxpayers' funds are used to directly fund the 
activities of private corporations. He predicted that the massive influx of money would 
result in an environmentally destructive development without solving the "drain effect" 
of base-related compensation-that is, the injection of large amounts of public funding 
70 ArakawaAkira., Okinawa: Togo to hangyaku, pp. 248-59. 
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into costly construction projects which only increase local government debt and 
economic dependence. Miyagi noted that the area marked for the airbase runway will 
destroy one of the few remaining living coral reefs on the main island, as well as a 
feeding area for what are thought to be the last remaining dugongs (an endangered 
marine mammal) in Japan. The Inamine administration's plan to combine the military 
airbase facility with a civilian airport calls for a much larger runway than originally 
envisaged, threatening to cause even more environmental damage.71 Miyagi concluded: 
"I can only view the role played by Shimadakon as that of an opiate set to destroy 
Okinawa from within."72 
The divisions discernible within the camp of the Okinawa Initiative's critics 
were a direct reflection of tensions within Okinawa's progressive movement, which are 
in turn in many ways a legacy of tensions inherent within the reversion movement itself. 
In particular, these divisions highlight pervasive questions relating both to 
conceptualising Okinawa's position within (or against) Japan, and the tenets of postwar 
economic development ideology as a whole. Are Okinawa's discontents focused only 
towards the US military bases per se, or are they also directed at the larger development 
agenda of the Japanese state, including the structure of economic compensation and 
public works projects? To what extent is this movement influenced, or limited by, 
mainland Japanese ideologies of peace and the upholding of Japan's so-called "Peace 
Constitution"? How do these ideologies negate, or reinforce, Japanese nationalism, and 
what is Okinawa's position in relation to Japan? Integral also to these issues is the 
dilemma of political action. Are Okinawa's struggles best fought ·within the Japanese 
political system, or do they require a rejection of these structures? If the latter, does 
such a "rejection" logically translate into a call for independence? Or does it entail the 
" According to plans under negotiation, it was estinwted the runway would be up to 2600 meters long 
and cost up to an estimated I trillion yen to construct. 
72 Miyagi Yasuhlro, "Tanko no kanaria no utagoe: 'Shimada-kondankai' jigyo hihan," p. 36. 
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broader yet extremely difficult task of challenging both the modem system of nation 
states and the conceptualisation of progress as economic development? 
In spite of these differences, the Initiative's opponents were highly critical of 
what they perceived as the group's "neo-assimilationism" (shin dokashugi), and the 
strategy to integrate Okinawa into centrally conceived notions of the "national interest." 
In 1999, the Obuchi cabinet passed extensive legislation in the effort to strengthen or 
legitimise state power, including laws designating a national flag and anthem, 
expanding state power during a time of military crisis (yuji) within "the area 
surrounding Japan" (shiihen), and enlarging police authority to conduct surveillance on 
the Japanese population. In July 1999, a further revision of the Special Measures Law 
on land utilized by the US military was also passed under the rubric of "promoting 
devolution" giving the Prime Minister direct power over the proxy functions that had 
been hitherto been delegated to local govermnent. 73 Many of the Okinawa Initiative 
critics saw the Okinawa Initiative as part of an attempt to reaffirm state power and 
promote homogenisation. 
The Initiative's critics shared a deep dissatisfaction with the present US base 
situation in Okinawa, and a sense that the Okinawa Initiative was an instrument 
designed to help incorporate Okinawa within the US-Japan security framework. 74 In an 
interview almost a year after the G-8 Summit, anti-base activist and local councillor 
Chibana Shoichi succinctly summed up the frustrated sentiment of anti-base activists 
and intellectuals when he observed: "The logic of the Okinawa Initiative is that no 
matter how much Okinawa has resisted the bases they remain, so therefore we should 
accept them and utilize their presence for our ovm gain. But the argument is premised 
73 OT(9 July 1999). 
'' Matsushima Yasukatsu, "Seisaku naku kichi yonin ni shiishi: Ajia e no miswnesseeji," OT (20 ).fay 
2000). 
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on the notion that Okinawa cannot choose its own destiny. Ifthis is accepted as 'reality' 
the future necessarily will be that simply nothing changes."75 
Picking Up the Pieces: A New Peace for the Twenty-first Century? 
Directly prior to the Okinawa G-8 Summit, moves were also made to integrate 
the Cornerstone of Peace within both a Japanese nationalist narrative and a pro-US-
Japan security treaty stance. On the Day for Consoling the Spirits in June 2000, Inamine 
invited the Commander of US Forces in Okinawa to commemorations at Mabuni for the 
first time. There, Inamine and Prime Minister Mori Y oshiro presented flowers in front 
of a large Rising Sun motif. In a contribution to a local newspaper, novelist Medorurna 
Shun denounced the "Yasukuni-fication" of the Cornerstone of Peace, and the presence 
of the US military commander, stating: "it is necessary to be aware that this is, 
following on from the alteration of the new peace museums' exhibits, a modification of 
the contents of 'the Day for Consoling the Spirits' and ... the historical perception of the 
Battle of0kinawa."76 
The climactic soliloquy reaffirming such an integration was given by then US 
President Bill Clinton, who in a three-day trip to attend the G-8 Heads of State Meeting 
became the first US president to visit Okinawa since Eisenhower was met with large-
scale pro-reversion protests forty years previously. The day before Clinton's 
momentous visit, on the eve of the G-8 Summit, former Okinawan governor Ota 
Masahide denounced the Japanese and US governments' intentions to perform a 
ceremonial confirmation of "peace" and US-Japan security relations at Mabuni. In an 
article in the Japan Times, he wrote: 
Why did we want to leave for posterity a monument which has carved on it the 
" Interview with Chlbana Sh5ichl (3 July 2000). 
76 RS (22 June 2000). 
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names of all those fallen in the Battle of Okinawa-regardless of whether they be 
friend or foe, soldiers or nonsoldiers? 
This was so that we would admonish ourselves, be sure to lend an ear to the 
voices of the dead and look squarely at the stark fact that war leaves the bereaved 
family and friends with irreparable scars and unfathomable sorrow for as long as 
they live, no matter whether they are victor or loser. 
Thus, if the governments of Japan and the US and top officials in the US armed 
forces in Okinawa think that in the name of securing "peace and security" in 
Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, they can reaffirm the importance of the bases 
in Okinawa and praise the US presence as a "deterrent" in front of the Heiwa no 
Ishiji monument, I can only say that such an act not only desecrates the dead, 
but also runs counter to the spirit of the monument, which Okinawans erected 
with the hope and prayer for peace.17 
A day later, on 21 July 2000, US President Bill Clinton made his planned 
historic speech in front of the Cornerstone. Clinton cited a famous poem said to have 
been read out by the last Ryukyuan king, ShO Tai, before he was banished to Tokyo in 
1879: "The time for wars is ending, and the time for peace is not far away. Do not 
despair. Life is a treasure." "May Sho Tai's words," concluded Clinton, sweltering 
under the Okinawan sun, "be our prayer as well as our goal here today." Through 
explicit references to King ShO Tai, Clinton sought to appeal to Okinawan's perceived 
traditional desire for peace-now translated as necessitating the maintenance of the US 
presence in East Asia, the US-Japan military alliance, and the US military presence in 
Okinawa. 
Takara Kurayoshi's prediction that the G-8 Summit would prove an 
"opportunity" for Okinawa to "learn" about the essence of "global power" certainly 
proved true. 78 In a similar way to the Marine Expo over twenty five years earlier, 
r 
' The Japan Times (20 July 2000), p. B6. 
78 Takara Kurayoshi, "Kichi no sonzai: sekkyoku hyoka," Asahi Shinbun, (Interview) (15 May 2000). 
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preparations for the Summit in Okinawa became integrally tied to both the further 
entrenchment of a public works project-centred system of compensation, and the 
promotion of a certain definition of national belonging-now also framed in opposition 
to Ota's policies and his conceptualisations of Okinawan history and identity. Within 
this context, as revealed by both the museum controversy and the Okinawan Initiative 
debate, the discursive realm of Okinawan identity emerged as a highly contested battle 
ground within which wider political and cultural struggles were fought out. The ensuing 
contests revealed important connections between political, economic, and cultural 
power relations, and highlighted the connected process whereby historical knowledge, 
security discourse, and political, economic, and military structures are both contested 
and reified. 
In the context of Okinawa and Japan as a whole, the fall of the Soviet Union and 
the advance of capital on a global seale has not Jed to either demilitarisation or a decline 
in nationalism. The breakdown of the Cold War order was accompanied in Japan as 
elsewhere by the opening up of possibilities for more diverse historical narratives and 
memories, the emergence of movements calling for the recognition of responsibility for 
atrocities committed in the past, and a challenging of essentialized claims to national 
identity and homogeneity. At the same time, and in part as a backlash against these 
currents, there has emerged a widespread reactionary tendency to reinforce a sense of 
social and cultural stability through exclusionist claims to a sense of national belonging, 
and the imposition of abstractly and symbolically imposed formulations of a hegemonic 
national ideal. Such reactionary movements also often call for a reinforcement of 
disciplinary and security regimes, as the line between domestic and global structures of 
surveillance and control has increasingly broken down. As William E. Connolly 
observed as early as 1990 "As obstacles to efficacy apply, the state increasingly sustains 
collective identity through theatrical displays of punishment and revenge against those 
elements that threaten to signify its inefficacy. It launches dramatized crusades against 
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the internal other (low-level criminals, drug users, disloyalists, racial minorities, and the 
underclass), the external other (foreign enemies and terrorists) and the interior other 
(those strains of abnormality, subversion, and perversity that may reside within 
anyone)."79 
In Japan, as the dictates of the free market and increased competition threaten 
the foundations of its developmentalist state structure, the ruling government coalition 
has sought to expand the state's symbolic-ideological resources in order to ensure its 
own legitimacy. 80 In this way, as Kang Sang-jung and Yosbimi Shunya point out, 
globalisation and nationalism have become often mutually reinforcing rather than 
opposing phenomena. The breakdown of social security networks embedded within the 
system of life-employment, increasing mass and highly fluid globalised monetaty flows, 
and a general increase in social and international instability have combined with 
stagnated recession and the collapse of the "Japanese miracle" to promote manifold 
hegemonic crisis. In this context, two contradictory yet at times mutually reinforcing 
inclinations can be discerned. On the one hand, the increasing proliferation of 
"postrnodem cultural conditions" further promotes the hybridisation and fragmentation 
of the subject, while on the other, these phenomenon are accompanied by a concurrent 
"return" to the desire for closed identity, subjectivity, and transcendental meaning. 
As Yumiko Iida observes, as a result, a new type of nationalism has emerged 
within Japanese public discourse since the 1990s which is directly linked to the 
breakdown of national hegemonies and ruptures within the discursive terrain. A wide-
spread ambiguity of meaning and dislocation in logic ;,yitbin public and intellectual 
discourse in fact served to accelerate the emergence and popularity of this new 
nationalism. Nco-nationalist historical revisionist discourses have cultivated anxieties in 
79 William Connolly, Identity and Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 206. 
80 Kang Sang-jung and Yoshimi Shunya, Gurobarizumu no enkinhO, p. 83. 
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the subject and rechannelled them into a reified nationalist narrative structure, often 
working within a framework which exploits the very discursive fragmentation of 
constructions of subjectivity and rationalist logic which precipitated the breakdown of 
narrative structures in the first. As Jida concludes: "In this sense, the seemingly 
contradictory phenomena of the self-indulgent play with language and the desire for 
subjectivity/ meaning were both manifestations of a single historical event, namely, the 
troublesome maturing process of Japanese identity, taking form as a highly advanced 
'postmodern' consumer society in which the absence of exteriority or the Other (i.e. that 
which stands outside of the hermeneutic surface) is increasingly felt." 
The at once tense and yet often mutually reinforcing relation between the 
commodification of culture and increasing nationalism is a widespread phenomenon by 
no means restricted only to Japan. Prasenjit Duara observes a similar process in his 
analysis of gendered regimes of authority within contemporary Chinese nationalism, 
concluding: 
As we look outward from the last decade of the twentieth century, at a time of 
accelerating globalisation and the transformation of customary notions of 
sovereignty, there appears to be an increasing commodification of the symbols of 
authenticity. This would appear to breach the demarcation of the two spheres of 
the market and authenticity, and in some cases it is possible that such a 
commodification ... has already eroded its symbolic capacity to represent the 
identifiable core of an evolving nation. But we also see a paradoxical 
development in which the discourse of cultural authenticity intensiftes with the 
commodification of its symbols. Thus, in China today, where the tornado of 
global capitalism has whipped up an unprecedented pace of change, we are also 
witnessing a wave of nationalism not seen in a long time. The nationalist rhetoric 
resorts to arguments about national inviolability based upon old and new images 
of authenticity. 51 
81 Prasenjit Duara, "The Regime of Authenticity: Timelessness, Gender, and National History in Modem 
China," pp. 380-1. 
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The Inamine administration's attempts to change museum displays, and the 
Okinawa Initiative policy papers, emerged within this context and were an integral part 
of it. Inamine's attempts to justifY the display changes through claiming a historical 
relativism, and even more clearly the dislocations in logic of argument and ruptnres in 
meaning embedded within the "Okinawa Initiative", were indicative of the way in 
which a postrnodern discursive displacement of the subject may be strategically evoked 
to reify hegemonic national narratives and a homogenous national subjectivity. In this 
sense, the Okinawa Initiative employed a logic not dissimilar to historical revisionists 
such as Fujioka Nobukatsu, Tokyo professor and leading figure within the Liberal View 
of History Study Group and Society for the Making of New School Textbooks in 
History historical revisionist movements. As Gavan McCormack has observed, Fujioka 
on the one hand presented his argument as moving beyond ideological dualism and a 
historical orthodoxy which separated the "good" (zendama) from the "bad" (akadama). 
Yet this "liberal" rejection of polemical historical debates in the name of historical 
relativism was also accompanied by a call to "correct history" through the upholding of 
a sense of pride in Japan and a distinctive Japanese historical consciousness. 82 
The Okinawa Initiative called for Okinawans to reject a "victimized" historical 
perception in order to achieve subjectivity, and consequently become the determiners of 
their own destiny. On one level the Okinawa Initiative promoted the envisioning of a 
collective Okinawan identity and sense of history through focusing on the uniqueness of 
Okinawan cultnre and historical experience, and Okinawa's "suffering" experienced in 
the war and post-war eras. On another level, the Initiative promoted a semiotic rupture 
between this past and the present. A sense of Okinawan political agency in the present 
was evoked, in other words, through a simultaneous upholding and rejection of an 
Okinawan historical subject. This historical rupture enabled Okinawan Initiative 
"Gavan McCormack, "The Japanese Movement to 'Correct' History" in Mark Selden and Laura Hein 
( eds.) Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States, pp. 53-73. 
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advocates to speak for "Okinawans", while avoiding engaging in highly contentious 
issues relating to the historical position of Okinawa, and the contradictions such a 
position may pose for re-authentication of a homogenized Japanese national identity. 
The Inamine administration's stance on the peace museums, and even more 
clearly the Okinawa Initiative, thus signified a significant semiotic and ideological shift 
within Okinawan public and intellectual discourse. From at least the years directly prior 
to reversion, a sense of Okinawan identity, as symbolized in Ota's vision of the 
"Okinawan Spirit," was most frequently evoked in the pursuit of a discursive site of 
resistance to mobilize against Okinawa's incorporation v<:ithin centralized cultural and 
political frameworks of power. In contrast, through the double evocation and rejection 
of claims to Okinawan identity and history, the Okinawa Initiative group laid claim to a 
sense of "Okinawan-ness" at the same time as incorporating excessive and 
overdetermined claims to a homogenized "Japanese-ness." This discursive shift was in 
turn an integral part of an ideological shift-wherein Okinawan autonomy was 
presented as compliance with central government policies, and political agency the 
ability to negotiate financial subsidies in return. Under postrnodern conditions, as 
Zygmunt Bauman observes: 
Diversity thrives; and the market-place thrives >vith it. More precisely, only such 
diversity is allowed to thrive as benefits the market. As the humourless, power-
greedy and jealous national state did before, the market abhors self-management 
and autonomy-the wilderness it cannot control. As before, autonomy has to be 
fought for, if diversity is to mean anything but variety of marketable life-styles-a 
thin varnish of changeable fashions meant to hide the uniformly market-
d d d. . 83 epen ent con IliOn. 
The contemporary shift within Okinawa's political and discursive terrain may be 
seen as inherently related to the market-driven conditions whereby difference is 
"Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, p. 273. 
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concurrently celebrated within a postrnodem hybridised discursive space and globalised 
cultures of consumption, and reincorporated into centralized economic and political 
structures and conceptualisations of national belonging. Within this process, which 
Tessa Morris-Suzuki has termed "cosmetic multiculturalism," cultural difference is 
commercialised and consumed at the same time that alternative claims to cultural, 
political, and economic autonomy are often denied. 84 Morris-Suzuki cites both the 
"Ainu Cultural Promotion Legislation" (Ainu bunka Shinko hO) and the promotion of 
Okinawan culture during the G-8 summit as typical examples of "cosmetic 
multiculturalism" within Japan. 85 Attempts to alter museum displays on the eve of the 
Summit exemplified the way in which the celebration of a certain definition of "cultural 
pluralism" can come hand in hand with the endeavour to erase more politicised and 
resistant plural conceptualisations of history and claims to autonomy. The Okinawa 
Initiative also clearly exposed the intimate connection between this process and the 
reification of structures of economic dependence and compensation politics. 
While placing themselves in direct opposition to Ota, in the endeavour to 
legitimise this opposing conservative agenda the Inamine administration and advocates 
of the Okinawa Initiative also utilized ambiguities and practices of authentication 
inherent to the Ota administration's visions of a collective Okinawan identity and desire 
for peace. In particular, the ambiguities of the Cornerstone of Peace helped enable its 
symbolic incorporation into Clinton's appeals to the necessity of the US military 
presence in Okinawa, and historical revisionist discourses within Japan. Soon after the 
84 Tessa Morris-Suzuki." 'Posuto koronializumu' no imi o megutte," Gendai Shiso Vol. 299 (July 2000), 
pp. 183-7. 
" Ibid., pp. 185-6. Significantly, in a comparative analysis of the Liberal View of History Study Group 
and the commercial aesthetieization of Asian within contemporary Japanese film, Aaron Gerow similarly 
coneludes that the consumption of historical revisionism and exoticized di.ffurence are manifestations of 
the same phenomenon of consumerist nationalism (Aaron Gerow, "Consuming Asia, Consuming Japan: 
The New Neonationalistic Revisionism in Japan," in Laura Hein and Mark Selden (eds.) Censoring 
History, pp. 74·95). 
350 
attempted changes to the New Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum were made public, 
Vice Director of the International and Cultural Affairs Bureau sought to explain the 
alterations by citing the need for the Peace Memorial be "at one" with the Cornerstone. 
In other words, the fact that the Cornerstone is a place "where those who died in the 
Battle of Okinawa lie together, not as allies or enemies" was cited to justifY attempts to 
water down Japan's war aggression in comparison with earlier exhibit plans.86 
Ota's vision of"Okinawa's spirit" sought to work within the straggle to claim a 
"Japanese" subjectivity, as envisaged according to the ideals of peace and democracy, 
while also maintaining an (ambiguous) opposition to "national identity". He sought to 
authenticate an Okinawan sense of identity against mainland Japan often through what 
may be termed an "atavistic" return to Okinawan history. Atavisms are present acts of 
constmctions and legitimisation based on a constmcted past-in-the-present. Such uses 
of the past for present purposes envisage the present and the future in terms of this 
past. 87 The Okinawa Initiative in tum utilized the authenticating potential of these 
claims to Okinawan identity, while at the same time (re )incorporating them within the 
assumptions and ideologies of Japan's "civilizing project." This is maintained by 
placing an arbitrary discursive rupture between "history" and "the present." A tamed 
version of "Okinawan-ness" is reincorporated within claims to a homogenous 
essentialized Japanese-ness, as a commodified form of "Okinawan" difference is also 
consumed within increasingly hybridised cultures of economy. This forms an essential 
part of the process whereby the deauthenticating potential of hybridisation and 
increasing fragmentation is also met ~ith increasing nationalism. 
116 RS(20August 1999). 
"uses of atavism in constructions of ethnic identity were the topic of the Panel "Political Fault!ines in 
Southeast Asia: pre-modernist atavisms in post-colonial nation-states" at the Annual Meeting of the 
Association of Asian Studies in Chicago (22-25 March 2001). Information kindly provided by Chris 
Ballard, Australian National University. 
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As implicated within this process, the APAP Okinawa Initiative presented by 
Takara, Oshiro, and Maeshiro maintained an inherently ambivalent stance towards 
globalisation. On the one hand it called upon Okinawans to recognize and embrace the 
supremacy of the market. At the same time, it saw globalisation as a threat to the nation-
state, and called upon the urgent need for Okinawans to construct a new "selt~ 
definition" conducive to Japan's emerging national image in an effort to combat this 
"crumbling" effect. This ambivalence is indicative of the tensions present within the 
attempt to embrace globalised market capitalism while reinforcing the power of the 
state and national paradigms. Such tensions are exacerbated in Japan by the legacies of 
the developmentalist state and postwar system of governance-whereby the LDP has 
been heavily reliant on both US support and public works subsidies for the maintenance 
of its power base. In the Okinawa Initiative these contradictions become blatant, as the 
need to recognize the "supremacy" of "market rule" is equated with the need to 
recognize the "reality" of Japan's subsidy policies towards Okinawa. 
It is also important to note that while historical revisionists, conservative LDP 
politicians, and advocates of the Okinawa Initiative may be seen as part of a new 
nationalism, by no means do they speak in one and the same voice. As much as their 
critics, historical revisionists hold a hybrid amalgam of differing stances, united only in 
a general criticism of pacifist ideology and Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution, 
and the upholding of a need for national pride. In the context of Okinawa, these 
differences are exacerbated by deep-rooted tensions between Naha and Tokyo, even 
within the LDP party. In relation to the Okinawa Initiative, such tensions can be 
discerned, for example, in subtle differences between Shimada and Takara, with the 
latter far more ready to claim the need for Okinawan "autonomy" {jiritsu) and a unique 
Okinawan history. To the extent that significant opposition to the US military presence 
in particular remains, local politicians in Okinawa remain placed between local opinion 
and national government policy. As Sheila A. Smith observes in relation to the Futenma 
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relocation issue: "As long as the policy solution devised by the national government 
continues to be the construction of a new US military base in Okinawa, the fiscal and 
regulatory power of Tokyo will have to contend with the strength of local citizen 
activism. And stuck in the middle of the fray will be the men and women that 
Okinawans have elected to ofti~the very same local officials that Tokyo depends on 
. I . I' ,88 to 1mp ement 1ts po 1cy. 
As the museum controversy and the Okinawa Initiative debate both clearly 
revealed, the economic and ideological incorporation of Okinawa within this process 
has moreover been fiercely contested. In the case of the New Prefectural Peace 
Museum, opposition to the tide of historical revisionism had at least some effect, and 
the intentions of the original planning committee were honoured to an extent. The 
Okinawa Initiative's critics presented a strong argument against the Initiative's vision of 
nationalism, its assumptions on security, and its negation of the significance of 
Okinawan history. The memory of wartime suffering at the hands of the Japanese is still 
powerful in Okinawa. While the Okinawa Initiative attempted to play down the 
importance of history, the "history question" was a vital and highly contested issue 
within the Initiative debate. The debate itself revealed the extent to which history, far 
from ending or fading in significance, remains connected to the present and wider 
political and cultural struggles in multiple ways. 
At the same time, Arakawa Akira's observations on the political situation in 
Okinawa made just after the G-8 Sunrn1it also proved valid. No broad-based anti-base 
movement which encompasses local municipalities in Okinawa and which could 
mobilize effective resistance against compensation strategies as typified by Shimadakon 
has emerged. Inamine' s arrival on the political stage was intimately connected to 
Shimadakon, and his administration has remained supported by and supportive of public 
"Sheila A. Smith, "Challenging National Authority: Okinawa Prefecture and the US Military Bases," p. 
114. 
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works-centred economic stimulus policies. The Inamine administration has continued to 
promote both large-scale military and civilian construction projects, including a new 
airport at Ishigaki, the large reclamation of the Awase tidal flats area, and the building 
of a new US military port in Urasoe and the new military runway at Henoko. Subsidy 
policies have assured electoral victories for Okinawa's LDP coalition, reinforcing 
existing economic and political structures and deepening links among private enterprise, 
national govermnent funds, and local politics. 89 As Gavan McCormack observes of 
Okinawa's predicament: "As with the drugs of dependence so v.ith the economy of 
dependence: the more the subject is hooked, the more difficult it becomes to break free 
of the addiction, which in turn requires higher and higher doses to maintain."90 
The reification of this structure has also contributed to increased environmental 
damage/1 disillusion and the increasing alienation of citizen-based groups from the 
political process, and intensified the polarisation of public opinion. This has resulted in 
a deepening division within communities, particularly in Nago. Soon after the G-8 
Summit, Okinawan novelist and Nago resident Medoruma Shun lashed out at politicians 
at all levels: "Prefectural leaders and local heads in the northern Okinawan district, to 
say nothing of the Japanese government, are so sunk in debauchery they are not even 
'"This fact was further confirmed in the overwhelming victory of incumbent Kishimoto Tateo over 
progressive coalition-backed Miyagi Yasuhiro in the Nago Mayoral elections of 3 February 2002. 
90 
"Okinawa and the Structure of Dependence." 
9
' The lnamine adntinistration maintained its support behind massive civilian as well as military public 
works projects. Two of the most controversial examples are an airport at Shiraho, lshigaki Island, next to 
an internationally renowned reef containing rare species of blue coral; and the reclamation of Okinawa 
Island's largest tidal flat, in Awase, Okinawa City, now a breeding ground to hundreds of sea creatures 
and bird life. On the environmental impact of the Ishigaki Airport plans, see for example Amanda Sutrtari, 
"Concern over Threat to Blue Coral Reefs," Japan 'limes {20 December, 2001 ). According to a recent 
Asahi Shinbun!Okinawa limes opinion poll, over 70% of local Okinawa City residents are against the 
reclamation of Awase. At the time of writing, however, the local, prefectural, and national government 
were still pushing for the project to go ahead, expressing opposition to a local plebiscite on the issue. 
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ashamed at openly confessing to the link between the relocation of Futenma base 
'within Okinawa' and the northern district economic stimulus policies."92 
On 23 June 2001, a blazing sun once again greeted Okinawa's day for consoling 
the spirits. In June of 2000, the remembrance day had been a prelude to the upcoming 
G-8 Summit. A year later, for the newly appointed Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro it was clearly a rehearsal for his planned homage to Yasukuni Shrine in the 
corning August. With an entourage of prefectural and central government officials and 
accompanying bodyguards, Koizumi paid his respects to the defeated Japanese military 
command during the Battle of Okinawa. At the Cornerstone of Peace, he paused with 
interest at the rows of names of war dead from the US and allied forces, and slightly 
nodded his head at a group of weeping Korean women as he headed towards the site of 
the official ceremony some hundred meters away. Many of the thirty or so Korean 
bereaved family members attending a small ceremony in front of the Cornerstone were 
seeing their family and loved ones' names on the imposing granite walls for the first 
time. Director of the Myongji University Institute for Okinawa, Hong Jong-Pil, who had 
spent the last four years confirming and seeking approval for new Korean names to be 
added to the Cornerstone, looked on at Koizumi' s retreating figure in contempt. 
Affronted by the prefectural government's change in manner and Koizumi' s stance on 
Y asukuni, the Cornerstone of Peace Korean Bereaved Families Association had decided 
for the first time in the history of the monument not to take part in official prefectural 
commemorations. 
In many ways, the process of 'Yasukuni-fication' of Mabuni to which 
Medoruma referred on the eve of the Summit has taken place. Yet the Cornerstone's 
principle of transnational inclusiveness and the inherent tensions between an Okinawan 
and (national) Japanese collective identity embedded within its stone formations has 
92 Medoruma Shun, "Uminari no shima kara: Henoko o migoroshi ni suru na," Shiikan KinyObi, no. 333 
(8 September 2000), 24. 
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also ensured that this process of closure is not complete. The Prefectural Peace 
Memorial Museum and the Cornerstone of Peace remain contested sites, just as the 
cacophony of competing narratives "''ithln the park itself may be still be heard. While 
struggles for autonomy, difference, and democracy invariably overlap \vith fierce 
contention over militarisation, nationalism, imperialism, and the meaning of war, peace, 
and the past, the restless ghosts ofMabuni look set to haunt Okinawa's volatile political 
landscape for some time to come. 
Chaperoning a group of mainland Japanese tourists around Mabuni peace park 
on the day to console the spirits, an Okinawan bus tour-guide paused in front of the 
walls reserved for Korean war dead. Pointing to the expanse of largely blank grauite 
wall before her, she explained: "I feel these walls of yet-to-be-filled nan1es represent 
more than anything the complexity of Okinawa's tragic past and its remembrance." The 
group looked on, as did I, contemplating the gravity of her words. As has been pointed 
out, the authenticating power of remembered tradition and history has a double edge, as 
"a cultural means for propagating hegemonic powers of the state andior dominant 
gtoups on the one hand, and a strategic device for recuperating the voice of 
marginalized groups on the other."93 The blank walls of irretrievable names and un-
memorialised tragedies in the Cornerstone of Peace testifY to the difficulties involved in 
this process of recuperation, and in the trans-nationalization of the act of remembrance. 
They also serve as a vivid reminder of the violent historical and political erasures which 
often accompany dominant commemorative narratives of war, and corresponding 
hegemonic national security claims in the present. 
---- ~ ----
93 Fujitani, White and Yoneyama (eds.) (2001) Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War, p. 17. 
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-•;: IN PLACE OF A CONCLUSION~· 
Making History from Japan's Margins 
"In the retrospective rephrasing of modernity, colonialism .. is seen 
as a global system of power, production and knowledge shaped by 
conflicts in the colonised 'periphery' as much as in the colonising 
'centre,' and giving birth to the globalised order in which we all live 
today. In this sense, to understand our contemporary world as 
'postcolonial' is to perceive the so-called 'globalization' of the 1990s 
as a new, globalized re-working of the age of colonial empires, 
within which the accumulated problems of the old order have also 
survived and become ever more dearly exposed to view." 
Tessa Morris·Suzuki, 2001 1 
As academic, public commentator, and politician, Ota bas played a key role in 
the making and shaping of Okinawan history. In his work and career, he has negotiated 
and crossed geographical, ideological, and political borders-between Okinawa as a 
military colony and the US "homeland", between the Okinawan "periphery" and 
Japanese "metropolis," between history and politics, and between "theory" and 
"practice." His energies and body of work seem larger than life, and during his term as 
governor he became, at least for a time, a symbol of Okinawa's struggle and a 
centrifugal force galvanizing groups together. The impact of his presence was reflected 
in the wave of disillusionment which followed his decision to back down on the second 
proxy case. In the attempt to deflate this galvanizing force, central government officials 
also sought to ensure that Ota did not emerge as a "tragic hero" in the contest over the 
1
" 'Posutokoroniarizumu' no imi o megutte," Gendai Shiso Vol. 19 No.9 (July 2001), p. 185. 
357 
proxy issue.2 In this sense, as Yoichi Funabashi notes, it is difficult to judge Ota by 
normal measures. Funabashi concludes: 
Ota is Okinawa. He is the personification of its modern history of war and peaee. 
Each of his words is plucked leaf by leaf from the tree of modern Okinawan 
history. If Ota has his contradictions, it is because Okinawa is itself one huge 
contradiction in the annals of modern Japanese history? 
Yet I would stop short of concluding either that Okinawa's historical experience 
may be represented as an essential totality, or that Ota is its personification. History, as 
a negotiation of the past and vision of the future, is open-ended. Played out against and 
within the homogenizing forees of the Japanese state and US-Japan security relations, 
the negotiation and (re )invention of Okinawan identity, historical remembrance and 
cultural representation has been and remains an intensely political process. Tensions 
between competing historical paradigms, political agendas, and personal interests also 
further entrench divisions within the islands. As Matthew Allen points out: 
(C)ulture, language, and identity are negotiable values that are destined to be 
endlessly renegotiated as new forms of identity clash at sites throughout the 
prefecture. This is not to negate the value of a political 'Okinawa.' Rather, it is to 
confirm that underneath the bridging discourse of 'Okinawan-ness' lies a 
multitude of voices that challenge for control ofthc body Okinawan.4 
2 Yoichi Funabashi writes: "There was something that the core of the administration had decided. Ota 
should no be made into some tragic hero. 'If we made him into a tragic hero, Okinawa would be done for 
good. So would Japan. So we worked towards avoiding that at all costs.' 'He can't be a tragic hero now 
that we've come this far; he's in the same boat as the rest of us.' These were the whispers that could be 
heard in the heart of the administration" (Alliance Adrift, p. 142). 
3 Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, p. 149. 
4 Matthew Allen, Identity and Resistance in Okinawa, p. 236. 
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Throughout the postwar period and today, identity within Okinawa has been negotiated 
and re-negotiated \Vi thin a constant dynamic. 5 It is precisely in this context that Ota has 
claimed an Okinawan political and historical location and sense of identity. 
Furthermore, while it may be said that Okinawan historical experience forms a 
contradiction within the annals of Japanese modem history, the reverse appears as at 
least equally pertinent. That is, to put it another way, these contradictions lie at the 
centre of the "annals" of modem Japanese history itself. 6 They trace back to an 
obsession in the modem era with classification and order, and to the very process of 
national consolidation. Founded upon the concept of inclusion and exclusion, the 
consolidation of political, social, and cultural power structures of the sovereign 
territorial nation-state has been "an act of violence perpetrated on the world."7 The 
contradictions, tensions, and erasures inherent to this process have been concentrated 
within modernity's drive to "assimilate" difference. 
Assimilation is a contradictory declaration of war on semantic ambiguity and 
cultural and political ambivalence. As Zygmunt Bauman points out in the context of 
Jews in nineteen century Germany, it was also "a bid on the part of one section of 
society to exercise a monopolistic right to provide authoritative and binding meanings 
for all-and thus to classify sections of the state-administered body that 'did not fit' as 
foreign or not st~fficiently native, out of tune and out of place, and thereby in radical 
need of rcform."8 This project of reform assumed the superiority of one form of being 
and the inferiority of another. It effectively reinforced inequalities by treating the 
'Ibid., p. 238. 
6 It should be noted that in its original Japanese, Funabashi's statement could be interpreted to mean that 
the contradiction of Okinawa is the contradiction of Japanese history itself (see Di5mei hyi5ryii, p. 166). 
7 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, op cit., p. 2. 
'Ibid., p. 105. 
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rejection of enforced hierarchical categories as a criminal betrayal, and justified 
discrimination on the grounds of "otherness. "9 
In Japan the contradictory policy of assimilation (discrimination) overlapped 
with the process of imperial expansion. As Tomiyama lchiro observes, Okinawa has 
been frequently relegated to an ambiguous position as neither fully "homeland" 
(kokunai) nor "colony" (shokuminchz). 10 The drive towards "becoming Japanese" was 
enforced not only by the process of national consolidation, but through a "pre-
sentiment" of the violence inherent to colonization. Up until defeat in war, it was a fear 
of colonial subjugation and the internalisation of a sense of inferiority in Okinawa 
which fed what Ota criticized in 1988 as a "beast-like devotion" to the Japanese 
militaristic state. In the postwar era, axioms of the assimilationist program were 
transformed and re-channelled within the context of high-growth economic ideology 
into a drive for "parity" with mainland Japan. Contradictions and inequalities have been 
negotiated, contested, and reproduced within Japan's postwar system and under US 
military hegemony. 
Negotiations over Okinawan history and identity have been part of the process 
whereby a sense of national belonging, paradigms of Japanese racial and cultural 
homogeneity, hierarchical structures v.cithin the project and discourse of assimilation, 
and the project of modernity itself are negotiated and contested. As Ota has repeatedly 
said, "\Vho are Okinawans?" is a question that forces a (re )appraisal of the very 
meaning of Japanese-ness. It also implicates US military colonization and foreign 
policy, the US-Japan security system, and Japan's national political, social, economic, 
and cultural structures of power. Ota has highlighted these issues in his analyses of the 
Battle of Okinawa, the formation of Okinawan popular consciousness, US colonization 
of Okinawa, historical relations between mainland Japan and Okinawa, and Okinawan 
9 Ibid. 
10 Tomiyama lchiro, Boryoku no yokan, p. 68. 
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identity. Ota sought to expose the extent to which Okinawa's historical experience both 
encompassed (to use Ota's own expression) the "other side of the coin" of Japan's 
postwar system and implicated the core ideological and political structures of the 
modern Japanese state. 
While interrogating these contradictions, Ota, like Okinawa as a whole, has also 
heen embedded within them. As Ota noted in his Who are Okina:wans?, the nation-state 
in its modern form has displayed a distinct "Janus-faced" quality-presenting an ideal 
mien that indicates a territorial and ideological location from which to perceive of 
individual autonomy, and also a "sinister force" that threatens to cancel out these 
promises. The modern nation-state was "born as a crusading, missionary, proselytising 
force, bent on subjecting the dominated populations to a thorough once-over in order to 
transform them into an orderly society, akin to the pre.:epts of reason."11 Yet nationalist 
discourse has also at least presented itself as the guarantor of political and social 
emancipation within the project of modernity. 12 Enlightenment political ideals such as 
equality, liberty, justice, and democracy were largely conceived within the parameters 
of the sovereign territorial nation-state. 13 The state is: "the institution of last recourse 
and highest appeal, the one that enacts what we seek to be through its institutions of 
accountability and effectivity. It is the sovereign place within which the highest 
international laws and policies are enacted and from which strategies toward external 
states and nonstate peoples proceed. "14 It is the ultimate agency and official centre of 
self-conscious political action. As such, it has been and remains an inherently contested 
site, within and against which ideological, political, and social struggles proceed. 
" Ibid., 20. 
"As pointed out by Deniz Kandiyoti. "Identity and its Discontents: Women and the Nation," cited in Rey 
Chow, Ethics after Idealism: Theory-Culture-Ethnicity-Reading {Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1998), p. 70. 
13 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Hihanteki s6zoryoku no tame ni (Tokyo: Heibonhsa, 2002), p. 41. 
14 William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, op cit., p. 20L 
361 
In postwar Japan, the search for shutaisei-incorporating notions of 
individuality, autonomy, and subjectivity to different degrees and in varying contexts-
formed a core focus of political and cultural struggles. Ota framed the "Okinawa 
struggle" within such counter-hegemonic conceptions of national identity, political 
participation, and democracy. He embraced the assumptions of postwar enlightemnent 
ideals and the project of modernity to the extent that he saw them as promising the 
formation and emancipation of the individual as autonomous subject, and appealed to 
state institutions and processes in the attempt to attain rights to equality and autonomy. 
At the same time, he was acutely wary of and strongly contested assimilationist 
discourse and state-centred policies of incorporation-from the prewar period and as 
they emerged on the eve of reversion. Bauman remarks on the way in which the modem 
offer of assimilation "lured" its victims into "a state of chronic ambivalence" with the 
"bait of admission tickets to the world free from the stigma of othemess."15 In a similar 
fashion to Bauman, Ota severely criticised the false promises and contradictions of 
prewar assimilation policies, the assumptions of superiority and conformism on which 
they were based, and the toadyism and sense of inferiority which he saw pervaded 
Okinawa as a result of hierarchical and dependent structures of control. From the eve of 
reversion, he sought to combat disillusiomnent and a deep-felt sense of loss through a 
"return" to a sense of community and Okinawan-ness. He evoked an Okinawan 
"cultural identity" that was situated within, against, and beyond a Japanese "national 
identity." 
Expressed in Foucauldian terms, Ota's endeavours to (re)claim and emancipate 
Okinawan subjectivity have been implicated in the power relations which they have 
resisted. 16 His attempt to "make history"-by participating in discussions of the past 
15 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, p. 120. 
16 For an analysis oflvlichel Foucault on power and the subject, see Thomas L. Dumm, Michel Foucault 
and the Politics of Freedom (Thousand Oaks, London, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996). 
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while working to effect political, social, and knowledge-related changes in the 
present-is contained and defmed within existing ideological, political, and historical 
relations. At the same time, this containment is never absolute. As has been pointed out 
in relation to questions of historical agency, neither the past nor the present should be 
seen as fully resolved in totalising practices of hegemonic structures. 17 Through 
effecting choice-even in its limited form as the failure or inability to choose-Ota has 
also participated in highly significant ways in the processes whereby these structures 
have been both transformed and reproduced. Ultimately, as governor he was unable to 
combat the multiple political and economic structures of dependence facing Okinawa to 
effect a substantial resolution to the US base issue or provide a working alternative to 
subsidy-based development. The dilemmas he faced a~ a result of these conditions and 
the tensions and contradictions inherent to his ovm agenda largely remain unresolved. 
On 29 July 2001 Ota was elected to the Upper House of the National Diet as a 
proportional representative candidate for the Social Democratic Party. In his election 
platform, Ota expressed opposition to the plan to relocate Futenma to Nago, to the 
introduction of "contingency" or "emergency" legislation to give the government 
extensive special powers in the case of the threat of foreign attack (yiiji h0se1), and to 
the revision of Article Nine of the constitution. 18 Over thirty years previously a~ an 
academic Ota had made the journey from Tokyo back to the Okinawan periphery in the 
attempt to contest the conditions of reversion from "within the island military garrison" 
which was Okinawa. Now, having faced political defeat and despair in the prefectural 
17 In the words of Christopher T. Nelson: "indi\iduals do not simply instantiate cultural forms ... they are 
not merely interpellated into social structures. It is the action of individuals that reproduces these 
forms ... and there are points at which the action of individuals have the capacity to transform them" 
("Huziki Hayato, the storyteller: comedy, practice and the politics of everyday life in Okinawa," p. 202). 
"OT(30 July 2001). 
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gubernatorial elections, he moved back to the "centre" in the attempt to effect changes 
inside the very nexus of the Japanese state. 
Yet by the time of Ota's election to the National Diet, the SDP was already 
severely weakened, comprising only a minority party within the severely fragmented 
government opposition. The breakdown in Japan's hegemonic structure has been even 
further accompanied by a decay in the efficacy of political and administrative 
mechanisms, and the lack of a sense of political, social, or economic alternatives. As 
Yumiko Iida notes, the present period is not characterised so much by the global 
ascendance of the democratic ideal as a decline in the universal goal of striving for 
ideals. It marks what may be seen as a "post-postwar era" and a retreat from the liberal 
and utopian ideals which arose from war experience and its aftermath. 19 The 
predicament of liberal progressive forces was paralleled in the irony of Ota's own 
political position. For now he represented at a national level the very party which 
Murayama Torniichi had led when he filed snit against Ota for refusing to act as proxy 
in the land lease process. 
This crisis in state hegemony, democracy, and existing political mechanisms has 
found expression in a particular and concentrated form in post-bubble Japan. Yet it is 
also part of a global trend. As the effects of global processes exceed the reach of 
sovereign states, late modernity emerges as a "time without a corresponding political 
place!'20 Within this world, "state power is simultaneously magnified and increasingly 
disconnected from the ends that justify its magnification." 21 In the face of 
fragmentation, hybridisation, and political, social, and economic alienation, 
corresponding counter-claims to c.ollective identity have become more exclusionary and 
jingoist. Ambivalence may be celebrated, yet to the extent that it c.onforrns to market 
19 Yumiko !ida, Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan, p. 274. 
"'William Connolly, Identity/Difference, p. 216 
21 lbid., p. 206. 
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centred-detlnitions of difference. Diversity is largely contained within the structures of 
capitalist investment and accumulation and, as seen in the context of the Okinawa 
Initiative, may be re-appropriated within hegemonic national narratives without 
guaranteeing either self-government or autonomy. 
If Ota's contradictions are the CDntradictions of Okinawa, these contradictions 
are also the contradictions of the Japanese state, and of the project of modernity. They 
are contradictions which emerge from the "Janus-faced" quality of nationalist discourse, 
and from the modem condition whereby identity struggles have often been framed as 
the only effective means available--to cope ;.vith the trauma of disfiguration and 
disorientation of colonization and modernization, and to engage in political contest In 
postmodern relations, these contradictions now emerge as an acute global cDndition, 
embedded within the asymmetry between territorialized political space and the 
glo balisation of contingency-as most clearly apparent in the effects of mass 
environmental destruction on a global scale.22 
On one level, increasing fragmentation is accompanied by a countermovement 
of closure in claims to a collective identity and historical consciousness. On another 
level, traditional political struggles---{)ver welfare, equality, autonomy, and democratic 
processes-which have been largely played out within the political and social 
mechanisms of the nation-state lose their impetus as the state itself loses its efficacy. As 
the territorial state increasingly becomes a conduit of global market pressures, "the 
sovereign state as the exclusive site of democracy places the established terms of 
democratic accountability under tremendous stress." 23 One result is the further 
entrenclunent of the conditions which have brought about a large-scale withdrawal from 
politics in its conventional form.24 
22 William Connolly, Idenlity!Difference, pp. 218-9. 
23 lbid., p. 217. 
24 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivlance, p. 276. 
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The contradictions of modernity and their acute manifestations within 
postmodemity call upon us to find alternate ways to articulate a political site and sense 
of historical belonging. It also calls for what Tessa Morris-Suzuki has described as a 
"new critical imaginary"-to reconceive of the mutual relations between political action 
and critical thought.25 This requires a forru of critical engagement beyond the traditional 
disciplinary regimes of history, philosophy, and political science?6 As an attempt to 
reconcile the gap between sovereign political space and global processes, it also 
necessitates a forru of political mobilization which challenges the very framework of 
"identity politics." 
At the same time, rather than merely dismissing all claims to identity as 
essentialist, it is vital to conceive of the importance of identity struggles-as they have 
been fought out in and against the nation-state, between nationalist narratives and 
counter-narratives, and within the complex process of history-making. As Stuart Hall 
observes: "It is only too tempting to full into the trap of assuming that, because 
essentialism has been deconstructed theoretically, therefore it has been displaced 
politically." 21 From at least the reversion and anti-reversion debates of the 1970s, 
Okinawan intellectuals have been grappling with this fact, and with the subsequent 
dilemma posed by attempting to negotiate a position within and against nation-state 
structures. As emerged within the debate between Ota and Arakawa Akira on the eve of 
reversion, questions relating to the connection between "theory" and practise" lie at the 
core of this dilemma. Intellectual debate in Okinawa, as it has been carried out under 
intensely politicised conditions, reveals for "post-colonial studies" as a whole the 
importance of continually relating the implications of theoretical observations to 
political practice. Conditions in Okinawa also highlight the vital need to reconcile 
2
' Tessa Morris-Suzuki (Tessa Morisu-Suzuki), Hihanteki soziiryoku no tame ni, pp. 59-60. 
26 Ibid., p. 59. 
27 Stuart Hall, "When was 'The Post..Colonial"? Thinking at the Limit," p. 249. 
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studies on postcolonial culture with observations on the structure of global capitalism. 
Put another way, this thesis has hopefully provided at least a glimpse into the 
interconnectedness between economic, political, and cultural structures and contests 
within Okinawan "identity politics," as well as the vital importance of conceiving this 
interconnectedness. 
Following the attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington, the 
issue of the US bases in Okinawa has been affected by a new set of circumstances-the 
international "war against terrorism," increasing calls for a stronger military role for 
Japan, heightened military security and security policy secrecy, and an initial severe 
decline in Okinawa's tourism industry as mainland Japanese avoided the island and its 
large concentration of US military facilities. Under these conditions, the already 
existing trend towards an increase in Japanese defence cooperation with the US has 
quickened in pace as Japan's political climate moves further and further towards greater 
"burden sharing" with the US, the "normalisation" of its regional and international 
security roles, and an increase in voices advocating a stronger military presence in the 
context of a heightened sense of insecurity. These developments lead Japan into two 
contradictory directions: towards the further consolidation of its role as a US strategic 
satellite and towards becoming an increasingly assertive military power. 28 The Okinawa 
base issue lies at the centre of resulting tensions between these dual positions. 
On 19 May 2002 the official ceremony marking the thirtieth anniversary of the 
return of administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan was held in Okinawa, and 
attended by a host of Japanese, US, and Okinawan dignitaries. Once again, contests 
over political conditions in the present intermixed with reflections on the meaning and 
significance of Okinawa's return to Japan. As predicted, at the ceremony the US side 
stressed the vitul importance of its forces in Okinawa, \>thile the Japanese government 
28 Aurelia George Mu!gan, "Beyond Self-defence? Evaluating Japan's Regional Security Role u.nder the 
New Defence Cooperation Guidelines," Pacifica Review Vol. 12 No.3 (October 2000), p. 246. 
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emphasized the extent of recent further economic stimulus policies tcwards the 
islands. 29 Okinawan Governor Inamine Keiichi walked the tightrope of appearing 
critical towards both the US and Japanese governments while also avoiding raising the 
issue of Futenma or the SACO agreement. Long-time progressive politicians and anti-
base activists were far more disparaging. Fukuchi Hiroaki, who had been a founding 
member of the Reversion Council, declared: "V,'hen (the Prime Minister] returns to 
Tokyo, he will forget about Okinawa, and do nothing. It is a repetition of the last thirty 
years since reversion."30 
Prior to the ceremony, Ota announced his refusal to even attend. He expressed a 
"strong sense of despair" towards the conditions of Okinawa over the thirty years sinee 
reversion, growing calls for a stronger Japanese military, and severe restrictions on 
individual rights and local autonomy contained within the "emergency legislation" 
under deliberation within the Diet. He also despaired over his inability to influence the 
situation. While as governor Ota had enjoyed a limited but central role in political 
negotiations, as member of a minority opposition and increasingly weakened party in 
the upper house of the Diet, he found this role severely restricted. Ota again strongly 
criticized the Japanese government and Okinawan opportunism and materialism-what 
he expressed as a move away from the Okinawan dictum "life is a treasure" towards the 
belief that "money is everything." He also called for an autonomous spirit and 
charismatic leader in order to combat the predicament facing Okinawa.31 The statement 
seemed imbued with a strong sense of regret that Ota himself has not been able to take 
29 Full text ofKoizumi 's spee<:h is published in OT (20 May 2002). Also available on the Okinawa Times 
website at http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp. US Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker emphasized the 
importance of Okinawd "in every dimension" of the relationship between the US and Japan and the 
"crucial role" the US forces played in Okinawa in "ensuring the continuing peace and security that ""' all 
want." The full text of Baker's speech is available at 
http:/iusinfo.state.gov/topicallpollterror/02052000.btm. 
30 OT (20 May 2002). 
"RS(l7May2002). 
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on such a role. Yet under present conditions at least, it seems unlikely that any figure 
could fill this void and take even more of a political risk than Ota was prepared to make. 
Ota did not become a martyr in the Battle of Okinawa. Nor has he emerged as a 
"tragic hero" in the prolonged struggle over Okinawa's postwar conditions. As a 
survivor, following the Battle of Okinawa he was forced to face the deep-felt sense of 
guilt and remorse which accompanied survival itself. In the realm of politics, he must 
live with the consequences of compromise and inefficacy. The dilemma which Ota now 
faces symbolizes a contemporary predicament: what role can individuals play in the 
attempt to transform a system which encompasses multiple structures of dependence 
and is in acute crisis? This dilemma is also related to the breakdown of political 
paradigms within postcolonial conditions: and a part of our desperate attempt to 
understand what making an ethnical political choice and political position, and 
participating in politics itself, can comprise within open, contingent, and fragmented 
political fields.32 
In the context of Okinawa, just as historical contests carry express10n m a 
particularly politicised form, these issues also appear to take on a particular urgency. As 
noted by the Okinawan press, the ceremony commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of 
reversion once again revealed the "perception gap" between Okinawa, the US, and 
Japan.33 It also reflected the divisions manifest within Okinawa itself--as the drive for 
subsidised development results in the increasing entrenchment of systems of 
dependence and large-scale environmental degradation. Only two months following the 
thirtieth anniversary of reversion, in July 2002, it was announced that the central and 
prefectural governments agreed on a relocation plan for Futenma Airbase, involving 
mass land reclamation over a coral reef off the Henoko district ofNago in order to build 
32 As pointed out by Stuart Hall in "When was 'The Post-Colonial'? Thinking at the Limit," p. 244. 
33 OT (20 May 2002), p. 2. 
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a 2,500 meter airstrip for "joint military and civilian use." 34 Opposition groups 
denounced it as the "worst possible scenario come true."35 
However perceived, the "Okinawa issue" persists, just as contests over the past 
and its futures continue in negotiations and struggles within Okinawa and between 
Okinawa and the US and Japanese govermnents. Neither history nor politics are at an 
end. For Ota, the two have always been, and remain, intimately connected. Put another 
way, the question of how to conceive of history from "the margins" continues to be a 
question of how to perceive and combat the multiple hierarchical cultural, economic, 
and political structures by which Okinawa has been, and remains, marginalised within 
Japan and under US-Japan bilateral relations . 
• ----
"AS (30 July 2002) (downloaded at http://www.asahi.comlenglishiop-ed/K2002073!0039l.htrnl). The 
Asahi Shinbun editorial reads: "The functions of Futenma Air Station, in the middle of a densely 
populated urban area, obviously need to be moved. But it is by no means clear why it has to be moved 
elsewhere in Okinawa ... .In this 30" anniversary year of Okinawa reversion to Japanese administration, a 
plan has been approved for construction of a new US military base. It could be sheer coincidence, but the 
timing demands a serious look at whether this is a natural consequence of three decades of our non-
comntitrnent to Okinawa's plight." 
35 OT (29 July 2002). 
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